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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
Explaining State Development: Indonesia from Pre-Independence Origins to 
Contemporary Democracy. 
  
This thesis uses the Indonesian case to present a new paradigm for explaining the 
state development of new or relatively new (post-World War II) states. The first 
chapter describes this paradigm of organic and mechanical types of state 
development, argues that the development of the Indonesian state from the 1950s to 
1990s is a good example of the mechanical type of development and shows how this 
can be confirmed by assessing and comparing the capabilities of the four different 
versions of a modern state developed by Indonesia since independence. The next 
chapter examines Indonesia‘s pre-independence debates about the form of state to 
be adopted, which led to Indonesia accepting a Western model of the state that has 
since undergone a development process involving four different versions of a 
‗modern‘ state. These four versions of the state are defined according to their type of 
regime and policymaking institutions: I) parliamentary democracy, II) Sukarno‘s 
civilian presidential monarchy, III) Suharto‘s military presidential monarchy and IV) 
presidential democracy. Chapters Three to Six assess and compare these four 
versions‘ capability in three key areas: 1) achieving legal legitimacy, 2) control of the 
military and 3) dealing with political disorder – a crucial area of state capability that 
requires two chapters. Then Chapter Seven examines and explains the pre-
democratic origins of the present version of the Indonesian state, the presidential 
democracy of Version IV. The Conclusion collates the findings of Chapters Three to 
Six on capabilities and summarises the arguments of Chapters Two and Seven 
regarding the 1940s acceptance of the Western model of the state and the late 
1990s opportunity for democratisation. Finally, there is a concluding assessment of 
the potential of the organic/mechanical typology as a new paradigm for studying 
state development in other countries, regions and eras. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
To start, it is important to say that the state, as an excellent place for the practice of 
power, used to be an absent character of the contemporaneous political science. It is 
since very lately, in other words, since the last few decades, that the thinking about 
the state construction developed considerably. In 1962, the UNESCO put in place a 
wide research programme related to comparative historical sociology of the state 
formation and the nation construction in which Shmuel Eisenstadt and Stein Rokkan 
being the programme‘s pioneers. In the early 1970s, the Committee on Comparative 
Politics of the Social Science Research Council gave Charles Tilly the responsibility 
for a comparative survey about the ‗Formation of the nation state  in western 
Europe‘. In 1984, the CNRS also undertook a thematic study on the modern state 
genesis. These efforts were dominated by historical sociology as the mentioned 
studies emphasized on the various approaches been developed by the twentieth 
century sociologist/philosophers such as Karl Marx, Frederick Engels, Emile 
Durkheim, and Max Weber. Thus, from being a neglected object of the social 
sciences, the state became the main concern of numerous research and projects. 
 
Focus and Purpose of the Thesis 
 
This thesis is titled: ‗Explaining State Development: Indonesia from Pre-
Independence Origins to Contemporary Democracy‘, or, to say this in a simpler way, 
‗explaining state development in Indonesia‘. This would explain what and why, but 
mainly it would focus on explaining the phenomenon by addressing three 
fundamentals: 
 
1) The ‗state‘ defined as a set of organisations and other institutions whose purpose 
is making and implementing public policy (Easton‘s definition of political system) 
for the inhabitants of a specified territorial area over which it claims a monopoly of 
the legitimate use of force (Weber‘s definition of the state).  
2)  State ‗development‘ defined as a change in the state‘s complexity and capability 
(Strayer‘s perspective on the historical development of the modern state).  
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3)  State development as a mixture of two different types of development: the 
mechanical and the organic.  
 
These three fundamentals will be described in more detail in the theory section of 
this Introduction and in the theory chapter of the thesis—Chapter 1: Toward A 
Framework of Analysis. It will also discuss four other conceptions of the state that 
provide alternative views of the state and will be discussed in the form of a ‗debate 
on the idea of the state: classic and modern‘. However, it will be shown that they are 
not as applicable to the topic of state development in Indonesia from the 1940s to 
1990s as are the definition of the state and state development that will be used in 
this thesis.   
 
Despite their significance, these four conceptions of the state will not be employed in 
this thesis,  
 
a. The classics (Hobbes, 1996, Rousseau, 1986) do not carry much weight 
because states, in terms of concept and practice, have developed significantly 
during the last few centuries, even though concepts from classical sources 
such as sovereignty have become embedded in the language of 
contemporary political science. 
b. Wittfogel (Wittfogel, 1957) is an example of state theory that is focused on 
explaining a particular structural type of state (despotism) in a particular 
region of the world (Oriental) and, like the classics, in a pre-modern era of 
history. 
c. Geertz‘s (Geertz, 1980) is an example of state theory that is focused on a 
particular cultural type of state (the Balinese theatre state) in the Indonesian 
region, and in ‗the nineteenth century Bali‘-like Wittfogel, Geertz does not 
address the models and sub-models of the state that in modern times have 
developed in post-colonial countries, such as Indonesia. 
d. The analytic theorists, Morris (Morris, 1998a) and Krasner (Krasner, 1999), 
are examples of contemporary state theory with a global perspective but they 
were not used in this thesis because they have little to say on the 
development of different administrative and political practices within a state. 
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Morris, for example, talks of development of a concept, not of development of 
an actual state in practice. 
 
In contrast to these four conceptions of the state, the modern and globally applicable 
Easton-based definition of the state (Easton, 1967) provides a basis for describing 
development of the state in terms of the nature of—and changes to—its 
policymaking and policy-implementing organizations and other institutions. Strayer‘s 
theory (Strayer et al., 2005) is also preferred because: 
 
a. It explains the origins of the modern model of the state that has been adopted 
by post-colonial countries such as Indonesia 
b. It explains the historical development of the model of the state in practice, 
and, therefore, is easy to adopt as the basis for a paradigm concerning the 
state as it develops different versions or ‗sub-models‘ during a historical 
period though this thesis covers only 50 years, rather than the 150 years 
covered by Strayer. 
 
Strayer‘s theory emphasizes that a particular state‘s development can be classified 
as an example of either organic or mechanical development. More specifically, the 
new states created in post-colonial countries, such as Indonesia, can be classified as 
examples of the mechanical type of state development. This thesis will argue that 
Indonesia is indeed a prime example of the mechanical type of state development 
because its development shows the rapidity and unpredictability of state‘s 
characteristic of such a type (compared to the organic type‘s gradual increase in 
complexity and capability). In particular, mechanical development was displayed in 
Indonesia by the rapid sequence of four different versions of the state developed 
from the 1950s through to 1990s: namely parliamentary democracy, civilian 
presidential monarchy, military presidential monarchy and presidential democracy.  
 
Specifically, these versions: 
 
a) display unpredictability in the changes to the complexity of the state, with the 
high complexity of democratic policy-making institutions being followed by a 
marked reduction in complexity through the shift from the democratic rule of 
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the people to the dictatorial personal rule of a presidential monarch, then by a 
minor reduction in complexity of policymaking institutions through the shift 
from a civilian to a military dictator and finally by a marked increase in 
policymaking institutions‘ complexity through a return to the competitive 
elections of democracy but in the new form of presidential democracy. 
b) display unpredictability in the relationship between complexity and capability, 
such as when the high complexity of parliamentary democracy was not 
associated with a similarly high capability or when the marked reduction in 
complexity from parliamentary democracy to civilian presidential monarchy 
was associated with some increase in state capability 
c) display a lack of predictable ‗proportionality‘ between state complexity and 
capability. This is evident in three areas that were crucial for the Indonesian 
state and other new, post-colonial states: 1) leadership and legitimacy, 2) 
control of the military and 3) the capacity to deal with political disorder  
 
As a confirmation of this argument about unpredictability, disproportionate capability 
is the main focus of the thesis and the subject of the core chapters, Chapters 3 to 6, 
because the relative levels and changes in state capability are much more difficult to 
identify and ‗prove‘ than the relative levels and changes of complexity associated 
with the four different versions. E.g. version 1 (parliamentary democracy) obviously 
has a higher level of policy-making complexity than version 2 (civilian personal 
dictatorship), and there will obviously be a marked decline in complexity when 
version 1 is replaced by version 2.  
 
The secondary focus of the thesis is to explain why: a) Indonesia imitated a western 
rather than Islamic model of the state when it became independent and therefore 
created the opportunity for the western-style parliamentary democracy of the first 
version of the state, and; b) Indonesia democratized in the 1990s and therefore 
created the opportunity for the presidential democracy of the fourth version of the 
state. The first of these explanations is presented in chapter 2 and the second in 
chapter 7.  
 
A further and largely implicit focus of the thesis is that the organic/mechanical 
typology is a useful new paradigm of state development. An attempt is made to be 
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more explicit about this in the thesis‘ Conclusion, after the collation and summing up 
of the findings of Chapters 3 to 6. 
 
Research Sources and Presenting the Findings 
 
Inasmuch the basis of this thesis is predominantly using primary sources such as 
Indonesian government documents and political direct observation as well as 
Indonesia-related news from Indonesian and foreign media since the time of pre-
independence. However, this thesis also includes English-language secondary 
sources. 
 
The findings of this research will be presented mainly through the four chapters on 
capability:  ―Chapter Three: Seeking Legal Legitimacy, Chapter Four: The Military 
and the State, Chapter Five: Dealing with Political Disorder: The Degree of Difficulty 
and Chapter Six: Dealing with Political Disorder: The Degree of Success‖. The 
research findings will be presented in these chapters by allocating separate sections 
of the chapter to each of the four versions: parliamentary democracy (version 1), 
Sukarno‘s civilian presidential monarchy (version 2), Suharto‘s military presidential 
monarchy (version 3) and the present presidential democracy (version 4). However 
chapter four will also include an introductory section in which they will describe the 
conceptual framework that will be used for analysing and presenting their findings –
chapter four opens with a section on Perlmutter‘s concepts of the revolutionary, 
praetorian and professional types of military. 
 
The research findings that help explain the origins of versions 1 and 4, namely 
chapters two and six, will be presented in a quite different way – ―Chapter Two: Pre-
Independence Origins of the First Version of the State‖ will describe the pre-
independence debate over what form the new state should take, that is, whether it 
should in fact copy the Western model of a ‗modern‘ state – and ―Chapter Six: Pre-
Democratic Origins of the Present Version of the State‖ will describe the factors that 
led to the demise of version 3 and its replacement by the presidential democracy of 
version 4. 
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The theory chapter, ―Chapter One: Toward a Framework of Analysis‖, will have a 
different structure from the research-oriented chapters and will explore several 
different aspects of the theoretical background to the thesis as well as providing a 
more in-depth view of the mechanical/organic typology of state development 
described in the final section of the Introduction. 
 
Theory: Mechanical and Organic State Development 
 
These two terms were inspired by Durkheim‘s ‗mechanical‘ and ‗organic‘ social 
solidarity (Durkheim, 1997)– otherwise these types of state development would have 
been labelled mechanical and ‗biological‘. There are obviously big differences 
between these two mechanical/organic typologies: Durkheim‘s types of social 
solidarity historically speaking states can develop from the mechanical to the organic 
type, even though historically develop mechanically or organically. Another 
difference is that state development of the mechanical type is the ‗newer‘ type 
because: a) it became prominent only in the twentieth century,  and b) it is typical of 
‗new‘, post-colonial states, such as Indonesia. The key theorist of state development 
is Strayer as his The Medieval Origins of the Modern State was one of the series of 
works during the 1960s and 1970s on historical state formation that set a new 
direction in the study of the state. This book was similar in its ‗functionalist‘ approach 
to work of earlier theorists of the state, such as Marx, Durkheim and Weber, in being 
concerned with the state‘s increasing capability to do things. For contemporary 
scholarship, Strayer‘s book was a pioneering one in the study of state development 
because it merged the earlier focus on the social function of the state with the more 
recent focus on the historical formation of the state. In the study of state 
development, this functional/formation mixture is represented by its concern with 
historical change (formation) in the complexity and capability (function) of the state. 
Strayer‘s book described a gradual increase in the complexity and capability of the 
monarchical states of medieval Europe in the period 1100 to 1450 (and beyond this 
medieval period into the early modern period 1450-1600 and beyond into the 1600s-
1700s). Therefore, his book pioneered the study of what is now labelled the organic 
type of state development because it is analogous to the biological, life-cycle 
development of an individual from egg, to embryo, to baby, to infant and then to 
adult, with the organism increasing in complexity and capability as it progresses 
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through these stages. In the case of a state‘s development, the life-cycle extends 
over centuries or even thousands of years, because Strayer‘s description of the 
‗origins‘ extends for 250 years and clearly the ‗modern state‘ emerges as the adult 
stage in the process as late as the nineteenth and/or the twentieth centuries, some 
four or five centuries after 1450 (and presumably states will eventually enter the old-
age stage of the life-cycle and begin to experience a gradual decline in complexity 
and capability). Strayer‘s book went a step further in this formulation, and 
demonstrated that the form of state that emerged in Europe in the 
nineteenth/twentieth centuries was, and should be, regarded as the ‗modern‘ state 
and as a model to be copied by countries outside. In other words, the historical 
development of the modern state in one part of the world was followed by the 
geographical spread of this model of the state to other parts of the world that had not 
historically developed this form of state. The countries copying this model were 
therefore ‗saving themselves the trouble‘ of centuries of historical development when 
they created a ‗modern‘ state with its complex set of organisations and institutions, 
such as professional military and civil service, parliament, electoral system and 
written Constitution. Many of these countries were actually creating their first state 
because they were former colonies achieving independence with different, colonial-
era territorial boundaries from any state that had previously existed in that part of the 
world. They were very ‗new‘ states when compared to the ‗old‘ states in Europe that 
had taken centuries to develop the modern form of state. However, these post-
colonial, new states would soon begin their own process of historical development 
and a very different type of development from the organic type described by Strayer. 
They experienced a more rapid and unpredictable development process in which: a) 
change was not a gradual progression but a rapid shift from one format (or design) to 
another and; b) there was often a lack of proportion between the levels and changes 
in complexity and the levels and changes in capability, especially when it was 
complexity in the state‘s policymaking institutions and involves such marked changes 
as shifting from democratic to dictatorial versions of the state. This type of state 
development has been labelled ‗mechanical‘ because it is analogous to the 
mechanical development of new versions of a piece of machinery that do not 
necessarily have a proportionate relationship between their complexity and 
capability, as when a more complex version may be less capable (or vice versa) 
because it is not suited (or is well suited) to the difficult conditions in which it is 
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operated. The new state of Indonesia would be one of the prominent examples of 
this type of state development and indeed the thesis‘s argument, as described 
earlier, is that modern Indonesia is a particularly good example of the mechanical 
type of state development as is confirmed by its unpredictable, disproportionate 
levels and changes in state capability. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
TOWARD A FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS 
 
1.1. A debate on the idea of state: classic and modern 
 
The term ‗state‘ is often interchangeable with ‗sovereignty‘. This was originally found 
in Aristotle‘s politics, expressed as the idea that, ‗There must be a supreme power 
existing in the state, and that this power may be in the hands of one, or of a few, or 
of many‘ (Aristotle, 1923, p.121). Passing through different traces of history, from the 
Roman and Mediaeval periods of European history, and even further to early modern 
times, this idea has proven itself to be persistent that ‗there is and must be (in all of 
forms of government) a supreme, irresistible, absolute, uncontrolled authority, in 
which the jura summi imperii, or the rights of sovereignty, reside‘1. This rubric implies 
that, in addition to the state being ultimate source of political authority in a territory, 
there are no theoretical limits to the demands that a state can impose on its subjects 
and that the authority must be absolute and indivisible. This fundamental thesis has 
been elaborated comprehensively by classic theorists such as Thomas Hobbes.  
 
For those who were traumatized by the Leviathan, Hobbes‘ name seems notorious. 
From his perspective, the sovereign can commit no breach of the social covenant, 
and cannot be judged by the people for a breach of the constitution; the sovereign 
cannot be punished; he himself is judge of matters such as the means necessary for 
the defence of the state; Further, the sovereign can do no injustice; he has the right 
to decide what doctrines shall be taught among the subjects; he is the law-making 
power; the judicial power; he posses the right to carry on war; the right to appoint 
officers; the rewarding and punishing power. In his words ‗……there can be no room 
remaining for another independent authority. Even the church should  be regarded 
as subordinate to the sovereign, since he is the vicegerent of God, and determines 
the validity of doctrine, even the authenticity of inspirations‘ (Hobbes, 1996, chapter 
XVIII). For this end, Hobbes preferred the Monarch to be the ultimate source of 
authority.  
                                                 
1
 Taken from Morris‘s citation of ―The sovereignty of the law, selections from Blackstone‘s 
commentaries on the Laws of England‖ MORRIS, C. W. (1998b) An essay on the modern state, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, BLACKSTONE, W. S. (1973) The Sovereignty of The Law: Selections from 
Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws of England, London, MacMillan., p.178-79 
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Similar notions on the sovereignty of the state were forwarded by Jean Jacques 
Rousseau when he declares that ‗as nature gives every man absolute control over 
all his members, so the social contracts gives to the body politic an absolute power 
over all its members‘ (Rousseau, 1986, Book II, chapter 4). According to this 
philosopher, the sovereign has unlimited control over all that affects the general 
welfare, and the indisputable right to judge as to what falls under this category; no 
rights are reserved to the individual; the sovereign cannot bind himself; limits are set 
to the sovereign power to the extent that it shall always act for the general good and 
it shall not discriminate between various classes of citizens, but of this restrictions 
the sovereign is the final judge since the sovereign finds its source in an original 
contract and abides permanently in the body politic, Rousseau credited the people 
with the power that Hobbes had given to the Leviathan. 
 
Though sovereignty was conceived as absolute and indivisible for both classic 
philosophers, there is a significant difference between Hobbes and Rousseau. While 
both argue that the sovereignty is indivisible and unlimited, they mean quite a 
different thing by this. Hobbes signifies that all state activities must come under a 
single-decision making authority, and that the sovereign can and may do anything he 
or she or it wants to do with its subjects. Rousseau merely argues that the sovereign 
is indivisible because he thinks that executive and judicial functions are conceptually 
speaking not functions of the sovereign at all. The sovereign is and can only be a 
legislative entity, and this, for Rousseau, precludes it acting as an executive or as a 
judicial branch. Furthermore, though Rousseau says that the sovereign is unlimited, 
he means this too in a special sense. For Rousseau, anything that attempts to treat 
individuals in a way that is not necessary to advance the common good is not the 
sovereign (Rousseau, 1986, Ibid).  
 
Indivisibility and absoluteness of the sovereign led to critical notions among the 
modernist. Along this line, Christopher Morris argues that the classical conception of 
state as absolute and indivisible is invalid. He says state authority is often limited and 
frequently fragmented or divided (Morris, 1998b, section 7.4.). By saying this, Morris 
does not seem to challenge the attribution of the ultimate source of authority into 
states. At the contrary, he avows with F.H. Hinsley that, ‗At the beginning, the idea of 
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sovereignty was the idea that there is a final and absolute political authority in the 
political community…..there is no final absolute authority exists elsewhere‘ (Morris, 
1998b, p.173). However, he emphasizes the fact that the concept of sovereignty has 
historically developed He writes, ‗I consider states that are legitimate, on my view, 
they are reasonably just and minimally efficient‘ (Morris, 1998b, p.179). In his Essays 
on the Modern State, Morris does not give a clear position on what form of political 
organization might reasonably replace and improve upon the sovereign state, but his 
theoretical examination provide a deep analysis on how the form of political 
organizations endowed with the supreme authority are supposed to function. This is 
an important question with regard to the notion of legitimacy. The queries are, what 
form the state must take in order to be justified? How minimal or extensive should 
the state be? How responsive to groups within its territories and to people should it 
be?  
 
These staments should function as the basic foundation of the modern thinking on 
state theory: vis, we should accept that justice and efficiency are sufficient criteria of 
a state‘s acceptability, and that other complex elements such as territoriality are 
marginal. According to Morris, territorial state must be justified, and that in a justified 
state, most of the administrative and judicial functions of modern states will also be 
legitimized. However, this last notion leads to a contradiction in the attribution of 
sovereignty upon states. By distinguishing sanctions from force, Morris has 
questioned Weber‘s thesis that the state has monopolized legitimate force within its 
territory. ‗States‘, he writes, ‗may posses significant amounts, or influence significant 
concentrations of legitimate force, but we should not expect them to be able to 
monopolize it‘ (Morris, 1998b, p.204). Morris also argues that state‘s claim to limited 
sovereignty is lack of credibility. He says, ‗…even reasonably just and efficient, 
states lack most of the attributes commonly associated with absolutist theorists of 
sovereignty‘ (Morris, 1998b, p.212). This discussion leads to the question: What 
might authority relations be like in non-sovereign states? By examining such issues 
as conflict resolution, sources of political authority, and social order, Morris argues 
that that states are not, and need not, be sovereign. He writes, ‗It would be better to 
suggest that we detach sovereignty from the idea of a state‘ (Morris, 1998b, p.223).  
 
12 
 
This conclusion is fortified by Morris‘s other notion in regard to the distinction 
between internal and external sovereignty. States typically claim to be the ultimate 
source of political authority within their territories (internal sovereignty), to be 
independent of other states (external sovereignty), and to hold a monopoly on the 
legitimate use of force within their polity. Relating to this notion, Morris forwards an 
argument that state legitimacy does not give it internal sovereignty, whether this is 
absolute and indivisible or limited (Morris, 1998a, p.224). Nor does it provide it with 
monopoly on legitimate force, or does it account for any general obligation for 
citizens to obey. Sovereignty, Morris argues, is not necessary for social order. 
Further, Morris claims that there is no clear justification for the territorial claims of 
existing states, and that ‗it is not evident that there are any general solutions for the 
question of determining the boundaries of states‘ (Morris, 1998a, p.265). What 
legitimate state may posses, in Morris view, is ‗Political Power‘: a limited ‗right to 
rule‘, to make and enforce rules, to adjudicate disputes, support useful practices and 
mechanism for collective decision, establish standards, and so on‘ (Morris, 1998b, 
p.292). This is, in Morris‘s point of view, less than states claim for themselves, but it 
is still a considerable moral power, (once again), justified by simple considerations of 
justice and efficiency.  
 
To have a better understanding on the kinds of state‘s sovereignty, especially those 
of internal and external, the polemic been produced by Stephen Krasner is 
enlightening in some ways. In his Sovereignty: organised hypocrisy, Krasner is trying 
to test the validity of the conception of Sovereignty in the modern context by dividing 
it into four categorisations: (1) international-legal sovereignty, a form of sovereignty 
connoted by mutual recognition of independent international entities; (2) domestic 
sovereignty, understood as the ability to exert effective control within the state itself; 
(3) interdependence sovereignty, defined as the ability to control trans-boundary 
flows from people to  goods to pollution; and (4) Westphalian sovereignty, defined as 
political organization based on the exclusion of external actors from authority 
structures within a given territory (Krasner, 1999, chapter one). Among these four, 
only domestic sovereignty and Wesphalian sovereignty that been emphasized by 
Krasner, from which he concludes that states have never been as sovereign as most 
of us assume they are, especially those of the Westphalian system (Krasner, 1999, 
Ibid). However, people still believe to the myth of sovereignty despite the frequent 
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violations over it, thing that is labelled by Krasner as ‗organised hypocrisy‘ (Krasner, 
1999). With regard to the notion of sovereignty, a very interesting point to be 
underlined in this context, that ‗surrendering sovereignty could be in any state‘s 
rational self-interest‘. Such a thing is possible, according to Krasner, because the 
international system is characterized by power asymmetries among nations, the 
existence of multiple and conflicting norms on the international level, the absence of 
authoritative structures to resolve these conflicts, and the fact that ruler‘s actions are 
driven by domestic constituency interests (Krasner, 1999). 
 
Among the ―Modernists‖, Morris and Krasner more or less adopt the same stance on 
the notion of state‘s sovereignty, but Karl Wittfogel does not. Wittfogel conceived the 
view that the sovereignty must be imposed upon the state as a necessity.  According 
to him, a society where irrigation was a matter of life and death to the people and 
their crops, and where the control of the water courses was in the hands of the ruler 
and his bureaucracy, so the sovereign must not in the hand of many otherwise will 
end to chaos (Wittfogel, 1957). Basically, Wittfogel use the term ‗hydraulic society‘ 
for an economy which involves large-scale and government-managed works of 
irrigation and flood control, to contrast with hydro-agriculture (small-scale irrigation).  
 
The ideological grounds of Wittfogel‘s concept of the decisive role played by political 
institutions, rather than economic factors, is opposed to Karl Marx‘s methodology 
that ‗Economic structure of the society is the fundament on which all political and 
judicial superstructures are established‘ (Badie and Birnbaum, 1979). Wittfogel by-
passes this economic relationship by deriving the state forms of ‗oriental despotism‘ 
notably from the characteristics of the geographic environment. The logic is more 
less like this: In a certain natural setting, agriculture requires irrigation; the 
construction of dikes and canals requires cooperation, such teamwork, in turn, 
requires leadership; so, there is a need for submitting to authority supposedly leads 
to despotism of the ruler and to general enslavement of the population (Wittfogel, 
1957).  
 
In relations with the notion of state and sovereignty, a summary can be taken from 
Wittfogel‘s conception. Firstly, the natural setting determines the nature of states, a 
notion that to some extent could serve us an answer to Morris; Secondly, all 
14 
 
governments fulfil a number of general functions which (in Marx‘s notion) were 
essential for the origin and maintenance of power of production while for Wittfogel 
serve as giving the oriental states its specific quality. That is, Wittfogell writes, ‗it was 
not a political superstructure overlying an economic foundation, but an essential part 
of this foundation‘ (Wittfogel, 1969), and; Thirdly, its official were not the political 
agents of social masters who controls the means of production. ‗They‘, Wittfogel 
notes, ‗themselves were the masters‘--‗Politically and economically they dominated 
the mass of the immediate producers, the peasants, no matter whether these 
producers lived under a communal village system‘ (Wittfogel, 1969). This essay 
sounds like a justification of Weber‘s definition, ‗A compulsory political organization 
with continuous operations will be called state insofar as its administrative staff 
successfully upholds the claim to the monopoly of the legitimate use of force in the 
enforcement of its order‘ (Weber, 1968). 
 
That ‗states are actually not as sovereign as they claimed‘ is also argued in an 
indirect way, by Clifford Geertz. States, in Geertz‘s view, were not necessarily 
political organizations endowed with sovereignty. They could be as they were in 
nineteenth-century Bali, an extension of social lifes where the state and the ruling 
powers, located at the geo-cosmological centre of the Balinese universe, constituted 
an empire of the spiritual meaning. The locus of theatre-state was not that of 
Tyranny; it was a non-sovereign entity. Ceremonial splendour, whether for life-crisis 
ceremonies, or royalty/temple festivals, was of the same level as rent-collecting, 
trade and land-leasing, treaty-making, temple and palace building, and feast-
preparation. Nineteenth-century Bali did not have a sovereign state, it was a theatre-
state (Geertz, 1980). Daily life for most of the Balinese people was located around a 
number of various associations and alliances, forming a series of interlocking cells 
ranging over the Balinese countryside. How were then the relations between the 
court and the people? Geertz explains that the king was a ‗king-bee‘ and the workers 
were the Balinese people who organized themselves into villages, irrigation 
societies, kinship groups, temple congregations, and the like. The inter-section of the 
two worlds, that of Negara (the court) and desa (the village), according to Geertz, 
was accomplished through the interrelations of specific people but also through a 
particular symbology of power that was both a model ‗of and for‘ both dimensions. 
Geertz also insisted that Balinese social organization had local variations such as 
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those of king-priest, dadia clientships (kin groups), perbekels (state functionaries) 
and so forth, through which the live of courtier and villager were linked. Through 
dramatic ceremonial ties, life and death rituals, the power and social order had been 
formed. For Geertz, hence, some sovereignty exists, but it is practiced in a different 
way than it was in Western sovereign states.  
 
Two facts, however, need to be taken into account when undertaking further study 
on state: first, the concept of state indeed develops, means across the time and 
geographical landscape, ‗state‘ should have been perceived in different ways despite 
terms and institutions remain indifferent, and; second, the definition of ‗state‘ must 
rest on various perspectives and has therefore been treated differently by the hands 
of multiple stakeholders such as philosophers, political theorists, historians, 
anthropologists, sociologists and so on. Stakeholders who are political scientists, 
especially the neo-institutionalists, have a viewpoint on the state that is focused on 
the modern state, wherever it is found in the world, the institutions that it uses, and 
the public policies that it makes and implements. Such a ‗political science‘ 
perspective on the state prefers a definition of the state that is not so concerned with 
theories or concepts of sovereignty but with more practical matters of structure and 
process. And such a definition also provides a better basis for studying state 
development than do conceptions of the state, whether classical or modern, that are: 
a) concerned with the pre-modern state and/or particular structural/cultural/regional 
types of state (the Classics and Wittfogell and Geertz) or; b) concerned with the 
modern form of state and from a global perspective but not concerned with the 
state‘s institutions and policymaking (Morris and Krasner).  
 
A political science definition of the state can be derived from Easton‘s famous 
definition of ‗the political‘ in his classic work, The Political System, first published in 
1953. Easton‘s most famous definitions are perhaps that ‗political science‘ is ‗the 
study of the authoritative allocation of values for a society‘ or ‗the study of the 
authoritative allocation of values as it is influenced by the distribution and use of 
power‘ (Easton, 1967, p.129, 146). However, this formula of ‗authoritative allocation 
of values for a society‘ was a clumsier way of phrasing what Easton initially 
described as: ‗political life concerns all those varieties of activity that influence 
significantly the kind of authoritative policy adopted for a society  and the way it is put 
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into practice. We are said to be participating in political life when our activity relates 
in some way to the ‗making and execution of policy for a society‘ (Easton, 1967, 
p.128). It would, therefore, be better to use this definition of ‗political life‘ as relating 
in some way ‗to the making and execution of policy for a society‘ or, instead, to a 
society‘s policy making and policy implementation (with ‗policy implementation‘ being 
a more modern description of what Easton termed ‗policy execution‘). Then, this 
definition of political life can be added to Easton‘s definition of the state as ‗a 
particular institutional form that political life takes at some historical moments‘ 
(Easton, 1967, p.142). This would mean that the state is a particular institutional form 
of ‗policy making and policy implementation for a society‘ that is found in particular 
historical eras, namely in the modern era of world history and in a few older historical 
eras in some parts of the world. 
 
The particular ‗institutional form‘ of a modern state includes complex organisational 
institutions, such as bureaucratised administrative organisations and highly 
professional military organisations, as well as the group institutions of a cabinet or a 
representative assembly and the ‗rules of the game‘ institutions expressed formally 
in written Constitutions and informally in the processes that have been 
institutionalised as informally recognised ‗rules of the game‘. This concept  should 
supplement Easton-derived definition with Weber‘s point about importance of 
territorial nature of the state in his classic definition of the state as an institution that 
claims the monopoly of legitimate violence within a territorial area. The boundaries of 
this territorial area delineate the boundaries of the ‗society‘ for which policy is made 
and implemented (if necessary, by using the state‘s monopoly of legitimate violence).  
 
Problem of this territorially delineated ‗society‘ being a new society because the state 
itself is new and also problem of this new society containing sources of potential 
disunity, such as ethnic, religious and territorial divisions e.g. in 1940s-to 1960s over 
a hundred new states were created by decolonisation of European colonial empires 
in Africa and Asia. Meanwhile, the new states‘ societies had usually existed only 
since the European colonial power had ‗formed‘ them by the boundaries of its 
colonial administration perhaps less than a hundred years earlier. Two most 
prominent examples of the decolonisation era were ex-British colony of India and the 
ex-Dutch colony of Indonesia: two largest new states in terms of territory and 
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population and also both these new states had very diverse societies, with marked 
ethnic, religious and territorial divisions. However, contrast between India‘s state 
stability in retaining parliamentary democracy from independence in 1948 to 2010, 
Indonesia has experienced parliamentary democracy in the 1950s, President 
Sukarno‘s civilian dictatorship in 1960s, General Suharto‘s military dictatorship in 
1970s-1990s and presidential (not parliamentary) democracy from 1999 to 2010 i.e. 
such marked changes in the policymaking institutions of the state that can be 
described as four different versions of the state. Therefore, in the case of Indonesia 
(and many other post-colonial new states that have experienced more than one 
version of the state since independence) there is a need for a concept of state 
development to explain at least what happened to the state and perhaps to help 
explain why this happened. 
 
1.2. Developing the „Modern‟ State: Complexity and Capability 
 
Since the nineteenth century, historians have worked to dispel the ―mystery‘ 
surrounding the emergence of the modern state. They paid particular attention to 
questions such as, ‗What was the origins of the modern state as thus is conceived 
today?‘, and ―How has this conception developed over time?‘.  Hegel (1770-1831), 
for instance, identified the modern state both as ‗sui generis‘ and as a specifically 
European product. This observation is based on his comments on the general 
attitudes of the ‗new‘ state entities, especially as to the kind of authority bestowed to, 
and the kind of loyalty required by, the modern state (See: Hegel and Friedrich, 
1999). This basic argument of Hegel is similar to later ideas of social scientists such 
as Max Weber--famous for defining the modern state as claiming a monopoly of 
legitimate violence within a specified territorial area. However, Hegel and Weber also 
realised that the ‗modern‘ state had developed in parts of Western Europe in the 
medieval and post-medieval eras and had then spread to other parts of the world as 
the model of a ‗modern‘ state.  
 
The phenomenon is therefore similar to Anderson‘s theory of nationalism: spreading 
from Western Europe to the rest of the world, first to ‗Creole‘ nations of the United 
States of America and Latin America, and then much later in the ‗last wave‘ of 
nationalism, post-World War II ‗colonial nationalism‘, spreading to parts of Asia and 
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Africa that had been under Western colonial rule. Anderson, however, ―did not use 
the same approach‖ when discussing the spread of the Western model of 
the state to Indonesia and this will be noted later in this chapter when describing the 
versions of the Indonesian state. Therefore, by focusing his attention on the 
emergence of multiple national consciousness in the medieval Europe during the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and relate these to the consequential 
phenomenon during the later centuries, Anderson was trying to say that the medieval 
Europe is the ‗metropole‘ of nationalism ‗religion‘---the ideology which then spread to 
the rest of the world at the later periods. As he argues in chapter 7 entitled with ‗The 
Last Wave‘: ―The New states of the post World War II period have their own 
character, which nonetheless is comprehensible except in terms of the succession of 
models we have been considering…….a very large of these (mainly non-European) 
came to have European languages-of-state. If they resembled the ‗American‘ model 
in this respect, they took from linguistic European nationalism its ardent populism, 
and from official nationalism its Russifying policy-orientation‖ (Anderson, 1983a, 
p.47).  
 
If such nationalism was ‗modular‘ in the sense of following Western models, so too is 
the spread of Western model of the state which became global model of the ‗modern‘ 
state. However, there was a problem of accommodating or adapting this model of 
the state to societies that have inherited non-Western institutions and culture – 
problem that concerned theorists of ‗political development‘ in 1960s and is still 
concerning theorists of economic development, who realise the importance of such 
‗political‘ factors.  
 
Strayer on State Development: The European Model of the ‗Modern‘ State 
 
The key theorist of such state development is Strayer who pioneered the notion that 
the historical development of the state in Europe produced a model of the ‗modern‘ 
state that had then spread geographically to other parts of the world. The European 
model of the state became the ‗fashionable model‘ and the non-European states 
‗imitated the European model in order to survive or else went through a colonial 
experience which introduced large elements of the European system. The modern 
state, wherever we find it today, is based on the pattern which emerged in Europe in 
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the period 1100 to 1600‘ (Strayer et al., 2005, p.12). However, the ‗fashionable‘ 
model imitated by the rest of the world as the ‗modern‘ state was not the basic 
pattern that emerged in Europe in 1100-1600, but the more highly developed pattern 
that had emerged by the time that the imitating occurred in the 1800s and 1900s. In 
fact, most of the imitating took place after the 1940s when there was decolonisation 
in the European colonial empires in Asia and Africa. Certainly, non-European states 
in this period would never have considered themselves as imitating Europe‘s 
monarchical institutions of 1100-1600 - as they regarded only the latest version of 
the model as being ‗fashionable‘ and worth imitating.  
 
The latest version of the model would be described by Strayer in terms of the state‘s 
increased complexity and capability. As was noted earlier, Strayer‘s study of state 
development was a merging of: a) earlier theorists‘ focus on the social function of the 
state, as in the case of Marx, Durkheim and Weber, and; b) the more recent 
theorists‘ focus on the historical formation of the state. In Strayer‘s study of state 
development this functional/formation mixture produced a focus on historical change 
(formation) in the complexity and capability (function) of the state. As early as the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the ‗latest version‘ of the model not only had 
bureaucratic administrative organisations and professional military organisations but 
also had most of the formal institutions of a parliamentary democracy, even if this 
early version had yet to develop fully democratic elections to its parliamentary 
representative assembly. As Tilly points out in his 2005 foreword to Strayer‘s book, 
the ‗compelling mystery‘ is ‗how unprecedented forms of government including 
representative institutions took shape at a relatively poor periphery of the Eurasian 
land mass, and eventually spread widely throughout the world‘ (Strayer et al., 2005, 
p.xvii) and it is the imitation of such ‗unprecedented‘ forms as the use of 
representative institutions that is the ‗compelling‘ feature of the spread of the 
European model to other parts of the world. Even non-European states that were 
already or later became dictatorships would outwardly imitate the parliamentary 
representative institutions of the European model, even if these formal institutions 
were informally operated in an undemocratic way, such as by staging non-
competitive or semi-competitive elections. Therefore, it is not surprising that Strayer 
extends his analysis of the ‗medieval origins‘ of the modern state into post-medieval 
periods of European history. He extends it into the early modern period of 1450-
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1600, with a further extension into the 1600s-1700s, and in fact by 1799 an infant 
form of parliamentary democracy had emerged in Strayer‘s two favourite examples, 
England and France, hence he is providing an analysis of not only the 1100-1450 
origins but also the 1450-1799 early development of the European model of the 
state. Nevertheless, Strayer‘s analysis of the early development of the European 
model of the state is selective or ‗biased‘ in its coverage because it focuses so much 
on the state‘s administrative organisations. Very little is said about the state‘s military 
organisations, even though the European professional armies and navies were a key 
part of the European model of the state imitated in other parts of the world. Also, not 
much is said about the early development of the European state‘s ‗unprecedented‘ 
policymaking institutions of cabinet government and an elected representative 
assembly.  
 
The Biological-like, Organic Development of the European Model  
 
Typical of Strayer‘s bias towards administrative organisations that the only occasion 
he explicitly uses an analogy with biological development is when he refers to 
functionally specialised administrative departments being in an embryonic stage in 
1700: ‗many departments were still in an embryonic stage‘ (Strayer et al., 2005, 
p.110). Describing this as an ‗embryonic‘ stage is making the analogy with the 
biological development of an organism through the various stages of its life-cycle, 
such as a human‘s development through the stages of embryo, baby, infant and 
adult. Strayer did not extend this explicit biological-development analogy to the 
whole state and refer to the medieval 1100-1450 as the embryonic stage of the 
European model of the state, to the early modern period 1450-1600 as the nascent 
or ‗birth‘ stage and to the 1600s-1700s period as the ‗infancy‘ stage. However, he did 
use an implicit biological analogy by occasionally referring to a) the ‗developing‘ or 
‗development‘ of the state and b) a ‗stage‘ or the ‗stages‘ in this development. This 
implicit analogy with biological development is also evident in the way he depicts the 
development process as a gradual progression that involves a predictable and 
proportionate increase in complexity and capability. These three features are 
characteristic of a biological organism‘s development through the stages of its life-
cycle from embryo to maturity (after which the cycle involves a decline in complexity 
and capability during old age) while it is not difficult to find evidence of the three 
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features in Strayer‘s analysis of what might be termed the ‗organic‘ development of 
the European model of the state.  
 
Evidence and examples of gradual progression from the 1100 to the eighteenth 
century 
 
i) 1100-1300 medieval period  
 
1. establishing the basic elements of a state after the 800-1100 feudal 
decentralisation i.e. now establishing  permanent institutions with professional 
officials, especially in the kingdoms of England and France (Strayer et al., 
2005, p.35-36). 
2. Judicial institutions of the King‘s judges and courts 
3. Financial institutions for ‗financial management‘ of King‘s revenues and 
expenditure 
4. French King‘s creation of a territorial-control administrative bureaucracy to 
exercise some central control over France‘s provinces (territorial control 
meant implementing the King‘s decisions, extracting the military and financial 
resources that the King was entitled to claim, and preventing political disorder 
by suppressing rebellions and maintaining ‗law and order‘) 
5. King‘s creation of representative assemblies, such as England‘s Parliament: 
‗an assembly of the magnates, knights elected by the shires, and 
representatives of the boroughs‘ (Strayer et al., 2005, p.45). At this stage, 
however, England‘s Parliament and other kingdoms‘ representative 
assemblies were merely an institutional means of displaying the kingdom‘s 
‗consent‘ whenever the King wanted to go beyond the customary limits on his 
powers by increasing taxation and/or creating new laws--‗The idea of political 
representation is one of the great discoveries of medieval governments‘ and 
became structurally institutionalised as representative assemblies because ‗all 
governments had to find a way by which the politically active, propertied 
classes could give consent‘ (Strayer et al., 2005, p.64, 66). 
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ii) 1300-1450 late medieval period  
 
1. Lack of development of the states‘ administrative organisations and the 
preference for ad hoc solutions because of  the strain of famines, plague, war 
and other problems (Strayer et al., 2005, p.57). 
2. significant development in functions of representative assemblies. Strayer 
noted that the English Parliament developed new functions, with the 
convening of Parliament being used by the King‘s subjects as ‗convenient 
occasions for voicing grievances, for demanding investigations and reforms‘ 
(Strayer et al., 2005, p.67). 
3. in addition to this accountability function, Parliament was also developing into 
an independent source of legislation as members of Parliament began 
petitioning the King to approve their proposals for new laws (Brooker, 2009, 
p.54-55). 
 
iii) 1450-1600 early modern period and beyond to 1600s-1700s 
 
1. Marked structural development of administrative organisations through the 
emergence of new, functionally specialised departments dealing with ‗foreign 
affairs, war and so on‘ (Strayer et al., 2005, p.104). 
2. This was a new form of structural complexity, because these new, functionally 
specialised departments were located in the capital city and were very 
different from the layers of territorial-control bureaucracy. 
3. A gradual process of development, for ‗it took the new bureaucracy two or 
three centuries to develop solidly organized departments with clearly defined 
areas of responsibility‘ and ‗the full array of new departments can scarcely be 
said to have appeared before the beginning of the nineteenth century‘ 
(Strayer et al., 2005, p.104), so that the development of a ‗full array‘ of ‗solidly 
organized‘ functionally specialised departments was still continuing as late as 
1799.  
4. The other key development in this period was the creation and development 
of an  institution that was functionally specialised to handle what Strayer terms 
the ‗policymaking process‘ (Strayer et al., 2005). This was the birth and 
infancy of cabinet government as the state‘s primary policymaking institution. 
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This policymaking institution began as a small (‗inner‘ or ‗working‘) Council of 
full-time and often long-term councillors, including history‘s first Secretaries of 
State, who helped the King make the ‗few hundred policy decisions‘ that 
needed to made every year (Strayer et al., 2005, p.92-95). 
5. These small Councils developed into cabinet governments that would take 
over the King‘s policymaking and depersonalise the monarchy‘s rule. In the 
1500s-1600s Kings still retained personal control of the state‘s executive 
power: ‗Most rulers asserted that they alone had the right to make whatever 
decisions were necessary to preserve and strengthen the state. They 
resented any attempts to limit or control this power. It was an intensely 
personal possession; others could advise but only the ruler could decide‘ 
(Strayer et al., 2005, p.102). 
6. However, by the 1700s the Kings of England were being gradually and 
informally dispossessed of executive power by their Cabinets of 
Secretaries/Ministers. The King no longer attended meetings of ‗his‘ Cabinet 
of Secretaries/Ministers and indeed ‗his‘ Prime Minister had become the real 
head of the government, with the King becoming a largely ceremonial head of 
state i.e. he was becoming a merely reigning, not ruling, monarch (Brooker, 
2009, chapter 2).  
 
Strayer pointed out the European state of the seventeenth century was ‗far from 
being a despotism ruled by a monarch and a few cronies‘ and that by 1700 
‗monarchy had been weakened‘ in England (Strayer et al., 2005, p.110-11, 108) but 
he did not discuss the continuing  depersonalising of rule that occurred during the 
1700s with the development of cabinet government. Similarly, England‘s Parliament, 
the representative assembly, was developing during the 1700s into the other 
important policymaking institution of the English state and was the foundation upon 
which cabinet government was being built. It was the foundation of cabinet 
government because the King literally could not afford to veto or dismiss ‗his‘ 
Cabinet of Ministers if they had the support of a majority of the elected 
representatives in Parliament, for then Parliament would respond by refusing to 
supply the King with the taxation revenue that he needed to finance the state‘s 
administrative and military organisations. In fact, England was gradually progressing 
towards a parliamentary democracy, even if the elections to Parliament still involved 
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only male property-owners and were certainly not ‗free and fair‘ elections. Therefore, 
if Strayer had chosen 1799 rather than 1700 as the point by when ‗the West 
European state had developed its own characteristic political patterns‘ (Strayer et al., 
2005, p.110), he could have used England as an example of the gradual progression 
towards Europe‘s most characteristic political pattern: parliamentary democracy 
 
 
Evidence and examples of the predictability of development 
 
The period between 1300 and 1450 was one the continual warfare  between 
England and France and ‗was so exhausting for both sides that it discouraged the 
normal development of the apparatus of the state‘; there was a ‗tendency to 
postpone structural reforms, to solve problems on an ad hoc basis rather than by the 
creation of new agencies of government‘ (Strayer et al., 2005, p.60). Hence Strayer 
apparently considers that the creation of new agencies of government is the normal 
development process that has been ‗postponed‘ because of the strain of continual 
war. In other words, it is a predictable development that would have occurred in 
normal times, i.e. times when the state was not under abnormal strain. 
 
Another example from the 1300-1450 period is that ‗many functions of a modern 
state were either not being performed at all, or were being performed badly. One 
would scarcely expect a medieval government to concern itself with problems of 
health or education. But one would expect ... that specialized agencies would have 
emerged to regulate the economy, to suppress crime and disorder, to organize the 
armed forces, and to conduct inter-state relations‘ (Strayer et al., 2005, p.77-78) 
hence Strayer is again implying that the emergence of increased structural 
complexity (functionally specialized agencies) is a predictable (expected) 
development that would have occurred in normal times, and in fact he noted that 
these functionally specialised agencies did emerge in 1300-1450 in Italy, where 
times were more normal than in England and France because in Italy ‗wars were 
fought on a smaller and less devastating scale‘ (Strayer et al., 2005, p.78,60).   
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Evidence and examples of proportional relationship between complexity and 
capability 
 
Strayer, for instance, links increased complexity to increased capability in his 
description of France‘s development of a complex territorial-control bureaucracy in 
1100-1300. The French King‘s local officials were supervised by the King‘s provincial 
officials who were in turn supervised by his regional officials who were ‗supervised 
by councils, courts, and chambers sitting in Paris. There was a constant flow of 
orders, rebukes, judicial decisions, and requests for information running from central 
to local officials‘ (Strayer et al., 2005, p.52). This was a complex administrative 
structure for a medieval state but the Kings of France needed ‗to develop a many-
layered administrative structure‘ if they were to be capable of exerting territorial 
control over their diverse provinces – in fact ‗the bureaucracy was the cement which 
held all the pieces together‘ and made it ‗possible to create a state out of provinces 
and regions with widely divergent characteristics‘ (Strayer et al., 2005, p.52,53). 
Another example of how the complex French territorial-control bureaucracy 
increased its state‘s capability comes from the later period of 1300-1450. Strayer 
implies that if this bureaucracy had been made even more complex by adding a sub-
local layer of officials, the bureaucracy would have been capable of exerting direct 
control over the whole population: ‗the French had increased the size of their 
bureaucracy enough to make the government more complicated but not enough to 
make it capable of dealing directly with the people‘ (Strayer et al., 2005, p.73). Yet 
another example of how administrative complexity could produce a proportionate 
capability in territorial control is that in the 1450-1799 period the states‘ increasingly 
large administrative organisations were capable of dealing with the increased 
demands being made upon them. In 1450-1799 a European state‘s thousands of 
territorial-control bureaucrats were making ‗tens of thousands of routine judicial, 
financial and administrative rulings‘ every year and maintained ‗reasonably effective‘ 
control over the provinces: regional rebellions were suppressed; the orders of the 
judicial courts were enforced; there was an increase in the security of the individual; 
and taxes ‗were collected regularly‘ (Strayer et al., 2005, p.92,101).  
 
Although Strayer described the ‗administrative systems‘ of the European states as 
‗barely adequate‘ in the 1450-1799 era, he emphasised that being barely adequate 
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was ‗quite different from failure‘, noting the contrast with a number of ‗new‘, post-
colonial states of the 1950s-2000s which have become ‗failed states‘ or have been 
unable to achieve a ‗barely adequate‘ capability. However, it is the state‘s 
policymaking institutions that provide the most important example of the 
proportionate relationship between complexity and capability. During the 1700s 
England‘s complex policymaking institutions of cabinet government and 
parliamentary representative assembly had given the kingdom an increased 
capability in  policymaking by  removing two of the major weaknesses associated 
with monarchical despotism and other forms of personal rule: 1) a personal ruler has 
too much power to inflict damage on state and society if that person is an 
incompetent policymaker, and; 2) a personal ruler cannot be bloodlessly removed 
from power until he decides to retire or, more often, until he dies of natural causes. 
The removal of these weaknesses gave the English state an unprecedented 
advantage in policymaking that made up for any remaining weaknesses in its 
administrative organisations. Strayer acknowledges that in the 1700s the ‗Asian 
empires‘ in Turkey, Persia, China, and Japan could rival the European states in 
‗organization and  power‘ (Strayer et al., 2005, p.105) but clearly no Asian state 
could rival England‘s policymaking institutions. For example, the ‗Oriental despotism‘ 
of Imperial China had an impressive administrative bureaucracy that exercised 
territorial control throughout the provinces of this vast country but this form of 
despotism had policymaking institutions that appear simplistic and primitive when 
compared to those of England in 1799 (see: Wittfogel, 1957). The only state in the 
world that could rival the complexity of England‘s policymaking institutions was the 
new state established in North America in the 1770s-1780s by some English settler 
colonies, i.e. the newly independent United States of America. 
 
The American Version of the Modern State 
 
Strayer does not mention the development of the state in the English settler colonies 
in North America, even though they developed a different version of the modern 
state (and also produced the first example of a Western state being imitated by new, 
post-colonial states when in the 1800s the newly independent Spanish settler 
colonies in Central and South America imitated the USA‘s policymaking institutions). 
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The republican USA created and developed the office of President as an elected and 
temporary monarch who is: a) the real head of government as well as ceremonial 
head of state but; b) shares power with an elected representative assembly like the 
Kings of England did in the late 1600s (but with a much larger proportion of the 
population having the right to vote than was the case in England in the 1600s or 
1700s). In other words, the USA was developing a presidential democracy rather 
than a parliamentary democracy, and this presidential form of democracy would be 
imitated throughout Central and South America and in a few post-colonial states 
outside America, such as Nigeria in 1970s. This American, presidential version of the 
modern state had policymaking institutions that were no less complex than those 
developed in Europe, but the executive power of the President was depersonalised 
not by cabinet government but by the President being elected and temporary (no 
more than two terms of office) and having his powers limited by a written Constitution 
interpreted by an independent Supreme Court. The American invention of a written 
Constitution interpreted by a Supreme Court can be viewed as a separate 
policymaking institution, for it would be imitated by many European parliamentary 
democracies and by most non-European states imitating parliamentary democracy. 
Similarly, some European and most non-European parliamentary democracies would 
use the title/office of President to give themselves a non-monarchical ceremonial 
head of state (Malaysia‘s creation of a reigning monarchy for its parliamentary 
democracy was one of the rare exceptions). Therefore, the ‗fashionable‘ model of the 
modern state in the 1800s-1900s should be labelled not the ‗European‘ but the 
‗Western‘ model, with two different but overlapping versions: a) European 
parliamentary democracy and b) American presidential democracy. The two versions 
are distinguished from each other by the differences in their policymaking 
institutions, not by any differences in their administrative and military organisations, 
but there is also some overlapping caused by such ‗American‘ institutions as the 
Presidency and a written Constitution being frequently imitated by states that are 
imitating parliamentary rather than presidential democracy. Next section of chapter 
looks at how the new state of Indonesia first imitated the European, parliamentary-
democracy version of the modern state before developing two new versions of the 
state that reduced its policy-making complexity by establishing the personal rule of a 
presidential-monarch dictator and then finally developed a fourth version of the state 
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that returned to the policy-making complexity of democracy but in the form of an 
Indonesian-developed version of presidential rather than parliamentary democracy. 
 
 
1.3. Mechanically developing democratic and dictatorial versions of the State: 
Indonesia‟s four versions, 1950-2010 
 
Mechanical versus Organic Development 
 
The previous section of this chapter described the development of the Western 
model of the modern state as being analogous to biological development  and 
termed it ‗organic‘ development. Organic state development is characterised by 
increasing complexity and capability plus three other characteristic features: i) 
gradual progression through stages of development and periods of history, ii) a 
predictable development path and iii) a proportional relationship between complexity 
and capability, such as when increases in complexity bring proportionate increases 
in capability. Organic development, however, is not the only type of development and 
it is usually combined with another type, the mechanical, during the historical 
development of a state or a model of the state. The mechanical type of state 
development is analogous to the mechanical development of new versions of a piece 
of machinery and is a more rapid and unpredictable development process than the 
organic type, i.e. in mechanical development:  a) change may involve a rapid 
replacement of one design by another, b) the new version may or may not be more 
complex than the previous version, and c) the levels and changes in complexity may 
or may not be proportionate with levels and changes in capability. Analogously, 
when a piece of machinery is being operated in difficult conditions, a highly complex 
design may be less capable of handling these conditions than a less complex 
version of the machinery.  
 
The particular combination or ‗mix‘ of the two types, organic and mechanical, varies 
from case to case of historical development, as is illustrated by three famous 
examples of Western model of the state that were mentioned in the previous section: 
the USA, England and France. The USA‘s element of mechanical development 
occurred only its origins, i.e. emerged through a war of independence that led to the 
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rapid and unpredictable development of the American version of the Western model 
of the state. In contrast, the other English settler colonies in North America (i.e. those 
in what is now the state of ‗Canada‘) would become independent through a gradual 
and predictable progression towards English-style parliamentary democracy with 
Governors-General deputising for the reigning English monarch as the ceremonial 
head of state. After its mechanical beginning, the USA shifted to an organic type of 
state development and, apart from a civil war in the 1860s, has maintained an 
organic gradualness and predictability for more than two centuries. Also in contrast, 
the Spanish settler colonies in South America continued to experience mechanical 
state development after their wars of independence in the early 1800s. Although 
these new states imitated the developing presidential democracy in the USA, they 
soon began to experience periods of military dictatorship and, in fact, some political 
scientists have argued that from the 1820s to the 1980s South America experienced 
‗a cyclical pattern of alternating periods of democracy and dictatorship, with each 
period lasting about 20 years‘ (Brooker, 2009, p.9).  
 
The military dictatorships were developing new designs during this century and a half 
of largely mechanical development. In addition to personal rule by a military leader 
holding the title/office of President, they developed rule by juntas (councils of military 
leaders representing the military as an organisation) and also ways of disguising 
military rule behind the formal institutions of presidential democracy, such as staging 
one-candidate, non-competitive elections or multiparty, semi-competitive elections. 
England, too, has experienced a period of mechanical development, even though 
very short and long ago, that produced a military dictatorship. In the 1640s-1960s 
England‘s organic development of parliamentary democracy was interrupted by a 
period of mechanical development that saw the overthrow of the monarchy, its 
replacement by a parliament-ruled republic and then the creation of Cromwell‘s 
military dictatorship, which included a brief period of military rule over the regions by 
Generals of his New Model Army. Although monarchical rule was restored in the 
1660s, England had experienced some typically mechanical development during this 
short period of rapid and unpredictable changes to the state, especially the two 
pioneering redesigns of its policymaking institutions into a parliament-rule republic 
and into a military dictatorship with regional as well as central military rule. 
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These versions are related to the state‘s policymaking institutions, especially to the 
parliamentary representative assembly and to the public office of President. So this 
perspective differs markedly from Anderson‘s well-known theory of Indonesian state 
development, which is focused on the policy-implementing institutions of civil service 
and military organisations (as is discussed in Appendix 1: Anderson‘s view of the 
Indonesian state). In contrast, the four versions of the Indonesian state described 
below are categorised in parliamentary/presidential and democratic/non-democratic 
terms, with a parliamentary version of democracy being replaced by two different 
versions of presidential dictatorship that are themselves replaced by a presidential 
version of democracy. 
 
Indonesia‘s Mechanical Development of Four Versions of the Modern State 1950-
2010 
 
Indonesia is a former Dutch colony and experienced mechanical historical 
development of the state as it imitated the Western model of the modern state. 
Subsequently, gained independence through the 1945-1949 war against Dutch 
colonial rule, and underwent a contested painful process when it imitated the 
Western model of the modern state: especially during the drafting of the pre-
independence 1945 Constitution (see Chapter 2). In 1950 the state adopted 
parliamentary-democracy version of the ‗modern‘ state i.e. European-style 
administrative and military organisations and European-style policymaking 
institutions in the form of a parliamentary democracy.  
 
Version 1 – Parliamentary Democracy 
 
The Indonesian parliamentary democracy is a French-style (Third and Fourth 
Republics) republican parliamentary-democracy policymaking institutions with 
Western-style bureaucratic and functionally specialised administrative organisations 
and professional military organisations (see Chapter 4, Appendix 2), but the first 
version of the state proved incapable of performing even territorial-control function of 
the state (see : chapter 5). The 1950 Constitution clearly specified cabinet 
government responsible to parliament – and official interpretation/commentary on the 
Constitution pointed out that responsibility to parliament was clear-cut and that the 
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Constitution could not be interpreted to mean instead a government of Ministers 
assisting the President, i.e. a presidential rather than parliamentary democracy. In 
addition, this official interpretation/commentary declared that the constitutional 
position of the Indonesian Prime Minister was to be interpreted as the same as the 
Dutch Prime Minister in the Dutch parliamentary democracy. This was a clear case 
of the imitation of a former colonial power‘s version of the state. However, 
Indonesia‘s first version of the state proved incapable of performing even territorial-
control function of the state as is remarked by Brooker: 
 
‗In the later 1950s army commanders on some of the outer islands rebelled 
against the central government, leading it to impose martial law on the whole 
country. Although rebellion was militarily defeated in 1958, this did not bring an 
end to the state of martial law. Instead, President Sukarno declared in 1959 that 
the military role in administering the country would continue and that the 
presidential 1945 Constitution would replace the existing Constitution. Indonesia 
had entered an era of what Sukarno called ‗Guided Democracy‘, which 
eventually saw him declared President for life‘ (Brooker, 1995, p.182). 
 
The revival of the mechanical development almost began in the pre-independence 
era, but was replaced by organic post-colonial imitation of European version of the 
modern state. This was return to 1945 Constitution which was being used to 
establish a dictatorship; therefore this was a marked reduction in complexity of 
policymaking institutions. This was a typical unpredictability of mechanical 
development, and, was made even more unpredictable because Indonesia was 
shifting to dictatorship in a different way than other ex-colonial new states, i.e. 
Indonesia shifted not  through a military coup or a misappropriation of power by the 
party that has won elections or even through an autogolpe (self-coup). Indonesian 
case closest to an autogolpe but Sukarno‘s ‗self-coup‘ carried out by the President of 
a parliamentary democracy instead of by the President of a presidential democracy. 
 
Version 2 – Dictatorship in the form of Civilian Presidential Monarchy  
 
The return to pre-independence 1945 Constitution meant shift to presidential 
policymaking institutions but dictatorial. President Sukarno goes even further by 
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interpreting that Constitution to deprive parliament of power and making it appointed 
rather than elected. The personalisation of his power became very obvious when he 
was declared President ‗for life‘ which is typical of ‗presidential monarchy‘, defined as 
‗the dictator‘s personal appropriation of the public office of President, with the 
dictator typically being viewed as his country‘s president for life, sometimes quite 
explicitly (even legally) and otherwise involving only ritualistic re-elections by the 
public or legislature‘ (Brooker, 2009, p.71). However, it is not evident that Sukarno 
was a populist presidential monarch like Louis-Napoleon in France in 1851-1852 
before he became Emperor. Sukarno was a civilian, like Louis-Napoleon, though he 
did have some military support. He also had the support of two political parties, 
which meant he is something like a presidential monarch in a Communist state or an 
African one-party state but there are two ‗official‘ parties in Sukarno‘s Indonesia. ‗His 
dictatorial rule over Indonesia was based upon the support of the military and of two 
major political parties – his own PNI party and the Indonesian Communist Party 
(PKI). The military was given a major role in running the country, not only through the 
administration of martial law and holding a number of provincial Governorships, but 
also in the form of several Cabinet posts and substantial representation in the new, 
appointed parliament. However, the army became increasingly hostile towards 
another of Sukarno‘s allies – the outwardly moderate but large and rapidly expanding 
Communist movement‘ (Brooker, 1995, 182-3). 
 
 
Version 2 – Dictatorship in the form of Civilian, Populist-like Presidential Monarchy  
 
Within a decade of independence, Indonesia‘s policymaking institutions had been 
redesigned into a dictatorial version of the modern state. The return to the pre-
independence 1945 Constitution meant that the formal institutions of policymaking 
‗modernity‘ were retained, such as the written Constitution, the title/office of 
President, and the representative assembly (though Sukarno‘s interpretation of the 
1945 Constitution produced an appointed rather than elected parliament). However, 
the form of dictatorial version was a monarch-like personal rule by President 
Sukarno, not dictatorship by the state‘s professional military or by a political party, 
and this personalisation of power is best described as a presidential monarchy. 
According to Brooker, ‗presidential monarchy‘ is defined as ‗the dictator‘s personal 
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appropriation of the public office of President, with the dictator typically being viewed 
as his country‘s president for life, sometimes quite explicitly (even legally) and 
otherwise involving only ritualistic reelections by the public or legislature‘ (Brooker, 
2009, p.71). In addition,  Sukarno was declared President ‗for life‘ and did not 
interpret 1945 Constitution to mean direct elections for President so he could not 
claim that direct link to the electorate which is typical of populist presidential 
monarchs, after the presiden Louis-Napoleon Bonaparte (see : Appendix 2). ‗The 
populist presidential monarch has reversed the principal-agent relationship with the 
people as an electorate of voters. Instead of the elected President being their agent, 
he has made the electorate an instrument of his rule, in the sense of providing him 
with a claim to democratic legitimacy, which he strengthens by having himself 
reelected through semi-competitive elections‘ (Brooker, 2009, p.79).  In distinction 
Sukarno relied on his claim to charismatic legitimacy as political leader of the war of 
independence as well as first President. He entitled himself as  ‗founding father‘ of 
Indonesia comparable to Jefferson, Washington etc as ‗founding fathers‘ of the USA 
(see : Chapter 3). Nonetheless, Sukarno‘s dictatorship was more like a populist 
presidential monarch than another kind of  presidential monarch: e.g., i) the military 
form, where the President is a military leader, and ii) the one-party-state form, where 
the President is leader of the ‗official‘ political party, such as a communist party . In 
contrast to these two forms, President Sukarno was not a military leader, and was 
party leader of only one of the two ‗official‘ parties in his dictatorship:  
 
‗His dictatorial rule over Indonesia was based upon the support of the military 
and of two major political parties – his own PNI party and the Indonesian 
Communist Party (PKI). The military was given a major role in running the 
country, not only through the administration of martial law and holding a number 
of provincial Governorships, but also in the form of several Cabinet posts and 
substantial representation in the new, appointed parliament. However, the army 
became increasingly hostile towards another of Sukarno‘s allies – the outwardly 
moderate but large and rapidly expanding Communist movement‘ (Brooker, 
1995, p.182-183). 
 
 
It was because Sukarno was neither leader of the military nor leader of the 
Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), that he could not intervene effectively to reduce 
this tension within his support base, the situation which escalated into a virtual civil 
war in 1965 that ended in the army‘s destruction of the PKI. Indonesia then 
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experienced more mechanical development as again a version of the state survived 
for less than a decade and was replaced by a new design. In 1966, ‗Sukarno was 
pressured into signing over his presidential powers to the army‘s supreme 
commander, General Suharto, who became ‗acting‘ President in 1967 and then in 
1968 ‗was appointed President for a five-year term by the Provisional People‘s 
Consultative Assembly‘ (Brooker, 1995, p.183). This is typical unpredictability of 
mechanical development and even more unpredictable because Indonesia was 
shifting to military dictatorship in a different way from other ex-colonial new states in 
the immediate post-colonial period and would produce a significantly different 
version of personal military dictatorship‘s military form of presidential monarchy. 
Some facts may justify this argument: First, the seizure of power in Indonesia was 
not gained through a normal military coup, or threat of a coup, leading to the 
overthrow of the government, and its replacement with military men or military 
appointees. This was because the 1966 pressuring of President Sukarno to transfer 
his powers to General Suharto was a ‗disguised coup‘ in which the military denied 
having exerted any pressure on the President (Brooker, 2000, p.68). In addition, 
General Suharto acquired the actual title of President two years after he acquired the 
powers of President from Sukarno ; Second, General Suharto‘s military form of 
presidential monarchy was unlike personal military dictatorships in other post-
colonial new states because even when they were military presidential monarchies, 
they did not use the democratic disguise of multiparty, semi-competitive elections as 
General Suharto did in Indonesia from the 1971 parliamentary elections. As a matter 
of comparison, Brooker mentioned that only in South and Central America did 
personal military dictators use semi-competitive multiparty elections, and there ‗new‘ 
states became independent in the 1800s, not the period from the 1940s to the 
1960s2.  
  
 
 
 
                                                 
2
 See how Brooker, in Chapter 9  ‗pairs off‘ Suharto‘s regime with Peron‘s regime in Argentina as 
‗Third World ―Multi-Party‖ Cases‘-- BROOKER, P. (1995) Twentieth-Century Dictatorships: The ideological 
One-Party States, Macmillan. ; and how Brooker, in Chapter 9 of his other book describes Latin America as 
‗The historical stronghold‘ of semi-dictatorships and their characteristic semi-competitive elections, with the 
‗classic example‘ being Mexico 1920s-1990s and other notable examples being Peron‘s Argentina 1940s-1950s, 
Brazil 1960s-1980s, Nicaragua 1960-1970s and the „Asian example‟ of Suharto‟s Indonesia--BROOKER, P. 
(2000) Non-Democratic Regimes, St martin's Press.  
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Version 3 – Dictatorship in the Form of Military Presidential Monarchy 
 
General Suharto‘s redesign of presidential monarchy was a less complex version of 
dictatorship than President Sukarno‘s because the new presidential monarch was a 
military leader and could base his version of personal rule solely upon the support of 
the military. For example, he did not feel the need to strengthen his populist 
credentials by having himself directly elected by the people, whether in a one-
candidate or semi-competitive election. Suharto was content to have himself re-
elected unopposed every five years by the People‘s Consultative Assembly. General 
Suharto not only retained the 1945 Constitution, but increased the complexity of the 
formal policymaking institutions by allowing parliamentary elections to be held in 
1971 – though these were only semi-competitive elections, and a 1975 law specified 
that only three, ‗officially recognised‘ parties were allowed to take part in 
parliamentary elections: the nationalist PNI, the moderately Islamist PPP and the 
government party, Golkar. The last of these, ‗secured‘ around two-thirds of the vote 
in the 1977, 1982, and 1987 elections (see : Chapter 7, section 7.4). In contrast, the 
informal policymaking institutions decreased markedly in complexity when compared 
with the situation in President Sukarno‘s dictatorship. It is noteworth that informal 
institutions can limit the personal power of a modern presidential monarch in a 
similar way that the customary ‗rules of the game‘ limited the personal power of a 
medieval monarch, such as English King John when he faced rebellion in 1215 
because he did not keep to customary rules, and, therefore had to sign Magna Carta 
as his formal, written agreement that keep to rules. Under President Sukarno‘s 
personal rule, the informally institutionalised ‗rules of the game‘ meant  his 
policymaking  had to involve or satisfy the three different components in the 
President‘s personal support base: the military, the communists and his own party  
while the new presidential monarch‘s policymaking processes (under Suharto) had to 
involve and satisfy only the military. Even this informal institution (rule of the game) 
was simplified as General Suharto gradually strengthened his leadership position 
over the military and eased it out of policymaking as by the mid-1970s he had 
‗succeeded in confining (the military) to policy-implementation‘ (Sundhaussen, 1976, 
p.192).  
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The reduction in the complexity of informal policymaking institutions was partly offset 
by the formal institutions being allowed more influence in policymaking than they had 
been allowed under Sukarno. This was especially the case for the now ‗elected‘ 
parliament: ‗The government‘s legislation was sometimes subjected to heated 
debate and prolonged deliberation, with amendments and even an occasional 
withdrawal being wrung from the government as the price for maintaining the image 
of consensual Panca Sila democracy‘ (Brooker, 1995, p.189). However, the overall 
effect of General Suharto‘s redesign of Sukarno‘s presidential monarchy was a 
further, though mild rather than marked, reduction in the complexity of the state‘s 
policymaking institutions. General Suharto‘s dictatorial version of the Western model 
of the ‗modern‘ state would last much longer than Sukarno‘s version, a whole 
generation, until in the 1990s mechanical development produced a marked 
depersonalisation of policymaking institutions through a return to a democratic 
version of the modern state. The return to democracy, however, was a presidential 
democracy instead of the parliamentary democracy of Indonesia‘s first version of the 
modern state. 
 
Version 4 – Presidential Democracy 1999 
 
 
The fall of Suharto‘s regime in 1998 did not only mark the end of long-lasting 
monarchies (which were surviving and glorious for nearly 40 years under version 2 
and 3) but also opened the way for Democracy that had been awaiting to emerge 
since 1980s while, in fact, a global trend of the 1990s (see: Huntington, 1991; see 
also: chapters 3 and 7). However, despite the adoption of new state machinery, the 
democratization in Indonesia since 1999 did not bring a new constitution as what 
was happening in 1950 (the transition from pre-independence to version 1) and in 
1959 (the transition from version 1, parliamentary democracy, to version 2, 
presidential monarchy). The 1945 Constitution is retained but with important 
amendments: firstly on October 1999, secondly on August 2000, thirdly on 
November 2001, and lastly on August 2002. In addition, the democratization also did 
not bring a return to version 1, parliamentary democracy, but instead a 
democratizing of version 2 and 3 that depersonalized their presidential monarchies 
and converted them into a presidential democracy, version 4, by introducing three 
new features: i) a constitutional amendment limited the time that any person 
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(Indonesian citizen) can hold the public office of president - According to the 1999 
constitutional amendment, the president has a five-year term of office and can be re-
elected once only as in the USA (see: Indonesia, 1999a - 1st amendment of the 
Constitution). This was a strong evidence that Indonesia since 1999 has been 
wanting depersonalized presidency, not ‗for life‘ and seems to be a top priority 
because the first constitutional amendment was undertaken in 1999, only a year 
after Suharto‘s fall, and, during the administration of Habibie, the figure which was 
widely believed to be Suharto‘s crony (see: chapters 3 and 7); ii) a constitutional 
amendment introduced election of the president by the people instead of by a 
People‘s Consultative Assembly – This was a clear indicator that Indonesian state 
machinery was following the Western model of democracy (see: Indonesia, 2001 - 
3rd amendment of the Constitution); iii) elections for presidents and for parliament 
are not semi-competitive but instead ‗free and fair‘, fully competitive elections – 
Again, following the Western model of democracy. Therefore, Indonesia created 
version 4 of the state, first of all, in order to make sure that the post Suharto/Habibie 
president is not a monarch, and next because it preferred to democratize by 
modifying the presidential (1945) Constitution of version 2 and 3 instead of by 
returning to the parliamentary (1950) Constitution of version 1 – in which Cabinet 
Ministers were responsible to parliament, not to the President, and the head of 
government was the prime minister, not the President (who is largely ceremonial 
head of state).  
 
 
1.4. The four versions‟ capabilities: Dealing with Legitimacy, the Military and 
Political Disorder 
 
This thesis is seeking further confirmation through further research that Indonesia‘s 
state development is clearly of the mechanical type. It is because mechanical-like 
changes in the versions of the state are the obvious structural evidence of 
mechanical development but also an evidence based upon the processes and 
‗outputs‘ of the state. Therefore, this thesis will seek confirmation by looking for 
evidence of the typically ‗mechanical‘ lack of proportion between levels/increases of 
complexity and capability, for example dictatorial versions‘ reductions in 
policymaking institutions‘ complexity were not accompanied by reductions in 
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capability. However, the analysis will not focus on policymaking capabilities because 
the evaluation of policymaking is too ‗subjective‘ and contentious for a research 
project on the theoretical structure of state development.  
Achieving legal legitimacy is crucial for a new state because it is needed for efficient 
policy-implementation. The more a state can rely on legal legitimacy (citizens‘ duty to 
obey legal commands), the less the state has to rely on more costly (financially 
and/or politically) means of implementing policies, such as the use of state coercion 
or the use of local allies. The use of state coercion requires an effective and 
therefore expensive state apparatus of officials, police etc, while the use of local 
allies, such as local community leaders, requires financial and political  ‗pay offs‘ to 
the local allies in exchange for their assistance in implementing the policy. In fact 
many new states may be: a) unable to pay these costs or; b) unable for other 
reasons to develop sufficient state coercion or local allies to implement policies 
effectively. And in these cases legal legitimacy is needed for effective (because there 
is a lack of alternative means) as well as efficient policy implementation. 
  
Controlling the military is crucial for a new state because the main threat to 
democracy – or even only semidemocracy – in new states has come from the 
military. From the  nineteeth century new states of Latin America to the mid-twentieth 
century new states of Asia and Africa,  democracy or semidemocracy has most 
frequently been overthrown by the military rather than by revolutions or ‗self coups‘ 
by elected governments. 
  
Dealing with political disorder is crucial for a new state because the main threat of it 
becoming a ‗failed‘ state – or even only a ‗weak‘ state – is through some form of 
rebellion, such as insurgency, secession or warlordism, taking away the state‘s 
control of some part of the society within its territorial boundaries. 
 
This thesis, therefore, will focus on the state‘s capabilities in performing functions 
that are relatively ‗straightforward‘ to assess and are also particularly important to 
Indonesia as a new, post-colonial state since it is clearly important in Indonesian 
case that: a) Problems with political disorder led to the end of version 1; b) Problems 
with the military led to the end of version 2, and; c) Problems with legal legitimacy 
have affected all four versions. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
PRE-INDEPENDENCE ORIGINS OF THE FIRST VERSION OF THE STATE 
 
 
In a relatively recent publication dedicated to better understanding3 about Indonesia, 
Donald K. Emmerson published an article entitled ―What is Indonesia?‖ in which he 
attempted to offer an ―alternative definition‖ of the country in question. His endeavour 
basically portrayed the image of Indonesia in space rather than exclusively tracing 
her over time. It focused on four aspects of identity: a unique Indonesia depicted 
along physical, social, and political lines; a centrifugal Indonesia lying on a great 
range of diversity; the historical identity of Indonesia variously influenced by its pre-
colonial, colonial and nationalist past; and a personal Indonesia as imagined or 
experienced by individual Indonesians, which overall, may bring intellectual 
satisfaction to its readers (Emmerson, 2005, pp. 7-73). 
 
Considering Emmerson‘s long dedication to his speciality, his article is an important 
reference point for those who have a special interest in Indonesia, and  his latest 
thoughts should have been expected to clarify the ‗mystery‘ of this former Dutch 
colony. However, instead of feeling enlightened, readers find themselves considering 
an even more ambiguous situation. Emmerson‘s arguments are reassuring but, at 
the same time, they justify the old slogan that to understand Indonesia well requires 
a parallel use of rationality and wisdom. 
 
Our goal in this chapter is more or less similar to that is of Emmerson: to elaborate 
specific aspects of ―Indonesia‖. However, while Emmerson focus was a broad one, 
this chapter limits itself to a very specific focal point: the constitution and its relations 
to the State. Emmerson portrayed Indonesia as an image on a certain space, but our 
analysis will examine the specific foundations of this image, and, at the same time, 
observe interactions between the foundations and the image. Some questions taken 
into account include: How was the Indonesian Constitution formulated, and under 
what circumstances did this formulation take place? If the Constitution is considered 
                                                 
3
 Emerson, meanwhile, denies his own postulate by saying that ―In selecting certain ways of seeing 
Indonesia for a brief treatment here, I did not try for comprehensiveness.‖ See: EMMERSON, D. K. (2005) 
What is Indonesia ? IN BRESNAN, J. (Ed.) Indonesia: The Great Transition. Oxford, Rowman and Littlefield 
Publishers, Inc., p.8 
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as the foundation of state, does this have the minimum requirement to ensure the 
stability of this structure? How, from the perspective of the Constitution, is the state 
supposed to exist and behave? Does the Indonesian State always behave in 
accordance with principles conveyed in the Constitution, or does it tend to violate 
them? How does the Constitution cope with different situations in the Indonesian 
political dynamic?  
 
Detailed answers to these questions could be very lengthy and unattainable unless a 
―clue‖ is found that clarifies the enigma of whether the Constitution adopted by 
Indonesia serves to strengthen the state, or brings about instability. To start with, two 
basic ideas of the state are presumed to have had a great impact in the formulation 
of the Indonesian Constitution: the ‗raison d‘etre‘ of the Indonesian nation which is 
the concept frequently called ‗Nationalism‘,4 and the social setting of the Indonesian 
state.  
 
2.1. Disunited nationalism versus the “Unity in Diversity” 
 
Some Western scholars who focus on Indonesian nationalism seem to share the 
views that Indonesia had no real root in nationalism in the pre-twentieth century 
period. Benedict Anderson for example, had grave doubts that nationalism existed in 
the past by saying: ―If one studies its brief global history, one can say that it 
(Nationalism) is not something inherited from the ancient past, but is rather a 
‗common project‘ for the present and the future‖ (Anderson, 1999, p.2). Therefore, in 
Anderson‘s view, nationalism should not be associated in a direct way with State.  
He provided the argument that the Indonesian state existed long before the notion of 
nationalism had even been conceived by saying that ―The genealogy of the state in 
Indonesia goes back to early seventeenth century Batavia. Its continuity is quite 
apparent even though the stretch of its territory increased vastly 
overtime….Furthermore, we should always bear in mind that in it last days, during 
the 1930s, 90 percent--I repeat 90 percent--of its officials were ‗natives‘. There were 
                                                 
4
 History about the Indonesian nationalism can be found in some excellent studies such as: KAHIN, G. 
M. (1952) Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia. , Ithaca, N.Y., Cornell University Press.; BENDA, H. J. 
(1958) The crescent and the rising sun : Indonesian Islam Under the Japanese Occupation, 1942-1945. , The 
Hague, Van Hoeve.; ABDULGANI, R. (1973) Nationalism, Revolution, and Guided Democracy in Indonesia, 
Centre of Southeast Asian Studies, Monash University. 
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of course some changes--extrusions and additions--during the revolution, but for the 
greater part the personnel of the young Republic‘s state was continues with that of 
the colonial state. The first post-1950 parliament was also full of former collaborators 
with colonialism and the new Republican army also included plenty of soldiers and 
officers who had fought against the Republic during the Revolution‖ (Anderson, 
1999, p.2). 
 
Anderson‘s ‗pre-modern‘ thesis is supported by other scholars, including Emmerson. 
However, despite his agreement on the significance of the past, Emmerson was 
more direct in rejecting the existence of Indonesian pre-Independence nationalism 
by stating ―Indonesia was state before it became a nation. In consequence, rather 
than the nation straightforwardly growing a state through which to organize itself, the 
Indonesian nation has been called into being by—and substantially for—a pre-
existing state‖ (Emmerson, 2005, p.8-9).  
 
In addition, another perspective about this issue is worthy of inclusion. On August 
1945, a few days after the declaration of defeat by the Japanese during the Pacific 
War, Sukarno and others declared the birth of the Indonesian state - historically 
marking their action with a document containing a brief statement later known as 
Naskah Proklamasi 19455: 
 
―Kami, Bangsa Indonesia, dengan ini menyatakan kemerdekaan Indonesia.  
Hal-hal yang mengenai pemindahan kekuasaan, d.l.l. diselenggarakan dengan cara 
seksama dan dalam tempo yang sesingkat-singkatnya. 
Jakarta, 17-8-1945 
Atas nama bangsa Indonesia 
(Signed) Sukarno-Hatta----------------―We, the Indonesian people6 hereby declare the 
independence of Indonesia. Matters concerning the transfer of power, etc., will be 
carried out in a conscientious manner and as speedily as possible. 
Jakarta, 17 August 1945. 
In the name of the people of Indonesia, 
[signed] Sukarno-Hatta‖ (Ricklefs, 1981a, p.198). 
 
                                                 
5
 The text was collectively drafted by Sukarno, Hatta, and Ahmad Subarjo. Other individuals such as 
Sayuti Melik. BM Diah, Sukarni, and Sudiro were present but admittedly didn‘t contribute on the drafting of the 
text. See: HATTA, M. (1969) Sekitar Proklamasi 17 Agustus 1945, Jakarta, Tintamas. 
6
 Ricklefs translates the Indonesian word ―Bangsa‖ into English as ‖People‖, whereas in this context 
Indonesians would rather use the word ―Nation‖ instead of ―People‖. This needs to be clarified as in certain 
circumstance, especially for an analytical objective, ―People‖ is not parallel with ―Nation‖. 
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Observing this text from a literal perspective, at least two important points stand out: 
The first is that the new state called Indonesia was declared by a nation named 
―Bangsa Indonesia‖---the Indonesian Nation; the second is that Sukarno, Hatta, or 
whoever were involved in this milestone (those most likely considered as the 
―project-makers‖) were declaring themselves to be acting on behalf of that nation. At 
least for Sukarno and his circle, Indonesian nationalism pre-existed the state and not 
vice-versa. 
 
The question of whether the so-called Indonesian nation existed prior or post August 
1945 causes us to look at conceptual debates on ‗Nation‘ and ‗Nationalism‘ (and 
eventually ‗State‘).  To this end, Ernest Gellner‘s ―Nation and Nationalism‖ serves as 
a representative analysis. According to Gellner, the difference between nation and 
nationalism unambiguously lies in their basic definition. The first refers to a group of 
individuals living in certain boundaries (not necessarily a state), while the second 
refers to sentiments blossoming among these individuals (Gellner, 1983, p. 1-7). In 
relation to the state, Gellner‘s next argument provides an explanation that sounds 
favourable to Sukarno‘s position while giving an additional space for further 
discussion. He wrote ―…..the problem of nationalism does not arise for stateless 
societies. If there is no state, one obviously cannot ask whether or not its boundaries 
are congruent with the limits of nations. If there are no rulers, there being no state, 
one cannot ask whether they are of the same nations as the ruled. When neither 
state nor rulers exist, one cannot resent their failure to conform to the requirements 
of the principle of nationalism‖. Due to the fact that the Indonesian state didn‘t 
(officially) exist before August 1945, this debate is void unless the attention is 
focused on ―sentiments‖ rather than on the ―people‖ as noted by Gellner. To bring 
clarity to his argument, related and supporting material can be brought into the 
analysis – Kartini‘s legacy. 
 
Raden Ayu Kartini (1879-1904), was a prominent Javanese and Indonesian national 
heroine and well-known as a pioneer in the area of women‘s rights for native 
Indonesians. As a Ningrat7, she had an exclusive opportunity to study at a Western 
                                                 
7
 The member of Javanese aristocrat 
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school from which she learned things such as Dutch language and western culture8. 
Based on her awareness of inequality between westerners and local people, she 
produced a number of manuscripts and correspondence that led to her being 
regarded as one of the pioneers of Indonesian nationalism. However, many tend to 
regard her values as local (Javanese) in character rather than national (Indonesian)9. 
For example Watson made the following comment:   
 
Reading what has been written about Kartini in this accounts brings strong confirmation 
that in history, interpretations are far more significant than facts. In Kartini‘s case there 
are the bald facts of dates of birth 1879 and death 1904, and the fact that we are 
speaking about a woman, but these in isolation tell us nothing than we want to know; 
they have to be contextualized: where was she born? who were her parents? what did 
she achieve? And it is already in answering these apparently simple questions that 
biographers and myth makers have immediately encountered difficulties and offered 
very different interpretations. Take for example her country of birth. Should we call it 
Java, Indonesia, or The Dutch East Indies?……………and her parents? One 
description of her has her of royal blood. Her letters in English translation are titled 
Letters from a Javanese Princess. But giving her such a title involves a misconception 
of stratification in Javanese society, and the term ―princess‖ is simply not appropriate. 
She was a member of aristocratic Javanese society, and her father was a senior official 
in the Dutch colonial government. Thus she was of high status within native 
society…..One of her biographers, the well-known Pramoedya Ananta Toer, anxious to 
rescue Kartini from her incarcerations and incarnations within myths constructed by 
liberal Dutch intellectuals and by post-independence ideologues, has emphasized her 
commons origins. The title of his book, Panggil aku Kartini Sadja, is taken from one of 
the letters Kartini wrote to a Dutch friend disavowing any aristocratic pretentions. The 
friend had asked how to address her, thinking that she was an aristocrat, and Kartini 
had replied saying ―Simply call me Kartini‖. To Pramoedya, this response is 
emblematic for her desire to identify with the common people. And indeed it is this 
alleged identification of her with the common people that he makes the principal theme 
of his biography, stressing that Kartini was an Indonesian nationalist avant la lettre and 
hostile to the feudal and hierarchical structure of Javanese society, which she 
constantly attacked (Watson, 2000, p.18-19). 
 
Returning to Gellner‘s definition, it seems that the sentiments required by the notion 
of ‗Nationalism‘ obviously did exist in Indonesia before the birth of the Indonesian 
state. There may be some hint of this idea in Anderson and Emmerson as well, but it 
should be enough here to say that the origins of nationalism in Indonesia are 
unclear, fragmented, and subjective, but, nonetheless, useful. 
                                                 
8
 A good reference about Kartini can be found in FAN, K.-S. (1982) Women in Southeast Asia: a 
bibliography, Boston, G.K. Hall. 
9
 It is more or less in the same sense that Pattimura of Ambon (1783-1817), Prince Diponegoro of Java 
(1785-1855), Teungku Cik Di Tiro of Atjeh (1836-1891), Pangeran Antasari of Kalimantan (1797-1862), and 
many more, were regarded as ―The Progenitor‖ of Indonesian Nationalism‖.  
 
44 
 
 
These different perspectives are congruent with the establishment of the modern 
Indonesian state. Since August 1945, in the declaration of Independence, there is a 
slogan referring to the wide archipelago: Bhineka Tunggal Ika—Unity in Diversity 
(various, yet one; diverse, but united). This national motto represents and reflects 
accurately the most profound reality of Indonesia. It expresses a strong desire to 
achieve unity despite the immense heterogeneous character of this state. The 
existence of this common will in turn presupposes the existence of common cultural 
characteristics underlying the apparent heterogeneity.  
 
The most impressive thing to say about this country is the fact that Indonesia is 
highly fragmented both geographically and ethnically. Consisting of not less than 
13,667 (big and small, inhabited and uninhabited) islands (Simatupang, 1977, p311-
322), the Indonesian archipelago is certainly the most scattered country in the world. 
Although the land area covers only about 735,000 square miles, its total land and 
sea area amounts to nearly four million square miles – a million square miles more 
than the area of the continental United States of America (Pelzer, 1963, p. 1-2).  
Indonesia‘s islands are spread over an expanse of more than 3,000 miles, equal to 
the distance between San Fransisco and the Bermuda Islands; and about 1,000 
miles wide, a distance equal to that of Buffalo, New York to Key West, Florida 
(Pelzer, 1963, p.1, Vlekke, 1943, p.x). Accounting for half of the area of Southeast 
Asia, Indonesia‘s land area is exceeded only by India and China (Peacock, 1973, 
p.1).  It is dominated mainly by five major islands: Sumatra, Java, Kalimantan, 
Sulawesi, and Papua. 
 
Ethnically and culturally, Indonesia is also one of the more heterogeneous countries 
in the world (Geertz, 1963, p.24). Its population is basically of Malay-race origin – the 
product of a large, but unverified, number of migrations from the Asian mainland 10 
dating back between 2500 B.C. and 1000 B.C. An amalgam with other racial 
elements over many centuries has produced various ethnic variations within that 
                                                 
10
 Mohammad Ali said that the ancestors of Indonesian Malay-race were migrants from the valleys of 
Mekhong, Irawady and Saluen in Indo-China (currently is Vietnam) who came to the archipelago at around 
2500 B.C. See: ALI, M. (1963) Perjuangan Feodal, Bandung, Ganaco., p.9-11 
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common racial framework and hence making its population difficult to classify11. 
Raymond Kennedy, as cited by Legge, noted that there are at least fourteen ethnic 
groups which are prominent in Indonesia: Atjehnese, Batak, Minangkabau, Coastal 
Malay, Sundanese, Javanese, Madurese, Balinese, Dayaks, Makassarese, 
Buginese, Torajas, Menadonese, and Ambonese (Legge, 1964, p.4).  Scholars such 
as Hefner, believe that there are at least 300 ethnic groups existing in Indonesia 
(Hefner, 2005, p.75). Such communities occupy their own particular region, speak its 
own language, and possess its own form of social organization. They have a sense 
of distinctness and sense of local pride that, in certain circumstances, take 
precedence over feelings of national loyalty (Legge, 1964, Ibid). According to a 
comprehensive study by the Summer Institute of Linguistics (SIL) cited by 
Emmerson, a total of 726 indigenous languages were spoken as mother tongues in 
Indonesia in the 1980s and early 1990s (Emmerson, 2005, p. 23)12. To this mix, we 
must add the presence of the Chinese, the Arabs, the Indians, and the Eurasians 
with their own languages and cultures. Some of them have lived in the archipelago 
for many generations (Skinner, 1963, p.97-117). 
 
With regard to religious life in Indonesia, we can say that, with the exception of 
Judaism, and with the addition of a wide range ―Indigenous religions‖, all the major 
and important world religions are represented, most of them alive and strong. 
According to the 1971 national census, Islam comprised 87.5% of the total 
population, Christianity (Protestant and Roman Catholic) 7.4%, Hinduism 1.9%, 
Buddhism 1.7% and others 1.4% (BPS, 1973). Furthermore, around 1.5 million 
(including much of the Chinese minority) are Confucianists (Van Der Kroef, 1953, 
p.121). Other statistical analyses may show some difference in percentage, but it is 
believed that Moslems count for at least 90 percent of the total Indonesian 
population (Peacock, 1973, p.147), and most of these live on the island of Java. 
Christianity is practiced mostly in the northern part of Sumatra and the eastern parts 
such as in Sulawesi, Maluku, and Papua; while Balinese and Lombokese are mostly 
                                                 
11
 Excellent historical studies about the movement of people and cultures around the Indonesian 
archipelago can be found in Anthony Reid and Denys Lombard. See: REID, A. (1939) Southeast Asia in the age 
of commerce, 1450-1680, New Haven, Yale University Press.; LOMBARD, D. (1990) Le carrefour javanais : 
essai d'histoire globale, Paris, Editions de l'Ecole des hautes etudes en sciences sociales. 
12
 Different information, however, were provided by some different scholars. Robert Cribb, for instant, 
put the number more than 350. See: CRIBB, R. & KAHIN, A. (2004) Historical Atlas of Indonesia, Lanham, 
Scarecrow Press., p. 260 
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Hindu. However, the kinds of Mohammedanism, Christianity, and Hindhuism that are 
practiced are hardly ―pure‖ versions. The Javanese, for example, who are almost all 
Moslem, still possess fundamental belief about spirits, life after death, magic, and 
pagan concepts. In addition, their practices are mixed with Hindhuism and Buddhism 
as a result of the political dominance of the Hindu-Buddhist Kingdom of Majapahit 
during the fourteenth and early fifteenth century. The ‗Agama Jawa‘ (Islam but 
Pagan-like) dominates in rural villages, and consists of a balanced integration of 
Animistic, Hinduistic, and Islamic elements. In Geertz‘s words, this basic Javanese 
syncretism is the island‘s true folk tradition (Geertz, 1976, p.5). The remainder follow 
a relatively unmixed form of Islam – distinguished by strict rituals and practices, 
depth of religious comprehension, and rejection of Animistic and Hindu beliefs.  The 
group known as Santri under Geertz‘s classification, possibly counts for more than a 
quarter of the total Javanese population.  
 
Heterogeneity and diversity are also present when we speak about the Indonesian 
economic, social, and political landscape. The various levels of human technology 
that developed over many centuries in the archipelago have produced various 
civilizations. The greater part of Java, especially the central and eastern part of the 
island, has been cultivated for many centuries before, and is an agricultural society. 
This, combined with the density of the population and agricultural village life of Inner 
Java (which is based on a closed economy) eventually created a feudalistic social 
pattern13. Under these circumstances, the rural life of peasants continued relatively 
unchanged with trade and interactions with outsiders monopolized by village leaders. 
The latter, in turn, were dominated by imperial rule – as such, their mansions and 
palaces became the centres of Javanese civilization. The society itself, as a 
consequence, remained stratified, creating extreme levels of heterogeneity.  
 
Northern Java, Sumatra, and the eastern coastal parts of Kalimantan, meanwhile, 
showed a different social pattern. The harbour principalities that flourished in these 
coastal towns facilitated close contact with outside traders for many centuries 
(notably merchants from Hinduist-India, China, the Middle East and Japan) who 
                                                 
13
 This kind of pattern is very close to the reconstruction of hydraulic society dedicated by Karl 
Wittfogel, See: WITTFOGEL, K. A. (1957) Oriental despotism : a comparative study of total power. , New 
Haven Yale University Press. 
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bartered precious commodities such as spices, camphor, gold, silver, and sandal-
wood along the sea roads (See:Reid, 1939, Lombard, 1990).  In these parts of the 
archipelago, the social distance between the aristocratic rulers and the urban 
population was much less pronounced than those of Javanese inland states. 
 
The hinterlands away from the harbor principalities of Sumatra and Kalimantan, 
however, showed yet another different social pattern. On these huge islands, the 
population was extremely sparse compared with that of Java, with vast tracts of land 
and jungle available for occupation. Farmers moved from one place to another, 
clearing jungle, burning it off and planting rice, cassava, maize and pepper (revealing 
a pattern of shifting cultivation). As a consequence, in a society without integration of 
the rural regions with larger political units, this was another factor of heterogeneity 
for the archipelago. All these factors caused the ―Unity‖ mentioned in the national 
slogan to be doubted, making ‗Unity‘ seem only an aspiration rather than a concrete 
reality. 
 
2.2. Polarization in perspectives among elites 
 
The different perspectives on Indonesian nationalism and its national setting have 
produced consequences: First, a common understanding about the genuine ―raison 
d‘etre‖ of the Indonesian nation is not shared by all Indonesians; Second, different 
elements of the nation tend to use this concept to serve sectarian interests; Third, 
certain groups claim association with the genuine founders, or to be the righteous 
inheritors of nationalism, thus asserting the privilege and right to determine the future 
of the nation. These two last consequences were significant in the tensions between 
Islamic and secular nationalists during the first half of the twentieth century when the 
Indonesian constitution was being formulated.   
 
Sukarno and the secular nationalists often took their nationalism from ‗Budi Utomo‘, 
an organisation founded by Sutomo in 1908. This organisation was initially a 
provincial movement (not a national one) though it covered the whole of Java 
(Nasution, 1965, p. 117). Furthermore, as far as its socio-cultural outlook and 
interests were concerned, it appealed only to the population of Central Java 
(Pringgodigdo, 1967, p. 8). Despite its early parochial origins, the Indonesian state 
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commemorated the Budi Utomo‘s establishment as National Awakening Day, 
justifying the secular nationalist‘s claim to the state. There are at least two 
connotations with this public symbol: First, despite its local character, Budi Utomo 
was crucial because with it, the struggle against Western domination was for the first 
time organised in a ―modern‖ way (Pringgodigdo, 1967, p.11); Second, from these 
early roots, secular nationalist movements developed (including the Partai Nasional 
Indonesia---PNI-Indonesian Nationalist Party---on July 4, 1927; the Partai Indonesia-
--Partindo-Indonesian Party---on April 1931; the Pendidikan Nasional Indonesia---
PNI Baru-Indonesian Nationalist Education---on December 1933; the Partai 
Indonesia Raya---Parindra-Great Indonesian Party---on December 26, 1935, and; 
the Gerakan Rakyat Indonesia---Gerindo-The Indonesian People‘s Movement---on 
May 24, 1937) (Pringgodigdo, 1967, p.55-62 and 105-144). 
 
This group of nationalists can be considered as the fanatic defender of pluralism and 
democratic liberal views in Indonesia. While struggling over equality between 
Westerners and local people, organisations under this category idealized a new 
republic---not necessarily self-governed---but one with preference for the 
parliamentary-model of governance emphasizing the multi-cultural dimension of 
nationalism. It tended to omit any differing factors among elements of the nation, 
including those of religion. In their view, any privilege associated with certain religion-
groups, which is in this case is the Islam-majority, was not tolerable, and the notion 
of state had to be separated from any religious discourse. By consequence, during 
the first period of the new republic, this group became a shelter for Indonesian 
minority-groups – most notably the Christians, who mostly lived in the eastern part of 
the archipelago14. Among the prominent leaders of this group were Dr. Radjiman 
Wedyodiningrat, Wurjaningrat Djiwosewodjo, Sukarno, AA. Maramis, Muhammad 
Yamin, Ahmad Soebardjo, and Mohammad Hatta. 
 
State-justified nationalism was not shared by all Indonesians, especially not by the 
Islamic nationalists. The latter regarded the establishment of the Sarekat Islam---SI-
                                                 
14
 In the later period, this geographical cleavage was used by the Christian leaders to warn Hatta that 
the eastern part of the archipelago would not join into the new republic if the Constitution of that republic gives 
its privilege to the Moslem majority.  
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Islamic Association (the continuation of Sarekat Dagang Islam-SDI15 founded by 
Hadji Samanhudi in 1905) as the starting point of the modern Indonesian nationalist 
movement (Nasution, 1965, p.1). There were two arguments that supported this 
position: First, unlike Budi Utomo (which focused its attention around Java and 
claimed fewer than 10 thousand members) Sarekat Islam had a much vaster scope 
of operation across the archipelago. In 1916, there were at least 181 Branches of SI 
scattered over the archipelago, with no fewer than 700,000 members, and later rising 
to 2 million people by 1919 (Pringgodigdo, 1967, p.18); Second, Indonesia‘s 
population was by nature divided into various ethnic groups, each with its own 
language, history, social structure, and tradition, so that the history of nationalism 
that appeared in the country prior to the twentieth century had a strong ethnic 
character. In this situation, Islam (notably the SI) was often regarded to be the major 
force capable of transcending these sectarian and primordial boundaries. As stated 
by Nasution: ―It was mainly Islam…that created in them consciousness of belonging 
to the same group. Islam was their rallying point of identity. It was through Islam that 
different ethnic groups were united into a large comprehensive community. Islam 
was able to break the power of local nationalism (Nasution, 1965, p.180). It was not 
by accident that during the nineteenth century Moslem Indonesian national heroes 
such as Diponegoro, Cut Nya Dien, Cut Meutia, Pangerang Tirtayasa, Teungku Cik 
di Tiro, Sultan Baabullah, and Pangeran Antasari were frequently referred to as 
‗complementary justification‘ to the Islam nationalists‘ claim. 
 
Unlike the Budi Utomo who focused only on Java, the concern of SI was for the 
whole archipelago. As such, SI transformed itself several times: as Partai Syarikat 
Islam (PSI-Islamic Association Party) in 1923; in 1927 that was altered again to the 
Partai Syarikat Islam Hindia Timur (PSIHT-East Indies Islamic Association Party); 
and finally it became Partai Syarikat Islam Indonesia (PSII-Indonesian Islamic 
Association Party) (Pringgodigdo, 1967,  pp.35, 40). Together with the Persatuan 
Muslimin Indonesia (Permi-Indonesian Muslim Union Party) established in Sumatra 
in 1932, and the Partai Islam Indonesia (PII- Indonesian Islamic Party) established in 
Java in 1938 (Pringgodigdo, 1967, p.124), the SI formed the Islam nationalist group.  
 
                                                 
15
 Initially was aimed to give protection to local-Moslem-traders from the expansion of monopolistic-
Chinese-traders. 
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Similar to objectives of the secular nationalists, this party also stressed its struggle 
for equal rights with Westerners, and more radically expressed their feeling of anti-
colonialism. This sentiment was based not only on the fact that colonialism had 
caused suffering among local people, but it was also nourished by the religious 
sentiment that the colonialists were foreigners with beliefs that made them infidels16. 
Unlike secular nationalists, a self-governed republic was the non-negotiable political 
objective for this group17. The SI declared that their objective was ―To achieve the 
real development of local people by the way of brotherhood, unity, and mutual help 
among Moslems...self governance (zelfbestuur) as the final objective of the struggle 
against colonialist‘s politics, and to contend any forms of exploitation by the nasty-
Capitalism18‖ (Pringgodigdo, 1967, p.18).  
 
Another distinguishing factor that split the secularists from Moslem nationalists was 
the relations between state and religion. For Islamists, the state could not be 
separated from religion because the purpose of the state system included 
maintaining the proper connections between the human world and the Divinity on 
which equilibrium and the well-being of the Indonesian people and the Cosmos 
depended. The reasoning here was more or less like that of Deliar Noer, who 
stated―(Islam)…does not separate the spiritual and the worldly affairs of man, but 
includes teaching on secular as well as religious activities. Islamic Law, Syari‘at 
(Shari‘a), governs both aspect of life, man‘s relations with God and his relations with 
his fellows (Noer, 1973, p.1). This group was expecting the Islamic shari‘a to become 
the foundation of the new state, though in general they could also be categorized as 
nationalist and democratic in their views. Among the prominent leaders of this group 
were: Hadji Samanhudi, HOS Tjokroaminoto, Natsir, Abikoesno Tjokrosoejoso, 
                                                 
16
 The similar arguments are forwarded by among others Harry J. Benda. See: BENDA, H. J. (1958) 
The crescent and the rising sun : Indonesian Islam Under the Japanese Occupation, 1942-1945. , The Hague, 
Van Hoeve. 
17
 For Sukarno and secular nationalists in general, the struggle for independence should be based on 
pragmatism rather than radical approach defended by Islam nationalists and Socialists group. This difference of 
approach then frequently leads to conflicts between these two latest ideology and secular nationalists. It is quite 
often, hence, Sukarno et.al were regarded as colonialist‘s collaborators because their moderate, and sometime 
cooperative, behaviour vis-à-vis the Colonial authorities during the period of 1920-1945. 
18
 This Declaration must be the key explanation of political proximity between Islamists and the ISDV 
(Socialist group in the Volksraad---the embryo of Indonesian Communist Party). It is therefore the later SI is 
often associated with Socialist-and not the Islamists, especially after the admission of Ki Semaun and Darsono 
(two prominent Socialists) into the S in 1918I, since then the popularity of SI among Moslems has sharply 
declined. About this topic, See: BRACKMAN, A. C. (1963) Indonesian communism : a history, New York, 
Praeger. 
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Abdul Kahar Muzakkir, Ki Bagus Hadikusumo, Abdul Wahid Hasyim, and Haji Agus 
Salim.  
 
As the discussion above suggests, bipolarisation was evident in Indonesian since the 
beginning of the twentieth century. With reference to the Budi Utomo which was in 
contrast to the Sarekat Islam, another party, Jong Java (Java Youths, established in 
1915) had its counterpart in Jong Islamiten Bond (JIB-Muslim Youth Union, 1925). 
Alongside, the Permufakatan Perhimpunan Politik Kebangsaan Indonesia (PPPKI-
Union of National Political Associations of the Indonesian People, 1927), and the 
Gabungan Politik Indonesia (GAPI-Federation of Indonesian Political Parties-1939) 
were both dominated by secular groups, but at another side there was a federative 
body of Islamic organisations which was the Majlis Al-Islam A‘la Indonesia (MIAI-
Great Islamic Council of Indonesia, 1937). Alongside, the Java Hokokai (People 
services Association on Java, 1944) stood as the rival to Majlis Syuro Muslimin 
Indonesia (Masyumi-Consultative Council of Indonesian Muslim, 1943) 
(Pringgodigdo, 1967, p.19-34, Anshari, 1997, p.9), and later between Individuals 
Sukarno and Natsir. 
  
2.3. Two competing models of constitution: The Shari‟a versus Secularism 
 
The friction between Islamist and Secular groups become apparent around 1940, as 
was reflected in the polemic discussion between Sukarno19 and Muhammad Natsir20. 
Concerning the relationship between state and religion (Noer, 1973, p.294), Sukarno 
(as the spoke-person of the Secular Nationalists) wrote articles entitled ―Memudakan 
Pengertian Islam-To Rejuvenate the Understanding of Islam‖, ―Masyarakat Unta dan 
Masyarakat Kapal Udara-The Camel and Aeroplane Society‖, and ―Apa Sebab Turki 
Memisahkan Negara dari Agama-Why does the Turk separate religion from the 
state‖. In his articles, Sukarno was trying to persuade Islamic nationalists that it was 
plausible to separate the notion of state from religious matters. According to 
                                                 
19
 Sukarno was born in 1901, was the founder and president of the PNI (1927) and the President of 
Indonesia for the Period of 1945-1966. A biography about Sukarno can be found among others in LEGGE, J. D. 
(1972) Sukarno: A Political Biography, London, Allen Lane the Penguin Press. 
20
 Natsir was born in 1908, was a leader of PII (1938) and the President of the Masyumi political party 
(1952-1959) and the first Prime Minister of the Unitary Republic of Indonesia (1950). A very brief biography 
about Natsir can be found in FEENER, R. M. (2007) Muslim legal thought in modern Indonesia, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press., p. 83-84 
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Sukarno, Indonesians must: First, be aware of their backwardness; Second, be 
gentle, avowing their misperception of the holy books as well as of the ancestral 
tradition, and; Third, free themselves from mistakes of the past otherwise they would 
not be able to step forward. Natsir (the spokesperson for Islam Nationalists) 
responded by publishing a series of nine articles entitled ―Persatuan Negara dan 
Agama‖-Union of Religion and State, in which he contended against all the 
arguments forwarded by Sukarno. 
 
In brief, secular Nationalists and Islamists were, at the time, in agreement that 
achieving Indonesian independence was just a matter of time, hence preparation for 
it was essential. However, both parties disagreed on the foundation of the state. The 
first was the preference of secularism, while the latter expected an Islamic state with 
Shari‘a law as the constitution.  
 
Developments in the international arena quickly modified this ideological map, with 
the events of World War II bringing about changes in the competition between rival 
Indonesian nationalist factions. Soon after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour on 
the 8th of December 1941, the United States declared war against the Japanese, 
which was followed by a similar declaration by the Dutch government two days later. 
However, this declaration of war was not accompanied with the necessary 
preparations by the Dutch Army in the East Indies.  As a result, the territory quickly 
fell under Japanese rule in less than a year.21 
 
For Indonesians, the capitulation of the Dutch and the introduction of Japanese rule 
made little difference. Although the Japanese continued the policies that had been 
established by the Dutch, they caused even greater hardship and stricter official 
control. However, as the tide turned by the beginning of 1944, the Japanese realized 
that they needed all the support they could possibly get in order to slow down the 
continuing progress of the Allied Forces on the Pacific Front. In September 1944, 
Prime Minister Koyso publicly promised to give Indonesia its independence 
                                                 
21
 The story around the World War II can be found in a large number of references, to cite one of them 
is BENDA, H. J. (1958) The crescent and the rising sun : Indonesian Islam Under the Japanese Occupation, 
1942-1945. , The Hague, Van Hoeve., especially Chapter 3 and 4. 
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―sometime in the future‖22. Some goodwill gestures were also made in order to 
convince the Indonesian people that the Japanese were serious with their promise.  
These included allowing Indonesian nationalists to take part in state affairs and 
giving them a greater freedom of movement. Indonesians was also allowed to form 
their own armed organisations such as PETA-Pembela Tanah Air—the Defenders of 
Motherland on 1943 and Hizbullah on 1944.  On September 9, 1944, the song 
Indonesia Raya (which later become the Indonesian national anthem and was 
prohibited up to that time) was permitted to be sung again. The Red and White flag 
was allowed to fly side by side with the Japanese flag (Panitia Lima, 1977, p.29). 
Finally, the Indonesian leaders were given more freedom to express their ideas in 
public, as long as they did not discredit Japanese authority. 
 
The term ‗future independence‘ and all kinds of freedom rendered by the Japanese 
authority provoked a wide range of interpretation amongst Indonesians, as the 
announcement did not specify when the independence will be granted.23 In 
Anderson‘s and Kahin‘s words, this promise ―…should not be interpreted as ‗in the 
near future‘‖ (Anderson, 1961, p.2) or ‗in the very near future‘ (Kahin, 1952, p.115). 
However, it was widely believed that most Indonesians at this time put their trust and 
hope on this promise.  Consequently, Sukarno and other secular nationalists 
preferred to wait and see, while cooperating with the Japanese authorities. In 
contrast, many Socialist youth activists gained some support from Islam nationalists 
who were in favour of a quick reaction24. These factors encouraged Indonesian 
nationalists to challenge Japanese control over the Dutch East-Indies territory and to 
declare it an independent state.  Slogans such as ―Independence must not be a gift‖ 
was frequently sounded among the activists with regard to this development. This 
                                                 
22
 The original text of Premier Koiso published in Asia-Raja edition 8 September 1944 says ―….kelak 
pada kemudian hari---someday in the future‖ DAHM, B. (1969) Sukarno and the struggle for Indonesian 
independence Ithaca, N.Y., Cornell University Press. p.276. 
23
 This fact serves as the background to the long debate during the period of post-independence on the 
issue whether the Indonesian independence is the grant of the Japanese Empire of merely the ultimate-result of 
long-nationalist-struggle against foreign domination.  
24
 An exception is the group of Abikusno Tjokrosujoso. In the days following the Dutch surrender, 
Abikusno Tjokrosujoso threw himself with verve into the activities of a section of the Indonesian political 
community aimed at forming Indonesian government to assist the Japanese war administration. This behaviour, 
according to Van Dijk, might be driven by his misunderstanding of the intentions of the Japanese. See: VAN 
DIJK, C. (1981) Rebellion Under the Banner of Islam : the Darul Islam in Indonesia, The Hague, Martinus 
Nijhoff., p.42 
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difference in perspective, however, did not persist, as Sukarno‘s approach received 
more support from the shifting circumstances. 
 
Indonesian leaders got their first real chance to sit together and formulate their ideas 
more clearly when a committee was established by the Japanese authority25 on the 
29th of April 1945 (Yamin, 1960, p.239) . The committee was named the Dokuritsu 
Zyunbi Tyoosakai (The Investigating Body for the preparation of an independent 
Indonesia), with 62 members and chaired by DR Radjiman Wedyodiningrat 
(Anderson, 1961, p.2). It had two Vice-Chairpersons, one of which was Japanese, 
and the other an Indonesian. Besides the 62 members there were also seven other 
Japanese as extra-ordinary members (Pantjasila 1964, p.10). Thus, not only were 
the proceedings of this body conducted under the close scrutiny of the Japanese 
occupying authority, but they also had to work quickly under severe time constraints.  
During its existence, this Committee conducted only two meetings. The first meeting 
began on the 29th of May and lasted until the 1st of June 1944; the second meeting 
was held from the 10th to 16th July 1945, during which the Investigating Body 
discussed the basic principles upon which the future state would be founded. The 
first and most important issue they had to deal with was raised by Dr. Radjiman who 
in his opening address, asked the committee members: What is the basis or the 
foundation of the Indonesian state which we are about to form? 
 
The members of the Investigating Body were soon divided into different groups with 
different ideas. Some thought that this question was too philosophical. They worried 
that by trying to answer this question the Body would fall into an irrelevant, abstract 
and endless debate. That is why they proposed to proceed directly to finishing the 
                                                 
25
 Soon after the statement of Premier Kyoso ―Instruction issued simultaneously from Tokyo to local 
commanders in the area, specified that the date of independence should be kept indefinite, and that the use of 
national symbols might be encouraged‖ ANDERSON, B. R. O. G. (1961) Some aspects of Indonesian politics 
under the Japanese occupation : 1944-1945. , Ithaca, N.Y. , Cornell University. Dept. of Far Eastern Studies., 
p.2.  Following this instruction, Lt. Gen. Keimakici Harada, the commander of 16th Army in Java, then declared 
the establishment of Dokuritsu Zyunbi Tyoosakai with the purpose of granting independence to Indonesia. On 
paper, this body was intended to consider the basic questions and to draft major plans for an independent state of 
Indonesia. The result of this would then be handed, via the Japanese, to another body called the Panitia 
Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia (PPKI-The Preparatory Committee for the Independence of Indonesia)—a 
later body established by the Japanese authority.   
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draft of the constitution which, according to them was more practical, realistic, 
relevant and urgent – especially under the heavy pressure of time.  
 
Most members, however, agreed that the issue raised by Dr. Radjiman was indeed a 
very important problem that had to be undertaken first before they could proceed to 
the following steps. But the agreement amongst the members of this group did not 
go beyond that and were soon divided into two opposing camps. One group 
defended Islam as the basis of the state, and the other group strongly rejected that 
idea, and favoured a secular basis. There were more conflicting ideas during the 
debate within the Investigating Body, as pointed out by Sukarno, ―The sophisticates 
of Java, the traders of Sumatra, the peasants from outer islands found no common 
ground. During siesta time from one to five, the Islamic group met separately, the 
Nationalist group met separately, the Federalist and Unitarians met separately. 
Those who claimed that our territory constituted exactly the boundaries of the former 
Netherlands East Indies formed one group. Others who claimed more or were 
satisfied with less formed another group. Orthodox Muslims pushed for a State on an 
Islamic theocratic basis. There were moderates who decided we were too immature 
to govern ourselves at all‖ (Adams, 1966a, p.299). 
 
On June 1, 1945, after three days of ―sharp conflict‖ amongst the members of the 
Investigating Body, Sukarno delivered his famous speech, known as ―The birth of 
Pancasila‖—the Philosophical foundation which is the soul of the Indonesian 
constitution. 
 
Paduka Tuan Ketua yang Mulia, 
―…menurut anggapan saya, yang diminta oleh Paduka Tuan Ketua Yang Mulia 
ialah, dalam bahasa Belanda: philisophische gronslag daripada Indonesia 
merdeka. Philisophische gronslag  itulah fundamen filsafat , fikiran yang 
sedalam-dalamnya, jiwa hasrat yang sedalam-dalamnya untuk di atasnya 
didirikan gedung Indonesia Merdeka yang kekal dan abadi – 
 
Honourable Chairman, 
―…in my opinion, what is Your Honourable is expecting from us is what is 
called, in the Dutch language: the Philosopische Grondslag—philosophical 
foundation—of the independent state of Indonesia. Philosophical basis is the 
fundamental, the philosophy, the underlying reason, the spirit, the deepest 
desire, on which to build the structure of a Free Indonesia, enduring and age-
long. (Soekarno, 1961, p.5). 
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In this speech, Sukarno proposed a compromise:  
―…Indonesia merdeka bukanlah negara Islam dan bukan pula negara sekuler, 
tetapi sebuah negara Pancasila‖---―...Independent Indonesia would neither an 
Islamic nor a secular state, but a Pancasila state‖ (Soekarno, 1961, Ibid).  
 
According to Sukarno, Pancasila—literally means ―five pillars‖ or ―Five Principles‖—
consisted of the following principles, arranged in the following order: 
1. Kebangsaan Indonesia---Indonesian Nationhood, or, Indonesian nationalism 
2. Internationalism/Perikemanusiaan---Internationalism/Humanitarianism 
3. Mufakat/Demokrasi---Unanimous concensus/Democracy 
4. Kesejahteraan Sosial---Social welfare 
5. Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa---The One Lordship 
(Pantjasila 1964, p.22-34) 
 
According to Sukarno, these five principles could be compressed into three (Trisila): 
Socio-nationalism, Socio-democracy, and One Lordship; and then again further 
compressed into one (Ekasila): The principle of Gotong Royong (Mutual 
Cooperation). 
 
―If I compress what was five into three, and what was three into one, then I have 
a genuine Indonesian term, gotong royong, mutual cooperation. The state of 
Indonesia which we are to establish must be a gotong royong state. How 
wonderful that is: a Gotong Royong state‖ (Pantjasila, 1964, p.35) 
 
Sukarno‘s speech received an enthusiastic response from the audience as it was 
seen as a solution to the deadlock between members of the investigating body, who 
were obliged to finish their task as quickly as possible. A small committee was soon 
appointed in an ad-hoc capacity with the tasks of: Reformulating Pancasila as the 
foundation of the state based on the speech given by Sukarno on the 1st of June, 
1945; and using the document as the text to proclaim Indonesian independence 
(Panitia Lima, 1977, p.31). The committee known as ―Panitia Sembilan‖ included 9 
members: Sukarno (Islam-Secular), Muhammad Hatta (Islam-secular), AA Maramis 
(Christian-Secular), Abikusno Tjokrosujoso (Islamist), Abdul Kahar Muzakir 
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(Islamist), Haji Agus Salim (Islamist), Ahmad Subardjo (Islam-Secular), Wahid 
Hasyim (Islamist), Muhammad Yamin (Islam Secular)26.  
 
The result of the work of this ad-hoc committee was known as the Jakarta Charter 
(and hence the embryo of The Indonesian Constitution) and was signed by its 
members on June 22, 1945. The text of the Jakarta Charter was as follows27: 
 
Truly, freedom is the right of all nations, and therefore colonialism throughout the world must 
be eradicated, because it is not compatible with humanitarianism and justice. 
 
And the struggle of the Indonesian independence movement has come to a happy moment to 
lead the people of Indonesia safely to the threshold of an Indonesian state, which is free, 
united, sovereign, just and prosperous.  
 
With the blessing and the mercy of Allah the Almighty, and moved by a noble ideal for a 
free national life, the people of Indonesia hereby declare their independence. 
 
And therefore, in order to form a government of the state of Indonesia which protect the whole 
nation of Indonesia and the entire territory fo Indonesia, and in order to promote public 
welfare, to sharpen the mind of the nation, and to participate in the realization of a world order 
which is based on freedom, eternal peace, and social justice, and the independence of the 
Indonesian nations is formed in an Indonesian Constitution, manifested in a democratic state 
of the Republic of Indonesia, which is based on: (the principle) of Lorship , with the 
obligation to carry out the Islamic Syari‟a for its adherents; according to the principle of a 
just and civilised humanity, the unity of Indonesia and of peoplehood guarded by the spirit of 
wisdom in (the form of) deliberation (and) representation, and the realization of social justice 
for the whole people of Indonesia.  
 
Jakarta, 6-22-1945     Signed by: 
       Ir. Sukarno 
       Drs. Mohammad Hatta 
       Mr. A.A. Maramis 
       Abikusno Tjokrosujoso 
       Abdulkahar Muzakir 
       H.A. Salim 
       Mr. Achmad Subardjo 
       Wachid Hasjim 
       Mr. Muhammad Jamin 
 
From this text, we can see that there are some differences between the formulation 
of Pancasila as proposed by Sukarno, and the formulation of Pancasila as proposed 
by Panitia sembilan.  
 
                                                 
26
 The composition shows that Moslem is 90% represented but the Islamists count only 45%, while 
secular is 55% represented. This map is not only explanative to the product of the committee, especially with 
regard to the result of the ‗fight‘ between Islamist vs. Secularists reflected in the draft of the Constitution, but 
also serves as the basis of arguments to be discussed below.  
27
 The Translation from the original text was cited from SIDJABAT, W. B. (1965) Religious Tolerance 
and the Christian Faith, Jakarta, Badan Penerbit Kristen., p.19 
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The most noted difference is the redaction and the ordering, as can be seen in the 
following table: 
 
Sukarno‘s version Panitia Sembilan‘s version 
1 Indonesian nationalism 1 One Lordship, with the obligation to carry 
out the Islamic Shari‘a for its adherents; 
2 Internationalism 2 A just and civilized humanity 
3 Unanimous Concensus/Democracy; 3 The Unity of Indonesia 
4 Social welfare 4 Peoplehood Guarded by the spirit of 
wisdom in deliberation and 
representation 
5 The One Lordship 5 Social Justice 
 
The second difference is the focal point. If according to Sukarno, the five principles 
of Pancasila can be compressed into one principle, namely Gotong Royong---mutual 
cooperation, Panitia Sembilan used the principle of One Lordship instead.  
 
A provocative question is then unequivocal: ―Why was the outcome (Sukarno‘s 
version) different with the output (the Panitia Sembilan‘s version) which is far from 
pluralistic in terms of character? 
 
The first analysis can be found in the composition of the membership. As 90% of the 
Panitia Sembilan members were Moslems while 50% of this majority were orthodox, 
the Pancasila of the later version was the result of tyranny from the majority. The 
original concept proposed by Sukarno clearly reflected a pluralist point of view – a 
perspective certainly not shared by the dominant Islamic majority. Despite Sukarno 
also belonging to this majority (as a Moslem), his perspective did not serve the 
group‘s interests. To a certain extent, hence, Sukarno‘s stance might have been 
regarded as a trait by the Islam nationalist group. 
 
The second analysis relates closely with the aspiration of those who formerly 
defended Islam as the foundation of state. This judgement is based on two 
considerations: Firstly, the ordering of the five principle of Pancasila places One 
Lordship at the top. Putting the principle of Lordship first within the order has a 
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significant implication for the entire meaning of Pancasila. As pointed out by the 
Panitia Lima: 
 
―The principle of One Lordship has become the principle which guide the aspiration of our 
statehood. It gives the spirit to our effort for doing all that is right, just, and good. While as the 
principle of a Just and Civilized Humanity becomes the practical implication of the guiding 
principle we have said earlier. In the present order, the principle of Just and Civilized 
Humanity has to follow, and is related to, the first principle, because it has to be viewed as a 
practical follow-up the ideal and the practice of the principle of the One Lordship. Using this 
principles as guidance basically means that our government may not deviate from the straight 
route, if it wants to work for the security of our state and society, for world order and for 
brotherhood (and sisterhood) along nations. Whenever we lost our way, there is always a 
mysterious pressure to lead us back to the right path. The implication of the change of order 
of the five principle is that, although the ideology of the state does not change with the 
changes of words, the politics of the state will be given a strong moral foundation. The 
principle of One Lordship will not merely mean mutual respect for each other‘s religion, but it 
will become a foundation which leads us to the ways of truth, justice, goodness, honesty, 
human brother-(sister)hood, etc. With it, the state strengthens its own foundation‖ (Panitia 
Lima, 1977, p.42), and; 
 
Secondly, the inclusion of the sentence ―with the obligation to carry out the Islamic 
Shari‘a for its adherents‖ after One Lordship brought about a specific meaning. ―One 
Lordshipness‖ is one of the basic principles of Islamic religion: Tauhid. Surat Al 
Ikhlas---the Purity of Faith (Taken from the Qur'an, Surat 112) said: 
 
1. Say: He is Allah, the One; 
2. Allah, the Eternal, Absolute; 
3. He begetteth not, Nor is He begotten 
4. And there is none Like unto Him 
 
The first Ayat (Clause) is to negate the idea of polytheism, which is opposed to the 
fundamental conceptions of Islam (as well as Abrahamic religions including  
Christianity and Judaism) – for unity in design proclaims the Unity of the Maker. At 
the same time, the words ―Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa‖ do not offend other major 
religions despite other religions (such as Hinduism and Buddhism) being able to 
adopt Polytheism regarding the concept of God and divinity to some extent. As 
pointed out by Nieuwenhuijze: 
 
―…..Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa. Untransable for its compactness, this sentence 
asserts that He Who is The Absolute One is the Lord. It distinctly evokes the Islamic 
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creed, except that the wording deviate on purpose, so that the adherents of other 
religions may equally well agree with the assertion‖ (Nieuwenhuijze, 1958, p.21-26). 
 
The third analysis is complementary to the second one. The words of ―With the 
blessing and the mercy of Allah the Almighty...‖ in the third paragraph of the Charter 
is a clear indicator of the Panitia Sembilan‘s accommodation of Islamist aspiration. 
The word ―Allah‖ refers to a personal God, specifically that of Islam. However, the 
first principle of Pancasila was formulated in a neutral form: Ketuhanan Yang Maha 
Esa (The One Lordship) instead of Allah Yang Maha Esa (Allah Who is The One) 
which also means The One Lordship. Because Pancasila was proposed and 
accepted as a compromise between those who were in favour of a religious state 
and those who preferred a secular state, the formulation tried to satisfy both parties 
while at the same time could not accept any of those ideas in their entire context. 
 
2.4. Mixed Constitution: The middle way  
Was the Jakarta Charter then adopted as the constitution of the new state? The 
answer is ―No‖. The content of the Jakarta Charter was only partially included by the 
Indonesian Constitution. Some crucial elements have been omitted in the new draft, 
creating an even sharper conflict between Islamists and Secular Nationalists during 
the later period.  
In the second plenary meeting of the Investigating Body (July 10 to July 17, 1945), a 
special committee was formed consisting of 19 members with Sukarno as 
chairperson.  This committee was in charge of forming a constitutional draft which 
was to be used as the basic material for the state constitution. Among these 19 
members, seven were appointed as members of a working committee headed by 
Supomo28, a member of the Budi Utomo board. 
                                                 
28
 It is interesting to note that Supomo---in the meeting of the Investigating Body on May, 31, 1945—
one day before Sukarno‘s historical speech—has made clear his rejection of an Islamic state. In  that meeting he 
said: ―To establish an Islamic State in Indonesia means to establish a state whose unity is based on the largest 
group, namely the Islamic group. If an Islamic state is to be established in Indonesia, “minority problems” will 
surely come up, i.e., the problems of small religious groups, the Christian group, etc. And even though the 
Islamic State will try its best to guarantee and to protect the well-being of the other-groups, still those small-
groups definitely will not be able to conform themselves to the goal of the united states which all of us are 
longing for‖. See: YAMIN, H. M. (1959) Naskah Persiapan Undang-Undang Dasar 1945, I-III, Jakarta, 
Yayasan Prapanca., Vol 1, p.117 
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Supomo‘s working committee had its draft ready on July 13, 1945. In this draft of the 
Constitution, an article on religion was included – Article 29, which consisted of two 
sections. The first section read as follows: ―The State is based on One Lordship, with 
the obligation to carry out the Islamic syari‘a for its adherents‖. It repeated what had 
been formulated in the Jakarta Charter. The second section mentioned: The State 
guarantees the freedom of every person to profess and to worship according to 
his/her own religion and belief29.  
The above formulation of Section 2, was actually an amended version from the 
previous formulation proposed by Supomo‘s working committee, which read: ―The 
State guarantees the freedom of every person to embrace another religions and to 
worship according to his/her own belief‖ (Yamin, 1959, Ibid). This original formulation 
was strongly rejected by the Islamic group, because according to orthodox Islamic 
belief, change of religion from Islam is regarded as apostasy. Therefore, the final 
formulation was a kind of compromise wherein neither the Islamic group nor the 
Secular group totally rejected or accepted it.  
Another significant issue is Article 6 (previously was Article 4 Section 2) of the 1945 
Constitution. Supomo‘s working committee proposed an article that reads ―The 
President must be a native Indonesian citizen‖, to which Wahid Hasyim added the 
words ―…and Moslem‖. However, this clause was declined by Haji Agus Salim who 
was also an Islamist. He said ―Dengan ini kompromi antara golongan kebangsaan 
dan Islam akan mentah lagi: Apakah hal ini tidak bisa diserahkan kepada Badan 
Permusyawaratan Rakyat? Jika Presiden harus orang Islam, bagaimana halnya 
terhadap wakil presiden, duta-duta dan sebagainya. Apakah artinya janji kita untuk 
melindungi agama lain? - With these, the compromise between nationalists and 
islamists would be useless: Why don‘t we just leave this to the House of 
Representatives? If the president must be a Moslem, how about the vice-president, 
ambassadors, etc. What is the meaning of our promise to protect other 
religions?‖(Yamin, 1959, p.262)   
Meanwhile, the situation was changing very quickly. As a further commitment to their 
initial promise, the Japanese authority established Panitia Persiapan Kemerdekaan 
                                                 
29
 The addition of the words ―and belief‖ was suggested by Wongsonegoro, one of the prominent of the 
Kebatinan (Javanese Superstition). 
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Indonesia—PPKI—The Committee for Preparation of the Indonesian Independence--
on August 7, 1945, to replace the former Investigating Body. However, before this 
committee even began functioning, the Japanese defeat in the Pacific front was so 
evident that it was clear they could not fulfill their promise of granting independence 
to the Indonesian people. As a result, on August 17, 1945 – two days after the 
Japanese declaration of submission to the Allied Forces, the Indonesian people 
unitarily declared their own freedom without official consent from the Japanese 
authority. Sukarno (the chairperson of PPKI) and Hatta (the Vice-chairperson off 
PPKI) issued this declaration on behalf of the Indonesian nation. 
A day after this declaration of independence, the PPKI held its first meeting, during 
which the Jakarta Charter was agreed to be used as the preamble of the 
Constitution, while the draft proposed by Supomo‘s working committee was to 
become the Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia – or more popularly known as 
the 1945 Constitution. However, competition between the conflicting nationalists 
arose soon after the first session started. As noted by Panitia Lima: 
―….the serious objection from those whose religion was not Islam. According to 
them, it was inappropriate if within a principle statement with concerned the 
whole nation there was a regulation with was applied only to a particular part of 
the whole Indonesian people, even though that part was the biggest part…….in 
order to guard the unity and the harmonious totality of the entire Indonesian 
territory, the phrase ―with the obligation to carry out the Islamic syariah for its 
adherents‖ was omitted from the preamble of the Constitution‖ (Panitia Lima, 
1977, p. 32). 
Learning from their previous experience of confronting critical situations  (in 
particular the threat of the Dutch return after the Japanese defeat) members of the 
PPKI then worked hard not to get trapped in another prolonged debate. Sukarno 
himself, in his opening speech, gave his warning to the members of PPKI to ―React 
fast‖ and not to debate on detailed matters due to the critical circumstances (Yamin, 
1959, 399). This suggestion seems to receive a positive response from the audience 
as it resulted in a quickly negotiated set of compromises reflected in three issues: a 
new composition of Pancasila; agreement of Article 29 of the 1945 Constitution; and 
the modification of Article 6 of the Constitution. 
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The new composition of Pancasila, read as follows: 
1. Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa---One Lordship 
2. Kemanusiaan Yang Adil dan Beradab---Just and Civilized Humanity 
3. Persatuan Indonesia---Unity of Indonesia 
4. Kerakyatan yang Dipimpin oleh Hikmat Kebijaksanaan dalam 
Permusyawaratan/Perwakilan---Peoplehood which is Guarded by the Spirit of 
Wisdom in Deliberation/Representation 
5. Keadilan Sosial---Social Justice 
Note:  The words ―with the obligation to carry out the Islamic Shari‘a for its 
adherents‖ has been omitted 
The second is the Article 29 of the 1945 Constitution read as follows: 
1. Negara berdasarkan atas Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa---The State is based on 
the Principle of One Lordship; 
2. Negara menjamin kemerdekaan tiap-tiap penduduk untuk memeluk 
agamanya masing-masing dan untuk beribadat menurut agamanya dan 
kepercayaannya itu---The State guarantees the freedom of every person to 
profess his/her own religion and to worship according to his/her own religion 
and belief.  
Note:  The words ―with the obligation to carry out the Islamic Shari‘a for its 
adherents‖ has also been omitted from section 1. 
 The word ―belief‖ was added to section 2, giving acknowledgement by the 
state to non-religious superstitions 
The third compromise was the omission of the requirement that the President of the 
Republic of Indonesia should be a Moslem (article 6). The new redaction reads 
―Presiden adalah orang Indonesia asli‖ – ―The president shall be a native Indonesian 
citizen‖. 
These modifications were read by Hatta in front of the members of the Committee, 
finishing with a brief statement ―Inilah perubahan yang maha penting menyatukan 
segala bangsa---These are very important changes unifying every nation‖. Soon 
after Hatta finished his speech, Sukarno made the remark ―…this Constitution is 
temporary, swift constitution, revolutiegrondwet…later when we are living in a more 
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conducive environment, we will assemble people representatives to create a better 
constitution (Yamin, 1959, p.410, Boland, 1971b, p.37). This latest formulation was 
then endorsed as the Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia, entitled the 
Constitution 194530. 
This fact that the constitution was not a hundred percent reflected the appeal of the 
majority is alone adequate to justify the presumption that actually the Indonesian-
Moslems (the majority group) had never fully accepted the Constitution 1945 in the 
form as currently adopted by the state despite their endorsement on the compromise 
formula of the Constitution on the 18th of August 1945. As pointed out by Nasution 
―The day of the revolution were not the appropriate time (for the Islamic nationalist) 
to press on with realization of their Islamic ideas. For them, the defence of the 
independence of Indonesia must have the priority‖ (Nasution, 1965, p.76).  
 
Another explanation is that the agreement from the Islamists was given with 
conditions regarding Sukarno‘s ‗Promise‘ that ―…later, when we are living in a more 
conducive environment, we will assemble people representatives to create a better 
constitution‖. This assumption becomes more relevant when the reference is put 
what Sukarno said on the first of June 1945 during which he elaborated his 
conception regarding the principle of Permusyawaratan—Wisdom in deliberation—to 
be adopted in the Pancasila. Sukarno said, ―Untuk pihak Islam, inilah tempat yang 
terbaik untuk memelihara agama. Dengan cara mufakat, kita perbaiki segala hal, 
juga keselamatan negara, yaitu dengan jalan pembicaraan dan permusyawaratan di 
dalam Badan Perwakilan Rakyat. Apa-apa yang belum memuaskan, kita bicarakan 
di dalam permusyawaratan. Badan perwakilan inilah tempat untuk mengemukakan 
tuntutan-tuntutan Islam---For Islamists, I would like to say that this is the most 
appropriate place to preserve religion. With the wisdom in deliberation, we can repair 
anything, including the safety of the state, which is conducted through debates in the 
house of representative. Any unsatisfactory issues, whatever they are, can be 
discussed in deliberation. This body is the place where Islamists may forward their 
                                                 
30
 There have been four period of the Indonesian states that have consequently brought about such a 
pause to the implementation of the 1945 Constitution: The first one from August 18, 1945 until December 27, 
1949 (Constitution 1945); the second from December 27, 1949 until August 15, 1950 (Federal Constitution of 
1949); the third from August 15, 1950 until July 5, 1959 (Temporary Constitution of 1950); and the fourth one 
from July 5, 1959 until today (Constitution 1945).  
65 
 
aspirations‖ (Soekarno, 1961, p.18). Without no doubt, hence, the Constituent 
Assembly established on November 1956 is the ‗golden opportunity‘ been long 
awaited by Islamists, the opportunity through which Sukarno (and his alliance along 
the Nationalist line) were expected to realize their promise31.  
 
By leaving the creation of the final constitution to the Constituent Assembly, in fact 
Sukarno and his nationalist front had shown a good faith despite doubts about their 
sincerity. This doubt was tested during the later period when certain secularists from 
the nationalist front, including Sukarno, showed their reluctance to agree with ideas 
along the Islamists‘ aspirations, such as what was said by Sukarno at the beginning 
of 1953. He said, ―Negara yang kita susun dan yang kita ingini ialah negara nasional 
yang meliputi seluruh Indonesia. Kalau kita dirikan negara berdasarkan Islam, maka 
banyak daerah-daerah yang penduduknya tidak beragama Islam akan melepaskan 
diri, misalnya Maluku, Bali, Flores, Timor, Kai, dan juga Irian Barat yang belum 
masuk wilayah Indonesia tidak akan mau ikut dalam Republik---The state that we 
wish to establish and that we longed for is a unitary state covering the whole 
Indonesian territory. If we wish to establish an Islamic state, many regions whose 
population avowed to non-Islamic religions such as Maluku, Bali, Flores, Timor, Kai, 
and Papua would certainly not be happy and prefer to separate from the republic‖ 
(Feith, 1962, p.281, Anonymous, 1953, p.2-3).  
 
Such a statement had not only provoked a vast reaction among the Islamists but 
also given an impression to the Islamic front that the Nationalists were not sincere 
with their promise. The Presidential Decree later issued by Sukarno32, therefore, was 
regarded by the Islamists as a political maneuver in the favor of Secularists rather 
than a wise solution in the interests of the whole nation. Some have even had more 
negative perception, those who regarded the Decree merely as the manifestation of 
                                                 
31
 The members of this body were elected through the popular vote being conducted in 1955. The 
Islamists  grabbed 230 seats (40%) while other parties consisting altogether Nationalists, Christians, Socialists, 
and Communists claimed 286 seats (60%). A complete reference about the 1955 election, See: FEITH, H. 
(1957b) The Indonesian elections of 1955  Ithaca, Modern Indonesian Project, Southeast Asia Program, Dept. of 
Far Eastern Studies, Cornell University. 
32
 On July 5, 1959, Sukarno, in his capacity as the President of Indonesia, issued a Presidential Decree 
which put an end to the Constitutional Democracy adopted by the republic since 1955. The Decree basically 
contains two subject matters: the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly and return back to the Constitution 
1945. An excellent reference of this topic is FEITH, H. (1962) The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in 
Indonesia. , Ithaca, Modern Indonesia Project, Cornell University Press. 
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Sukarno personal ambition, passing over the Islamism-secularism issue. As asserted 
by Boland  ―The 1945 Constitution could open the way to his ―guided democracy‖ 
and could thus legalize his ‗conception‘. So, he decide to enforce a ‗return to the 
Constitution of 1945‘ passing over those of 1949 and 1950 and setting aside the 
work of the Assembly. If this interpretation is correct, it must be concluded that 
Sukarno‘s real aim was to bring about ‗guided democracy‘ via a ‗return to the 
Constitution of 1945‘ and not that was looking for a way out of the deadlock in which 
the Assembly found itself and then decided to force the issue by a ‗return to the 
Constitution of 1945‘, which then ended up in ‗guided democracy‘‖.(Boland, 1971b, 
p.91) 
 
However, it is not easy to rely too much on Boland‘s assumption as the Decree had 
in fact a solid reasoning which was the ineffectiveness of the Constituent Assembly 
during the period of 1956-1959. What was happening is that the members of the 
Constituent Assembly tended to waste the time33 and eventually didn‘t prevail to 
complete their main task to create a new constitution34. For almost three years, the 
Body was always repeating the same prolonged debates as that of the period of 
1944-1945 while the central issue remains the same: whether the state must stand 
                                                 
33
 This kind of opinion was not defied by the Islamists but they were very in disagreement with the 
opinion that the Constituent Assembly didn‘t make any significant progress regarding their task. For them, the 
finalisation of the new Constitution was just a matter of time when Sukarno authoritatively dissolved the 
Assembly. About this polemic, see: ANSHARI, E. S. (1997) Piagam Jakarta 22 Juni 1945: Sebuah konsensus 
nasional tentang dasar negara Republik Indonesia 1945-1949, Jakarta, Gema Insani Press., p.91-107 
34
 At the beginning, three options were available to be chosen by the Constituent Assembly as the 
philosophical foundation of state: Pancasila, Islam, and Socialism. Pancasila was supported by PNI (116 
representatives), Partai Komunis Indonesia (Indonesian Communist Party—PKI—80), Partai Kristen Indonesia 
(Indonesian Christian Party—Parkindo—16), Partai Katholik (Catholic Party—10), Partai Sosialis Indonesia 
(Indonesian Socialist Party—PSI--10), Ikatan Pendukung Kemerdekaan Indonesia (Indonesian Independence 
Supporters Bond—IPKI—8) and other small parties that counted in total 272 members. The Shari‘a option was 
defended by Masyumi (112 representatives), NU (91), Partai Syarikat Islam Indonesia (Indonesian Islamic 
Shari‘a Party—PSII—16), Persatuan Tarbiyah Islamiyah (Perti—7) and other four small parties which count in 
total 230 members of the Constituent Assembly. While the third option, Socialism, was supported by only 9 
members, five are members of Labour Party, and four members are from Murba Party, See: SIMORANGKIR, J. 
C. T. & SAY, M. R. B. (No year) Konstitusi dan Konstituante Indonesia, Jakarta, Soeroengan., p.169-173. 
Basically the polarization was centered into two groups: the Islamist and the the Nationalist Secular; but none of 
them come up as the champion the adoption of an ideology required at least two thirds of total 470 members of 
the Body. To avoid deadlock and to respond to the proposition of the government to return to the Constitution 
1945, the Assembly conducted three votes. The first took place on May 30, 1959 with results: 269 for and 199 
against. The second vote was on June 1, 1959: 264 for and 204 against. The latest vote was conducted on June 2, 
1959 resulted: 263 for and 204 against YAMIN, H. M. (1959) Naskah Persiapan Undang-Undang Dasar 1945, 
I-III, Jakarta, Yayasan Prapanca.. Since according to the Assembly‘s rule a principle decision required a two –
thirds majority of present members, this drama finally ended in another deadlock – which was then resolved by 
Sukarno‘s Decree. 
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upon Islamic or Secular base; and the competing parties were also indifferent: 
Islamist versus Nationalist secular. As pointed out by Alisjahbana, ―…..the debates 
on political and philosophical principles, inevitably provoked in the writing of any 
constitution, revealed the Constituent Assembly as a whole as divided into two: one 
group wanting an Islamic basis for the state, the other demanding the acceptance of 
the Pancasila (Alisjahbana, 1961, p.151-152). In brief, through the Presidensial 
Decree of the 5th July 1959, the Constitution 1945 was adopted by the Indonesian 
state without any alteration under Sukarno‘s regime, being preserved with 
mystification35 by the State under Suharto, and being adopted with four amendments 
by Indonesian state over later periods. 
  
                                                 
35
 During the period of Orde Baru, Pancasila and the Constitution of 1945 were regarded as a sacred 
symbology of state despite the flexibility of interpretation towards their contents. Any attempts to amend and 
alter these two symbols would, therefore, be regarded as a threat to the existence of state. 
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CHAPTER THREE: 
SEEKING LEGAL LEGITIMACY 
 
        
 ―A basic problem faced by all new nations and post-revolutionary societies is the 
crisis of legitimacy. The old order has been abolished and with it the set of beliefs 
that justified its system of authority. The imperialist ogre upon whom all ills were 
blamed has now disappeared, and there has been a slackening of the great 
unifying force, nationalism, under whose banner private, ethnic, sectional, and 
other differences were submerged. The new system is in the process of being 
formed and so the question arise: to whom is loyalty owed? And why?‖ (Lipset, 
1963, p.16) 
 
 
 
3.1. Version I: post-colonial attempt of democratic legal legitimacy 
 
The surrender of the Japanese following the dropping of atomic bombs on Hiroshima 
and Nagasaki had not only put an end to the war in Asia and Pacific, but had also 
determined the fate of ‗nations‘ in this region including those who were living in the 
East Indische which later formed a state known as ‗Indonesia‘. On the 17th of August 
1945, several days after the declaration of defeat by the Japanese, some Dutch-
educated inhabitants took advantage of the vacuum of power by declaring 
independence. Sukarno and Muhammad Hatta, two figures who read the text of the 
declaration of independence, were designated as the first president and vice-
president of the new state. 
 
As soon as it was declared independent, the ‗newly-born‘ state was confronting a 
series of immediate problems, in particular the urgent need of international 
recognition of her sovereignty and the threat of the Dutch‘s return following the 
departure of the vanquished Japanese. Internally, the problem was more related to 
the question of legitimacy, as there did not yet exist a mechanism to justify a fully 
legitimate government. The regime and its political leaders were still self-designated 
and not elected nor appointed through a constitutional procedure.  Furthermore, 
institutions were unilaterally established by consensus among a very few number of 
elites in Jakarta, while these few elites had to act on behalf of the entire elements of 
the state. Meanwhile, the critical situation of the time required the existence of an 
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‗independent‘ and ‗legitimate‘ government expected to be capable and efficient 
enough to handle the on-going uncertainties. This ‗urgency‘ was realized by the 
founding fathers of the republic. Sukarno and his companions then quickly undertook 
several actions, notably: (1) establishing the ideology of the state; (2) forming the 
state‘s constitution; (3) Installing a political mechanism appropriate to the nation‘s 
social setting which was indeed a melting-pot of various ethnics, religions and 
languages, and; (4) consolidating any possible resources to support the infant 
state.36 To carry on these ‗burdens‘, the then-adopted constitution, the Constitution 
of 1945 chose ‗presidential‘ system as the form of regime. 
 
Soon after, an effective government was obviously far from feasible, especially 
because it lacked the minimal amount of essential resources required by a state. 
Moreover, the central authority had to immediately deal with the eroding factors 
(such as rebellious movements provoked by conflicting ideological factors that 
eventually led them to question the legitimacy of the government37). In fact, the 
continuity of the regime and the internal cohesiveness of the new state were 
maintained only by the popularity of Sukarno and Mohammad Hatta, two figures 
supported by the majority of the people living within the territory. 
 
In the mean time, the Dutch launched a propaganda campaign amongst the triple 
alliance – saying that Indonesia would be used as a fascist‘s ‗puppet‘ in Southeast 
Asia. For Sukarno and his comrades, this development was crucial because this 
propaganda encouraged the triple alliance to deploy a new wave of foreign troops 
into the archipelago. In November 1945, three months after the declaration of 
independence, Indonesia aligned with the ideology of the triple alliance state by 
adopting the system of liberal democracy based on ‘multi-party‘ parliamentary 
                                                 
36
 The first three ‗actions‘ has been elaborated comprehensively in Chapter 2. The fourth action is 
elaborated along this chapter, chapter 4, 5, 6, and 7. A comprehensive story around the situation during the early 
period of Indonesian Independence can be found in many works. See among others: MAS'OED, M. (1989) 
Ekonomi dan Struktur Politik Orde Baru 1966-1971, Jakarta, Lembaga Penelitian, Pendidikan, dan Penerangan 
Ekonomi dan Sosial (LP3ES)., and also BASTIN, J. & BENDA, H. J. (1968) A history of modern Southeast 
Asia : colonialism, nationalism, and decolonization, Englewood Cliffs, Prentice-Hall.  
37
 Most of the rebellious movement (except in Sulawesi) involved ideological issues. The rebellions 
were mainly started by the rejection of certain groups to Pancasila that then led to their resistance to the 
authority of the secular government. Some even as simple as  according to Shari‘a, the loyalty is supposed to be 
rendered only to Imam—pious Muslim leaders. See: chapter 5 on ‗Maintaining Political Order‘. 
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government38. A prime minister was elected as the head of the government39, and 
assisted by ministers in the cabinet who were responsible to Parliament.  While 
Sukarno himself played the role as head of state, his power in the government was 
not significant. Obviously, this model did not bring about a solid government because 
of the intense conflicts between the political elites – especially between those who 
preferred a Marxist-revolutionary approach and those who preferred using diplomacy 
to obtain a full and recognized independence40. In addition, the government was very 
weak owing to a lack of economic resources required for efficient operation. The 
majority of resources (such as mining and plantations) were still under the control of 
the Dutch, while other resources (such as taxes) were impossible to rely upon 
because the government did not really ‗exist‘. As a consequence, cabinets were 
always falling soon after their establishment, resulting in failure to address the 
problems. For instance, between November 1945 and December 1949, the year of 
the Dutch recognition of Indonesian independence, only a single cabinet out of five 
was able to stand for more than two years (See: Feith, 1962). 
 
The agreement between Indonesia and the Dutch in 1949 brought about new 
consequences to the Indonesian state through a constitutional alteration. As an 
imposed condition by the Dutch within the agreement, Indonesia had to adopt the 
federal system under a new constitution--the provisional Constitution of 1950--
through which a new state entitled ‗The Federal State of Republic of Indonesia‘ (RIS) 
was proclaimed. This model was accepted with suspicion amongst the Indonesian 
people--that the federal system was part of the Dutch‘s strategy. The logic was that 
the model would divide the Indonesian territory into states, and  when the territory is 
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 Scholars such as Feith believed that this decision was taken as a strategy gain international support, 
especially to show to the triple alliance that Indonesia was not the part of fascism as was propagandized by the 
Dutch. See: FEITH, H. (1962) The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia. , Ithaca, Modern 
Indonesia Project, Cornell University Press.  
39
 As for the emergency circumstances, prime ministers were elected not through a popular vote but by 
consensus among political elites. See:Ibid., p.58 
40
 In ‗The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia‘, Feith analyse several factors explanative 
to the failure of the federal government that ended up at authoritarianism under Sukarno‘s guided democracy.  
Feith explain this failure from the perspective of elites. He said, the main factor contributed to the failure of the 
federal government was the conflict between the ‗administrator‘ (who preferred to adopt western-way to achieve 
the national goal) versus the ‗solidarity maker‘ (who emphasized national unity and freedom). This argument, 
however, is rejected by Benda, who explain the failure from the perspective of culture—that Indonesian society 
is culturally patrimonial and favor to paternalism/authoritarianism rather than democracy. See: BENDA, H. J. 
(1964) Democracy in Indonesia: A Review Article. Journal of Asian Studies, Vol 23, 3, May 1964.;  FEITH, H. 
(1962) The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia. , Ithaca, Modern Indonesia Project, Cornell 
University Press. See also:MAS'OED, M. (1989) Ekonomi dan Struktur Politik Orde Baru 1966-1971, Jakarta, 
Lembaga Penelitian, Pendidikan, dan Penerangan Ekonomi dan Sosial (LP3ES). 
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not ‗united‘, it would be easier for the Dutch to return to their old colony (devide et 
impera). Obviously, the federal government was not able to neither implement its 
programs nor ensure stability, particularly due to the short-life of its cabinets. 
 
Among the major factors causing these cabinets to fall was the party system –
marked by extreme polarization in platforms and ideologies amongst parties that 
prevented them from finding a common base for cooperation in the parliament as a 
solid government. From a theoretical perspective, to establish a stable government 
in a democratic state would require a ruling party that claimed the majority of 
support, or at least the support from a solid coalition in the parliament, which was not 
the case at that period. As a result, a permanent deadlock among political parties 
also escalated into extra-parliamentary conflicts and friction41. 
 
The reasons behind the adoption of the multi-party system (in November 1945) were 
practical. Elites in Jakarta shared the position that the Indonesian society, which is 
very heterogeneous, required a system of representation that was capable of 
accommodating best such diversity. As was declared at Komite Nasional Indonesia 
Pusat—Central Commission of National Indonesia (KNIP), the embryo of the 
Indonesian parliament, the government ‗welcomes the establishment of political 
parties as by these parties, aspirations of the all elements of the society can be 
channeled through regular activities‖42. Unfortunately, this system was applied 
directly onto a ‗young state‘ with a plural society and extreme cultural distance. Even 
in the 1930s, when the concept of an independent state was still only an 
‗imagination‘ amongst Indonesians, groups and parties that existed in the 
archipelago tended to represent different political interests that made it impossible 
for them to reach a compromise. In 1950, for example, there were 50 political parties 
representing not only very different interests, but potentially antagonistic forces (see: 
Feith, 1957a). 
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 The overall map of political parties at the period is theoretically known as ‗centrifugal‘that lead to 
political instability--will be partly elaborated in chapter 5 on ‗Maintaining Political Order‘. Classifications on 
political parties can be seen in many works, for example: DUVERGER, M. (1950) Sociologie des Partis 
Politiques Traité de Sociologie. Paris, PUF.,  
42
 Cited from SOEDJATMOKO (1956) The Role of Political Parties in Indonesia. IN THAYER, P. W. 
(Ed.) Nationalism and Progress in Free Asia. Baltimore, John Hopkins University Press., p.130 
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Since the majority of the political parties were representing radical sectarian 
interests, religions, and the political ambitions of elites, it is then very understandable 
how difficult it was to find a spirit of compromise amongst them. The general election 
of 1955 (which was expected to be able to ‗defrost‘ political deadlocks during the 
period) was obviously becoming another source of political uncertainty despite its 
democratic significance. In fact, this election was only beneficial to the stability of the 
government in term of its contribution into the moderation the political parties. As 
revealed by Feith, four parties came up as the major parties in the parliament: Partai 
Nasional Indonesia--the Nationalist Party (PNI); The Majelis Syuro Muslimin 
Indonesia—progressive  moslem party (Masyumi); Nahdlatul Ulama—
traditional/conservative moslem party (NU), and Partai Komunis Indonesia—the 
communist party (PKI). However, none of these parties obtained the status of single 
majority while a coalition in the parliament was essential43. However, as the interest 
represented by these parties was very ‗distant‘, the quest to create a solid 
government with the support from the parliament remained unachievable.  
 
The extreme multipolarity of the Indonesian society was also reflected by the conflict 
between political parties with regards to the creation of a state constitution. Although 
ten years since the declaration of independence had passed, these political parties 
had never reached an agreement on this fundamental question. As elaborated in the 
previous chapter (chapter 2) the prolonged debate mainly focused around the 
question of ‗What ideology should be adopted by the Indonesian state?‘ – 
represented by two competing alternatives: Shari‘a and Pancasila. The Constituent 
Assembly (the state institution produced by the election of 1955 with a mandate 
among others to create a new constitution) had obviously failed to reach consensus 
on this problem. 
 
This situation brought Indonesia into the period of permanent political deadlock. 
Disagreement among elites was intense. The government lacked both legitimacy 
and the economic resources required for its operation. Political parties did not play 
their role as the democratic articulator of the multicultural elements of the society, but 
                                                 
43
 A complete report on the general election of 1955 can be seen in FEITH, H. (1957a) The Indonesian 
Elections of 1955. Interim Report Series, Modern Indonesia Project 1957 ed. Ithaca, Southeast Asia Program 
Department of Far Eastern Studies, Cornell University. 
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became an additional source of political chaos.  Sukarno, a popular figure of the 
revolution, was politically neglected by the democratic and liberal political system. 
The army, another important actor of the revolution, was also politically neglected44. 
These two main actors, therefore, often contributed to the destabilization of the 
liberal system. In October 1952 for example, the army tried to dissolve the 
parliament – an action far beyond its constitutional habitat. In June 1955 with 
Sukarno‘s support, the army also refused the appointment of commander of the 
Army Strategic Division (KASAD) designated by the Cabinet45. As mentioned earlier, 
Sukarno himself often showed his dissatisfaction to the existing political system, 
arguing that the liberal democratic system was ‗not-Indonesian‘ and tended to 
fragment an already ‗severely fragmented‘ Indonesian society. To this, Sukarno 
made his famous cynical statement that the parliamentary liberal democracy was the 
‗Democracy Fifty Plus One‘46.  
 
The liberal government was exhausted – a situation that brought about disaster for 
Indonesia‘s economic sector that was already devastated by the obligation to repay 
debts inherited from the colonial government as well as the need to finance the 
project of national integration. The economy was therefore threatened by an extreme 
level of inflation, zero monetary reserves, and a chronic deficit in the state budget. 
Worse still, a number of political parties were also declared corrupt, and accused of 
abusing public money to finance sectarian interests. In all, the extractive capacity of 
the state was very weak – not only because of the rare availability of conventional 
resources such as taxation, but also the fact that the majority of the economic 
sectors (mines, plantations, foreign trades, and transports) were still controlled by 
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 According to the Provisional Constitution of 1950, the army was positioned as an instrument of state 
hence has no authorities except the defense hence did not give any space for the army to get involve in political 
activities. This status, cohabitated with the civilian incapabilities in creating political stability, then dissuate 
dissatisfaction among the generals of army. This topic will be analysed in next chapter on ‗The Role of the 
Military and the Weakness of the State‘.  
45
 About the dynamic of the Indonesian army in the period, See among others: CROUCH, H. (1978) 
The Army and Politics in Indonesia, Ithaca, Cornell University Press., and BLANCHARD, F. C. (1991) 
L‟Indonésie, l‟armée et le pouvoir: De la Révolution au développement, Paris, Asian Research L‘harmattan. 
46
 The intervention of these two extra-parliamentary actors become more extensive especially when the 
election of 1955 did not bring about strong cabinet as been expected by the public. The parliament and the 
cabinet were always imprisoned by conflicts and inconsensus, mainly dominated by two groups (PNI and 
Masyumi) in relations with the fundamental problems of the state‘s ideology. See: FEITH, H. (1963) The 
Dynamics of Guided Democracy. IN MCVEY, R. T. (Ed.) Indonesia, Human Relations Area. New Haven, Files 
Press., p.316 
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foreign companies47. As a consequence, Indonesia was not an attractive place for 
investors, indicated by the capital flight which became endemic up to the end of 
1957, and furthermore preventing the liberal government to execute effective 
economic programmes.  
 
On top of this crisis, the political situation was increasingly fragile: prolonged debate 
on the ideology of state; the increase of communist influence; the shortness of 
cabinets‘ life; the split between Sukarno and Hatta; the weakness of central 
government‘s capacity of control towards peripheries; and the emergence of new 
separatist movements in Sumatra and Sulawesi – altogether which brought about 
disaster to the state‘s legitimacy. 
 
3.2. Version II : Sukarno‟s charismatic legitimacy 
 
 
The fall of the liberal cabinet on March 14, 1957 opened the way for Sukarno‘s 
‗guided democracy.‘ Through his ideological concept, Sukarno asserted a kind of 
corporatist-style political system based upon two traditional Javanese principles: the 
gotong royong (collective and voluntary work) and the musyawarah mufakat 
(democracy with the spirit of deliberation, with consensus as the expected outcome). 
According to Sukarno, this kind of ‗democracy‘ was suitable to the Indonesian 
political society and consequently would be more efficient to mobilize support from 
the people48. Further, Sukarno also proposed the establishment of the ‗Gotong 
Royong‘ cabinet (composed by the members of all political parties) and also a 
national assembly made up of members from functional groups, representative of the 
regions, commanders of the army, commanders of the national police force, 
representatives of the public prosecutor and several ministers of the cabinet (Feith, 
1962, p.542). This design was supported by the PNI and the communist party (PKI), 
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 About the Indonesian economic performance during the period, See: HEINZ, A. (1967) Economic 
Disorder and the Task Ahead. IN TAN, T. K. (Ed.) Sukarno's Guided Indonesia. Brisbane, Jacaranda., also:  
MAS'OED, M. (1989) Ekonomi dan Struktur Politik Orde Baru 1966-1971, Jakarta, Lembaga Penelitian, 
Pendidikan, dan Penerangan Ekonomi dan Sosial (LP3ES).; MACKIE, J. (1967) Problems of Indonesian 
Inflation, Ithaca, Cornell Modern Indonesia Project. 
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 This ideology was also used by Sukarno as a campaign agaisnt the adoption of Western-style 
democracy that he synically called as ‗Democracy 50+1‘.  
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but not by Masyumi. The army, meanwhile, took a ‗wait and see‘ profile but later 
declared its support to the establishment of the national assembly.49 
 
When the PNI failed to form a cabinet based on ‗proportional balance‘ at the 
parliament, with pretext of ‗provisional‘, Sukarno took advantage from the situation 
by setting up his own cabinet, entitled as Kabinet Karya, composed of ministers from 
political parties but excluded those from the PKI. Sukarno, however, didn‘t take any 
action against the national assembly despite its major contribution to the failure of 
the cabinet formation. Instead, Sukarno used this assembly to carry out his great 
ambition, which was to form a sentiment of ‗nationalism‘ among the Indonesian 
people. In fact, Sukarno was doing this because the national assembly could be 
used as a political vehicle to gain a wider base for his legitimacy. Because the body 
was composed by members representing the key elements of society (including 
those from regions/peripheries) Sukarno was the central national figure who enjoyed 
popularity among the people and was capable of bridging frictions among elites.  
Consequently, the national assembly gave significant support for Sukarno‘s 
legitimacy, and at the same time would provide support for his political maneuvers. 
Sukarno‘s formal position outside the assembly had also given him even more 
freedom to make important decisions that sometimes were ‗extra-ordinary‘ and 
beyond the constitutional authority assigned to him. For example, when the 
constituent assembly (parliament) failed in its attempt to create a new state 
constitution, Sukarno, with support from the army and certain political parties, 
overrode the state constitution by launching the controversial decree of July 5, 1959, 
through which he dissolved the constituent assembly whose members were elected 
democratically by the people through a popular vote in 195550.  
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 It is believed that this decision was taken based on pragmatical reason as the national assembly 
would gives the army a space to play ‗political role‘ which was evident later for a long period until the end of 
the Suharto‘s order. This decision, however, seems to be an ambiguity for the army was still opposing the 
esistence of communist ministers in the cabinet while these ministers were among the members of the national 
assembly. 
50
 The presidential Decree of July 5, 1959 became a very important stage in Indonesian political history 
because this Decree had put an end to the debate in connection with the ideological bases of the State and at the 
same time became the legal base for the re-application of the Constitution of 1945 which is still adopted by the 
Indonesian state untill today—See: Chapter 2. This Decree contains three important points: a) the dissolution of 
the constituent assembly; b) economic rehabilitation; c) return to the constitution of 1945 
 
76 
 
The reactivation of the Constitution of 1945 brought about radical change in 
Indonesian politics. Initially, it had put an end to the long debate on the ideological 
base of the state because the Constitution of 1945 contained Pancasila principles 
that by consequence override any other ideologies – including the Shari‘a. There 
was also an alteration in the model of government--from one being centralized in the 
parliament to one with the government concentrated around the president, with 
Sukarno as the central figure. Furthermore, the National Assembly was now re-
elected, reinforced and also confirmed as the National Consultative Assembly – 
resulting in an even more solid powerbase for Sukarno. In addition, a national 
planning body (with the main task of creating Indonesian-style socialism that fit 
Sukarno‘s ideology) was also established. Finally, after the old parliament rejected 
the state budget proposed by Sukarno, he designed a new provisional parliament 
(Gotong Royong-DPRGR) as the state institution with the highest authority after the 
constitution.  
 
In addition to these political innovations, a more moderate party-system was to 
follow. Of the 25 existing political parties, Sukarno merged them into 10: three 
nationalist parties (PNI, Partindo, IPKI), three Islamic parties (NU, PSII, and Perti), 
two Christian parties (Parkindo and Catholic) and two Marxist parties (Murba and 
PKI). In order to control these parties, Sukarno created the Front National. Even 
though this organization was declared with the intention of mobilizing support from 
the people, for Sukarno the body was actually aimed to be an instrument to integrate 
all political power into one political party.51  Moreover, it was an institution under his 
direct power. 
 
These changes marked the establishment of an authoritative regime in Indonesia 
with the power of the state mainly in the hands of Sukarno, despite intense 
competition between the army, the president, and the communist party (PKI). When 
the power of most of the political parties (except PKI) and that of the parliament 
decreased, the power of the president increased significantly. The army also finally 
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 A comprehensive story on political changes in Indonesia after the publication the presidential Decree 
of July 5, 1959, See: ABDULGANI, R. (1973) Nationalism, Revolution, and Guided Democracy in Indonesia, 
Centre of Southeast Asian Studies, Monash University.; and also MAS'OED, M. (1989) Ekonomi dan Struktur 
Politik Orde Baru 1966-1971, Jakarta, Lembaga Penelitian, Pendidikan, dan Penerangan Ekonomi dan Sosial 
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obtained legitimacy for its engagement in the political and economic sphere of the 
State – and consequently became more and more powerful (Lev, 1966, p.206). The 
political dynamics were therefore dominated by the very competitive alliance 
between Sukarno and the commanders of the army; accordingly the power relations 
between these two actors determined the destiny of the political parties. In fact, 
Sukarno was playing the role of guardian of the political parties from the army‘s 
aggressive political strategy52. There are at least two points that can be interpreted 
from Sukarno‘s political behaviour at this stage: first, Sukarno did not want to see 
these political parties disappear, for they were the only possible alternative to 
counterbalance the growing threat from the army‘s increasing political influence; and 
secondly, these political parties were the pillars supporting Sukarno‘s charismatic 
legitimacy for three important institutions: the parliament, in the national assembly 
and in the Front National.  
 
Another important phenomenon in Indonesian politics during this period was the fast 
growing influence of communism. Different in terms of ideology from other political 
parties, and despite becoming the main target of the army‘s aggressive maneuvers, 
the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) gained vast popular support across the 
archipelago. There were at least two factors determinant to this phenomenon: the 
organizational efficiency of the party and, most importantly, its brilliant strategy of 
‗constituent-mobilization‘. Like Sukarno‘s nationalist party (PNI), PKI was developing 
institutional structure in accordance to the Western standard of modern organization, 
but with some modifications53. The PKI elites, for instance, considered that the 
Indonesian political circumstances at the time were not favourable to a ‗pure‘ type of 
revolutionary ideology that was usually the main feature of communist parties in 
other parts of the world. Although the platform of the PKI in 1950s was not similar to 
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 The Army, for example, used to try to demolish the old system of political representation based on 
parties and instead to create a new system based on functional representation. It used  also try to cut off the 
political parties‘ ties with their mass-bases by encouraging them to join into an organization called ―Sekretariat 
Bersama Golkar—Joint Secretariat of Functional Groups‖ established and dominated by the army. In many 
occasion and in certain areas, the army also prohibited the activities of political parties. See: KAHIN, G. M. 
(Ed.) (1964a) Government and politics in Southeast Asia, Ithaca, Cornell University Press., in particular the 
article of Herbert Feith on ‗Indonesia‘. 
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many scholars. See, among others:MORTIMER, R. (1974) Indonesian Communism under Sukarno: Ideology 
and Politics, Ithaca, Cornell University Press., and BRACKMAN, A. C. (1963) Indonesian communism : a 
history, New York, Praeger. 
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those in the Soviet Union or in China, its organization and bureaucracy were. In 
addition, the PKI did not apply the same standard of ideology as in the Soviet Union 
or China, especially when Aidit was appointed as the leader of the party. Since 1950, 
it chose the ‗peaceful way‘ when pursuing power and playing its role in the political 
system (Palmer, 1973, p.159). After all, the parliamentary system and political 
circumstances of the time gave the PKI an opportunity to develop itself as a mass-
based party under the concept of ‗guided democracy‘. 
 
This last phenomenon explains Sukarno‘s inclination towards such a popular-base 
party despite himself officially being the leader of the PNI. The skill and capacity 
demonstrated by the PKI elites impressed the president, and at that time it was very 
clear to the public that Sukarno was not only very imminent to PKI‘s leaders such as 
Aidit, Nyoto, and Darsono but it was also believed that Sukarno began giving his 
personal ‗blessing‘ to the party despite the poor image surrounding the PKI only two 
years earlier.54 As a result, the party developed incredibly quickly after 1950, and 
confirmed itself as one of ‗the Big-Four‘ in the election of 1955.  The PKI then 
became the ‗primadonna‘ in the parliament, and enjoyed massive support amongst 
the people. According to Mortimer, the number of its official members was very high 
(approximately 3 million in the 1960s), consolidated through several satellite-
organizations led by professional leaders – altogether making the PKI the most 
efficient organization after the army (Rex Mortimer, 1974, p.366-367).  
 
Sukarno therefore regarded the PKI as an important alliance, especially vis-à-vis the 
army – for during the period of guided democracy, the Indonesian realpolitik was 
reflected through the dynamics of power relationships between three major actors: 
president Sukarno, the army and the PKI. While the PKI and the army were in 
constant conflict, it was Sukarno who played the role of ―balancer‖ between the two 
competing forces.  The PKI required Sukarno as its ‗guardian‘ against the threat from 
the army; while for the army, Sukarno was important because, as a president, he 
was expected to give his continuous support for its engagement to their political 
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 In 1948 PKI launched a rebellious action against the Republic known as ‗Pemberontakan PKI 
Madiun—PKI Madiun Rebellion Movement‘. This insurgency has brought about negative image to the party as 
well as severe suspicious feeling among elites in Jakarta to PKI‘s leaders. Sukarno‘s blessing was therefore 
regarded as ‗extraordinary‘, especially as Sukarno was among the decision maker when Jakarta sent troops ro 
crush the rebels that was concentrated in the eastern part of Java.   
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objectives; Sukarno, meanwhile would need the army to prevent the potential 
uncontrollable influence of the PKI, but at the same time he would also need the PKI 
as an effective organization to mobilize the level of mass support demanded by his 
‗charismatic‘ legitimacy55. 
 
This competitive relationship of power had brought about a negative impact to the 
performance of the government during 1959-1965. Certain sectors of development 
(including the economy) were often neglected for the sake of political interest, or 
merely been put aside because of the intense political competition among the elites. 
Thus, when the problem of separatism had been relatively ‗under-control‘ at the 
beginning of 1960s, the government obviously did not give enough attention on 
economic development.  Instead, it placed emphasis upon other issues – such as 
the ‗Penyelamatan Papua Barat operation —The ‗West Papua Rescue‘. In fact, 
Sukarno had used those issues to increase his own power through the mobilization 
of the people. The army and the PKI, meanwhile, did not show any resistance to 
Sukarno‘s offensive policies. Presumably, these two actors also took advantage from 
the situation – the operation provided an opportunity for the army to modernize its 
equipment; while for the PKI, this issue had become a means to express its 
patriotism, in particular its loyalty and obedience to the president. When the problem 
of West Papua was resolved successfully in 1963, the people wished the 
government concentrate on economic development. Later, this aspiration was 
accommodated by Sukarno, who proclaimed an ―Economic Declaration‖ through 
which the government set up an economic program of stabilization in order to restore 
the nation's economy through an open policy toward capitalism and liberalism 
(Thomas and Panglaykim, 1973, p.59).  
 
This commitment, however, did not last long, as Sukarno then sought to engage with 
other issues that were more interesting to him and more suitable to his ‗revolutionary 
approach‘ that aimed to strengthen the base of his charismatic legitimacy through 
mobilization of the people.  Again, Sukarno‘s wish found a good moment during 
another massive operation known as ―Ganyang Malaysia‖ (confrontation against 
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 See: REX MORTIMER, R. (1974) Indonesian Communism under Sukarno: Ideology and Politics, 
Ithaca, Cornell University Press., p.79; About the relations between Sukarno-PKI, p.86-88; About the relations 
between PKI-the Army, p. 102-107; The relations between Sukarno-the Army is elaborated in CROUCH, H. 
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Malaysia). Dissatisfied with the decision of the British Empire – specifically the 
establishment of the Malaysia Federation under British authority – Sukarno 
considered this as ‗negligence‘ towards Indonesia‘s aspirations, and saw it as a 
‗threatening‘ sign. Within the country, Sukarno therefore launched a radical 
campaign against British and American interests, including those of nationalizing 
properties and plantations owned by the two countries. The attention of the 
Indonesian people, as a consequence, was diverted from a program of economic 
stability that had never been given priority by the government.  
 
From this brief analysis, it can be seen that during the period of Guided Democracy, 
the major political actors did not consider the economic sector as well as another 
aspects of development as ‗important‘. They were more concerned with military 
campaigns and operations that gave Sukarno and the army opportunities to increase 
their legitimacy and political power. As remarked by Mackie, ‗……the political 
balance was preserved by sacrificing the economic equilibrium‘ (Mackie, 1967, p.10). 
 
3.3. Version III : Suharto‟s claim to performance legitimacy 
 
 
Neglecting the economic sector brought Indonesia into a state of bankruptcy. The 
national budget (which had been in deficit since 1955), fell day by day.  For example, 
the deficit of the national budget dropped from 14% in 1955 to 174% in 196556. In 
addition, inflation became a serious threat – reaching 635% in 1966, while the 
government had to settle its international debt, which exceeded 530 million dollars. 
Moreover, economic growth was stagnant, falling down to less than zero percent 
between 1960-1963. Consequently, the foreign debt increased to 358 million dollars. 
The industrial capacity decreased by up to 20% because of the lack of parts for 
machinery.57 This economic shock was exacerbated by costly military operations 
launched during the period of guided democracy (such as the operation against the 
separatist movements in Sumatra and Sulawesi, the ‗West Papua Rescue‘ and 
‗Ganyang Malaysia‘). 
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 The data in relations to the economic condition during the period of guided democracy, see: Tables 
(Appendix 2). 
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At the international level, Indonesia became more and more isolated as the result of 
her policy regarding the nationalization of Dutch, British, and American companies 
began in the 1960s58. This decision ruined Indonesia‘s image among capitalist 
countries.  The situation worsened with Sukarno‘s political orientation – that 
international politics was an arena of ideological competition between the Soviet 
Union and America. Instead, Sukarno raised a discourse proposing the possibility of 
a new type of political landscape: competition between New Emerging Forces  
(NEFO) and the established Old Emerging Forces (OLDEFO).  This situation was 
one that encouraged Indonesia to forge alliances with China, Cambodia, Vietnam, 
and North Korea59.  
 
At the domestic level, the crisis became increasingly intense by 1965 as the 
competition between the army and the communists had turned into open friction and 
violent action. Sukarno (who was expected to be an impartial balancer between 
these two competing forces) started to interfere with the army‘s internal affairs by 
assigning some strategic posts within the army to his close ‗friends‘.  This was 
regarded as a ‗threat‘ by the army (Crouch, 1978, chapter 2). The communists, 
meanwhile, also decided to leave the peaceful political strategy and instead 
launched an aggressive campaign against its rival enemies – mainly the Islamists—
and demanded radical ‗concessions‘ from the government, including those of the 
typical communist ‗revolutionary‘ strategy, namely land reform. The tense political 
circumstances finally culminated with a coup de etat in October 1965 (known as 
Gestapu) – later declared by the army as being organized by the PKI with support 
from the air force60. With most of the activity in Jakarta and Yogyakarta (middle 
Java), the coup involved the assassination of top-rank army leaders (6 army 
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 Analysis around the politics of ‗nationalization‘ under Sukarno‘s guided democracy can be seen in 
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behind the coup. Among interesting analysis around the coup, see: ANDERSON, B. R. O. & MCVEY, R. T. 
(1971) A Preliminary Analysis of the October 1, 1965, Coup in Indonesia. Interim Report Series. Ithaca, 
Modern Indonesia Project, Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University.  
82 
 
generals including general-in-chief Ahmad Yani) and brought about radical change 
onto the Indonesian political landscape61. Soon after the coup the triple alliance of 
Sukarno-PKI-army broke up; Sukarno‘s power and his political influence decreased 
significantly; the communist disappeared from the political scene; and the army 
became the sole dominant actor in the politics. Suharto, who was playing an 
important part in the mission ‗sauvegarde de la nation‘ then became a prominent 
figure within the army despite Nasution still alive62. Several months after the coup in 
1966, Suharto acted as a ‗presidential caretaker‘ and then later confirmed as the 
Indonesia‘s second president in 1967. 
 
Suharto was an important actor for ‗sauvegarde de la nation‘ – the period following 
the failed coup of 1965. In addition, he had been a ‗hero‘ since the revolution — a 
status that gave credibility to his familiarity with applying military strategies to 
economic development and assuring political stability for his regime.63 
 
Soon after his assignment as presidential caretaker in 1966, Suharto came up with a 
new regime named ‗Orde Baru‘ (New Order) – literally aimed to distinguish his 
regime with Sukarno‘s ‗Orde Lama‘ (Ancient Order). Since its first days in power, this 
regime had to deal with severe problems inherited from the Orde Lama: 
 
1.  Economic crisis resulting from an extreme deficit in balance of payments and 
precarious inflation after 1949. 
2.  Political crisis caused by intensive conflicts between the elites regarding the 
ideological base of the state and the best system to govern society. 
3.  Splits among groups of various levels, social instability and violence following the 
coup of 1965. 
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 Hierarchically, Nasution was Suharto‘s superior as well as his commander within the army. He was 
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 Although Suharto also implemented strategies in politics, they must not be the priority of his regime. 
Later in this section and everywhere else we will see that efforts to stabilize the politics are merely aimed to 
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legitimacy. 
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4.  Spreading sentiments that Sukarno and the communists were the key actors 
behind the instability during and after the coup — a situation which had the 
potential to end up in horizontal conflict with Sukarno‘s supporters.  
 
The emergence of the Orde Baru cannot be separated from the series of political 
and economic crises produced by the disastrous orientation of the Orde Lama, which 
emphasized politics over anything else. In fact, the orientation and priorities of the 
Orde Baru were simply the opposite to those of the Orde Lama. The first and the 
main objective of the Orde Baru was to consolidate Suharto‘s power – who, as soon 
as he had acceded to the presidency, had to confront multiple crises. Facing such a 
challenging situation, Suharto formulated policies that can be categorized into three 
steps:  
 
Initially, he launched efforts to gain legitimacy from the people by giving priority to 
economic development; secondly, Suharto consolidated the national elements of the 
state (through nationalist-rhetoric) with the objective of assuring the political stability 
required by the government in order to efficiently create and implement economic 
policies; and finally, Suharto tried to regain the international support (particularly from 
non-communist countries) that had been devastated during the Orde Lama period. 
All these measures determined the performance of Suharto‘s regime, while serving 
as the sources of legitimacy to his long-lasting rule. 
 
Economic development as the main source of legitimacy 
 
Economic development was given priority by the Orde Baru because the regime had 
a big interest to gain instant support from the majority of people. However, there 
were specific reasons for choosing economic development as the priority of the 
regime. The first was that economic development could be expected to bring new 
hope to a society that had been suffering for a long period of time of multi-
dimensional crisis. As stated by Lipset, all questions in relation to the government‘s 
right of control finally must deal with the question of gaining support from the people 
by showing its effectiveness; while for new countries, the demonstration of the 
effectiveness would mean economic development (Lipset, 1968). Secondly, when 
Suharto replaced Sukarno as president, Sukarno was still alive while his supporters 
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and ideology were still enjoying significant influence across the archipelago. If 
Suharto‘s regime could not bring a significant progress to people‘s lives, there would 
be a fear of Sukarno‘s return. Thirdly, the decision was based partly on the army‘s 
sectarian interest (proven during the later period of Suharto‘s regime) that economic 
development could give space to the army for engaging in economic activities under 
the pretext of ‗stabilization‘. These facilities would later help the army to finance its 
political wing (the Golkar) which dominated Indonesia‘s politics for almost three 
decades until 1997. Fourthly, Suharto must have learned from Sukarno‘ experience 
of what Stein Rokkan terms as `nation and character building' – that the sense of 
‗Indonesian nationalism‘ envisioned by Sukarno could not be created through 
political development alone. Suharto understood that too much emphasis on ‗politics‘ 
would only bring about quarrels amongst the elites and hence not always effective to 
gain legitimacy from the people. Finally, Suharto understood that revolution could not 
last forever. Sukarno was a prominent leader during the period of revolution and 
remained in that profile in 1965, twenty years after the heyday of the revolutionary 
era.  Suharto found Sukarno‘s speeches and radical policies had not only failed to 
bring about sustainable legitimacy, but had also created negative image for 
Indonesia at the international level. 
 
Based on these conclusions, Suharto wanted to manage the state and his regime by 
using strategies different to Sukarno—the economy (and not politics) came first. 
Rhetorical speeches on nationalism, ideology and revolution were replaced with 
measures to mobilize national resources in order to support economic development. 
There was a strong belief that if the basic needs of the people were satisfied, then 
there would be a positive ‗spill over‘ to other sectors –eventually bringing about 
political stability and the prosperity to the nation. 
 
The first dilemma faced by Suharto was related to the question of economic strategy 
– two alternatives were available: a ‗radical strategy‘---which promised a quick 
achievement of legitimacy; or else a ‗cooperative and moderate strategy‘64 which 
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reinforcement of this capacity as the best way out from crisis. According to this model, the government should 
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especially from those who get a direct profit from the nationalization of foreign companies and the farmers who 
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Suharto ultimately decided upon as the national economic strategy. Initially, ―the 
New Order‖ was founded on three major pillars: the army, the students and the 
technocratic anti-communists.  These three social groups could not accept a radical 
economic strategy that reflected the Marxist approaches as preached by Sukarno. In 
particular, a plan of redistribution of resources through land reform or graduated 
income structure (similar to that implemented during the 1960s) was likely to 
constitute a serious threat for the unity of the new coalition. The landowners (who 
were in the anti-communist majority) would not accept this, nor would the 
intellectuals and the army. Furthermore, the radical strategy would cause capital 
flight, as the government would find itself with an obligation to provide the basic 
needs of the people by spending enormous financial resources that it did not have, 
and moreover, constrained to ask for help from external partners. Lastly, the radical 
strategy would have slowed down economic growth and cause inflation.  
 
Hence, the ―New order‖ adopted a capitalist national development model that 
encouraged private sector initiatives by establishing an open market system, and by 
offering facilities to foreign investors. This policy was made official and formalized at 
the 23rd provisional General meeting entitled ―Renewal of the base of the economic 
policy, financial and of the development.‖ This assembly specified three stages of 
economic development (MPRS, 1966): 
 
1. A ‗rescue‘ stage whereby the causes and effects of economic decline were 
anticipated so that it did not worsen. 
2. Economic stabilization and rehabilitation through control and improvement of 
the economic infrastructure. 
3. Economic development itself 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
would get advantage from land reform policy. In addition, in short term the government will find an instant 
alternative of financial resources required to implement its programes of development. However, this kind of 
strategy is risky toward external as the countries whose companies were nationalised would launch a counter-
attack against the Indonesian interests  overseas. Contrarily, moderate strategy relies on the active involvement 
of foreign investment in the national economy. Towards external, this strategy would create a positive image on 
Indonesia especially from foreign investors and international companies. Towards internal, however, this 
strategy had frequently to oppose the nationalist  groups of the society as usually the government efforts to 
attract investors would involve certain facilities that may disappoint these groups. Scholar such as Mas‘Oed, 
therefore, called the Indonesian economic strategy at the beginning of the New Order period as ‗Towards-
external‟. See:MAS'OED, M. (1989) Ekonomi dan Struktur Politik Orde Baru 1966-1971, Jakarta, Lembaga 
Penelitian, Pendidikan, dan Penerangan Ekonomi dan Sosial (LP3ES). 
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The first stage aimed to remove Indonesia from the economic crisis that had already 
overflowed onto other sectors by addressing two factors: 
1) the significant increase of Indonesia‘s budget deficit. 
2) the uncontrollable expansion of bank credit65.  
 
By the beginning of 1960, significant increases in state spending were not matched 
by increases in its income. According to economic theory, a budget deficit can be 
controlled by two means: either to increase its income through tax revenue, or to 
print new money. The government chose the second means without taking into 
account measures for the supply of goods and services. This situation was worsened 
by the flow of bank credit in an expansive way, which meant that even more money 
entered circulation. Consequently, the nation's economy suffered a double negative 
effect: domestic inflation continued because of the increase of money in circulation, 
and the increase of imports to satisfy domestic demand. This last aspect, however, 
was necessary, for Indonesia had great need for industrial machines, spare parts, 
rice, textiles – all items of capital that could restart the economy. Nevertheless, these 
factors contributed to the budget imbalance, insufficient economic infrastructure, a 
decline of the currency reserve, weakness of the capacity to produce – all which 
decreased the activity and the sources of export, sending the country into a vicious 
circle. 
 
The other objective of the economic rescue was to eliminate both the short-term and 
(as much as possible) the negative effects of the crisis. It was necessary, therefore 
to ensure efficient provisioning of things such as rice, textiles, machines and other 
factors of production, as well as controlling imports through a series of governmental 
measure – for example, policies concerning currency and import licensing. But these 
measurements were not effective because of the existence of an enormous variation 
in the international exchanges between income from exports and the price of 
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imports66. In 1966, the income from exports reached $600 million, while import prices 
reached $600-$700 million. Moreover, the payment of foreign debt reached $530 
million in 1966 and $270 million in 1967(Panglaykim and Thomas, 1973, p.689-690). 
 
To regulate variation in its currency, the ―New order‖ government required access to 
credit which, in the short run could not contribute to a further increase in domestic 
funding. Vis-a-vis this situation, the West, Japan and other capitalist countries 
offered a solution to Indonesia, whereby loan conditions and distribution of debts 
were relatively flexible. But in the long run, Indonesia required not only financing to 
regulate the variation of the currency, but also foreign assets and their investment to 
ensure the continuity of national development. In short, Indonesia needed the 
support of capitalist countries, as well as banks and multinational corporations. 
 
The leaders of the ―New order‖ realized that it was not easy to obtain the support of 
the community and the international institutions. Foreign investors were already 
traumatized by the policies of Sukarno that opposed international assistance. 
Moreover, his expansionist strategy and confrontation with Malaysia were not 
appreciated by the international community. Therefore, Suharto and his economic 
advisors tried to show the international community the changes of the new 
government.  
 
They initially tried to demonstrate its capacity to control existing economic problems. 
With an aim to gain international support, the government revealed its new policy 
under seven points in April 196667: 
 
1. They acknowledged that Indonesia was confronted with chronic inflation, 
budget deficit and foreign debt. If the government was committed to settling 
the foreign debt that year as it had envisaged, they would need to exhaust all 
foreign-exchange reserves to pay for the importation of necessary items. For 
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this reason, the government made a proposal with its creditors to discuss the 
possibility of a delay in the debt servicing. 
2. The rehabilitation of the economic infrastructure could be possible through the 
importation of the parts and machinery. 
3. Effective research of Indonesia‘s economic rationale would become the basis 
for policy of the government both internally and externally. This engagement 
meant that the government would accept foreign aid without imposing its own 
political conditions. 
4. Active association and consultation with the peripheries during economic 
decision making.  In other words, the central government preached a policy of 
decentralization allowing the peripheries to exploit local resources within the 
limits and laws of the State. 
5. The government would stop all subsidies. 
6. The removal of taxes would be carried out after a reform of the tax system. 
7. Short-term measures to stabilize and rehabilitate the economy would quickly 
be taken by the government in order to give to private companies an 
opportunity to develop and organize themselves.  
 
After this declaration of intent, the next stage was the stabilization and the 
rehabilitation of the economy. This aimed to soften the pressure of inflation and to 
reinforce the balance of payments through two means: to decrease monetary flows 
in circulation in order to slow down inflation and thus stabilize the budget deficit, and 
to increase public income through foreign aid and increase in taxation. In accordance 
with that, the government made a series of fiscal/tax and monetary reforms and 
policies68. 
 
Fiscal/tax reforms: 
 
a. reduction of the national expenditure 
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Considering the national budget was the greatest source of expenditure, reducing it 
was effective to slow down inflation. Moreover, the government determined that the 
current expenditure had to be financed by the current income. For that, it was 
necessary to reduce the budget to conform with income, so that a point of balance 
could be reached. 
 
b. Increase in income tax 
 
This policy was carried out through an improvement of tax mechanisms and a fight 
against corruption. The government carried out an increase in income tax through an 
increase of customs duties and increase of taxes on petroleum products. 
 
c. Suppression of subsidies and adaptations to pricing system 
 
Subsidies granted to state enterprises would be removed with an aim of making 
these companies more autonomous, effective, rational and beneficial. This policy, as 
a consequence, increased tariffs for electricity, water and telecommunications. 
However, the government tried to guarantee the price stability of essential products. 
For that, the subsidies for the procurement of such products were maintained, and 
an institution established to manage their distribution.  
 
The monetary policy: 
 
a. Financial tightening 
The central bank took measures to tighten financial distribution by determining a high 
level of interest between 5% and 9% per month.  
 
b. ‘Deposito‘ Saving 
When the program to control inflation began to produce results, the banks introduced 
a new range of saving plans through which the money in circulation within the 
country could be controlled.  
 
Moreover, in accordance with the intention of the ―New order‖ to adopt a capitalist 
system, the government also applied co-operative policies in connection with 
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overseas investors and international exchange. Suharto‘s regime created a program 
to address this: 
 
International assistance and foreign investment 
 
a. To set out debt structure and to seek new appropriations  
 
The government took active measures to redesign the debt structure and to seek 
long term financial solutions with low appropriations in terms of interest rate 
management.  
 
b. Overseas investment 
 
To attract the attention of international investors, the government offered facilities 
and stimulants. For example, in 1967, the government announced a new law 
concerning overseas investment which granted tax relief for the first six years for 
certain projects; release customs taxes for the importation of machines and capital; 
as well as the right to take profit back to their country. 
 
c. Privatizing those companies that were previously nationalized. 
   
The objective was to show to investors the ―serious‖ intentions of the new 
government. The ―new order‖ privatized those companies that had been nationalized 
by Sukarno and gave them compensation. To these companies, the government 
also offered the same facilities as to those new foreign companies that had been just 
been established. 
 
Liberalizing international exchange 
 
a. Currency Regulation 
 
The decree of the government of October 3, 1966 became the basis of the reformed 
currency exchange market. Through this new system of payment, the government 
increased the allowance of currencies for exporters and gave them other facilities to 
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support their activities.  In addition to this liberalization, the government also 
determined a new rate of exchange – 75 rupees for 1 US$69.  
 
b. Stimulants for International Exchange 
 
On July 28, 1967, the government continued to offer facilities to exporters and 
importers, including the reduction of export duties, and streamlined 
export/importation processes.70  
 
Reducing Bureaucracy and Decentralization policy 
 
Through this directive, the government promised that it would avoid acting as an 
―economic commando‖ as it did during the time of Orde Lama.  Instead, it transferred 
most of its economic decision making capacity to the ‗market‘. As a result, certain 
payments to the government were removed and market institutions rationalized and 
made more effective. 
 
The third stage was directed toward long term market solutions. Overseen by expert 
economists from the University of Berkeley (known as the `Berkeley Mafia'), Suharto 
built a national macroeconomic development program. This program called ―Pelita,‖ 
facilitated an economy that was structured, planned, and evaluated every five years, 
with priority sectors renewed during each period. ―Pelita‖ was essentially an 
adaptation of the theoretical framework regarding company development, as 
proposed by W.W. Rostow.71 
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To carry out all these changes, on July 25, 1966 Suharto established a new Cabinet 
sentimentally named Cabinet AMPERA (Amanat Penderitaan Rakyat – meaning 
mandate of the suffering of the people) which aimed to address the problems of 
prosperity and economic development. The latter involved the installation of a 
special team within the cabinet called the Committee of the Economic Stability, a unit 
directly under the direction of Suharto. Members of the Berkeley Mafia were 
designated as special advisers to him and consequently become major technocrats 
of the ―New order.‖  
 
Consequently, many Indonesians accepted the arrival of Suharto and had several 
reasons to recognize his legitimate leadership.  For example, Suharto imposed 
social order, restored the economy, and removed the threat of communism as well 
ideological conflicts from social life. He also brought a fundamental change in the 
quality of life to Indonesian people through economic development. As an illustration, 
in 1965 Indonesia was the poorest country in Asia, with approximately 60% of its 
population (around 55 people million) lived below the poverty line (Bresnan, 1993, 
p.1, 286, Schwartz, 1994, p.58-59), which was so different with the situation during 
the Orde Baru period. As a result of Suharto‘s development policies72, the annual 
growth of the GDP continuously exceeded 6% for the next thirty years. Until 1996, 
poverty had been reduced to 11%, (22 million people). Impressive results were also 
recorded for life expectancy, agricultural output and food self-sufficiency.  
Furthermore, with an abundant labour source and immense natural resources, 
Indonesia seemed assured for sustained growth. In brief, despite certain underlying 
factors that prevented Indonesia from achieving success, under Suharto‘s leadership 
Indonesia found stability, hence very few people were concerned when his party, 
Golkar, gained a quasi-plebiscite after the 1971 election – a political trend that 
brought him an ‗authoritative‘ image around the world. Even so, at the domestic level 
Suharto gained a very significant level of legitimacy – seen as the saviour of the 
                                                                                                                                                        
consumption. Using this model, Suharto and his technocrats wish to bring more rapidly ‗western‘ standard of 
national development to Indonesia. 
72
 In addition to these, an important factor should be taken into accout: 1973 records a boom oil 
revenue which brought more economic prosperity to the country and made it possible for Suharto to even 
consolidate his legitimate power and rule. 
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country vis-a-vis communism, secessionism, and poverty – hence entitling himself as 
‗The Father of Indonesian Development‘.  
 
It was only towards the end of the 1980s that questions surrounding the long reign of 
Suharto began to arise when a series of deficiencies started to appear: disparity of 
income, urban misery, environmental degradation and human rights violations. Most 
serious was the problem of corruption. An examination of the Indonesian leadership 
system, makes it obvious that entire economic sectors were structured as channels 
for benefiting the Suharto family, close relations of the president and their associates 
(such as military officials). Rather than serving the community, the majority of the 
state apparatus was mobilized for the elite.  Consequently, the poor suffered terribly.  
By 1996, dissatisfaction amongst society had reached its highest level after almost 
three decades of stability.  These negative trends led to loss of support for Suharto 
from the people, as well as the army and political elites (these topics will be analyzed 
in chapter 4 and chapter 5), and resulted in the collapse of his regime in 1997, and 
brought a new era of leadership under the presidency of Habibie.  
 
3.4. Version IV: Democratic legal legitimacy 
 
 
When Habibie took leadership of Indonesia, the morale of the state had never been 
so low. Widespread disorder reigned throughout the country after Jakarta and other 
major cities were traumatized following the May riots that year. Moreover, the 
economy was in crisis and the financial sector was totally in ruin. Millions of 
Indonesians had been thrown into poverty (see Chapter 1 section 1.5.1). Meanwhile, 
the task of the new president was made even more difficult as Habibie also inherited 
serious political and economic crises just like his predecessor. However, unlike 
Suharto in 1965, Habibie did not have enough support from the people nor the 
political elites, and the army only half-heartedly accepted his rule. The political elites, 
students and the army were in an alliance against any kind of leadership that could 
be regarded as a ―continuation of the New Order,‖ and Habibie‘s regime was 
suspected to be such. Even the constitution could not be expected to give legitimacy 
to the regime. In brief, Habibie‘s regime was in a position of acute political weakness 
with an extremely low level of legitimacy. Nevertheless, Habibie‘s civilian regime was 
able to stand more than one and half years without military intervention and without 
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fatal resistance from the elites, students and the people — altogether, this meant a 
significant but limited form of legitimacy for the regime.  
 
How Habibie had been able to secure this precious aspect of state legitimacy during 
his short rule is, therefore, analytically interesting. For example, Habibie had made 
extraordinary and daring strategic decisions such as granting independence to the 
press, releasing political prisoners and solving the issue of East Timor.  
 
Establishing a New Government and Setting-up a Democratic Election 
 
Left with little choice, Habibie tried to manage the unfavorable situation by setting up 
a number of measures which would later be the basis for all regimes after 1998. 
Among Habibie‘s urgent tasks was to establish a new government in the shortest 
time possible in order to alleviate any possibility of intervention from the army due to 
the chaotic political circumstances. A cabinet was then created with multiple 
objectives – most important of which was to ease tensions amongst reformer-elites. 
At the beginning, however, it seemed that Habibie was unable to please the 
reformers as the new cabinet was still dominated by prominent figures from the 
previous regime. The majority of the 36 ministers were from Golkar (Suharto‘s party) 
or from the army. Twenty ministers came from Suharto‘s last cabinet – including the 
‗Group of Ten‘ who signed the ‗letter of refusal‘ for Suharto‘s leadership prior to his 
resignation73. Habibie also maintained the four ‗anti-reform‘ ministers from the 
previous government, including Faisal Tanjung who was assigned to a strategic post 
as the coordinating minister for politics and security. Habibie‘s sectarian allies were 
also represented in this cabinet. Some were his collaborators in the ministry of 
science and technology (such as the minister of industry and trade, Rahardi 
Ramelan), while others were his companions from Habibie‘s hometown Sulawesi 
(such as the minister of state enterprises, Tanri Abeng).  These moves were 
suspected as efforts to form a clan in the cabinet.  Even though the cabinet also 
included a certain number of politicians from Islamist groups they still came from 
Habibie‘s proxy at the ICMI, in particular the minister for the co-operatives, Adi 
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Sasono. Due to this composition, the cabinet gave only little satisfaction to the 
demands for reform. Therefore, the political elites then urged the government to 
conduct a popular vote rather than supporting the new regime. From their 
perspective, only an election could be expected to put an end to the political 
uncertainty, and later lead to the creation of a legitimate government. 
 
Facing this new political pressure, Habibie did not appear to be reluctant. His 
objective was to give the impression that the new regime was not operating under 
the influence of Suharto‘s Orde Baru, so he immediately expressed his willingness to 
prepare for democratic elections earlier than necessary74.  To make this willingness 
more apparent, on May 23, 1998, the president gathered key reformers (such as 
Amien Rais, Nurcholish Madjid, Emil Salim and Adnan Buyung Nasution) to discuss 
the possibility of an election75. After these discussions, a spokesperson announced 
that the president wished to hold a new legislative election as soon as a new 
electoral law could be adopted. Since this task would take some time, the president 
stated that he would examine this question further before fixing a date for the 
election. 
 
Habibie had apparently decided on this tactic after ‗discreet‘ consultation with the 
army, as the spokesperson for the army also held a press conference at more or less 
the same time as Habibie‘s statement. ―A precondition to solve the economic crisis 
was‖, said the spokeperson, ―a government which is elected by the people‖(Suara 
Pembaharuan, 1998a). From this brief statement, the army thus approved the call 
from Habibie to conduct a legislative election. This was really extraordinary as it was 
declared by an institution that had defended Suharto‘s military presidential monarchy 
for three decades. Nevertheless, the declaration also contained certain 
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preconditions. Many Indonesians wondered whether the army was simply waiting for 
the best moment to intervene while trying to ease dissatisfaction from the people and 
political elites76. Another suspicious feeling amongst society was that perhaps the 
army hoped that a democratic election would bring general Wiranto, the chief-
commander of the army to the presidency (in fact, he later showed his intention to 
put forward his candidacy).  
 
Meanwhile, Habibie‘s real intention was still unpredictable – whether he wished to be 
a candidate in the next presidential election, or if he would be satisfied to act only as 
a transitional president.  Another fear was that he might try to reinstate Suharto‘s 
reign later in the future, or at least maintain his previous influence. However, 
Habibie‘s famous ‗intelligence‘ convinced many elites that he would prefer to lead a 
peaceful transition in order to privilege himself later as the ‗father of the democracy,‘ 
rather than taking an opposite stance.  Nevertheless, Habibie‘s proximity to Suharto 
was the main reason that the public was anxious of knowing what approach he 
would choose. 
 
Criticism and skepticism amongst the elites started to emerge when Habibie gave 
the sign of a non-immediate election. From his speech of June 22, 1998, Habibie 
mentioned that an election would be possible only if a new political law was 
available, and he envisaged that it would not be until December 1998 that new 
political laws could be drafted; moreover, such processes would be subject to the 
lengthy delay of an extraordinary session of the parliament that would determine the 
election date. Habibie proposed that this legislative election would be conducted by 
mid-1999, and thus the presidential election would not take place before December 
1999. This process (taking eighteen months after the resignation of Suharto) was 
considered as too long by the reformers.  For example, Emil Salim claimed that this 
decision would slow down the Indonesian economic recovery.  In comparison, 
Thailand and South Korea had responded to the financial crisis by instituting rapid 
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political change. This caused turbulence amongst the elites. In October 1998, radical 
students demonstrated against military units, sometimes with violent consequences. 
However, as Habibie‘s reason for the delay was technical, political elites and 
students could not be too ‗insistent‘ on this matter. In addition, the three main leaders 
representing the reformers---Amien Rais (intellectuals), Megawati Sukarnoputri 
(Nationalist), and Gus Dur (Islam)---would hardly think to confront the army only to 
precipitate the election, especially since Habibie himself had promised to hold a free 
election in 1999.  Their moderate strategies were based on their confidence to gain 
victory in the election, and to use the time to make preparations for this. Megawati 
and Gus Dur (who were quite passive at the beginning) later declared the 
establishment of their political parties at the end of 1998. Gus Dur created a 
traditional Islamist-based Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa—National Awakening Party 
(PKB) while Megawati created a nationalist-based Partai Demokrasi Indonesia 
Perjuangan-Indonesian Democratic Struggle Party (PDIP). 
 
Enforcing the Law 
 
The next important measure taken by Habibie‘s regime to gain legitimacy was 
through law enforcement. It had been widely believed that the fundamental stumbling 
block constraining the Indonesian economic recovery was the lack of respect for the 
law amongst the people. There was hence a popular cynical statement saying that 
Indonesia was governed by what was called ―Ruler's Law‖ – a term which in fact tried 
to negate the ―Rule-of-Law‖. For more than four decades after 1945, the legal 
system had always been designed to defend the supremacy of the ruler (leader), 
rather than the supremacy of the law itself. However, this did not mean that the legal 
system in Indonesia did not function at all. In fact, it functioned very effectively for the 
interests of the elites, but did not, however, deliver justice amongst the people. 
Moreover, the system was rife with corruption within the legal infrastructure. Judges, 
prosecutors, the police force and lawyers were not loyal to their professionalism or 
their principles and ideals of public services, as the entire system placed little value 
on these qualities. Instead, their professional activities were structured by their 
loyalty to their superiors, the rich or the power-holders. Over time, the practices of 
enriching themselves through loyalty had conditioned the bureaucracy and the 
military with a culture of corruption. It was common for civil servants to sell their 
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services to the highest bidder. Therefore, the legal system became a mechanism 
whereby the rich and powerful could exploit the poor and the weak. Habibie, 
therefore, wanted to buy people‘s support by promising to reform the legal system.  
To do so, Habibie appointed Muladi, a leading figure of justice at the time, as the 
minister of justice77. 
 
The nomination of Muladi was welcomed by the reformers with high expectations 
because of the integrity shown by the minister during his time as a chancellor at the 
University of Diponegoro in central Java. Muladi was obviously capable of pleasing 
reformers‘ demands – most notable of which was his decision to release political 
prisoners as well as cleaning up corrupt judicial institutions previously headed by 
retired general Sarwata. As such, the reformers applauded Muladi‘s initiatives and 
committed themselves to supporting the new minister in his project for reformation 
within his institution, and hence a positive indicator for Habibie‘s legitimacy.  
 
Reforming the army 
 
Soon after Habibie‘s appointment as head of state, the army commander-in-chief, 
general Wiranto approved the institutional reforms applied to the armed forces. 
Initially the reform began with the reduction of soldier‘s representatives in the 
parliament from 75 to 38 seats. Then the army was asked to be politically neutral by 
pulling out of its active involvement in business as well as in political parties (such as 
Golkar). In addition, army officers who were previously in charge of bureaucratic 
positions and public administration were now replaced by civilians. 
 
Supplementary to these reforms, structural changes within the armed forces were 
also applied in April 1999, when the national police force was separated from the 
armed forces. The police force was now in charge of internal security and placed 
under the direct command of the president rather than the Minister of defense. In 
doing this, Habibie promised to give ‗professional‘ protection to the society while 
expected to gain even more support from the people for his quest of legal legitimacy.  
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observation by the researcher who, during the Habibie‘s presidency, served as his assistant at the State 
Secretariat of the Republic of Indonesia.  
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Managing the problem of ‗East Timor‘ to regain international support 
 
Despite state‘s independent status, history has shown that Indonesian regimes have 
not always been capable of being ‗fully-independent‘ – especially during periods of 
crisis. Suharto was trying to regain international trust in order to support his efforts to 
gain legitimacy at the domestic level after Sukarno‘s reign. Habibie‘s situation was 
not so different as can be seen in the following story. 
 
East Timor had long been a burden for Indonesian diplomacy. In 1975 Indonesia 
forcibly annexed this tiny territory after Portugal withdrew itself. The refusal of the 
United Nations to recognize this annexation combined with years of human right 
abuses involving the Indonesian army, had drawn considerable attention from the 
international community. During his rule, Suharto had rejected the repeated attempts 
of the international community to peacefully resolve the difficult question of Timor. 
While Suharto‘s firm internal legitimacy was capable of easing these international 
concerns, Habibie (whose legitimacy was suffering an intense attack and pressures 
at the domestic level) could not do the same. During a time of economic crisis, the 
international community was a potential ally when there were no better alternatives 
available. Hence, daring initiatives to review the question of East Timor appeared at 
the top of Habibie‘s agenda.  
 
Initially, Habibie‘s initiative was aimed to give more flexibility to East Timor than 
during Suharto‘s period. He promised to grant the territory ‗special autonomy‘ while 
reducing the number of Indonesian troops based in the area. He wished that this 
initiative would be welcomed by the Timorese who had lived under ‗iron-law‘ for more 
than two decades (See: Appendex 3-Garnadi Document); by the Indonesian elites 
and army for East Timor as doing so would not hurt national integrity; and the 
international community, as the policy was a ‗break-through‘ after a long period of 
being ‗idle‘. 
 
This initiative was challenged by the elites – especially the conservative groups. 
They had fears that these concessions would encourage secessionist sentiments in 
certain areas like Aceh and Papua. In addition, with the nation being so diverse and 
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multicultural and which had suffered from previous multicultural conflicts and 
secessionism, questioning national integration would be politically taboo. Suharto 
had ardently used nationalist sentiments to keep this territory as part of the national 
unity – a project that proved to be effective despite the absence of international 
recognition. There were, however, certain actors capable of assuring Habibie‘s 
different perspective. One of them was a woman (who like Habibie, was a pious 
moslem intellectual) Dewi Fortuna Anwar. 
 
In her official role of assistant to the state secretary for foreign affairs, Anwar had 
seen how the imbroglio of East Timor had harmed Indonesia‘s foreign relations with 
its international counterparts, donors and the United Nations. Her advice that the 
review of East Timor issue could mean extending good will from the regime, and also 
be greatly welcomed by the international community, ultimately convinced Habibie. 
In a press conference held on January 27, 1999, the president announced that 
Jakarta could organize a ‗referendum‘ to accommodate the ‗purest intention‘ of the 
Timorese (State Secretariat of the Republic of Indonesia, 1999). 
 
Habibie held the belief that a referendum for the Timorese was the best solution 
available for the island, and also a brilliant way to win the international support 
significant to his quest for legitimacy. Moreover, due to its tiny size, East Timor might 
have been regarded as relatively unimportant by Jakarta.  As the territory accounted 
for only one percent of the total Indonesian population, Habibie thought that the loss 
of Timor would have little impact to Indonesia. He had even put forward an argument 
to persuade conservative groups that East Timor was not worth preserving by 
saying: ―East Timor, what have that territory given us? Natural resources? No. 
Technology? No. Abundance gold? No. Stones? Yes‖ (Strait Times, 1999). The 
policy was hence considered as in the interests of the Indonesian majority and a 
rational requirement considering the political realities of the post-Suharto era.  
 
Conclusion 
 
The political behaviour and orientation under the different forms of leadership from 
Sukarno to Habibie, is related to an important aspect of how and why a state enjoys 
legitimacy. This aspect is determined by the capacity of each leader to deal with 
political and economic circumstances. The quest for legitimacy by each regime was 
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mainly undertaken through championing support from subjects at the domestic level, 
and sometimes combined with support from the international community. 
 
During Sukarno‘s period, the ‗power‘ of the state was concentrated around a 
legitimate charismatic leader. Sukarno‘s vision of the future of the Indonesian state 
was executed through speeches on topics of ‗nationalism‘ and ‗revolution‘ – and was 
proven to be effective in gaining enthusiastic obedience from the domestic level. 
Furthermore, this charisma had influenced other actors in the political arena – 
despite the intense competition between the army and the communists, the president 
remained at the center of power, and in some cases, gave him an unchallenged 
extra-constitutional power. Thus, when the British established a federation for 
Malaysia, Sukarno used this issue as a political tool to divert the attention of the 
people from the intense internal conflict; moreover, the people obeyed him 
voluntarily. Sukarno hence played role as a ―balancer‖ that not only assured the 
stability of the whole political system, but also provided a guarantee of the people‘s 
support.  
 
Sukarno also made ‗nationalism‘ and ‗unity‘ as the foremost priorities of his regime, 
by virtue of which voluntary support and obedience were harvested from his 
audience (the Indonesian people). The widespread concerns regarding the 
possibility of Dutch return to power in his old colony gave him additional 
opportunities to develop his nationalist rhetoric. Meanwhile, as international politics 
were dominated by ideological competition between the West and the East, Sukarno 
had successfully led Indonesia into the non-alignment bloc – a successful strategy of 
mobilizing ‗Third World‘ countries that gave even more charismatic power to Sukarno 
at the domestic level. Despite an arrangement that had led the state towards 
aggressive politics with the international community, this political orientation was 
effective for diverting internal quarrels and turning social poverty into the ‗common 
enemy‘. 
 
The leadership during the ―New Order‖ period behaved in a completely opposite 
direction to that of Sukarno‘s.  The strategic problems that Suharto faced at the 
beginning of his reign were related to the failure of the preceding regime. Sukarno‘s 
political style put too much priority on ‗ombrageux‘ nationalism, resulting in severe 
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economic bankruptcy at the domestic level and significant loss of support from the 
international community. Learning from this failure, Suharto then tried to achieve 
legitimacy at the domestic level by restoring the economy and setting up a suitable 
development program. Over a course of more than 30 years, Suharto had 
successfully rectified the nation's economy and brought Indonesia towards a 
significant level of development. In the political dimension, Suharto strictly controlled 
the power of state by initially eliminating any potential political rivals (especially the 
communists) and giving the army more access to power while neutralizing the 
nationalist groups.  
 
During the period of New Order, Suharto‘s authoritative style of leadership had set 
directions with a ‗military standard‘ of operation, so that the regime was able to 
secure its legitimacy and reinforce martial Law through the manipulation of the 
political process at the domestic level and the proposition of a progressive formula of 
economic development based on capitalism. To address the external situation, the 
national economy was opened up to the market and supported by politics of co-
operation with the international community – in particular those capitalist countries 
that were ready to provide political as well as financial support for Suharto‘s 
development programmes. Moreover, every element of the state accepted these 
arrangements – their obedience being obligatory and coerced by the regime. 
 
The circumstances faced throughout Habibie‘s leadership were much less favorable 
in comparison with his two predecessors. Habibie had also inherited serious political 
and economic crises, but unlike Sukarno or Suharto, Habibie was not surrounded by 
significant popular support. The political elites, the students and the army were 
resistant to the ‗New Order‘ as well as its continuators, while Habibie‘s regime was 
considered by the people as a continuation Suharto‘s regime. Amidst this 
multidimensional crisis, the regime had also lost confidence from international 
donors as a consequence of Suharto‘s radical stance during his last days in power.  
 
Under these circumstances, legitimacy based either on constitution, charisma or 
authority was not effective. Hence, Habibie tried to find support wherever he could – 
from inside as well as from outside. Habibie, therefore, ended up taking 
extraordinary and daring decisions – such as granting independence to the press, 
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releasing political prisoners, and especially reviewing the problem of East Timor. 
Despite all these efforts, Habibie‘s leadership lasted for only one and half years. 
Nevertheless, these efforts become standard of legal legitimacy which were to be 
adopted and practiced by later regimes from 1999 until the current period. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: 
 
THE INDONESIAN MILITARY AND THE STATE 
 
 
―……..the military has taken over power in a large number of developing 
countries: in Egypt (1952), in Pakistan, Burma, Thailand, Iraq and the 
Sudan (1958), in Turkey (1960), in Korea (1961) and again in Burma in 
1962. In other countries, too, the military have tended to play an 
increasingly important role, as in Vietnam, the Phillipines, Indonesia, and 
less prominently as yet, in Jordan and Ethiophia‖  
(Daalder, 1962, p. 9) 
―More than two-thirds of the countries of Latin America, Asia, Africa, and 
the Middle East have experienced varying levels of military intervention 
since 1945‖  
(Nordlinger, 1977, p. xi) 
 
 
Scholars often argue that the twentieth century saw witnessed the rise of the 
nation-state, with the military being a ‗required‘ institution behind this 
development and establishment78. In this kind of arrangement, the military is 
assigned one major function in social organization: that of national defence. In 
theory, a military should be politically impartial, economically withdrawn, and 
focused on its main task of defending the nation from any threats. However, at 
the practical level, such an arrangement is not always the case. Within a state‘s 
evolution, the military has often played multiple roles which were far beyond its 
primary one and involved in political and economic activities. In Russia during 
the liberation from the Marxist-Leninist regime, the military played the part of a 
‗liberator‘ not of the people or the state, but of a particular party.  From the 
1950s, militaries have intervened in the politics of various developing countries, 
seizing power and using it as an instrument serving their particular interests. At 
other times, militaries have taken ‗necessary steps‘ to put an end to the existing 
civilian-deadlock or radical measures to alter the status quo. Militaries have also 
been involved in the social and economic development of nation-states, and 
have even determined the development of the whole system of the state 
through the formation of military-based leadership at various levels of 
government. Further, in these countries, militaries have been assertive in 
                                                 
78
 See, for example: HUNTINGTON, S. (1957) The Soldier and the State, Cambridge, Harvard 
University Press.; FINER, S. (1976) The Man on Horseback, Harmondswort, Penguin. 
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economic and social life, identifying themselves initially as the ‗savior‘ of the 
nation, but then as the ‗true‘ agent of development and modernization, taking on 
a role that traditionally belonged to civilians in monarchies, aristocracies, and 
political parties in democracies.  
 
The involvement of the military in the politics of modern nation-states, especially 
in the third-world, is certainly not a new object of scholarly attention. For some 
time, prominent scholars such as Samuel Huntington (See: Huntington, 1957), 
Harold Morris Janowitz (See: Janowitz, 1960), S.E. Finer (See: Finer, 1976), 
Amos Perlmutter (See: Perlmutter, 1969, Perlmutter, 1977), H. Daalder (See: 
Daalder, 1962), Robert W. Jackman (See: Jackman, 1976) and Eric Nordlinger 
(See: Nordlinger, 1977, Nordlinger, 1970) have analysed comprehensively this 
kind of intervention in conjunction with a more or less parallel question: why is it 
that in many countries the military have taken (or tried to take) state power? 
Various answers have also been offered by those scholars. Daalder, for instance, 
suggests four logics behind this phenomenon. First, the military have often been one 
of the earliest Westernized institutions in traditional societies. Traditional elites, on 
the other hand, have thought it possible to borrow the ―cutting edge‖ of Western 
civilization while insulating their societies as much as possible from Western 
influences in other respects and, in doing so, have contributed to making the army 
into a potential revolutionary force par excellence (Daalder, 1962, p.12). Second, in 
traditional societies, a military career has often been a means of upward social 
mobility for groups which otherwise occupied an inferior status, since the military 
men in many countries have been recruited from relatively low-status segments of 
society. According to Daalder, the army has consequently become one of the few 
channels of upward mobility in societies which have been marked by a very rigid 
stratification (Daalder, 1962, p.13). Third, the military is in fact not a completely 
homogeneous force but a single ‗corporate‘ body with a collective interest. Apart 
from natural division of the military into armies, navies, and air-force, each division is 
further divided into multiple strata within the profession. This produces a diversified 
outlook and experience that, according to Daalder, may lead to various behaviours of 
the military, including that of intervention into domestic political sphere (Daalder, 
1962, p.13-15). Fourth, Daalder also explains military revolts in the light of civilian 
failures. Daalder argues that national independence, by itself, raised expectations 
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which it would have been impossible to fulfil even under the most favourable 
conditions. Meanwhile, political leaders have been uncomfortably perched between 
the social forces of traditionalism and their desires for modernity. In this situation, 
according to Daalder, the military would have the tendency to intervene, given that it 
has both weapons and a vision of itself as the guardian of the nation which, it feels, 
might easily fall prey to imperialist designs if internal anarchy persisted (Daalder, 
1962, p.16).  
 
These dynamics should be kept in mind for the remainder of this chapter, since they 
show that military-civilian relationships around the world have been complicated. 
Further, they also provide an explanation of why the military tends to engage itself in 
the political sphere of third world states. This chapter, therefore, attempts neither to 
add salt to the seawater nor to polish the already-sophisticated treatises on why the 
military intervenes in the political sphere. The question addressed here is rather, 
‗How does the military established itself in a particular society?‘ As the Indonesian 
state is the focal point of the study, the inquiry is based, more specifically, on the 
question of ‗How has the Indonesian military place itself within the Indonesian state?‘ 
The observation and assessment will be concentrated on the empirics from the 
period of early independence until today. Some points, therefore, need to be 
underlined at this initial stage. First, military intervention is a general phenomenon of 
the ‗relatively new states‘ in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. The Indonesian state 
falls within this category. Second, as ‗corporate‘ institutions, the militaries of these 
states follow certain organizational patterns that have been developed in the West 
and adopt certain orientations similarly copied from the West. It is in this respect that 
the assessment of the Indonesian military is based on Western concepts. Third, a 
military is not a fully independent entity with a fixed orientation; its existence is 
always attached to a ‗client‘, and it also suffers from the influence of its environment. 
Consequently, it can take different forms and orientations over time. Based on these 
three considerations, the model most relevant to the Indonesian case is that of 
Perlmutter, which distinguishes between professional, praetorian, and revolutionary 
militaries. 
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4.1. Perlmutter‟s, Professional, Praetorian, and Revolutionary Types 
 
Among the many studies of the military in third-world states, Perlmutter‘s  ‗Military 
and Politics in Modern Times: On Professionals, Praetorians, and Revolutionary 
Soldiers‘ deserves particular attention. Perlmutter is an expert whose concentration 
is on the military in Middle Eastern countries, and the majority work concerns the 
military intervention in Egypt and Israel (see, for example: Perlmutter, 1978, 
Perlmutter, 1974). This regional focus provides a distinctive advantage, since it is a 
theoretical analysis of non-Western phenomena from a non-Western perspective. 
Another promising fact is that Perlmutter is considered as the pioneer of a non-
traditional approach, for he has created an alternative to the functionalist and 
ideological approaches to civilian-military relations developed by his predecessors. 
Perlmutter concentrates on the ‗corporate character‘ of the military establishment, 
which is also the focal point of this chapter. We will therefore begin by looking at 
Perlmutter‘s classification of the military before dealing with the main quest: 
analysing the Indonesian military.  
 
Perlmutter identifies at least three  types of the military in developing as well as in 
developed nation-states, each of which, according to Perlmutter, come about as a 
result of external ‗stimuli‘ rooted within the civilian authority. The first type, the 
professional, is linked to a society in which the civilian government is successful in 
maintaining social order and political stability. The second type, the praetorian, is at 
the other end of the spectrum, arising within societies where the minimal requirement 
of social security cannot be assured by the civilian government--the situation 
generally associated with social disorder and political instability. The third type, the 
revolutionary, is associated into ‗states-in-transition‘ and establishes itself within a 
society where the sustainability of political stability by the civilian government 
remains ‗in question‘ despite the existing social order  (see: Perlmutter, 1977, p. 9). 
 
The Professional Soldiers 
 
Literally, the term ‗professional‘ refers to a person who has obtained a degree in a 
professional field hence its broad definition is related to certain criteria such as: 
academic qualifications; expert and specialized knowledge; manual/practical and 
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literary skills; high quality of work; certain standard of ethics and behaviour; and also 
certain level of moral and motivation.  
 
The definition of ‗Professional military‘, meanwhile, is not really clear-cut but 
scattered in accordance to various objectives and perspectives. Even the scholars 
mentioned earlier do not have a common definition despite their being the 
mainstream sources. Perlmutter, for instance, only emphasizes Huntington‘s criteria 
of professsionalism: (1) expertise79; (2) clientship80; (3) corporateness; and (4) 
ideology81; while adding his two own criteria: 1) secularity82 and 2) social mobility83 
(Perlmutter, 1977, p.9). 
 
The Praetorian Soldier  
 
The term ‗Praetorianism‘ found its origins in the Roman history84, the concept being 
defined by Perlmutter as ―.....a situation where the military class of a given society 
exercises independent political power within it by virtue of an actual or threatened 
                                                 
79
 The expertise of the military, according to most scholars, depends on the skills associated with the 
military organization, and in this case have something to do with the ability to manage any threats by using 
force and violence, an expected standard of conduct that can only be achieved through training. As was 
suggested by Machiavelli, ―.......In every country, good soldiers are made by training, because where nature is 
lacking, the industry supplies it, which, in this case, is worth more than nature‖—see MACHIAVELLI, N. 
(1521) The Art of War, Feedbooks., p.18 
80
 The clientship criterion of the military refers to the rationale that any profession should serve specific 
clients. Doctors require patients, a lawyer would not be a lawyer without clients, and teachers require students. 
Likewise, there can be no professional military in the absence of user such as a state, society, monarch, empire, 
party or other client chosen by the military 
81
 A set of doctrines containing values, rules and procedures which all military officers are supposed to 
use as their main point of reference. 
82
 Being independent from sectarian groups such as church, class, caste and the like, while maintaining 
its organization based on rational principles 
83
 Selection and advancement of officers on the basis of skill rather than according to class or other 
distinctions 
84
 According to Bingham, the imperial praetorian guard was an elite unit of the Roman army whose 
primary responsibility was initially to safeguard the emperor and his family. Later, this military unit became the 
personal army of the emperor, and its power and responsibility were much greater than that of a regular defence 
force. They became responsible for specialized military tasks involving issues of security and for various 
administrative duties in Rome. This evolution, still according to Bingham, occurred because of the close 
relationship between the guard and the emperor, who saw the potential for a large number of soldiers to be put 
to good use for his own benefit and that of the state. The praetorians would not only assist in the management of 
the capital, but would also serve as a constant reminder to the populace of the substantial armed force 
underlying imperial rule—see: BINGHAM, S. (1997) The Praetorian Guard in the Political and Social Life of 
Julio Claudian Rome. Department of Classical, Near Eastern, and Religious Studies. Ottawa, The University of 
British Columbia., p.ii. The praetorian, therefore, is simply defined as emperors‘ guardians who turn into the 
real rulers of the empire. Nordlinger said, ―They ended up using their military power to overthrow emperors and 
to control the Roman senate‟s „election‟ of successive emperors‖—see: NORDLINGER, E. (1977) Soldiers in 
Politics: Military Coups and Governments, Enlewood Cliffs, New Jersey, Prentice-Hall., p.2-3 
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use of force‖ (Perlmutter, 1977, p.89). A praetorian military, thus, is a type of the 
military that shows a dominant involvement in the politics within a state as was seen 
in the period of the Roman state85. However, praetorianism of the modern context is 
understood in a slightly different way from that of the Roman period. According to 
Perlmutter: 1) Modern praetorianism tends to create a military-style regime in which 
political leadership is allocated to military members or to pro-military groups; 2) 
Instead of interfering indirectly in the political processes, modern praetorians‘ 
intervention is executed through direct affiliation with the organs of state such as 
parliament or executive branches; 3) modern praetorianism appeared not because of 
the ruler‘s privilege or the legitimacy from the senate/parliament but because of the 
weakness of civilian institutions; and 4) In contrast to the praetorian guard whose 
main motivation was to gain supremacy over the provincial armies, modern 
praetorianism tends to appear whenever the civilian leadership is decaying 
(Perlmutter, 1977, p.93).   
 
With regard to Perlmutter‘s categorization, the praetorian is associated with a 
number of characteristic: Firstly, for praetorians, professional knowledge is not very 
strictly observed, and training is not considered the primary criteria of a military 
career despite the existence of military colleges and training centres; Secondly, the 
loyalty of the Praetorians is directed towards a ‗master‘ which could be the nation, a 
certain ethnic group or tribe, military commanders, junta-government, or the state. 
The main criterion of this loyalty is simply the ability of the master to secure the 
interests of the military; Thirdly, the praetorians defend corporateness as the 
exclusive property of the military just as the Professional Military does; Fourthly, the 
subordination principle operates in the praetorian military may shift in accordance to 
the changing environment; Finally, in terms of ideology, the praetorian military is 
more traditional, materialist, and anti-socialist, while the Professional Military is 
usually very conservative (see: Perlmutter, 1977, p.12-13).  
                                                 
85
 Military intervention into politics had actually been approached by scholars with multiple terms. 
Borrowing Nordlinger‘s description, ―The military officers who have intervened in the political sphere have 
been called ‗Men on Horseback‘ in reference to the traditional mounted position of army officers; ‗Soldiers in 
Mufti‘ because they often substitute civilian titles and clothing (mufti) for their military insignia and khaki 
uniform; ‗Iron Surgeons‘ in recognition of the public justification for their intervention, namely the need for 
decisive action in regenerating the politics and economy; and ‗Armed Bureaucrats‘ because their political 
attitudes and governing style approximate those of the higher civil servants‖--NORDLINGER, E. (1977) 
Soldiers in Politics: Military Coups and Governments, Enlewood Cliffs, New Jersey, Prentice-Hall., p.2 
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Revolutionary Type 
 
In specific circumstances, revolution is identical with crisis as the term is generally 
used to address a fundamental change in a short period of time, during which crises 
are likely to exist. In political science, for instance, the term is used to denote the 
change of power or of socio-political institutions which often involves confrontations 
between the revolutionary forces and the defensive status quo, between the 
reformers and the incumbent, between the progressives and the conservatives, or, in 
the case of a new state, between a movement party and the colonial power. The first 
group would normally take measures to bring about radical change or reform of the 
system which is defended by the second group, while the latter would try to preserve 
the status quo. When both parties were relatively equal in terms of power, 
confrontation would be the most likely result. 
 
Despite the close relationship between revolution and crisis, between crisis and 
security, and between security and the military, the revolutionary type of military is 
actually a different object of analysis which is not necessarily directly related to the 
revolution itself. Even when a co-relation exists, the discussion would tend to have 
something to do with the behavioural aspect of the military: whether they would be 
part of the revolution or leave the business in the hands of civilians. This logic may 
lead a different analysis of the military, and needs to be clarified at the beginning86.  
According to Perlmutter, the revolutionary type of military ―.....is certainly one of the 
finest, best disciplined professionals‖ (Perlmutter, 1977, p.205) hence can be 
considered as a variant of the professional one. However, the revolutionary military 
is professional in a different way. Using the criteria of professionalism elaborated 
earlier, there are at least six differences which can be extracted from Perlmutter‘s 
observation: First, the specific knowledge associated with the professional type is 
based on objective standards of competence, which makes the level of expertise 
relatively high. In the case of the revolutionary type, the professional knowledge is 
oriented towards social-political values and the level of its expertise is usually less 
                                                 
86
 The revolutionary military that we are trying to analyse in this chapter is an ideal type with certain 
characteristics which persist regardless of how soldiers behave. As a consequence, this type of the military 
refers to the military which is part of the party movement—and  not one which defends the status quo. 
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measurable. Second, the client of the professional military is the state, while the 
client of the revolutionary military can be any group, institution, or even individuals 
who are in charge in the revolution. This is normally referred to as the ―party-
movement.‖ Third, the professional military defends corporateness as the exclusive 
property of the military, while the revolutionary type refuses to do so. According to 
Perlmutter, this refusal is the main difference between professional and revolutionary 
militaries. He said, ―The Orientation, organization, and inclination of the revolutionary 
soldier are anticorporate or non-corporate (Perlmutter, 1977, p.205). Certain 
indicators of corporation – such as hierarchy, cohesive-organization, collectiveness, 
and subordination – would therefore be neglected by, or even entirely absent in, the 
revolutionary military. Fourth, conscription within the professional military is very 
restrictive and even conservative, and this would change to universal only in the 
case of emergencies such as war. The conscription within the revolutionary type, 
meanwhile, is always universal regardless the circumstances. Fifth, from the 
perspective of ideology, it is obvious that the revolutionary type will subscribe to the 
revolutionary ideology. The professional type, meanwhile, is conservative in 
ideology. Sixth, the disposition of the professional type to intervene into politics is low 
regardless of the state of civilian politics. The revolutionary type is slightly different. 
The disposition to intervene amongst the soldiers is very high before and during the 
revolution, but then becomes low once the revolution is completed.   
 
The revolutionary military‘s rejection to corporateness leads to what Perlmutter calls 
‗inclusivity‘, a character which is not only unique to the revolutionary military but also 
made this type of military less formal, less hierarchical, less corporate, and 
sometimes seems to neglect the basic criteria of professional military (see: 
Perlmutter, 1977, p.206). As the consequence, a figure can be recruited or promoted 
into the strategic military posts or leadership without necessarily considering his 
formal education, training, medical condition, and the like. Recruitment is open, 
means that whoever is able to fight and ready to provide a high level of loyalty can 
join the military and climb its ranks, while title and status can be given to soldiers 
even without external recognition (Perlmutter, 1977, p.14). 
 
It is based on these unique characteristics that Perlmutter identified certain 
behavioural characteristics which can be used to help identify the revolutionary type 
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of military.  The first indicator is its submission to the party movement during the 
revolution. At the initial stage, this seems to be a ‗standard of behaviour‘ for the 
revolutionary type hence tends to be temporary. When the revolution is over, 
however, this would transform itself into other kinds of behaviour or, in Perlmutter‘s 
term, behavioural cycle (Perlmutter, 1977, p.13-14). The next indicator is related to 
clientship. According to Perlmutter, the loyalty of the revolutionary military is to the 
state or to the nation but this loyalty will shift as time passes. It is because, still 
according to Perlmutter, the real client of the revolutionary soldiers is the revolution 
itself. ―The client of the professional soldier is the state and, hence, the 
nation......Once the party movement becomes identified with the state or regime, he 
experiences ambivalence and he may become more loyal to the nation than to the 
regime‖ (Perlmutter, 1977, p.14-15). 
 
Perlmutter‘s classification of the military is used to explain the Indonesian military 
during five different periods: 1) post-colonial Indonesian state (version I); 2) late-
period of post-colonial Indonesian state (version I); 3) the period of Guided 
Democracy (version II); 4) Suharto‘s era (version III), and; 5) post-1998 Indonesian 
democratic state (version IV). As we will see in sections below, Perlmutter‘s model 
fits the Indonesian military of each period except that of Sukarno‘s Guided 
Democracy.  
 
4.2. Version I: Legacy of the Revolutionary Type  
 
The Indonesian military was the product of a revolution. It was not created by an 
established civilian state, but the soldiers themselves had contributed to the creation 
of the state to which the military would then attach its loyalty. Its appearance can be 
traced up to the Japanese mass-mobilization policy in the Netherlands Indies during 
World War II.  
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The story started in 1940 when Nazi Germany invaded the Netherlands and brought 
about significant change to the war map of both Europe and the Pacific87. On the 
European front, the Dutch hopelessly struggled to defend its territory against the 
Nazi invasion but could stand only for several days (Shirer, 1960, chapter 21). Very 
soon after the invasion, on the 15th of May, the Dutch government confirmed its 
submission and then sought refuge in British territory. Even though mainland 
Netherlands was left to the control of the Nazis, the Dutch government maintained 
control of its colonies in Southeast Asia, primarily because the war had not yet 
finished and there was hope that the Dutch would be able to regain control of its 
territory with the help from the Allied Forces. An unconfirmed speculation was that 
the Dutch government might want to use one of its colonies as a temporary base for 
reinforcement, especially because the Dutch government-in-exile had few resources 
of its own (Shirer, 1960, Ibid.). Having relatively high autonomy to take necessary 
measures following the Dutch defeat at home, the Dutch authority in the East 
Indische88 declared a state of siege in the territory and put the Netherland Indies 
under the status of war (Benda, 1958, chapter 4)89.  
 
As the consequence of this status, the Dutch authority also applied a tight policy to 
the Netherlands Indies‘ trade with potential enemies, which included Japan. All 
exports from the Netherland Indies to Japan were stopped by July 1940, a decision 
which was responded to negatively by Japan (Benda, 1958, Ibid). Up to that year the 
Japanese still did not show any intention of launching a military expansion to the 
south90. Instead of launching a military campaign to restore trade, the Japanese sent 
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 The invasion of the Netherlands by Germany was started on the 10
th
 of May and lasted until the 14
th
 
of May 1940. This military invasion is recorded in a wide range of references. See for example: SHIRER, W. L. 
(1960) The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich: A History of Nazi Germany, New York, Simon & Schuster. 
88
 Also known as Netherlands Indies, the term used to point the Netherland‘s colonies in the Southeast 
Asia, especially the territory called today as Indonesia. 
89
 An also excellent reference containing historical analysis on the circumstances in Southeast Asia 
around 1940s, see: BASTIN, J. & BENDA, H. J. (1968) A history of modern Southeast Asia : colonialism, 
nationalism, and decolonization, Englewood Cliffs, Prentice-Hall. 
90
 The Japanese might still be suffering from the trauma resulting from the Russo-Japanese war in 
Manchuria two decades earlier, while a military would exhaust the empire‘s resources. The Japanese understood 
that its victory in the war could have left hatred amongst the Russians who may launch an act of vengeance as 
soon as the Japanese empire was weak. This concern found evidence later when Russia resumed a military 
invasion to Manchuria in 1945. The story about the Russo-Japanese War, See: CHAPMAN, J. & NISH, I. 
(2004) On the Periphery of the Russo-Japanese War. Suntory Toyota International Centre for Economics and 
Related Disciplines (STICERD), London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE).; Also: COX, G. P. 
(2006) The Russo-Japanese War in Global Perspective: World War Zero. Journal of Military History, Vol 70. 
No.1. 
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a mission to Netherland Indies led by Kobayashi with the main task of negotiating a 
trade deal the Netherland Indies. After a series of difficult talks with Van Mook91, the 
mission achieved a significant result. Trade was opened on the condition that Japan 
excluded the Netherlands Indies from its project of co-prosperity sphere92. Kobayashi 
accepted the condition and was ready to cooperate, indicated by a joint declaration 
on October 26th saying that the Indies would not be part of the co-prosperity sphere, 
marking a peace agreement between the Japanese empire and the Dutch (Nomura, 
2007, p.2).  
 
The peaceful situation, however, did not last long. The Japanese broke off the joint 
declaration and applied more pressure to the Dutch on the issues related to the co-
prosperity sphere. Not too long after Kobayashi left the Indies, in January 1941, a 
new mission under Yoshizawa arrived in Batavia (Jakarta) with the objective of 
forcing the Dutch to allow the Netherlands Indies to join the Greater Co-Prosperity 
Sphere, a proposal which was again rejected by Van Mook93. The Dutch stated that 
there would be no more trade concession for Japan and that the Netherlands would 
freeze Japanese assets in the Indies (See:Dick, 1989). This marked the collapse of 
diplomacy between Van Mook and Kobayashi, and in anticipation of possible military 
                                                 
91
 Van Mook, or Governor Huvertus Van Mook was the latest head of Dutch administration in the 
Netherlands Indies. He was famous as liberal in perspective. During the 1940s, Van Mook was very active in 
advocating Dutch interests in the Netherlands Indies, including negotiating with the Japanese and discretely 
pleading with the Bristish and the US for defense supplies--KAHIN, G. M. (2003) Southeast Asia: A Testament, 
London, Roudledge., p 23-25  
92
Since the 1930s, the Japanese had encouraged French Indochina and the Netherlands Indies to 
corporate willingly into the Southeast Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. This project was part of ‗The Greater East-
Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere‘, the concept created and promulgated by the Emperor Hirohito together with the 
Japanese military. The main objective of this concept was to achieve a self-sufficient block of Asian Nations led 
by the Japanese that, in the Japanese point of view, would be capable of counter-balancing Western domination 
in Asia during the period. In fact, the concept had been manipulated by the Japanese to exploit local populations 
and economies for the benefit of imperial Japan--See: LEBRA, J. C. (1975) Japan's Greater East Asia Co-
Prosperity Sphere in World War II: Selected Readings and Documents, Oxford, Oxford University Press. 
Presumably, this concept had inspired Sukarno during the later period as there are some similarities between this 
concept and Sukarno‘s idea of Non-Alignment Movement in 1950s. 
93
 For some scholars who work on the Indonesian history, Van Mook‘s rejection on Yohizawa proposal 
was regarded as a triggering factor to the Japanese military expansion to Southeast Asia in 1942. The argument 
said that from the Dutch perspective, accepting the proposal would mean giving the Netherlands Indies to the 
Japanese protectorate scheme or literally surrendering without first engaging in war. See, for example: BENDA, 
H. J. (1958) The crescent and the rising sun : Indonesian Islam Under the Japanese Occupation, 1942-1945. , 
The Hague, Van Hoeve., especially chapter 4. 
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action by the Japanese, Van Mook fled to the United States to find reinforcements 
(Tarling, 1999, p.13-18)94.  
 
By July 1941, the Japanese decision to expand its military campaign to the South 
had become clear. The empire announced on the 25th of July that the Indochina 
should be its protectorate95. Japan invaded Malaya in December, landing troops on 
the Southern Coast of Thailand and also in the northern part of Malaysia. Later in 
that month the Japanese launched a major attack on the Philippines and at the same 
time they also openly confronted the British in Kuching, Serawak. By January 1941, 
the Japanese gained victories on these fronts and took over Manila, Sabah, and 
Brunei. Next, Japan continued its military campaign to the Netherland Indies, marked 
by their attack on Borneo (Kalimantan) and Celebes (Sulawesi). These military 
invasions as well as the wave of the Japanese attacks on Tarakan, Menado, 
Balikpapan, Kendari, and Ambon could not be resisted for too long by the Dutch in 
the Netherland Indies, especially since their allies in the region had little hope of 
defending their own colonies. America had lost the Philippines and the British were 
forced to abandon Malaya and Singapore. This departure from the region left the 
Dutch alone defending the wide archipelago. Within a month, the Japanese had 
taken over Pontianak, Makassar, Surabaya, Cilacap, Palembang, and most other 
regions in the Indies except West Papua at the eastern end of the colony (see: 
Dower, 1986). By the end of 1941, the Japanese had completely taken over the 
Netherlands Indies from the Dutch (Dower, 1986).  
 
Soon after taking control of the major part of the archipelago, the Japanese started 
to consolidate their grip in the Netherland Indies by implementing a series of 
measures. At first they tried to persuade the people that they were not a colonial 
power but a ‗liberator‘ to free Asian nations from Western exploitation, a statement 
                                                 
94
 Van Mook understood that America might not provide the reinforcements required by the Dutch. It 
might be based on this understanding that the Dutch hurriedly created a military academy in Bandung, West 
Java, with the purpose of recruiting and training locals who could be used any time the Japanese attack. 
Nasution, the creator of the Military‘s double function, was amongst the products of this Dutch-created 
academy. The history about the establishment of  this military academy, see: INDONESIA (1972) Cuplikan 
Sejarah Perjuangan TNI-Angkatan Darat, Jakarta, Dinas Sejarah Militer, Angkatan Darat. 
95
 Records on the Japanese military activities in Southeast Asia during 1942-1945 can be traced in a 
wide range of sources. To cite among the most recommended reference is DOWER, J. W. (1986) War Without 
Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War, New York, Pantheon Books. 
116 
 
which proved effective as propaganda. The Japanese arrival was therefore 
welcomed, and when the Japanese asked for voluntary support for its war against 
the Allied forces, the people immediately showed their enthusiasm. This can be seen 
in Hamka‘s testimony: ―Many thousands of us gathered in front of the Great Mosque, 
to welcome (the Japanese) with shouts of ‗Banzai‘‖ (Hamka, 1943, p.25). 
 
To show more commitment to their good intentions, the Japanese authority 
summoned Sukarno, Hatta, and Sjahrir, the most prominent nationalist figures during 
the Dutch colonial period, to Jakarta96. During this meeting, the Japanese explored 
possible plans for the archipelago, including the offer of Sukarno becoming the head 
of the Indonesian government97. Six months after the meeting, the Japanese created 
Pusat Tenaga Rakyat (Putera), a political organization created with the purpose of 
mobilizing the support required by the Japanese in its war against the Allied forces. 
In order to gain support amongst the indigenous populace, control of this 
organization was also given to local nationalists. Sukarno was appointed as the 
chairman, while Hatta98, Ki Hadjar Dewantara99, and KH Mas Mansyur, held senior 
positions in the Putera (Legge, 1972, p.191).   
 
This strategy proved effective in gaining the trust and sympathy of the locals, 
especially after the speech by Prime Minister Tojo on July 7, 1943, which promised a 
                                                 
96
 This opportunity was used by Sukarno, Hatta, and Sjahrir to discuss a discreet agenda on the 
Independence of the archipelago.  These three figures then agreed to cooperate on an ‗Operation towards 
Independence‘. Sukarno was responsible for rallying the masses, Hatta was responsible for handling diplomacy 
towards foreign countries and parties which had sympathy for Indonesian independence, and Sjahrir was 
responsible for the coordination of ‗underground‘ activities—See: THE JAKARTA  POST (2009) The Little 
Known Prime Minister. The Jakarta Post. 10 March 2009 ed. Jakarta.  
97
 From any perspective, the circumstances of the first half of the 1940s did not leave any choice for the 
Indonesian nationalists but to cooperate with the Japanese—Even the Dutch who had resources could not resist 
the Japanese invasion. Later, the nationalists‘ decision to cooperate with the Japanese was used by the Dutch to 
accuse Sukarno and Hatta of being Japanese collaborators. See: ADAMS, C. (1966b) Sukarno: An 
Autobiography as Told to Cindy Adams., p.168 
98
 Muhammad Hatta proclaimed the Indonesian independence together with Sukarno on August 1945, 
from then he was the Vice President of the new republic. Hatta was among the indigenous who had benefited 
the Dutch elite politics. About Muhammad Hatta, see: NOER, D. (1990) Mohammad Hatta: Biografi Politik, 
Jakarta, LP3ES. 
99
 Ki Hadjar Dewantara was a nationalist and independence activist during the period of revolution and 
the pioneer of modern education for the indigenous. He was also the most prominent figure of Muhamadiyah, 
the second largest Muslim organisation in Indonesia. About Ki Hadjar Dewantara, See: ARISANDI, S. (1983) 
Ki Hadjar Dewantara, Ibu Sejati. 
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limited self-government for the Indonesian people100. As a result, these people were 
very enthusiastic in their support for the Japanese at war. When the Japanese began 
to organize Heiho, a military organization recruiting locals as armed militias on April 
1943, a huge number of Indonesians were willing to participate101.  
 
The establishment of the Heiho was initially aimed to provide the Japanese Army 
with backup on the battlefield. They were in charge in secondary tasks such as 
building barracks, bridges, logistics, and the like. However, as the war continued and 
even became more severe, the Japanese Authority let the Heiho fight for Japan in 
the archipelago as well as overseas such as at Burma and Morotai (Cipta Adi 
Pustaka, 1989). Later, the Japanese found that the militias served its interests well, 
and they had no reluctance in creating other militias similar to the Heiho. In October 
1943 the Japanese organized Pembela Tanah Air—The Defender of the Fatherland 
(PETA). On December 1943, an armed forces of Muslim youths associated with the 
Majelis Syurah Muslimin Indonesia (Mayumi)102 was also established under the 
banner of Barisan Hizbullah103.  
                                                 
100
 For many Indonesians at the time, Prime Minister Tojo‘s promise was regarded as the commitment 
of the Japanese sincerity towards Indonesian independence in the future, especially with reference to the 1941 
fact when the Dutch rejected the rights of independence for the people living in the Netherlands Indies despite 
its ratification of the Atlantic Charter on August 1941. Whereas the Charter called for the right of all peoples to 
chose the form of governments under which they live. When Queen Wilhelmina of the Netherlands gave a 
speech in London on the 6
th
 of December 1942 promising a reformed relationship with the colonies after the 
war, Indonesians regarded this promise as the Dutch‘s strategy to get support from the indigenous—see: 
BENDA, H. J. (1956) The Beginnings of the Japanese Occupation of Java The Far Eastern Quarterly, Vol. 15, 
pp. 541-560  
101
 By the end of 1945, not less than two millions Indonesian joined the Putera and the Heiho.  The data 
about the Heiho can be found at MAEKAWA, K. (2006) The Heiho during the Japanese Occupation in 
Indonesia. IN KRATOSKA, P. H. (Ed.) Asian Labor in the Wartime Japanese Empire. Singapore, NUS Press., 
p.192. There is no exact data about the number of locals who joined the Putera. However, as the Putera consist 
of several satellite-organizations such as Persatuan Guru Indonesia, Perkumpulan Pegawai Post, Telegraph dan 
Radio, Isteri Indonesia, barisan Banteng, Badan Perantara Pelajar-Pelajar Indonesia, and Ikatan Sport 
Indonesia, it can be estimated that the number of its personnel was at least one million. 
102
 Masyumi was a social organization founded by the Japanese with the purpose of controlling Islam in 
the archipelago, See:RICKLEFS, M. C. (1981b) A History of Modern Indonesia, c. 1300 to the present, 
Bloomington, Indiana University Press., p.194. After the declaration of independence in 1945, this organization 
transformed into the Masyumi Party which later became one of the four Largest parties in the 1955 election 
(See: chapter 3). Detailed information about the Masyumi, see: LUCIUS, R. (2003) A House Divided: The 
Decline and Fall of the Masyumi (1950-1956). California, US Naval Postgraduate School.  
103
 The majority of members recruited into these organizations came from the group known as Pemuda 
which actually did not belong to specific categories within the society as they come from various social strata—
the upper, middle, and lower classes—in the urban as well as in rural areas, and also from various ethnic and 
ideological backgrounds. Literally, Pemuda means the youths even though this term has not always anything to 
do with age. In the Japanese perspective, Pemuda simply means those who were physically able to fight in war 
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From the Japanese perspective, the essential purpose of these organizations was to 
mobilize resources in support of the war effort. In fact, this policy was a double-
edged sword. While these organizations did provide support to the Japanese, the 
Indonesian nationalists also used them to advance the cause of revolution towards 
independence. The organizations were crucial for the nationalists for at least two 
reasons. First, these organizations could be used to show the nationalists‘ support 
for the Japanese war effort, which allowed them to undertake their ‗clandestine‘ 
activities without much concern for Japanese suspicion, and; Second, they saw 
military training, basic understanding of administration, and access to modern 
strategy as an advantage in the preparation for possible independence in the future. 
By mid-1945, there were around 120,000 armed fighters in Peta, a number large 
enough to later form a national military unit during the period of independence104.  
 
It is at this point that the story of the Indonesian military begins. After three years of 
application, the Japanese mobilization policy had distributed ‗military skills‘ amongst 
the Pemuda, and also, caused a kind of politicization of society. In 1945, the majority 
of people living in the Indies were becoming aware of the significance of 
independence for their own country, which required a struggle as strongly as did the 
liberation of the Asian people from Western imperialism stressed by Japanese 
propaganda. This feeling became even stronger due to the growing conviction that 
the Japanese Authority was actually no different from any other imperialist105. A few 
                                                                                                                                                        
and had not yet been contaminated by the Netherlands. About Pemuda, see:  SIMATUPANG, T. B. (1981) 
Pelopor dalam Perang, Pelopor dalam Damai, Jakarta, Sinar Harapan. 
104
 Many prominent figures of the Independent Indonesia‘s army such as Soedirman and Suharto used 
to sign up to Peta. About the Peta, See: NOTOSUSANTO, N. (1979) Tentara Peta Pada Jaman Pendudukan 
Jepang, Jakarta, Gramedia. 
105
 There were at least three facts that served as factors in the emergence of anti-Japanese sentiments 
amongst these people: 1) Forced labor---Many Indonesian men were forced to do hard work such as doing 
constructions for the Japanese army at the battle fields such as in Burma and Suriname. They were reported to 
be in a terrible conditions while thousands of them were killed or disappeared; 2) Forced requisitioning-The 
Japanese took food, clothes and other supplies by force without any compensation with the pretext of supporting 
the war. This had contributed to the massive hunger and poverty-related disease spread in Java during the 
period, and; 3) Forced slavery of Women—The Japanese took women and kept them as ‗comfort women‘ for 
the amusement of the Japanese soldiers. These war crimes were recorded in a number of classified and 
declassified references. For quite detailed records, see for example:  DREA ET.AL. (2006) Researching 
Japanese War Crimes Records: Introductory Essays, Washington, DC, National Archives and Records 
Administration for the Nazi War Crimes and Japanese Imperial Government Records Interagency Working 
Group. 
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nationalists who had gained access to education during the Dutch Ethical policy106 
had the confidence to lead the Indies people in a revolution. Soon after the 
submission of the Japanese at war, the Pemuda, which had been transformed into a 
well-trained force, easily became an important actor within the new republic along 
with a number of new elites who played roles as political leaders.  
 
On the 14th of August 1945, the American air force dropped atomic bombs on the 
Japanese‘s cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, a major strike that led to the surrender 
of the remnant of Japanese empire in Southeast Asia and the Pacific (see: 
Hasegawa, 2007). This news arrived to the Indies without delay and brought about 
uncertainty regarding the future of the Indies while the Japanese Army and Navy still 
held control on the territory107. Anticipating any possibilities, Sukarno and Hatta fled 
to Vietnam on the same day in order to meet Marshall Terrauchi, the top commander 
of the Japanese authority in the Pacific, from whom they heard the confirmation of 
the Japanese defeat108. At this meeting, Terrauchi also admitted his concern about 
the future of the territory and therefore promised to grant Indonesia independence by 
the 24th of August (Shunkichiro, 1996). This promise, however, was looked upon with 
mistrust by the majority of nationalists except Sukarno109 (Legge, 1972, p.203). In 
fact, Sukarno and the civilian leaders were uncertain about the real situation and 
were reluctant to take any major action. Meanwhile, Pemuda who had heard about 
the defeat of the Japanese in the Pacific War decided that it was the time to act 
without delay. On the 15th of August, they started to force the Japanese military units 
                                                 
106
 The Ethical Policy was a policy applied in the Indies since the beginning of the twentieth century as 
a response to the growing demands from the nationalists in the Netherlands Indies as well as from intellectuals 
in Netherlands. The background of this policy was the social conditions of natives living in the Netherlands 
colonies--they were very poor and under-developed while for centuries their resources had been transferred to 
the Netherlands. The ethical policy hence was an idea to improve the welfare of the native people through, 
among other things, education. In fact, the Dutch brought education to the archipelago in order to fulfil their 
need for skilled and semi-skilled workers in their plantation companies and bureaucrats to meet the requirement 
of expanding bureaucracy. Sukarno, Hatta, and Sjahrir, were among those who had benefited from this policy. 
About the ethical policy, see: SCHMUTZER, E. (1977) Dutch Colonial Policy and the Search for Identity in 
Indonesia 1920-1931, Leiden, E.J. Brill's Archive., chapter three; and also BENDA, H. J. (1958) The crescent 
and the rising sun : Indonesian Islam Under the Japanese Occupation, 1942-1945. , The Hague, Van Hoeve., 
p.35-39 
107
 For the story about the circumstances around the end of Japanese occupation , see: BENDA, H. J. 
(1958) The crescent and the rising sun : Indonesian Islam Under the Japanese Occupation, 1942-1945. , The 
Hague, Van Hoeve., chapter 8 
108
 The content of Sukarno‘s meeting with Terrauci was recorded by Miyoshi Shunkichiro who served 
as the interpreter—See: SHUNKICHIRO, M. (1996) My Recollections of the Military Occupation in Java, No 
14. Kokusai Mondai 80, 67, November 1996. 
109
 According to Legge, Sukarno trusted Terrauchi too much. He was so anxious to get Japanese 
Authority, and so sure that he would get it, that he would have procrastinated until it was too late. 
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in the Indies to surrender and intimidated the Japanese using an assortment of 
weapons such as bamboo spears and swords while mobilizing the masses to 
encircle the Japanese camps (Cribb, 2008, p.163-167). They also urged civilian 
leaders to declare independence, but Sukarno and Hatta refused to do so, a decision 
that led to an incident that took place on the 16th of August 1945, just a day before 
independence was proclaimed by Sukarno and Hatta. In the early morning of August 
the 16th, the Pemuda ‗kidnapped‘ Sukarno and Hatta and forced them to immediately 
make a declaration of independence110. Apparently unfazed by the pressure from the 
Pemuda, later in the day, Sukarno and Hatta met General Yamamoto and spent the 
next night at vice-admiral Maeda Tadashi‘s residence (Wirasoeminta, 1995, p.61). 
After they were told that Japan no longer had the power to make decisions regarding 
the future of Indonesia, in the morning of the 17th of August 1945 Sukarno read a 
brief declaration marking Indonesian independence, taking the risk of being arrested 
by the Japanese authorities (Wirasoeminta, 1995, p.63). When the political leaders 
declared Indonesian independence, the Pemuda was ready to defend the newly-
born republic.  
 
At this time, however, Indonesia had neither a government nor an army, while there 
were millions of Pemuda who had risen from the Japanese‘s ruins and awaited a role 
to play. They were scattered across the archipelago, disorganized, armed with 
various, but limited, weapons. These people were highly patriotic, but in urgent need 
of leadership and guidance. As was described by Syahrir,  
 
The present psychological condition of our youth is deeply tragic. In spite of 
their burning enthusiasm, they are full of confusion and indecision because 
they have no understanding of their potentialities and perspectives of struggle 
they are waging. Thus their vision is necessarily very limited. Many of them 
simply cling to the slogan of Freedom or Death. Whenever they sense that 
Freedom is still far from certain, and yet they themselves have not faced 
death, they are seized with doubt and hesitation (Syahrir, 1968, p.21). 
                                                 
110
 This incident is known as Peristiwa Rengasdengklok, during which some Pemuda figures such as 
Wikana, Soekarni, and Chaerul Saleh took Sukarno and Hatta from their residents and arrested them them in a 
house at Rengasdengklok, an area at the eastern part of Jakarta. The Pemuda forced Sukarno and Hatta to 
immediately proclaim independence otherwise they threatened to take over the power from the nationalist 
leaders. For details about Peristiwa Rengasdengklok, see: WIRASOEMINTA, S. (1995) Rengasdengklok, 
Tentara Peta dan Proklamasi 17 Agustus 1945, Jakarta, Yayasan Pustaka Nusatama.  
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Meanwhile, the civilian leaders were still preparing to create the institutions required 
for the operation of the new state. On August 29, the new republic confirmed the 
adoption of the constitution that had been drafted by the Committee for the 
Preparation of Indonesian Independence--PPKI (see: chapter 2). On August 18, 
Sukarno and Hatta were declared president and vice-president. The PPKI was then 
transformed into the Komite Nasional Indonesia Pusat—Central Indonesian national 
Committee (KNIP) which functioned as a central parliament; In the regions, similar 
bodies were also established and titled Komite Nasional Indonesia—Indonesian 
National (but actually local) Committee (KNI) which functioned as regional 
parliaments111. Sukarno and his colleagues also created a new government with a 
list of ministers intended to be members of cabinet. Surprisingly, in this list there was 
no mention of the defense minister112, a fact which produced speculation regarding 
the reluctance of Sukarno to raise an army. The creation of Badan Keamanan 
Rakyat—People‘s Security Organization (BKR) on the 22nd of August disappointed 
the Pemuda. Even though the BKR was declared a national army and its members 
were mainly the former Peta and Heiho, this organization was attached to Badan 
Penolong Keluarga Korban Perang—Organization for Aid to Families of War Victims 
(BPKKP), a decision which was less than Pemuda‘s expectation (Raliby, 1953, 
p.17). In addition, the BKR was clearly not a national army as it was not centrally 
organized, had no headquarters, and its formations were dependent on the initiatives 
of the KNI (Bhakti et al., 2009, p.6). The clearest indicator that the government was 
reluctant to raise an army was the absence of measures by the government to 
explore possibilities towards the creation of an army despite the existence of a 
cabinet, the state institution which actually had the competence and authority to do 
so.  In addition, although the central government circulated the news to regions 
about the establishment of the BKR, there was no firm guidance for the Pemuda in 
the regions, and they therefore tended to neglect the news (Cribb, 2008, p.60). The 
government seemed to concentrate more on diplomacy and the creation of 
governmental machinery while disregarding the military. 
                                                 
111
 About the PPKI, KNIP, and KNI, see: ARCHIVE (1974) Indonesian Serial 1942-1950. Yogyakarta, 
Perpustakaan Negara. 
112
 See: INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT Archive: Susunan Kabinet Presidensial 2 September 1945-14 
Novermber 1945. Jakarta. 
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When the Pemuda realized that they were not about to get orders and guidance from 
the central government, they took it upon themselves to create armed forces and to 
defend themselves113. They began to seize arms from the Japanese troops across 
the country because they needed resources for their defence, especially weapons. 
They also organized themselves into armed units known as Laskar114. Those 
associated with a certain group of society also organized themselves into sectarian 
military groups. Two examples of these are the Barisan Pelopor—Vanguard Corps 
(BP) and Barisan Hisbullah—The Army of God—who were associated with Islamists 
and very popular during the early days of the revolution; both were products of the 
Japanese mobilization policy (see: Kahin, 1952p.161-164). Thus, even before 
Jakarta instructed the Pemuda in regions to form regional BKRs, the armed 
organizations were already on their way to becoming military forces. By the time the 
order to form BKR reached the regions, the effective command was merely to re-
name the armed organizations which already existed115.  
 
The government‘s hesitation in raising an army suddenly disappeared following a 
statement on the 29th of September by General Sir Phillip Christison, the commander 
of the Allied expeditionary forces in Indonesia. A moment before departing to 
Indonesia from Singapore, General Christison said in a radio broadcast that he did 
not see Sukarno and other Indonesian leaders as the Japanese‘s collaborators and 
that his troops ‗would not interfere in Indonesia‘s internal problems—for the Allies 
would enter the country only as a guest to fulfil a mission which was to disarm the 
Japanese army, to secure the release of prisoners of war, and then to return home‘ 
(Raliby, 1953, p.43)116. A few days later, when Christison was already in Jakarta, he 
also made more positive remarks for Indonesia, saying that he personally recognized 
                                                 
113
 It needs to be underlined that the term ‗Pemuda‘ does not refer to a single-corporative entity. The 
term is actually too general so a classification within this term is simply impossible. However, due to the 
significance of this term to our analysis, along this chapter it is used to denote a certain social group during the 
period of revolution without any intention of oversimplification. To make it clear, the Pemuda should be 
understood as ‗the majority‘ amongst the Pemuda.  
114
 Laskar or Lasykar, according to Anderson, is a ‗struggle organization‘ that is described as ‗emerging 
from the organizational debris of the Japanese period, formed from the bottom up on the basis of common 
aliran, ethnic origin, geographic propinquity, or simple friendship—See: ANDERSON, B. R. O. G. (1967b) The 
Pemuda Revolution: Indonesian Politics 1945-1949. Cornell University., p.338. 
115
 This remark is borrowed from Anderson-see: ANDERSON, B. R. O. G. (1972) Java in Time of 
Revolution: Occupation and Resistance 1944-1946, Jakarta, PT Equinox Publishing Indonesia., p.235 
116
 According to Anderson, the Dutch protested the statement of Christison and requested the Allied 
Forces to compel him, a demand which was met by the British government on January 1946—See: 
ANDERSON, B. R. O. G. (1967a) The Pemuda Revolution: Indonesian Politics 1945-1946. Unpublished PhD 
Dissertation. Ithaca, Cornell University., p.190 
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the de facto government of Sukarno and Hatta (Raliby, 1953, p.47). For Sukarno, 
this statement was a clear sign that the establishment of a formal army by the 
republic would not be regarded as a threat by the Allies. Without much delay, 
Sukarno stated that he would no longer resist the expectation of Pemuda and then 
declared on the 5th of October the formation of the national army known as Tentara 
Keselamatan Rakyat—The Army of People‘s Security (TKR). However, similar to the 
BKR‘s case, the formation of TKR by the government was not well received by the 
Pemuda, especially because it was not followed by clear instructions for its 
realization and implementation. In Anderson‘s words, ―The announcement of the 
formation of the TKR hardly had more effect than to rename the local BKR and other 
armed groups without changing their relationship to Jakarta‖ (Anderson, 1972, 
p.235). The declaration thus had little impact on the fighting in the regions as, by the 
time of this declaration, the Pemuda and Laskars seemed to act on their own and 
neglected the civilian leaders‘ orders. As the result, the civilian government had no 
control of the army, and confrontations between the Laskars and the Japanese as 
well as the Allied Forces had broken out in many regions such as Surabaya, 
Magelang, Solo, and Yogyakarta117.  All these incidents took place without any 
instruction from the political leaders (Wehl, 1948, p.51). Even when a bloody 
confrontation took place for several days in Surabaya between the armed Pemuda 
and Allied troops, the Allied Forces used Sukarno to persuade the Pemuda to 
retreat118.  
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 These confrontations and their results are a clear indicator that the Pemuda and Laskars were 
effective military units despite their tiny size and being relatively disorganized. Accordingly, most of the armed 
groups of Pemuda which emerged throughout Java during this period were composed of members who in 
majority have had military training in Peta, Heiho, and various organizations that the Japanese had established 
as part of their mobilization policy. According to Nasution, following these moves to disarm the Japanese, there 
were 10,000 arms in Sumatra, 10,000 in West Java, and 30,000 in central and east Java—With this huge amount 
of arms in the hands of 150,000 Japanese-trained Indonesians, in Nasution‘s account, ―we could have 
operational military power far more powerful than that which the Allies and the Dutch could mobilize in 
Indonesia between 1945-1949--NASUTION, A. H. (1955) Tjatatan2 Sekitar Politik Militer Indonesia, Jakarta, 
Pembimbing., p.18 
118
 For the Indonesian military, Sukarno‘s compliance to the Allied forces‘ wish during the Surabaya 
confrontation was often regarded as the weakness of the civilian government vis-a-vis the colonial powers. This 
presumption partly found its evidence around a year later when Sukarno and his civilian government decided to 
‗surrender‘ to the Allied Forces and left the Army continued fighting on their own—see: later part of this 
chapter. 
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Soon after the TKR was established, Sukarno named Amir Syarifuddin, an 
underground activist119, as the Minister of Information within the cabinet who was 
also in charge in security matters. During his underground activities, Syarifuddin 
used to have close contact with former KNIL120 officers such as Urip Sumohardjo 
and Didi Kartasasmita. These two names were the product the Dutch policy of 
recruiting a very limited number of locals of distinguished family backgrounds in 
order to maintain close relationship with local feudal lords (see: Kahin, 1952, chapter 
III). When the Japanese were about to launch a war against the Allies in the Pacific, 
the Dutch extended the scope of the policy to recruit locals from lower social 
backgrounds through the establishment of military academy in Bandung, the main 
city in West Java (Simatupang, 1981, p.50-56). Amongst the graduates of this 
military academy were Abdul Harris Nasution121, Tahi Bonar Simatupang, and Alex 
Kawilarang. It was presumably because of friendship, or because of their military 
experience and training, that Syariffudin asked these former KNIL officers to join the 
TKR, and it might be based on seniority considerations that the top position of the 
Army, the Chief-of-Staff, was given to Urip Sumohardjo (see: Soebroto, 1971, 
p.100). As Urip became the Army Chief-of-Staff, other KNIL former officers held 
strategic positions in the military headquarters in Yogyakarta as well as being 
territorial commanders in the regions. At this point, we can conclude that the 
formation within the TKR was based on the professional military standard because 
the strategic commanders were elected based on their professional military skills and 
knowledge. However, the leadership of the TKR was not yet as cohesive as is 
normally found in a professional military. A clear factor in this was that Urip 
Soemohardjo, the Chief-of-Staff, and Didi Kartasasmita came from different social 
strata from Nasution, Simatupang, and Kawilarang, a fact which led to different 
perspectives and ideology. In addition, while Urip and Didi tended to identify 
themselves as professional soldiers, Nasution and his friends felt more comfortable 
calling themselves Pemuda Pejuang—Youth Freedom Fighters (See: Nasution, 
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 Amir Syariffuddin was imprisoned by the Japanese during the period of occupation because of his 
clandestine activities. He was also a leftist who had a close relationship with other socialists in Sukarno‘s circle 
such as Sjahrir. Later in 1948, Syarifuddin was killed in the PKI Madiun Affair. On Amir Syarifuddin, see:  
VICKERS, A. (2005) A History of Modern Indonesia, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press., chapter 4 
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 The Army of Netherlands in the Netherland Indies.  
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 Apart from military training at KNIL, Nasution had also benefited from Japanese military training 
for three months as part of the requirement to be an instructor of Seinendan, one of the Japanese-created 
organizations—See: NASUTION, A. H. (1982) Memenuhi Panggilan Tugas, Vol.1, Jakarta, Gunung Agung. 
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1982). This situation meant that the army was less effective than it might have been, 
and was exacerbated by the fact that the civilian government was not imposing 
effective control on the military. As was noted by Kartasasmita,  
In October 1945 I got instructions from the republican government to organize 
one division of TKR in West Java....Thus I created the division by following a 
process of top to bottom. But in reality the process went in the other direction, 
namely from bottom upwards. ....The commander of each unit was elected by 
his own troops, each section selected its own section commander, and so on. 
The requirement for election as commander was not whether or not one had 
sufficient knowledge for the job. Popularity was the only requirement. 
Hierarchical relationship were almost non-existent. Thus, the TKR at the time 
was not an army but just a grouping of Pemuda of diverse qualities. The cost 
of sustaining this division came from the people around us122. 
Similar to Didi‘s, Nasution‘s experience is no less interesting. He said in his memoir,  
The selection of the commanders was not always smooth, because the units 
had already been there, created by local initiative, and almost nothing could 
be done to change them. I had instructions to make the composition of their 
commanders ‗more military‘. But what I could do was just to confirm the 
already elected commanders. I once went to Garut with the intention of 
appointing a new man to the post of regiment commander—a post that was 
already in the hands of a former judge, who had as a chief-of-staff a former 
police chief. My candidate for this regiment, a former Peta company 
commander, came together with me to Garut. Here again, I had merely 
confirmed the existing commander, since my candidate was refused by the 
troops123.   
 
As the Pemuda and the Laskars tended to ignore Urip‘s instructions, the de facto 
army was not controlled by the political leadership. The actual power of the military 
thus remained in the hands of the Pemuda and Laskars who organized themselves 
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 Taken from:  DUTCH GOVERNMENT (1948) Interogation of Didi Kartasasmita of 9 November 
1948. Batavia, Royal Dutch Archive, General Secretary Box VII No.24. 
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 See: NASUTION, A. H. (1982) Memenuhi Panggilan Tugas, Vol.1, Jakarta, Gunung Agung., p.216 
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in BKR and were loyal to local commanders. Included in this category was Sudirman, 
who was popular among his troops in Central Java124.  
 
Facing this troublesome situation, especially after the Surabaya bloodshed between 
the Pemuda and the Allies, Urip took the initiative of gathering the representatives of 
Pemuda and Laskars in a dialogue with his army (TKR). This dialogue was intended 
as a ways of finding a common perspective on the military strategy against the Allies 
and the returning Dutch, and could also be used to reduce the gap in perspective 
between the political leadership and the de facto military125. A conference was finally 
held in Yogyakarta on the 11th of November, attended by military commanders in 
Java and Sumatra as well as representatives of the government in Jakarta which 
ended up at the election of Sudirman as the top leader of the Army (see: Nasution, 
1982).  
 
For Sukarno, the election of Sudirman as the ‗army‘ Commander-in-Chief had left 
him no better choice but to accommodate the soldier‘s aspirations. In fact, Sukarno 
and other political leaders would need support from the ‗army‘ more than from any 
others, even the British Army, and he therefore decided to endorse the decision 
taken at the Yogyakarta conference. As the consequence, the TKR was then 
reorganized and its name was changed to Tentara Republik Indonesia—The Army of 
the Republic of Indonesia (TRI). Sudirman was sworn in as Panglima Besar TRI on 
the 21st of May 1946 and promoted to full General, while Urip remained in his old 
position as the Chief-of-Staff (Nasution, 1970, p.265). The divisional commanders 
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 Sudirman is an important factor in understanding the Indonesian military during this period. His 
significance is not only due to the fact that he was more popular and charismatic among the Pemuda and the 
Laskar than the government, but also because his approach and policies have confirmed the revolutionary status 
of the Indonesian military until the mid 1950s. The Indonesian military‘s position under Sudirman of acting 
independently from the political leadership while acknowledging the authority of the civilian government must 
have also inspired Nasution when he created the ideology of Dual Function, which was adopted by the 
Indonesian military during the later period. For the story of Sudirman, see: MACFARLING, I. (Ed.) (1995) 
General Sudirman: The Leader who Finally Destroyed Colonialism in Indonesia, Canberra, Australian Defense 
Studies Center. 
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 While the Pemuda and Laskars kept fighting the Allies throughout Java and Sumatra, the political 
leadership in Jakarta had its own policy towards the Allies. In their calculation, the Allied Forces were too 
strong to combat, and were also of the belief that the Allies had no intention of making Indonesia their enemy. 
By being on the Bristish side, Sukarno and friends were hoping that the Allies would not help the Dutch to re-
colonize Indonesia.  
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had the rank of Major-General while their chiefs-of-staff were given the rank of 
Lieutenant-Colonel (Nasution, 1970, Ibid). 
 
Sudirman‘s acceptance of being sworn in and promoted by Sukarno, as well as his 
willingness to re-organize the TKR (along with Pemuda and Laskar) and then to form 
the TRI, all signify a shift of the Indonesian military from revolutionary towards 
professionalism. First, the Pemuda and Laskars were now becoming more corporate 
within the TRI; Second, Sudirman was now General Sudirman, an officer, while 
others were Lieutenant General, Major General, Colonel, Lieutenant Colonel and so 
on, which signified the existence of a structural hierarchy within the TRI; Third, the 
formal client of the military was now the state, which was represented among others 
by the civilian government, and; Fourth, rank and promotion within the TRI was now 
based on training and knowledge. All these facts brought the Indonesian Army 
toward professionalism until at least 1959, when Sukarno removed liberal democracy 
from the Indonesian political landscape. 
 
On the 18 of December 1948, the Dutch surprised the United States and the 
Republic by declaring that they were cancelling the Renville Agreement126. The 
declaration was followed by a massive attack on the Republic on the 19th of 
December 1948, which brought about significant change to the strategies and 
arrangement within the Republic. Members of the civil government, including 
Sukarno, Hatta, and Syahrir, decided to surrender to the Dutch and allowed 
themselves to be captured (Kahin, 1952, p.341). The army, however, refused to do 
so. Instead of following civilian leaders, the army decided to continue fighting the 
Dutch by using guerrilla tactics and continuing to operate the state in the absence of 
civilian leaders. Sudirman instructed Colonel Nasution, his deputy, to reorganize the 
army into two forces, the mobile army and the territorial army, while he himself 
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 In order to comply with the protest from the US, India, Australia, and the Soviet Union following 
the Dutch police action in July 1947, the Dutch agreed to talk with the representatives of the Republic. On 
December 8 of the same year, a meeting was organized on board the U.S.S. Renville, a US Navy transport in the 
Phillipnines. Under the UN‘s auspice, this agreement drew a ceasefire line favourable to the Dutch. The major 
parties in the Republic such as PNI and Masyumi opposed this agreement. About the Renville Agreement, see: 
KAHIN, G. M. (1952) Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia. , Ithaca, N.Y., Cornell University Press., 
chapter IX 
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prepared the people for a total war127. Even though Sudirman‘s strategy to a certain 
extent demonstrated the autonomy of the army vis-a-vis the civilian government, the 
military‘s loyalty was still to the state and its orientation remained professional. This 
can be seen in Simatupang‘s testimony regarding the instruction:  
First, the republic would continue to resist as a state and by using the 
instruments of a state. Second, no matter how difficult the circumstances of the 
war became, the administration would have to continue—even for instance, in 
regions which had become isolated, were frequented by Dutch‘s patrols, or in 
which permanent Dutch military posts had been established. To this end, civil 
servants at all levels would have to be paralleled by military personnel, and 
extensive authority should be delegated to the regions. Third, the military 
administration was first of all a means of resistance, that is, a means for 
mobilizing and organizing all fighting forces and a means for using local 
resources in the resistance (Simatupang, 1972, p.130). 
 
This pattern towards professionalism continued even more strongly in the 1950s, 
during which time the Indonesian military was undoubtedly of the professional type. 
There were at least three factors that may have made this trend sustained: 
 
1. Following the transfer of sovereignty from the Dutch to the Indonesian 
government in December 1949, Indonesia had to adopt a new constitution 
known as the provisional constitution of 1959. This constitution was clearly 
based on Western standards of liberal democracy, according to which the 
military is subordinated to the civilian authority (see: chapter 2). 
2. The command of the army was in the hands of figures with a modern way of 
thinking, such as Nasution and Simatupang. In 1950, Nasution took the 
position as the army‘s Chief-of-Staff, while Simatupang replaced Sudirman as 
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 The mobile army would function as a shock force which would concentrate on attacking the Dutch 
establishment wherever they were, while the territorial army would remain in definite locations to be the nucleus 
of the people‘s resistance against the enemy. In fact, the territorial army would function exactly as a bureaucracy 
whose operation superseded the existing civilian machinery. This territorial role of the Indonesian military then 
became the main justification to Nasution‘s Double Function ideology—See: SIMATUPANG, T. B. (1972) 
Report from Banaran: Experiences during the People's (Translated by Benedict Anderson and Efinbeth Grave), 
New York, Modern Indonesia Project, Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University., p.128-129 
129 
 
Panglima Besar TRI, which had changed its name once more to Tentara 
Nasional Indonesia-Indonesian National Army (TNI)128. Nasution and 
Simatupang hoped to create a smaller, but more modern and professional, 
army. In 1952, they decided to adopt a policy of restructuring and reorganizing 
of the army to achieve this goal (Sujatmoko, 1997).  
3. After the death of General Sudirman in January 1950, the military lost its 
irreplaceable leader—Sudirman was famous as a unifier of the heterogeneous 
army, while it was the lack of unity that made the Army the object of civilian 
interventions, especially during the parliamentary democracy era when 
political power was mostly in the hands of political parties. 
 
This trend, however, began to decline from 1957 when Sukarno started to remove 
the institutions of liberal democracy from the Indonesian political system. 
 
4.3. Sukarno‟s Mixed-Type Military: Version II 
 
The period of 1956-1957 is the most critical period of political turbulence in Indonesia 
since the transfer of sovereignty from the Dutch in December 1949. The coalition 
government of PNI-Masyumi-NU under Prime Minister Ali Sastroamidjojo obviously 
brought nothing but corruption and inflation and finally collapsed in March 1957129. 
The Constituante (the parliament resulted from the 1955 general election), which 
was given a mandate to create a permanent constitution, ended up in deadlock over 
the issue of whether the state should be based on Shari‘a or Pancasila (see: chapter 
2). At more or less the same time, Army officers from Siliwangi Division (West Java) 
attempted a coup d‘etat but failed (see: Van Dijk, 1981). Colonel Sumual took control 
of the eastern part of Indonesia, marking the beginning of the Permesta rebellion in 
Makassar, South Sulawesi (See: Harvey, 1977). In Manado (North Sulawesi), army 
officers declared the autonomous state of North Sulawesi (Harvey, 1977, Ibid). 
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 This change was part of another re-organization attempt initiated by the government in August 1947 
intended to bring the Army under the control of the Defense Ministry. This reorganization had little impact on 
the progression towards a professional military except a change of name.  For this reason, it is not elaborated in 
this chapter.  
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 On the situation under Ali Sastroamidjojo‘s government, see: FEITH, H. (1962) The Decline of 
Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia. , Ithaca, Modern Indonesia Project, Cornell University Press., chapter 
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Rebellious movement in Sumatra and Aceh became more active, further eroding the 
public‘s confidence in the capability of the civilian government to maintain order (see: 
chater 5, section 5.2). Nasution ordered the arrest of many politicians involved in 
corrupt activities and blamed the civilian government for the growing instability130.  
Before stepping down, the Ali Sastroamidjodjo government declared Martial Law 
throughout the country, a decision which was based on two considerations: 1) The 
June Affair131, and; 2) Tensions between the regions and Jakarta132. This declaration 
not only signified the state of siege within the country but, in fact, was also an 
opportunity for the Army to exercise more power over its political adversaries. The 
army proposed an initiative to return to the strong presidential system that existed 
prior to 1950133.  
 
This proposition was obviously not without purpose. Due to the decay of civilian 
government, Nasution, who had experienced the civilian intervention during his 
leadership of the Army, had been trying to find a way to formalize the Army‘s socio-
political role within the country. Meanwhile, taking over the state power was never a 
good choice if one valued survival, and Sukarno seemed the most powerful potential 
backup for this plan. According to the Provisional Constitution of 1950, the President 
had less significant power even though Sukarno was actually a very influential figure. 
In brief, the Army would need Sukarno to support its socio-political role, while 
Sukarno would need the army‘s support to gain more power within the state (see: 
chapter 3, section 3.3).  
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 Lev described this situation— ―the military were angry at the confusion of political parties, the 
corruption, the ideological strife, the political instability, all of which they believed,....was to blame for the lack 
of progress in the country‖—see: LEV, D. S. (1966) The Transition to Guided Democracy: Indonesian Politics 
1957-1959, Ithaca, Southeast Asia Program, Department of Asian Studies, Cornell University., p.59 
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 Following the establishment of a new cabinet on July 1953, Iwa Kusuma Sumantri, a leftist, was 
appointed as the Defense Minister. During his time, he applied policies which irritated the Army, such as the 
sympathetic policy to the actors of 1948 Madiun Affair who were arrested and executed by the Army and some 
policies which were regarded as deepening the cleavage within the army regarding its attempt to dissolve the 
parliament on the 17
th
 of October 1952. This irritation continued for years and reached its peak when Iwa (on 
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This conspiracy theory found its first evidence in the Army‘s declaration on 
November 12, 1958 of the ‗Middle Way‘ principle, a new ideology which more or less 
articulated the Army‘s view of its place in society. According to Nasution‘s 
interpretation of the concept, ―(In order)... to regain the unity and the spirit of national 
struggle, to cultivate a stable government ideally and structurally after the liberal 
system failed to bring about stabilization‖ (Nasution, 1971, p.18)134. Next, the Army 
proposed the idea of abandoning liberal democracy through the re-adoption of the 
revolutionary constitution of 1945 (See: Feith, 1962, chapter X). This suggestion can 
be considered as the ultimate confirmation of the conspiracy theory mentioned 
above135. 
 
Responding to this idea, in July 1959 Sukarno formally declared the return of the 
Republic to the Constitution of 1945, accompanied by the dissolution of the National 
Assembly136. Sukarno also banned several major parties such as Masyumi and PSI 
on the pretext that the leaders of these parties were involved in certain rebellions in 
the regions (See: Van Dijk, 1981). While the PNI was divided under Sukarno‘s 
shadow, the PKI was the only significant political party which then become the main 
rival of the Army during the Guided Democracy period (see: chapter 3)137. Therefore, 
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 Lev interprets Nasution‘s speech as ―not just the ‗civilian tool‘ like in the Western Countries nor a 
‗military regime‘ which dominates the state power, but as one of many forces in the society, the force for the 
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Sukarno‘s decree not only reflected the civilian leadership‘s accommodation to the 
Army‘s wish, which was to minimize the role of political parties and to maximize the 
role of functional groups in the political system, but also provided a more space for 
the Army‘s intervention in politics. 
 
Loyalty to Pancasila and Sukarno as the state leader 
 
Since Sudirman‘s acceptance of the position of officer in 1946, the Army had always 
been unreservedly loyal to the state. This loyalty was manifested in soldiers‘ 
obedience to the military as well as political leaders who represent the state 
authorities. The soldiers also kept themselves away from conflicts amongst political 
elites regarding the ideology of the state. Even when the parliamentary Democracy 
was applied in the early 1950s, during which time political parties were mushrooming 
and came up with various ideologies, the orientation of the military remained 
unaltered--The Army kept away from politics and left the issues in the hands of 
political parties. This orientation, however, started to change from 1957. The trend 
became more intensive during just prior to Sukarno‘s Decree in 1959, and was 
conclusively confirmed after the Decree was announced. This shift in orientation was 
clearly reflected in Nasution‘s speech at Seskoad on the 7th of August 1961, saying 
that the Army support Sukarno‘s decision to eliminate political parties and their 
ideologies. This speech also confirmed the Army‘s support to Pancasila as the sole 
ideology in Indonesia138.  
 
The new orientation of the Army was then formalized when Sekolah Staf dan 
Komando Angkatan Darat—the Army Staff and Command School (Seskoad) on 
March 1962 announced a new doctrine for the Army based on the Middle-Way 
principle139. In brief, the Army maintained its professional character, but its loyalty 
                                                                                                                                                        
of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia. , Ithaca, Modern Indonesia Project, Cornell University Press., p.591-
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 The English version of Nasution‘s speech, see: PAUKER, G. J. (1973) The Indonesian Doctrine of 
Territorial Warfare and Territorial Management, California, The Rand Corporation., p.170 
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 Quoting Pauker‘s translation of the doctrine, ―For the successful implementation of territorial 
warfare, attention must be given to the following: 1) Stabilization in the political field; 2) Consciousness that the 
Pantjasila is our only ideology and that it has but one official interpretation; 3) A single authoritative leadership 
which is constantly felt; 4) Complete integration of the three services (land, sea, and air) and their utilization in 
territorial warfare on the basis of the capability of the state; 5) Planned over-all development which in turn will 
133 
 
was now directed towards one ideology, the Pancasila, and towards one leader, 
Sukarno.  
 
4.4. Version III: Suhartos‟s version of the Praetorian Type  
 
Following the failed coup d'état organized by the leftists in 1965, the political situation 
in Indonesia changed considerably. The PKI, which used to be the main rival of the 
Army, soon disappeared from the Indonesian political landscape. President Sukarno, 
who was believed to be sympathetic to the communists, also lost a considerable 
amount of power. The political parties and the Islamists had not yet recovered from 
the blow of Sukarno banning them in the late 1950s. On the 11th of March, 1966, 
Sukarno transferred the state‘s authority to maintain order to Suharto, a decision 
which would give even more power to the Army (see: chapter 5, section 5.2). This 
entire situation left the Army with an unparalleled degree of power in the country.   
Creating a new doctrine and military commands 
 
Being aware of its position as the dominant political force, the Army then organized a 
seminar in Sekoad at Bandung, Western Java, from the 25th to the 31st of August 
1966 to create a new doctrine which was more relevant to the current situation140. 
The result of the seminar was the doctrine of Tri Ubaya Cakti (Three Sacred Efforts), 
according to which the Army had to deal with three main tasks: 1) Pertahanan Darat 
Nasional—National Earth Defense; 2) Kekaryaan—Functional duties; and 3) 
Pembinaan—Control. The first task was to deal with threats from enemies, the 
second was to conduct intelligence and investigation operations, and the final was 
related to measures in order to control and maintain regions and territories141. As a 
conceptual level, this new doctrine maintained the principles contained in the old 
doctrines of Perang Rakyat Semesta—Guerrilla Warfare and Pembinaan Wilayah--
territorial management which had actually been adopted since Sudirman‘s era. The 
                                                                                                                                                        
maximize the resources for territorial warfare; 6) Territorial management which will permit self-sufficiency in 
carrying out territorial war‖ Ibid., p.56 
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 Another seminar was actually held at the same place a year before. This seminar, however, was no 
longer considered relevant, since the result was highly influenced by the Guided Democracy ideology. In 
addition, when this seminar was held, the army was only one among other political forces, whereas in 1966 it 
was the dominant political force.  
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 About this doctrine, see: DINAS SEJARAH TNI ANGKATAN DARAT (1979) Sendi-Sendi 
Perjuangan TNI-AD. Bandung, Disjarahad. 
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difference was that the Army was now prepared to actively guide the rule of the 
country142.  Reading the background of this new doctrine should be enough to arrive 
at this conclusion: 
 
In these days all of the people‘s hopes are addressed to ABRI (Armed Forces) 
in general and TNI-AD (Army) in particular. Hope for ABRI there is only one 
alternative. That is to realize what the people have entrusted to ABRI. And 
because of that ABRI is compelled to construct and cultivate a respectable 
government, a government which is powerful and progressive (Angkatan Darat, 
1966, p.10).  
 
This doctrine was detailed in the guidance labelled Tjatur Dharma Eka Karma –Four 
Obligation Towards One Purpose (TJADEK), which justified the dual function of the 
Indonesian military. According to this guidance, the Indonesian defense force‘s 
coverage was classified into seven strategic areas143: 
 
1. The element which is capable of eliminating the enemies at their front door 
2. The element which is capable of destroying the enemies at the sea and in the 
air before landing on Indonesian territory 
3. National air defense which is capable of destroying the enemies before they 
reach vital objects 
4. National maritime defense which is capable to destroy enemies at the sea 
5. Joint armed forces (army, navy, and air force) 
6. Territorial elements and Guerrilla warfare which is capable of assuring a long 
term defense, operating on the ground, air, and sea  
7. A special element which is capable of handling domestic disorder such as 
subversion and infiltration 
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This new doctrine and guidance was affirmed through Suharto‘s decree ‗Kepres RI 
No.132/1967‘144 which at the same time established seven operational commandos 
as the manifestation of the doctrine (see: Appendix 7). A new special unit was also 
created: Komando Operasi Pemulihan Ketertiban dan Keamanan—Command for the 
Operation to maintain Order and Security. Suharto himself affirmed the 
establishment of this military unit thorough the President‘s decision number 9/1974 
and then used this unit as a means of penetrating all aspects of the political 
system145. Reading the decree, the Kopkamtib is...―Sarana pemerintah yang 
bertujuan memeliharakan dan meningkatkan stabilitas dan keamanan dan 
ketertiban, dalam rangka mewujudkan stabilitas nasional—the government‘s tool 
which is aimed to increase stability, security, and order in order to create national 
stability‖ (Ricklefs, 1981b, p.287).  
 
Next, the territorial management system developed by Nasution was transformed 
into a more sophisticated military bureaucracy, in the form of military commands 
parallel to the civilian bureaucracy.   
 
1. Komando Daerah Militer or Regional Military Command (Kodam) at provinces 
2.  Komando Resort Militer or Sub-Regional Military Command (Korem) at 
residences 
3. Komando Distrik Militer or District Military Command (Kodim) at regencies 
4. Komando Rayon Militer or Sub-District Military Command (Koramil)  at sub-
districts, and  
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 The complete text, see: INDONESIA (1967) Keppres RI No.132/1967 tentang Pokok-Pokok 
Organisasi dan Prosedur Bidang Pertahanan dan Keamanan. Jakarta, Sekretariat Negara RI. 
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 The creation of Kopkamtib marked the beginning of dominant military engagement in Indonesian 
politics. In fact, this unit not only became the government‘s tool to maintain order and stability, but had also 
made the military the dominant actor able to affect every policy and strategy related to the national security as 
well as other aspects of the state. In 1998, Kopkamtib changed its name into Badan Koordinasi bantuan 
Pemantapan Stabilitas Nasional—Coordinating Committee for Assisting the National Stability Measures—
BAKORSTANAS—but in terms of character in responsibility, it was unaltered. On Kopkamtib or Bakorstanas, 
see: MCDONALD, H. (1980) Suharto‟s Indonesia, Melbourne, Fontana & Collines. On the main tasks and 
function of Bakorstanas, see: INDONESIA (1988) Keppres No.29/1988 tentang Badan Koordinasi Bantuan 
Pemantapan Stabilitas Nasional. Jakarta, Sekretariat Negara RI. 
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5. Bintara Pembina Desa or Village Development Non-Commissioned Officers 
(Babinsa) at villages146. 
 
All of these measures were justified by citing the experience of civil-military relations 
since the period of revolution, a tactic aimed mainly at questioning the capability of 
civilians to run the state. To some extent, this was also projected to show the 
disintegrative nature of party-based democracy while building public impression that 
the military was the only element capable to run the state147.   
The logical consequence was Nasution‘s Dual Function ideology that the Indonesian 
military should be heavily involved in every single aspect of the state, since  the army 
is not only the ‗Pemersatu‘—Unifier of the country, but also the ‗Penyelamat‘—the 
savior of Indonesia148. In addition, the military regarded itself as the dinamisator  
willing to develop the country. As was explained by Suharto in 1969, the Army wants 
to make the society dynamic by ‗Ing Ngarso Sung Tulodo, Ing Madya Mangun Karso, 
Tut Wuri Handayani‘—leading by example in the front, inspiring in the midst of the 
people, and encouraging from behind149. 
 
Depoliticizing and reorganizing the Armed Forces 
 
Suharto seems to have learned about managing the Indonesian military from his 
predecessors, especially from the experience of Nasution, the military figure who 
was dominant in 1950s and 1960s. In 1950s, for instance, Nasution used to develop 
a military structure that led to a highly politicized army, the situation that brought 
about extreme difficulties to civilian leaders because the military was very difficult to 
control, especially during the period of guided democracy under Sukarno. Suharto 
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 See: JENKINS, D. (1984) Suharto and His Generals, Ithaca, Modern Indonesia Project, Cornell 
University., Chapter II 
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 A political adviser of Suharto, for example, said ―ABRI is the only group in society which was born 
together with the new institution, namely the state based on Pancasila....It is because ABRI has the ability and 
tradition to overcome groups ideologies and interest that make it the leader of the country‖  MOERTOPO, A. 
(1974) Strategi Politik Nasional, Jakarta, Yayasan proklamasi, CSIS., p.109 
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 Experiences mentioned to justify this argument included the war against the Dutch during the 
revolution period, the communist rebellion of 1948, the war against Darul Islam/TII in the 1950s, the war 
against PRRI rebellion from 1957, and the operation against the communists at the 1965 coup d‘état—See: 
NASUTION, A. H. (1971) Kekaryaan ABRI, Jakarta, Seruling Masa. , p.41 
149
 For a detailed explanation of this concept, see: LIDDLE, R. W. (1985) Suharto's Indonesia: Personal 
Rule and Political Institutions. Pacific Affairs, Vol 58 No.1 (Spring 1985)., p.84-85; NOTOSUSANTO, N. 
(1984) Pejuang dan Prajurit, Jakarta, Sinar Harapan., p.288 
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was well aware of this deficiency, and he therefore quickly reorganized the military 
after he was confirmed as President in 1967.  
 
The first measure targeted the military‘s top command. The position of Chief-of-Staff 
was downgraded from the highest military command to a secondary level without 
any direct power over the troops150. In addition, Suharto also eliminated the 
intelligence units controlled by the Chief-of-Staff and disbanded their planning, 
budget, and the elite troops which previously had access to political affairs 
(Ramadhan, 1994, p.174-181). In undertaking the measures, Suharto hoped to be 
able to depoliticize the military. Additionally, by transferring power from the Chief-of-
Staff to the Army‘s headquarters and the Ministry of Defense in Jakarta, Suharto was 
able to concentrate the power of the military in his own hands151.  
In addition to attempting to pacify and control the military, Suharto was also trying to 
eliminate certain figures within it whom he considered potential opponents. Officers 
such as HR Dharsono152, Kemal Idris, and Sarwo Edhi Wibowo, all Java-
commanders who used to provide Suharto with major backup during the operation 
against communist coup d'état  in 1965, were expelled by Suharto during the second 
half of 1960s (Crouch, 1978, p.235). All these efforts culminated in the massive 
reorganization of the Indonesian military in 1969, in which the majority of military 
posts in Jakarta and all the regions were reformed and massive personnel changes 
were made. Strategic positions were stacked with officers amongst Suharto‘s circle 
or at least the officers he considered politically reliable. This period can therefore be 
considered as part of Suharto‘s effort to consolidate his power (see: chapter 3, 
section 3.4). 
 
By the 1970s, there was no doubt that Suharto had become a strong military as well 
as political leader. All his opponents had less significant power to influence the 
political system. The Dual Function Doctrine had been modified and applied to serve 
the interests of the regime. Nasution, the figure who presumably had the clearest 
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 See: EDITORS, T. (1969) Current Data on the Indonesian Army Elite. Indonesia, Vol 7, April 1969. 
151
 A similar analysis is also put forward by Crouch—See: CROUCH, H. (1978) The Army and Politics 
in Indonesia, Ithaca, Cornell University Press., p.240 
152
 HR Dharsono of the West Java Army Division, for example, was known to be allied to the leftist 
PSI and developed his own idea about New Order Indonesia which was different from Suharto‘s—See: 
LIDDLE, R. W. (1973a) Modernizing Indonesian Politics. IN LIDDLE, R. W. (Ed.) Political Participation in 
Modern Indonesia, Monograph Series. New Haven, Yale University., p.177-206 
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idea about the doctrine, was started to be neglected by the regime. Instead, to 
maintain this strong position, Suharto promoted his most loyal servants such as 
Major General Ali Murtopo153 and General Soemitro154 in more strategic position.  
This combination, however, did not work as smoothly as Suharto had expected, 
because both generals ended up at conflict in their competition to be close to the 
center of power (Sundhaussen, 1978, p.71-72). This conflict culminated in a major 
riot in Jakarta at the beginning of 1974 during the visit of Japanese Prime Minister, 
the incident known as Peristiwa Limabelas Januari-Malari (see: Crouch, 1974). 
Nevertheless, Suharto‘s effort to consolidate his power had succeeded to a 
considerable extent, meaning that the conflict between his closest assistants did not 
have an impact on the already controllable military. Soon after ending Soemitro‘s 
military career following the riot, Suharto again restored full control of the military by 
giving important positions to military officers he trusted, such as General LB 
Moerdani, Admiral Soedomo, General Yoga Sugama, General Maraden 
Panggabean, General Mohamad Jusuf (Wiwoho and Chaeruddin, 1990, 219-222, 
Pour, 1993, p.306-307).  
 
Serving the regime at all cost 
 
In choosing these figures to fill strategic military posts, Suharto seemed to use at 
least two criteria: 1) Suharto had a certain amount of trust in them, or 2) they were 
unlikely to challenge him. General Murdani, General Sugama, and Admiral Sudomo 
fulfilled the first criteria, for they had been known to be close to Suharto since he 
served in the Army during Sukarno‘s reign (see: Wiwoho and Chaeruddin, 1990, 
Ibid).  
 
It was especially under Murdani and Sudomo that the Indonesian military was, in 
General Soemitro‘s words, ‗a tool of power‘155 rather than the instrument of state. In 
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 Suharto said in his memoirs, ‗Some people thought that Ali Moertopo was the man who decided 
everything. Why? Perhaps because he was a good speaker, courageous, and as my special assistant, he was 
supposedly close to me and they thought that everything depended on him....That just wasn‘t true‘—See: 
SUHARTO, SWIPAYANA, G. & RAMADHAN, K. (1991) Soeharto, My Thoughts, Words, and Deeds, 
Jakarta, Lamtoro Gung Persada., p.378 
154
 These changes were part of Suharto‘s effort to bring the Panitia Sosial Politik from the Army‘s 
headquarters to Suharto‘s circle which would then function as Suharto‘s think  thank (see: chapter 3 on ‗Asisten 
Pribadi‘) 
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the first place, the military was ‗cleaned‘, depoliticized, and used as the guardian of 
the regime‘s policies. In 1966, when Suharto inherited a military which was highly 
contaminated by Guided Democracy ideology, the military was very difficult to 
control, even by President Sukarno156. From 1969, when Suharto launched his 
reorganization policy, the military was ‗neutralized‘. The leftist or Sukarnoist 
sympathizers were imprisoned, while potential opponents amongst the active as well 
as retired officers were either disciplined or dismissed from service (Crouch, 1978, 
chapter 9). The activities of retired officers were also closely supervised (as Murdani 
was controlling the Intelligence force). The command of the military was centered in 
the Army‘s headquarters in Jakarta and was directly controlled by Suharto. Even so, 
this subordination did not really bother the military as Suharto was an Army General 
who became President with the support of the Army. Psychologically, the soldiers 
regarded Suharto as their leader and not as an outsider, especially since Suharto 
often identified himself as a military man rather than as a civilian157.  
 
Further, the selection of leadership positions within the Army was not tightly 
constrained. Not long after Murdani was promoted, he transferred most of the 
command posts within the Army from the generation of 1945 to young graduates of 
the military training centers in Magelang (central Java) and Bandung (West Java), 
but expertise was actually not the real consideration (Vatikiotis, 1994, p.80). Rather, 
this recruitment exercise was aimed at eliminating older generals sympathetic to 
Sukarno. In addition, Murdani‘s efforts to concentrate the Army‘s power in its 
headquarters would be easier when fresh officers held the commands rather than 
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 At an occasion long after his retirement as the Commander of the Armed Forces, Sumitro said that 
the Indonesian military was degrading from being the tool of the state towards the tool of power which, 
according to him, was due to an ‗uncertain political situation as well as provisions of the 1945 Constitution that 
have not yet been transformed into  clear legal rules‘—see: GATRA (1995) Untuk Apa Soemitro Menggebrak? 
Gatra. July 8, 1995 ed. Jakarta. 
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 Following the coup d‘état of 1965, Sukarno gave a series of orders to the military to take measures, 
but the military neglected these orders. Instead, the army took its own initiative and ‗forced‘ Sukarno to follow 
this initiative. This was similar to the disobedience of Sudirman in 1949 when Sukarno ordered the Army to 
surrender to the Dutch---see: CROUCH, H. (1973) Another Look at te Indonesian Coup. Indonesia, Vol 15 
(April 1973). 
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 Suharto admitted in his memoirs, ―...my retirement from active military service does not mean that I 
have ceased to serve as a member of the Army. Moreover, the law states that a retired soldier carries on as a 
member of the reserve corps of the Armed Forces‖--SUHARTO, SWIPAYANA, G. & RAMADHAN, K. 
(1991) Soeharto, My Thoughts, Words, and Deeds, Jakarta, Lamtoro Gung Persada., p.279 
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senior officers158. At the top level, meanwhile, the main criterion of promotion was 
Suharto‘s blessing. As long as Suharto did not show any resistance, an officer was 
entitled to a promotion regardless the expertise, rank, age or seniority (See: Crouch, 
1988).  
 
4.5. Version IV: Towards Professional Military 
 
The 21st of May 1998 was the last day of Suharto‘s 32 years of service as the 
President of the Republic of Indonesia. In the credential room of his palace, he 
delivered his last speech as President in front of a small audience of his entourage 
and the media. It was during this speech that he gave his resignation (See: Appendix 
6). 
 
On the same day, Wiranto, the Pangab and the Minister of Defense, made a public 
statement saying: 
1) Recognizing the situation and the people‘s aspirations, the Armed Forces 
support and welcome the decision of Mr Suharto to step down as President 
and, based on the constitution, support Vice-President BJ Habibie as the new 
President of the Republic of Indonesia 
2) The Armed Forces remains solid and encourages the Indonesian people to 
accept President Suharto‘s resignation which is in accordance with the 
principles of the constitution of 1945 
3) The Armed Forces will be active anticipating any possible threats to the unity 
of the nation 
4) Respecting the nation‘s culture and tradition, the Armed Forces is committed 
to protecting the safety and dignity of former presidents, including Mr Suharto 
and his family 
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 According to Vatikiotis, this approach was a strategy driven by Murdani‘s background in 
intelligence—see: VATIKIOTIS, M. R. J. (1994) Indonesian Politics Under Suharto: Order, Development, and 
Pressure for Change, London, Routledge., Ibid. 
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5) The Armed Forces encourages all parties to restrain from undertaking 
possible violence which may lead to chaos159 
 
General Wiranto‘s statement that the Armed Forces ―support and welcome‖ 
Suharto‘s resignation revealed that the Indonesian military had started to change its 
orientation. As was analyzed in the previous section, in 1966 the Military decided to 
establish a ‗respectable government, a government which is powerful and 
progressive‘, the position which was manifested by its support for General Suharto‘s 
presidency under which the military played a dominant role as the guardian of the 
regime for the next 32 years. With Wiranto‘s statement, this role was simply over, for 
the military was now letting Suharto and his regime fall without offering any 
resistance whatsoever160. The military‘s final commitment to the regime was a mere 
promise to protect the safety and the dignity of Suharto and his family. The loyalty of 
the military had now also shifted from the regime to the state/nation, as is reflected in 
point 3 of the statement.  
 
This change of orientation was confirmed with General Wiranto‘s speech in West 
Java on the 17th of July, 1998, which introduced the new paradigm of the military and 
contained some fundamental principles:  
 
1) ABRI does not have to be on the front line;  
2) ABRI should no longer dominate but only influence;  
3) ABRI must change its way in influencing;  
4) ABRI is ready to share power with civilian politicians (see: Republika, 1998).  
 
Following this statement, since 1999 the Indonesian military distanced itself from 
politics and attempted to return to the original principle of Dual Function ideology as 
was developed by Nasution, with the military being only ―one out of many forces in 
society, the force for the struggle of the people which works together with other 
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 Translated from the original text (Indonesian version) as published by  KOMPAS (1998a) Kompas. 
22 may 1998 ed. Jakarta.   
160
 This kind of behaviour may lead to speculations related to the question ―Why did the military not 
instead take over the state power from Suharto and continue its domination?‖ However, this topic is not our 
focus of analysis in this chapter.  
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people‘s forces‖161. This new ‗limited‘ paradigm was then adopted and implemented 
by the Indonesian military with an objective of bringing the military back under the 
civilian control within a democratic system. 
Military reform 
 
Consistent with the new paradigm, the Indonesian military made a series of step by 
step adjustments, starting with the structural reform of its organization. The very first 
measure was returning to the pre-1980s seventeen Komando Daerah Militer-
(Regional Military Command) system, announced by Wiranto on May 1999 based on 
the argument that the military should be closer to the people (Editors, 2000, 
p.132)162. A new Kodam, the Kodam XVI Pattimura, was established in Moluccas 
soon after Wiranto‘s announcement, while six other Kodams were planned to be 
newly created or upgraded from the existing Korems163. On March 2000, President 
Abdurrahman Wahid made two Presidential Decrees to dissolve Bakorstanas 
(Previously Kopkamtib) and Litsus164. Again, in April 2000 the military announced a 
trial abolition of the Military‘s existence at the village level (Babinsa) and sub-district 
level (Koramil) which was followed by reduction in the territorial structure (Editors, 
2000, p.133). In May 2000, the Minister of Defense Juwono Sudharsono announced 
plans to abolish the position of Military Commander-in-Chief (Pangab) and replace it 
with a Kepala Staf Gabungan—Chief of the Joint Staffs (Kasgab), which would no 
longer have ministerial rank but be placed under the Minister of Defense (Editors, 
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 This conclusion is borrowed from Lev—see: LEV, D. S. (1966) The Transition to Guided 
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Dijadikan Kodam. Media Indonesia. September 29. 1999 ed. Jakarta. 
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INDONESIA (2000) Kelompok Cilangkap Dominan. Media Indonesia. June 11, 2000 ed. 
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2000, Ibid, Jawa Pos, 2000)165. At the National Assembly meeting in August of the 
same year, a new bill was passed requiring that the selection of the Military 
Commander be approved by the parliament and granting the Vice-President the right 
to play a role in military appointments (Suara Merdeka, 2000, Ibid). On July the 1st, 
2000, the national police force was separated from the Armed Forces and placed 
directly under the President‘s control, while plans were also announced to increase 
significantly the number of police officers and to replace the existing military-style 
rank system of the police with a more internationally conventional police system 
(Editors, 2000, Ibid). The Armed Forces also announced a significant reduction in the 
number of the Special Forces (Kopassus) personnel, as well as a decrease in 
combat forces of its three branches, despite expansion of military organization 
through the creation of new specialized roles within these branches166.  
 
This structural reform was also accompanied by change in the military elites. During 
Habibie‘s presidency until October 1999, General Wiranto was still controlling the 
majority of the military power, since he was serving as both Commander of the 
Armed Forces and Coordinating Minister for Politics and Security. When 
Abdurrahman Wahid came to presidency as a result of political bargaining, the 
power of the military was multi-polarised for, in the new cabinet, Wahid placed 
several generals and Wiranto himself in ministerial positions: General Wiranto was 
Coordinating Minister for Politics and Security; Lieutenant General Susilo Bambang 
Yudhoyono as Minister of Mines and Energy; Lieutenant General Agum Gumelar as 
Minister for transportation; Rear Admiral Freddy Numbery as Minister for 
Administrative Reforms, and Lieutenant General (ret) Soerjadi Soedirdja as Minister 
of Home Affairs (Barton, 2006, part 5). The post of Minister of Defense was given to 
a civilian, Juwono Sudharsono, while the Armed Forces Commander post was filled 
by Admiral Widodo Adi Sucipto from the Navy (Barton, 2006, Ibid). At the Army‘s 
headquarters, the Army Chief-of-Staff, General Soebagyo HS was replaced by 
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General Tyasno Sudarto on December 1999, and this was followed by personnel 
changes in the Army high commands during March and June of the following year in 
order to shift the Army leadership from senior to more junior classes. Rationalization 
was not restricted to the top levels of the military, but also applied to lower levels. 
Since 1998, a series of personnel changes have been undertaken. From March to 
May 1998, seven commanders of Kodam (Pangdam) were replaced: Kodam I, III, IV, 
VI, VII, VIII, and IX (Editors, 2000, p.127). 
 
These measures were accompanied by a number of other reforms which could not 
possibly be detailed in a single chapter. However, in order to simplify, John 
Haseman‘s observations of the Indonesian military might give a rough idea of the 
extent of the reforms. Haseman, who used to serve as defense attaché in Indonesia 
during the post-1998 period, noted in 2000 that there were at least 9 significant 
military reforms effective since 1999: 
 
1. Removing the national police from the military chain of command 
2. Abolishing staff positions in socio-political affairs at TNI headquarters and 
subordinate regional commands 
3. Abolishing the post of assistant for security and order at TNI headquarters 
(who was usually a national police officer) 
4. Requiring that all military personnel in civil government posts either retire from 
the armed forces or return to normal military duties 
5. Reducing dedicated military seats in Parliament from 100 to 75 in 1990 and to 
38 in 1998, and totally eliminating them by 2004 
6. Prohibiting any role by the military in day-to-day political activity  
7. Prohibiting political party bias 
8. Maintaining neutrality in the 1999  general election and all future elections 
9. Revising doctrinal publications and instruction to reflect the changing role of 
the military in society (Haseman, 2000, p.23-30). 
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These measures signify a major shift in the Indonesian Military‘s orientation towards 
professionalism which continues today. 
 
4.6. Conclusion 
 
The characters and orientation of revolutionary type offered by Perlmutter match 
those of the Indonesian military during the post-colonial Indonesian state (version I). 
In the 1950s, the Indonesian army retained revolutionary features as a legacy of its 
nationalist revolution against the Dutch. Initially, the Pemuda (the youths), who were 
trained during the Japanese mobilization policy, created Laskars (armed units) which 
then organized themselves into a national corporation out of the ruins of the 
Japanese occupation. During this period, the Indonesian military was very efficient in 
small and regional units, loyal to the state, but extremely disorganized at the national 
level and not under the control of the civilian government. The reluctance of the 
civilian political leadership to raise a formal army at the end of the Japanese 
occupation and the high-level of uncertainty during the period of revolution made this 
self-created organization relatively independent of the civilian government. As a 
result, the Indonesian army had dual loyalties during this period: (1) to the military 
commanders who believed that independence had to be achieved through physical 
struggle and thus favoured attacking the Japanese and Dutch head-on, and; (2) to 
the civilian leaders who opted for peaceful diplomacy and a measured approach 
towards independence. Up until the mid-1950s, the soldiers actively intervened in the 
politics of the Republic. In the second half of the 1950s, however, the army began 
moving towards becoming a professional army with the new democratic state as its 
client, so that Perlmutter‘s criteria of professional type were relevant to explain the 
Indonesian military at this period. 
 
The only exception to Perlmutter‘s model was during Sukarno‘s civilian presidential 
monarchy (version II). When Sukarno established 'Guided Democracy' and a civilian 
presidential monarchy, he attempted to transform the army into an unusual form of 
the revolutionary type which would be loyal to his Pancasila ideology and to him 
personally as the leader of the revolution. This pattern was unlike the usual 
revolutionary type as is found in Perlmutter‘s model, in which loyalty is to the 
revolutionary party-movement rather than an individual leader. This leads to a 
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conceptual problem in attempting to classify and analyse the Sukarno era in which 
the military was being pushed into a revolutionary type, because Perlmutter‘s 
concept is simply not applicable to this phenomenon. In the meantime, it might be 
worth speculating that this shift was due to a weakness of the Indonesian military 
compared to itself during the first half of the 1950s, since it was a shift away from 
possible professionalism even if it was going towards the revolutionary, rather than 
praetorian, type of military. However, it does not seem to be such a large negative 
shift as the change to praetorianism when the army replaced Sukarno with Suharto. 
When the army replaced Sukarno with Suharto and allowed him to establish a 
military presidential monarchy (version III), the army was changing into a praetorian 
type of military hence this phenomenon provides support for Perlmutter‘s theory. In 
spite of its professionalism in the past, the Indonesian soldiers gradually transformed 
themselves into mere instruments of Suharto‘s authoritarianism. By the beginning of 
the 1970s, the Army became the most powerful political institution in Indonesia and 
the principal pillar of the regime. Its political role was rationalized through the re-
adoption of the double-function doctrine according to which the military is the armed 
wing of the nation, being responsible for the defense of the state and at the same 
time an instrument of the nation‘s development. In fact, the double function ideology 
was an obvious anachronism because the military, rather than becoming the armed 
wing of the nation, played the role of guardian of Suharto‘s policies. However, this 
praetorianism shows legacies of the revolutionary-type role contained in the middle-
way and dual-function doctrines, which continued to be the official justification of the 
military's role. The difference was simply that the military was now under the Suharto 
regime rather than the Sukarno regime.  
 
Perlmutter‘s criteria of professional type were also equivalent to the characters of the 
Indonesian military of the post-1998 Indonesian democratic state (version IV). When 
the army politically abandoned Suharto in the 1990s and supported democratisation, 
they were beginning to become a professional type of military while the present 
democracy has continued to show progress towards this goal of professionalism. In 
addition, since 1998 the Indonesian military has decided to ‗back to barracks‘. It has 
not only detached itself from politics by giving up its claim of reserved seats in the 
central parliament as well as in regional assemblies, but as an institution, it has also 
withdrawn from day-to-day political activities in the country. Active officers must 
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choose to get retired from their military service when taking non-military posts, or, to 
remain becoming military officers but have to leave any civilian-government 
assignments, the situation which is very contrast to that of under Suharto‘s 
administration, during which active military officers were persistent in controlling 
strategic posts in the civilian bureaucracy and dominating the cabinet as well as 
societal occupations at all levels. Even though civilian political parties keep seeking 
supports from the military as well as from influential figures within the army, the 
military officers‘ involvement into the political sphere of the society were limited 
within individual capacity because the TNI has now refused institutional support to 
any political parties as it did to Golkar during Suharto‘s New Order. The gradual 
reform been applied since 1998 had assured civilian control over the military and 
brought about wide transparency related to military budget and activities.  
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CHAPTER FIVE:  
 
DEALING WITH POLITICAL DISORDERS: DEGREE OF DIFFICULTY 
 
 
―Lycurgus is one of those who have earned no small measure of praise……For 
in the Laws which he gave to Sparta, he assigned to the kings, to the 
aristocracy, and to the populace each its own function, and thus introduced a 
form of government which lasted for more than eight hundred years to his very 
great credit and the tranquillity of that city‖ (Machiavelli, 1970, p.109). 
 
―Sparta……was governed by a king and by a small senate. It was able to maintain itself in 
this way for long time, because in Sparta there were few inhabitants and access to outsiders 
desirous of coming to dwell there was forbidden. Moreover, it had adopted the laws of 
Lycurgus and, as the laws were observed, they removed all occasion for tumult, so that 
Spartans were able to live united for a long time‖ (Machiavelli, 1970, p.120). 
 
 
Giving such a statement, Machiavelli must have been very impressed by the political 
formula adopted by Sparta and to consider it as significant to the state‘s success. He 
admired the law system of Lycurgus which, he maintained, was capable of 
guaranteeing the stability of the city state for more than eight centuries. Then, his 
inquiries were extended to the point that Sparta adopted a specific form of 
government in which the realm was governed by two elements: the king and the 
senate.  
 
Considering those two findings as a matter of fact, Machiavelli offered three 
explanations. First, law enforcement was essential to Spartans, by virtue of which a 
durable system could be secured while internal threats were effectively diminished; 
second, the power of the state was distributed among three distinct elements of the 
realm: the ruler, the wise, and the ruled, an arrangement presumably capable of 
minimizing the ―struggle for power‖ among the grunts, and; finally, Sparta was 
thoroughly mono cultural that was a characteristic maintained by authority. In brief, 
Spartan state was solid and durable by virtue of: efficient and enforced laws; equal 
distribution of power among the elements of the state, and; the absence of 
multicultural-problems. These features provide Machiavelli‘s reader with a model of a 
permanent state, and a unique method with which to understand it. 
 
A different picture of order and stability, however, is shown by a state typical of the 
modern age; namely, Indonesia. Since her existence as an independent state 
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(declared unilaterally on 1945, recognized internationally in 1949), she has appeared 
not as a sustainable harmonious new nation, but as an arena of bitter struggle 
among contending individuals and social forces. This struggle can be categorized 
into a number of episodes.  
  
5.1. Version I: early-independence episode 
 
Indicators of disorder had been obvious since the early period of independent 
Indonesia (between 1945 and 1949). The tension was initially dominated by the 
rivalry between Islam and secular nationalists over the philosophical foundation, or 
more concretely the ideological basis, of the new state. As has been elaborated in a 
previous chapter (see: chapter 2), both parties were in a bitter contest to determine 
what kind of ideology under which the new state would be established. The Islamic 
nationalists,  with their ‗majority‘ status, insisted on the adoption of Shari‘a (the 
Islamic Law); the secular nationalists, in contrast, holding the ideal of the plurality of 
the Indonesian society, strove for Pancasila (Sukarno-style Secularism) as the 
ideological basis of the state, manifested by the adoption of 1945 Constitution by the 
new republic. The success of the nationalists did not put an end to the contest, which 
continued among parties within both the elite (political) and mass (social) arenas. 
Friction between the elites was especially strong over the Konstituante.167 This 
struggle saw the contestants polarized into two competing poles: with the integralist 
group (or Pancasila-ist) and Indonesian Communists on one side against the 
Islamists on the other. The subjects of dispute were many, ranging from the choice 
of national flag to the proper relationship between the organs of the state, but the 
debates were mainly preoccupied by the classic issues relating to the ideology of the 
state: whether the state should be based on Shari‘a or on Pancasila. A second 
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 The three constitutions adopted by Indonesia: the 1945 Constitution announced on the 18 of August 
1945 (37 Articles, provides for powerful presidency); The Constitution of Federal Republic of Indonesia of 
1949, announced in 1949 as the result of negotiations with the Dutch over a cease-fire, and; the 1950 
Constitution, adopted from 1950 to 1959 (146 Articles, provides guarantees for Individual freedoms and 
stipulates a parliamentary system of government with the president holding ceremonial powers); all were meant 
to be provisional—hence Sukarno‘s promise emphasized the need for a permanent constitution to be created by 
a more representative body—so that Article 134 of the 1950 Constitution called for a constitutional assembly to 
be convened (as soon as the situation permits) in order to enact a permanent constitution. The Konstituante is 
this meant-representative body, whose members were elected through a universal suffrage held in late 1955—
the first election in independent Indonesia. Being dominated by four main parties: PNI (Nationalists), Masyumi 
(Islamists), Nahdatul Ulama (Islamists-traditional), and PKI (Communists); this Assembly was bestowed with a 
task which was to create a permanent constitution for the republic. 
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contest, meanwhile, was found among the populace throughout the archipelago and 
involved a variety of issues, ranging from dissatisfactions among people of certain 
regions to radical criticisms over the conduct of the young republic made by those 
hostile to the state as well as by supporters of secularism. In certain parts of the 
archipelago, these tumults were often dominated by pogroms targeting people of 
Chinese descent (See: chapter 6). There are many significant examples of social 
and political mayhem during this period. Among them are the Social Revolution 
(against state authorities) on Java‘s North Coast—Brebes, Tegal, and Pemalang 
Regencies in 1945; the rebellion of the Muslim Guerrilla organizations Hizbullah and 
Sabilillah in West Java in 1948; Amir Fatah‘s Darul Islam Movement in Central 
Java—Tegal, Brebes, Bumiayu, Purwakarta, Majenang, and Cilacap Regencies in 
1948; The Islamic state of Indonesia proclaimed by the Darul Islam under 
Kartosuwiryo of 1949.168  
 
5.2. Version II: 1950-1965  and 1965-1966 episodes 
 
The next events were between 1950 and 1965, a period of disorder that, to a certain 
extent, can be considered as the continuation of the post-independance struggle. 
Rejecting Shari‘a as the base of the Indonesian state, during the period of 1950-
1962 Sukarno and his fellow nationalists worked intensely for the unity of the nation. 
The adoption of the 1945 Constitution by the state with Pancasila as its soul had not 
only been an interim victory169 for the secularist group, but had created a deep 
disappointment among Muslim nationalists and other ideological elements of the 
republic. Not long after international recognition was gained (1949), social tumults 
and rebellious movements once again rampaged through the nation. The most 
significant among these were the revolt of the troops of the Islamic Communities in 
                                                 
168
 Darul Islam rebellious movement was the most significant among others in term of coverage and 
durability. It was proclaimed on the 7
th
 of August 1949 in West Java by Darul Islam (literally means: the 
house—the home—the territory—of Islam) under the leadership of Sekarmadji Maridjan Kartosuwiryo. The 
movement spread quickly across the archipelago soon after its declaration, especially in areas of Central Java, 
South Sulawesi, South Kalimantan, and Aceh, and only by the year of 1962 that this movement was overcome 
by the state. A comprehensive story about this movement, See:  DIJK, V. (1981) Rebellion under the Banner of 
Islam: The Darul Islam in Indonesia, The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff., and NIEUWENHUIJZE, C. A. O. V. 
(1958) Aspects of Islam in Post Colonial Indonesia, The Hague, Bandung, W. Van Hoeve. 
169
 To repeat what was mentioned at the previous Chapter, despite the acceptance of the 1945 
Constitution, Muslim Nationalists has actually never fully accepted Pancasila as the foundation of the 
Indonesian state. This assumption need to be reemphasized as it gives explanations to the features of 
relationship between main actors in the independent Indonesia and also a base of arguments along this thesis. 
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Kebumen Regency of 1950; Kahar Muzakkar Islamic State Rebellion in South 
Sulawesi province of 1953-1955; The rebellion of Ibnu Hadjar‘s Islamic Kingdom in 
South Kalimantan Province of 1950-1953; The Social Revolution and Mujahidin 
revolt in Aceh of 1951; and the Daud Beureuh‘s Islamic State in Aceh of 1953. There 
were also many other disturbances all signifying serious challenges to the 
established Pancasila state170.  
 
The strict competition between political elites, Sukarno, and the army--combined with 
Sukarno‘s political manoeuvres during the period of federal democracy (see: 
Sukarno‘s charismatic legitimacy, chapter 2)--culminated in a coup d‘état in 1965 
organized by the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), which had been believed to 
operate with the blessing of Sukarno. Soon after the failure of the coup, an 
orchestrated civil war occurred between 1965 and 1966, during which  an army-
sponsored alliance of Muslims, Christians and Hindus undertook widespread killings 
of their own compatriots who were accused of having ‗affiliated‘ with the PKI. The 
coup itself remains mysterious; even today, there is no clarity of who was the real 
actor and for what purpose they had undertaken the coup171. Some speculations and 
analysis around this coup are of interest, but our concern in this chapter is the 
contest between elements of the nation which eventually brought about political 
disorder and catastrophes against humanity. A day before the coup, there were only 
a small number of casualties; six army generals and a lieutenant were taken by a 
group of leftists under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Untung (the commander 
of Cakrabirawa---President Sukarno‘s special guards). The counter-revolutionary 
movement led by Suharto, (Commander of Kostrad--- The Strategic Reserve 
Command) being deployed shortly after the declaration of action by Untung, had also 
brought only about hundreds of casualties among the PKI members and those who 
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 Stories about those social tumults and rebellious movements can be found in many scholarly works 
such as: HORIKOSHI, H. (1975) The Dar-ul-Islam Movement in West Java (1948-1962). Indonesia, Vol 20, 
October 1975, 58-86.; ARIWIADI (1965) Gerakan Operasi Militer VII: Penjelesaian Peristiwa Atjeh, Jakarta, 
Mega Bookstore.; BOLAND, B. J. (1971a) The Struggle of Islam in Modern Indonesia, The Hague, Martinus 
Nijhoff.; BARDOSONO (1956) Peristiwa Sulawesi Selatan, Jakarta, Jajasan Pustaka Militer.; ANWAR, R. 
(1951) Peristiwa Kahar Muzakkar Hanja Satu Aspect Sadja. Indonesia Merdeka. 18 September 1951 ed. 
Jakarta.; JACKSON, K. D. & MOELIONO, J. (1971) Participation in Rebellion: The Darul Islam in West Java. 
IN LIDDLE, R. W. (Ed.) Political Participation in Modern Indonesia. New Haven, Yale University Southeast 
Asia Studies, Monograph Series Vol 49. 
171
 A sophisticated ‗theory‘ about the massacre, See:  ANDERSON, B. R. O. & MCVEY, R. T. (1971) 
A Preliminary Analysis of the October 1, 1965, Coup in Indonesia. Interim Report Series. Ithaca, Modern 
Indonesia Project, Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University.  
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were defending Halim Air Force Base, where the drama initiated. The real 
catastrophe, however, began a month later.  In three main islands of Indonesia 
(Java, Sumatra, and Bali), no less than half a million people were butchered between 
October 1965 to January 1966172, while hundreds of thousands more were 
imprisoned without trial and tortured by state institutions during the followed years.173  
 
5.3. Version III: 1997-1998 episode 
 
In 1997, an economic crisis injured Southeast Asia and brought about economic 
disasters to some countries in the region, including Indonesia. While other countries 
such as Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, and the Philippines were struggling to 
recover from the economic crisis, Indonesia experienced an extra upheaval, which 
ended with the overthrow of Suharto from power (see: chapter 8). A sad story, 
meanwhile, was accompanying this milestone. Riots and looting spread across the 
main cities of Jakarta, Yogyakarta, Solo, Surabaya, and Makassar, targeting public 
facilities, business centres, and members of Chinese minority: another tragedy that 
brought about thousands of casualties174.  
 
During this disorder, stresses of the broader political issues were also growing, 
especially in the period from 1998 to 2001. Some of them were ‗purely‘ social 
disorders, but some others showed clear indicators of separatist intentions. Their 
significance in the analysis of the Indonesian state was mainly due to these 
‗disorders‘ had brought about radical change in the state‘s policies since 1998 (see: 
chapter 7). 
                                                 
172
 There is no official record telling the exact number of the casualties. Scholar such as Anderson, 
estimates 600,000 to 2,000,000 of Indonesians had been executed, but the number frequently cited is around half 
a million. Thus, to make it simple, we would say at least half a million lives were claimed by the humanitarian 
catastrophe during this period.   
173
 Stories around the 1965 coup can be found in some excellent studies such as VITTACHI, T. (1967) 
The fall of Sukarno, London, A. Deutsch, ANDERSON, B. R. O. & MCVEY, R. T. (1971) A Preliminary 
Analysis of the October 1, 1965, Coup in Indonesia. Interim Report Series. Ithaca, Modern Indonesia Project, 
Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University, SUNDHAUSSEN, U. (1982) The road to power : Indonesian 
military politics, 1945-1967, New York, Oxford University Press., and PALMIER, L. H. (1973) Communists in 
Indonesia. , London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson. 
174
 Some scholars have dedicated their time to compile facts as well as to create analysis on social and 
political circumstances in Indonesia around 1998. To cite among the most prominents: HANDERSON, C. 
(1998) Asia Falling : Making Sense of the Asian Crisis and its Aftermath, New York, McGraw-Hill.; BHAKTI, 
I. N. (1998b) Chronology of events leading to the fall of President Suharto. IN FORRESTER, G. & MAY, R. J. 
(Eds.) The fall of Soeharto. Bathurst, Crawford House.; MANNING, C., AND DIERMEN, V. (Ed.) (2000) 
Indonesia in Transition : Social Aspects of Reformasi and Crisis, London, Zedbooks. 
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5.4. Version IV: post-1998 trend of communal violence and separatism 
 
1. Mysterious Killings in Banyuwangi 
 
In rural, impoverished and over-populated regions of the East Java province, 
religious traditions were part of the daily-life of local society. This is particularly true 
in Banyuwangi, one of the 37 districts of the province, where the populations practice 
cultural and religious principles indifferently. Located at about 830 kilometres from 
the capital city Jakarta, this region lies on the eastern end of Java island, which has 
a predominantly Moslem population. This region is separated from Bali (where 
Hinduism is dominant) just by a narrow strait. As a crossroad between the two 
islands, Banyuwangi has then been a melting pot of the Moslem cultures of Java and 
the Hindu tradition of Bali. This situation has created a hybrid culture and a religious 
syncretism175. In the island of Java, Islam was strongly interpreted with certain 
aspect of mysticism while Hindu Bali strongly emphasized the role of the spirits. 
Combining the elements of the two traditions, around two millions of Banyuwangi 
population then live in proximity with supernatural qualifications and practices. They 
believe in Santet (magic spells), Sihir (sorcery) and Tenung (Black Magic). The 
Dukun (experts) often occupy important positions of the villages, being respected but 
also feared for their malefic capacity. Such fear sometimes reaches the point of 
hysteria, as happened in 1998 when a group of locals assassinated Dukun Santets 
who were accused of using magic to harm members of the society. In July 1998 
alone, among the victims were five Dukuns, and people started to seek refuge in 
other regions (Forum Keadilan, 1998a, p.12). 
 
When similar murders occurred within a month, there could be no doubt that these were 
not just ‗ordinary‘ crimes. During September, the frequency of the killings increased, 
reaching three murders per day. These murders were now reported not only in 
Banyuwangi but also in the regions across East-Java peninsula and even further up to 
Madura Island (Jawa Pos, 1998b). By the end of the month, the number of deaths had 
exceeded 100, while more than two thirds of the victims were the members of NU 
(traditional-Islamists) (Al-Zastrouw Ng, 1999, p.98-105). With the massacres continuing 
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 This term is borrowed from Clifford Geertz‘s comprehensive study on the Religions of the Javanese. 
See: GEERTZ, C. (1976) The Religion of Java, Chicago, University of Chicago Press. 
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in October, violence and terror increased. At the beginning of November, investigations 
indicated that the ‗Dukun Tenung‘ were not the only target of the mysterious murders as 
the majority of the mordered were NU-affiliated
176
. In addition, in term of coverage, the 
tragedy was now overwhelming
177
. The army and police force, meanwhile, seemed 
incapable of stopping the continuous violence (Jawa Pos, 1998b, Ibid). 
 
2. Riots at Ketapang  
 
The Northern area of Jakarta is a known place of drug trafficking, prostitution, gambling 
and general crime. Many of the inhabitants of this area had engaged in these illegal 
practices, especially those who resided in the area of Ketapang which was notorious as 
one of the biggest gambling zones in the Southeast Asia. The gamblers in general were 
Chinese, while the workers were Christian migrants from the ethnic group of Ambon 
(Ambonese). Even though the practices had operated for years without significant 
turbulence, it was in 1999 that these practices arrived to irritate the Moslems who were 
the major inhabitants of Ketapang (Ministry of Defense, 1999). On November 22, a 
conflict erupted between local Moslems and Ambonese. Initially, the clash was 
insignificant but very quickly escalated. Following the minor tension, hundreds of 
Ambonese gathered and prepared to confront the Moslem inhabitants. They engaged in 
provocation--undertaking vandalism along the streets of Ketapang.  When a mosque 
was destroyed, this was interpreted by the Moslems as an act of war by the Christians 
(Sabili, 1998). Within hours, hundreds of armed men were deployed from Tangerang, 
the nearest big city around twenty kilometres from the Western part of Ketapang. These 
men then set fire to a church where the Ambonese were hiding. Not content with burning 
a church, the riot would further escalate thereafter as the crowd attacked Christian 
churches and schools in the northern area of Jakarta.
178
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 An NU figure said ―There are many victims from the NU‖ See: JAWA POS (1998b) Jangan Tutup-
Tutupi Kasus Banyuwangi. Jawa Pos. 13 October 1998 ed. Surabaya.; a NU official stated ―Seventy percent of 
them were NU people, See: SURABAYA POST (1998) Soal Investigasi NU Jatim Tentang Santet: Pertemuan 
PB NU-Muspida jatim Ditunda. Surabaya Post. 7 December 1998 ed. Surabaya.  
177
 Initially, the murder cases were reported in only three Kecamatan (sub-district) of Banyuwangi 
Regency, but later, they were reported to have happened in the entire Regency (which consists of 21 sub-
districts) and even in other regencies proxy to Banyuwangi. 
178
 The Ketapang riots marked the appearance of Front Pembela Islam—The Islamic defender front 
(FPI), a pro-government militia. Structured itself as a paramilitary group, the FPI has a close relationship with 
figures in charge of the national security in Jakarta, such as the commandant of Garrison and the head of police 
department. See: SUAEDY, A. (1998) Premanisme Politik, Jakarta, Institut Studi Arus Informasi. 
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3. Riots at Kupang  
 
Located on the western half of Timor Island, approximately 1900 kilometers from 
Jakarta, Kupang is a provincial city with around 300,000 inhabitants, 90% being 
Christian. On November 29, 1998, a crowd attacked mosques in Kupang in what was 
presumably an act of vengeance against Moslems for their rampage on churches during 
the Ketapang riot a week earlier
179
 (Forum Keadilan, 1998b, p.15). This anti-Moslem 
crowd ransacked the city for two days, took three lives, left 27 wounded, and damaged 
100 buildings including nine mosques(The Asian Wallstreet Journal, 1998).  
 
4. Civil war in Moluccas180 
 
The most violent conflict in the archipelago after 1998 was the civil war in Moluccas, 
where confrontations between Moslems and Christians happened on a massive 
scale. These clashes, which started in January 1999, killed more than 10,000 and 
created 500,000 refugees from a total population of 2.4 million (The Jakarta Post, 
2001a). The two principal sites of conflict were Ambon, the capital city of Moluccas  
in the province of Central Moluccas, and in Halmahera, a region in the northern 
island of Moluccas. Presumably with the objective of gaining supports from Jakarta, 
both Moslems and the Christians in central Moluccas claimed that the other group 
had secessionist inclinations. When the Moslem forces gained significant victories by 
mid-2000, the chiefs of the Protestant militia created the Front Kedaulatan Maluku—
The Front of Sovereign Moluccas (FKM) in December 2000, claiming independence 
for Ambon and surrounding islands (The Economist, 2001). However, separatism 
should not be seen as the real issue of the Moluccas civil war: the roots of this 
conflict stretched back the colonialism, which produced great local antagonism. As 
the result of Dutch-colonial ‗missionary‘ program, most of the Moluccas population 
was Christian, a group which monopolized not only the administration but also the 
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 The background of this riot was beliebed to be religious since at the more or less same time, bombs 
were blasted on churches at Sabang Street (Central Jakarta) and at Karawang (West Java). The government, 
meanwhile, kept persuading people for not to get provoked by wicked campaign to confront Moslems and 
Christians See: . Analysis about religious conflicts in Indonesia can be seen in, among others:  
180
 The conflict in Ambon was particularly concerning as this conflict continued for several years and 
was becoming an inter-religions conflict. This tragedy has been studied by many scholars and can be found in a 
big number of published books. The list of references about the Moluccas civil war can be consulted for 
example in http://media.isnet.org . In addition, the information involved in the analysis of this conflict was also 
based on the researcher‘s direct involvement in conflict-resolution measures undertaken by the Indonesian 
government during the period of 1999-2001. 
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local army. Understanding the potential problems of such a concentration of 
Christians, Jakarta attempted to create an exact balance between Christians and 
Moslems in 1971. However, because of the ‗transmigration‘ program propagated by 
the government during 1980s and differences in birth rate, Moslems constituted 57% 
of the population in 1991 (Klinken, 2001, p.12). Since that time, the Moslems have 
become more and more dominant in the provincial bureaucracy, holding three 
quarters of the 38 administrative stations in 1999 (Klinken, 2001, Ibid). There was 
often severe competition between Moslems and Christian when seeking jobs in 
government offices in the city, a situation which intensified in the period following the 
economic crisis (Klinken, 2001, p.10-11). The intensified social transformation since 
1980s had also contributed to inter-community tensions. Local elites tried to use the 
(national) political parties to set up their domination as well as patronage networks. 
This provoked religious tension which reached its paroxysm in December 1998 when 
Protestant troops who had been defeated in the ‗northern-Jakarta‘ war (cf. the 
Ketapang riot) were now returning to Ambon. All of these factors contributed to the 
Ambon civil war which started in January 1999.  
 
The war in Ambon and surrounding islands continued until July 1999, when the 
victory of the PDIP (representing the Christian interests) at the provincial election 
triggered the second riot. In response to the ongoing pressures on Muslims in 
Ambon, thousands of people from various Islamist organizations gathered in Jakarta 
demanding that President Abdurrahman Wahid (who was also the Leader of the NU-
Traditional Islamist) take immediate measures to give more protection to Moslems in 
Moluccas. It was mainly due to the fact that the government did not give an 
immediate response to this demand that from May 2000 radical Moslem groups 
undertook unilateral action. Around 6000 members of the Islamic armed militia 
labelled Laskar Jihad (the Jihadist) from Java were sent to Moluccas, bringing more 
complexity to the troubled island (See: Kompas, 2000). The massive arrival of 
Laskar Jihad changed the ‗balance of power‘. The Christian group was now in a 
defensive position (Klinken, 2001, p. 20-23), and at the conflict now looked like it 
would last for a longer time. Meanwhile, there were also sporadic conflicts in proxy 
islands such as Seram, Saparua and Buru. In March 2001, around 1,500 
representatives of Moslems and Christians met to discuss the reconciliation and to 
accept a certain number of local traditions and habits adapted to their differences 
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(The Jakarta Post, 2001b).The conflict decreased significantly by 2001, but serious 
tension remained until 2002. 
 
5. Civil war in Halmahera (Northern Moluccas) 
 
The social conflict in the northern part of the Moluccas Island was no less violent. It 
erupted in August 1999 with the creation of Halmahera as an administrative region by 
the central government. The source of conflict was quite clearly that Halmahera was a 
district where the Moslems
181
 were dominant, with the reforms being directly aimed at 
influencing the provincial elections to be held by June 2000 and therefore rejected by 
certain groups within the province. Clashes between Protestants, supported by the 
Sultan (local king) of Ternate, and Moslems led to some deaths. However, when the 
Makian Moslems in Halmahera expelled the Christians from Ternate and Tidore (two 
regions of Halmahera) in October 1999, the number of casualties grew rapidly. In 
December 1999, Protestants troops launched an attack on villages populated by Makian 
Moslems and massacred hundreds (Kearney, 2001, p.5-7). These atrocities could only 
cause more reprisals against Protestants not only within Halmahera but also in other 
regions of the archipelago. In June 1999, Moslem combatants ransacked a Christian 
village killing more than 100 villagers. Elsewhere, riots burst simultaneously in Sumatra, 
Kalimantan, Poso, Ujung Pandang and Western Java (Klinken, 2001, Ibid)
182
. 
 
6. The East Timor Crisis 
 
East Timor was a ‗game‘ that had to be played by Indonesia. As partly analysed in 
previous chapter (see: chapter 3), Habibie‘s regime began to play this game in 1998 
by offering to the people of East Timor a referendum of ‗self-determination‘, a 
decision mainly based on the argument that East Timor was of great significance for 
Indonesia while issues related to the status of this territory were important for 
Indonesia‘s diplomacy. In fact, by organizing the popular consultation, Habibie (as 
                                                 
181
 The majority of Moslems who reside in Halmahera were migrants from Makian Island, a small 
island nearby.  
182
 The Habibie‘s administration considered the increase of violence in the country within this period 
was not a coincidence. In certain region such as Moluccas, the social setting was favourable for religious tension 
and conflicts but elsewhere like in the northern Sumatra, Kalimantan, and Poso, the social landscape tend to 
negate any possibilities of conflicts that can be related to religious issues. There is therefore a strong suspicion 
that the spreading social conflicts during this period were ‗engineered‘ by certain parties with the objective of 
weakening the regime (Based on the researcher‘s personal knowledge). 
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well as the majority of Indonesian elites) was of the belief that the vote would 
produce a result favourable to national integration, thus confirming the status of the 
troubled territory as an Indonesian province. For Habibie, such a possibility would 
amplify his personal prestige at an opportune time: the presidential election was 
looming, and his regime faced a crisis of legitimacy. Even if the referendum favoured 
the independence of the territory, Habibie believed that this still would give him 
advantageous external supports. By making such a rational calculation, the president 
had enormously underestimated the internal opposition to the independence of 
Timor. Like the United Nations, the third party deeply involved the process of the 
referendum, Habibie had taken an ‗expensive‘ option in terms of human lives.  
 
General Wiranto, as well as the majority of the army generals, opposed the popular 
consultation proposed by Habibie. The army had fought the guerrillas in Timor for 25 
years and had lost thousands of men. This produced a profound resistance to the 
independence of Timor, and the military chiefs were also fearful of the domino theory 
that the ‗independence‘ concession on the East Timor would encourage secessionist 
movements in Aceh and Papua183. In fact, the army had its proper interests in the 
game. 
 
The Indonesian army had significant financial independence. It was mainly because 
the government‘s budget for the defence covered only around a quarter of the total 
required for its regular operation. Unlike military chiefs elsewhere in the world, 
Indonesian generals would rarely ask for increases in the defence budget. This was 
because the Indonesian military, especially the army, were involved in the economic 
activities in Jakarta and other regions, including East Timor. Therefore, a few weeks 
before Habibie launched the idea of a popular consultation for the Timorese, the 
commanders of army were alarmed. While Habibie regarded the vote as the best 
way for Indonesia to get rid of its diplomatic burdens and the economic crisis, the 
army, on the other hand, regarded East Timor as a strategic battlefield and a gold 
mine. Wiranto thus announced a rapid response on behalf of the military.  
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 In fact, the fear of domino effect was over-estimated as there were important differences between 
the three most alarming provinces of Indonesia, especially for the independence of Aceh and Papua was unlikely 
to happen. Different from Aceh and Papua which were colonized by the Dutch, the East Timor had been a 
Portuguese colony until 1974. While the United Nations (the representative of the international community) 
recognized the integration of Papua to Indonesia in 1965, it has never approved the Indonesian annexation of the 
East Timor in 1975.       
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Wiranto discreetly established a new military unit within a government‘s official 
Taskforce later known as Satuan Tugas Pelaksana Penentuan Pendapat di Timor-
Timur—Tasksforce on Referendum at the East Timor (P3TT). Even though this 
taskforce officially had no offensive objectives, it had capacities exceeding any 
military operations in the occupied territory. To direct the P3TT, Wiranto chose 
general Zacky Anwar Makarim, who was famous of his involvement in secret military 
operations since 1970s184. 
 
The nomination of Makarim coincided with the period when paramilitaries in 
Indonesia were particularly a trend. From Jakarta‘s point of view, the militias were 
organized militarily to secure the special session of General Assembly to be 
organized on November 1998 and at the same time as a less-risky alternative to 
establish social order following the May 1998 riots (See: chapter 8). As Makarim took 
his assignment at Dili (the capital city of the East Timor), the existence of the 
paramilitary groups was still relevant as Makarim launched a program to increase the 
involvement of pro-Indonesia armed militia in East Timor (Kingsbury, 2000, p.70). 
This military program was never a secret. Colonel Tono Suratman, the commandant 
of the East Timor military zone, indicated to journalists at the beginning of December 
1998 that his troops would recruit five to ten volunteers in each village to be used as 
civil militia to fight the guerrilla fighters. According to Suratman, it was the will of the 
villagers, expressed through their local representatives, that the military form the 
militia in order to defend their villages (Sydney Morning Herald, 1998). In addition, 
Suratman denied that the Indonesian military would arm these militias by saying that 
if they were to carry firearms, it would be on their own initiative (Sydney Morning 
Herald, 1998). At a later time, Wiranto rejected any implication of military 
involvement in the armed militia, saying that the paramilitaries in the East Timor had 
developed spontaneously185. However, a certain number of members of the militia 
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 Informations about Major General Zacky Anwar Makarim, See: 
http://www.yayasanhak.minihub.org/mot/cons92z%20-%20Zacky%20Makarim.htm 
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 Wiranto‘s denials about the involvement of the Indonesian military in the supports on the pro-
Indonesia paramilitaries had harmed the credibility of the general at the international level as, in fact,  the 
Indonesian soldiers had employed the paramilitaries in the East Timor since more than a decade. In 1999. This 
was clearly indicated by the number of personnel in these paramilitary forces—approximately 6000 civilian 
Timorese had been recruited to give an ardent support for the East Timor‘s integration to Indonesia. See: 
SUAEDY, A. (1998) Premanisme Politik, Jakarta, Institut Studi Arus Informasi., p. 128-129 
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and the chiefs of the pro-Indonesia groups admitted to have received weapons and 
finance from the Indonesian military186.  
 
On April 4 in Liquica town, a known pro-Indonesian militia under the banner of Besi 
Merah Putih (red and white steel) killed five people. Officers in Jakarta denied that 
the security forces were implied (Agence France Presse, 1999). As Jakarta promised 
to hold an investigation, reactions followed. Xanana Gusmao, the leader of the 
Fretilin, declared that the Indonesian army would undertake every single effort to 
prevent the vote and that the People of the East Timor would never have a chance of 
self-determination (Suaedy, 1998, p.135). He threatened to launch a armed 
campaign if the United Nations did not set up a guarantor of peace in the territory 
(Suaedy, 1998, Ibid). Gusmao had succeeded in alerting the international community 
to the gravity of the situation in East Timor, and the United Nations then obtained a 
commitment from Wiranto that the Indonesian army would disarm the militia 
(ANTARA, 1999).  
 
In the following days, Gusmao faced a new adversary: Eurico Guterres, the leader of 
Besi Merah Putih militia. Guterres attracted attention for a virulent speech that he 
gave in Dili on April 17, 1998. In front of thousands of sympathizers and defenders of 
integration with Indonesia, he declared ―From this day, I order all the pro-integration 
militia to lead a complete clean-up against the traitors of the integration, to capture 
and kill them‖ (Far Eastern Economic Review, 1999b). Within hours of speech, the 
militia of Aitarak attacked the house of an important figure of the independence 
movement, Manuel Carrascalo, whose brother had been a popular governor in the 
1980s (Asian Wallstreet Journal, 1999). 
 
Another incident caused by the Aitarak militia also broke out on August 17. This left 
five dead among the freedom fighters in Dili and produced significant consequences. 
Immediately, Habibie and Wiranto were contacted by the Prime Minister of Japan, 
Keizo Obuchi, the American Foreign Minister and the Secretary of Defense, as well 
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 See, for example: FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW (1999a) Indonesian Military Looks Set 
to Sour Independence Plans. Far Eastern Economic Review. 18 February 1999 ed. Hongkong, THE 
ECONOMIST (1999) Crossbows and Guns in East Timor. 13 February 1999 ed. London, The Economist 
Newspaper Ltd. THE WASHINGTON POST (1999) Residents of East Timor Weigh Independence Autonomy. 
The Washington Post. 14 February 1999 ed. Washington D.C. 
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as the Foreign Minister of Australia, Alexander Downer187. The United Nations 
secretary general Kofi Annan also emphasized the need for the Indonesian security 
forces to restore the law and order in Timor. Finally, a few days before the vote, 
Wiranto recalled Makarim to Jakarta. Wiranto also dismissed the commander of the 
zone of Maliana, Lieutenant colonel Burhanudin Siagian (Sydney Morning Herald, 
1999). 
 
On the day of voting, observers predicted attacks by the militia on voters in the 
polling stations. Some attacks in fact occurred; of particular note was the open fire by 
the militia on a polling station which was visited by the US ambassador, Stapleton 
Roy (Klinken, 2000, p.64). Apart from this incident, the overall process of the vote 
was peaceful, confirming the Indonesian military‘s promise to ‗discipline‘ the militias. 
A new wave of disorder, however, started again soon after the votes were counted. 
Ninety eight percent of the enlisted voters made it to the polling stations, and the 
majority of them voted for Timorese independence. Even before the counting 
process finished, the chiefs of pro-Indonesian militias had denounced the poll as 
unjust. The (pro-Jakarta) governor of the East Timor, Jose Abilio Soares, also 
blamed the United Nations Mission on the East Timor (UNAMET) for having given 
incentive to hatred and violence amongst the Timorese (Suara Pembaruan, 1999). It 
was because of this disappointment that the violent actions of the pro-Indonesian 
militias were now aimed to local officers of the UNAMET. The militias took some 
UNAMET officers hostage in the zone of Ermera and killed three of them (Klinken, 
2000, Ibid). A similar hatred against the UNAMET spread quickly across the East 
Timor territory and forced all the officers of UNAMET and journalists to withdraw to 
Dili (Klinken, 2000, p.65). In Maliana, the militia opened fire and burned houses. The 
capital Dili itself became chaotic with militia wandering in the streets, blocking 
transportation, burning houses and attacking the United Nations‘ symbols and public 
facilities188. 
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7. Separatism in Aceh 
 
The feeling of being exploited (economically) combined with a strong sentiment of 
‗local-nationalism‘ since the end of 1980s had produced resistance amongst the 
Acehnese to the authority of Jakarta. During the period of national revolution (1945-
1949), the Acehnese supported the Indonesian nationalist movement with the 
expectation that an independent Indonesian state would show more respect to the 
Acehnese‘s local tradition and aspiration (Kell, 1995, p.8-10). The pursuit of national 
interests had led to a neglect of local aspirations, including those of the Acehnese, 
by the center. The desires of the Acehnese (which tended to be the Shari‘a-like) 
were not fulfilled by the secular-Indonesian state. As a consequence, the relationship 
between Jakarta and Aceh since 1949 has tended to be tense and even violent189. In 
1953, a separatist movement was established in Aceh under the banner of Darul 
Islam, symbolising the unresolved disappointment amongst the leaders of local 
santris (devout Moslems). Responding to this ‗separatist‘ development, Jakarta tried 
to cut off the separatists‘ link with the Acehnese by making Aceh a semi-autonomous 
province in 1957 (Peoesponegoro, 1992, p.361). Two years later, Jakarta made a 
further concession to the province by assigning it the new status of Daerah Istimewa 
Aceh—Special Region of Aceh— giving a high degree of freedom to the region in 
term of religion, common law and education. Most of the Acehnese welcomed this 
policy and praised Jakarta even more when Suharto took steps combat communism 
in the mid-1960s190. Suharto‘s economic policies and authoritarianism during the 
1970s and 1980s, however, had caused a new form of resentment amongst the 
Acehnese. The most significant complaint was related to the exploitation of the 
enormous stock of natural gas in the province which the Acehnese saw as providing 
a profit to Jakarta but not to the Acehnese. This dissatisfaction was mainly focused 
on the Zona Industri Lhokseumawe – the Industrial Zone of Lhokseumawe (ZILS) – 
created by Jakarta at the beginning of the 1970s to facilitate the exploitation of oil 
and gas in the area. In fact, the industrial zone had brought about significant 
destruction of Aceh‘s environment during the first decade of its operation. Apart from 
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 An excellent reference about Jakarta-Aceh relationship since the early independent period, See: 
REID, A. (2006) Verandah of Violence: The Background of the Aceh Problem, Singapore, National University 
of Singapore Press. 
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 The communists had been the biggest rival of the Islamists in the Indonesian politics since the 
period of revolution. As the majority of the Acehnese were Moslems, Suharto‘s strike against the communist 
was regarded by the Acehnese as the state‘s favour to the Islamists. 
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this, the zone was regarded by the Acehnese as having created an economic 
enslavement of the local people as the majority of labourers involved in this zone 
were imported from other provinces. Combined with large scale pollution and the 
exhaustion of Aceh forest resources, all of these dissatisfactions ended up producing 
Acehnese resistance (Kell, 1995, p.13-16).  
 
In 1976, Hassan Tiro, a former delegate of Darul Islam, created the Front 
Pembebasan Aceh-Sumatra—the Front of Aceh-Sumatra Liberation, the embryo of 
the Gerakan Aceh Merdeka—Aceh Liberation Movement (GAM) (Aspinall, 2002, 
p.19). As this separatist movement started to attack the members of Indonesian 
military in 1998, Suharto responded by deploying six thousand troops from the 
Army‘s Strategic Reserve (Kostrad) and from the special forces until mid-1990 
(Aspinall, 2002, p.11). This offensive measure continued until 1998, when the 
province was placed under the status of Daerah Operasi Militer—The military 
operations are (DOM) (Kell, 1995, p.74-75).  
 
Even though sporadic attacks from the GAM remained frequent, it can be said that 
by the end of 1991, the Indonesian forces had crushed the rebellion. The relations 
between the Acehnese and Jakarta, however, remained tense, especially due to 
humanitarian issues arising during the military operation period (Aspinall, 2002). It 
was only in 1998, following the collapse of Suharto regime, that the reconciliation 
between Jakarta and Aceh seemed possible. In August 1998, the army ceased 
military operations in Aceh and withdrew its non-regular forces, including of the 
Special Forces, from the territory (The Jakarta  Post, 1999a). All these efforts, 
however, did not relieve the resentments of the Acehnese. In November 1998, the 
GAM launched terror attacks against local government officials and military 
members. This situation forced Jakarta to re-deploy a new wave of military strike 
(The Jakarta  Post, 1999b). In spite of the promise from Habibie that Jakarta would 
send only troops strictly following procedures of human rights, atrocities continued. 
Of particular salience was the murder of a religious teacher and his 57 pupils in July 
1999. By mid-1999, violent incidents between the GAM and the Indonesian military 
had created more than 100,000 refugees (Sukma, 2001, p.390). Disappointed with 
Jakarta, most of the Acehnese boycotted the elections of June 1999. 
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8. Rebellious Movement in Papua 
 
At the other end of the archipelago, in Papua, Indonesia was also troubled by a 
persistent separatist movement similar to that which revolted in Aceh. 
 
Inclinations toward secession in this province had started when the Dutch authorities 
had prevented New Guinea from joining Indonesia in 1949. Based on Sukarno‘s 
claim in 1945 that the Indonesian territory includes the land and the water in East 
Indische (the ex-Dutch colony in the Southeast Asia), the majority of the Indonesian 
nationalists at that time were of the opinion that the territory legitimately belonged to 
Indonesia. Sukarno then launched a military operation aimed at liberating Papua in 
1962191.  
 
The Indonesian military-political campaign against the continuous control of this 
territory by the Netherlands had to face diplomatic interposition from the United 
States. This continued until an agreement between the conflicting parties was 
reached in 1962 that the territory would be transferred under the UN‘s authority in 
October of that year (Van der Veur, 1961, p.54-55). Six months later, on May 1963, 
the status of the territory changed to ‗protectorate‘ under UN jurisdiction. This status 
was to remain in place until 1969, when ‗The Act of Self-Determination‘ would 
confirm Papua as the integral part of Indonesia (Van der Veur, 1961, p.56). 
Meanwhile, the local political leaders unilaterally declared the independence of 
Western New Guinea (Papua) in 1961 by denying the legitimacy of United Nations‘ 
process. Since 1963, hence the Indonesian government consider the supporters of 
the 1961 declaration of independence as irredentist. Even though there were 
frequent armed incidents between the separatists and the Indonesian military, the 
agitations were well controlled by Suharto‘s regime. After the fall of the New Order in 
1998, however, they began to reappear and intensify.  
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 The crisis began in 1959 (see: the next section). For a comprehensive history of this military 
operation, See: VAN DER KROEF, J. (1961) Nasution, Sukarno, and the West New Guinean Dispute. Asian 
Survey, Vol. 1 No. 6 (August 1961). For further history about the relations between Indonesia, Papua, and the 
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9. Secessionist movement in Riau   
 
The increase of political freedom in Indonesia since 1998 had led to the expression 
of dissatisfaction in certain provinces. Especially in Riau, the discontent even 
inclined towards secessionism. The complaints among inhabitants of Riau were 
mainly related to the exploitation of natural resources in the province. Riau is one of 
the richest provinces in Indonesia due to its forest resources and reserves of oil and 
gas. Further, two of Indonesia‘s largest industrial zones, Batam and Bintan, were 
located in this province, and its geographical proximity to Singapore should also 
have been an economic advantage. Like Aceh, though, these natural blessings192 do 
not prevent almost half of the population from living under the poverty-line (The 
Jakarta  Post, 2001). From the beginning of 1999, the demands from local activists 
increased, exceeding the special autonomy which had been offered by the central 
government. Some demanded greater autonomy within a federal state; others 
wanted full independence193. Blockades of oil reservoirs and tourist sites as well as 
anti-Chinese riots and attacks against migrants from other provinces spread until 
2004 (The Jakarta  Post, 2004, Menon, 2001). However, despite intensive 
secessionist propaganda in the province, there is little evidence of the existence of 
active armed groups. 
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 To show the significance of Riau to the Indonesian economy, the production of oil in the area 
contribute to 14% of national GDP. See: BULLETIN (2008) Laporan Utama. Bulletin. October 2008 ed. 
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CHAPTER SIX:  
 
DEALING WITH POLITICAL DISORDERS: DEGREE OF SUCCESS 
 
The previous chapter analysed political order in the sense of difficulties faced by the 
Indonesian regimes of four versions of state machinery. This chapter will analyse the 
same topic with different emphasize: the degree of success. The attention, therefore, 
will be focused on measures undertaken by the regimes when facing the challenges 
while the overall argument is based on presumption that national and international 
systems function in such a way as to continuously reinforce each other. ―Politics 
everywhere, .....are related to politics everywhere else. Where the functioning of any 
political unit was once sustained by structures within its boundaries, now the roots of 
its political life can be traced to remote corners of the globe‖ (Rosenau, 1969). 
Following this postulate, the Indonesian regimes‘ effort to maintain order is assumed 
to have correlations with external factors while ‗order‘ will not be treated only as the 
outcome of a regime‘s policy, but also as a kind of self-adaptation to its environment.  
 
6.1. Version I: Post-colonial dealing with disorder 
 
To partly sum up what was elaborated in the previous chapters, disorders and 
instability during the period of parliamentary democracy stemmed mainly from three 
factors: 1) the complexities resulting from the uncertain political situation at both the 
domestic and international levels; 2) the disagreement amongst elites as well as 
social groups on the issue of state ideology, which ultimately produced political 
tensions and rebellious movements from orthodox Islamist, and; 3) the tense 
competition between political elites and the inability of civilian leaders to control the 
military. Facing these challenges, the parliamentary government and President 
Sukarno applied measures aimed mainly at solving the on-going problems and more 
particularly to unify the elements of the nation by, among others: 1) creating 
Revolution ideology in addition to the Pantjasila and; 2) launching direct strikes 
against rebels. 
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Creating a ‗unifying‘ ideology 
 
At least until 1957, political life in Indonesia was dominated by the theory and 
practice of revolution. During this period, the republic had marched forward and 
sought to transform society by a complete political, economic, and social reordering 
(See: Kahin, 1952). At the same time, the founding fathers of the new republic were 
engaged in an act of nation building, for which an ideology was always crucial. 
However, this quest by the state for an ideology was obviously much more complex 
than had been predicted. Even though the Pantjasila was accepted as the ideology 
of the state, it was not enough to unite the nation, especially since the majority of 
subjects (the Islamists) were in favour of the Shari‘a (See: chapter 2). Meanwhile, 
Sukarno was fully aware that his charismatic leadership meant a majority of the 
Indonesian people would obey him while in reality he had less significant political 
power within the parliamentary system. The fact on his charismatic popularity hence 
gave Sukarno a kind of confidence to engage in a bold political experiment while the 
existing political system also gave him more incentives to impose his charismatic 
leadership. Sukarno then connected the revolutionary tendency of Indonesian 
politics with his project of nation-building, creating a ‗supplementary‘ ideology 
labelled as ‗Continuous Revolution‘. Thus, in addition to his position as the head of 
state, Sukarno styled himself as ‗The great leader of the Indonesian revolution‘ (See: 
Legge, 1972, chapter 12).  
 
In Sukarno‘s term, however, the revolutionary ideology did not have exactly the 
same meaning as that of the generally-accepted definition of revolution, despite the 
flexibility of the word194. According to Sukarno, Indonesian Revolution was the 
political-economic process that would culminate in a modern Indonesian society, the 
goal of which was not so different from other revolutionary ideologies elsewhere in 
the world. The uniqueness of Sukarno‘s ideology was mainly related to the means by 
which this goal was to be achieved. For Sukarno, the essence of revolution is 
confrontation, as he said in one occasion ―Oleh karena kita berada pada masa 
revolusi, kita harus menerapkan konfrontasi guna menghancurkan tatanan lama dan 
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 Carl J. Friedrich, for instance, remarked that there are features of revolutions going far beyond the 
strictly political dimensions ―..........the creative and spiritual aspirations, involving values and beliefs‖, See: 
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NOMOS VIII. New York, Atherton Press., p.4 
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membangun tatanan baru. Dalam konfrontasi tersebut, kita akan memiliki musuh 
baik di dalam maupun di luar yang ingin mempertahankan tatatan lama. Dengan 
kata lain, akan ada benturan antara tatanan lama dan tatanan baru atau antara the 
New Emerging Forces (NEFO) dan the Old Established Forces (OLDEFO) ---Since 
we are in a revolution, we should launch a confrontation to destroy the old order and 
create a new order. In launching a confrontation, we will have enemies at home and 
abroad who want to preserve the old order. In the broader sense of the word, there 
will be a collision between the old and the new forces or between the new emerging 
forces (NEFO) and the old established forces (OLDEFO)‖(Sukarno, 1963)195.  
 
To emphasize the ‗significance‘ of his leadership in the revolution, Sukarno‘s position 
was affirmed by his statement at another occasion ―Tanamkan, wahai rakyat 
Indonesia, tanamkan di dalam hati and pikiran kalian—Sebuah revolusi hanya akan 
berjalan dan berakhir semestinya apabila ada satu pemimpin revolusi yang 
revolusioner, satu ideology dan konsep nasional yaitu revolusioner, jelas, tegas, and 
terinci‖---―Implant it, oh People of Indonesia, implant it in your hearts and minds—a 
revolution can proceed and end properly only if there is one revolutionary leadership 
for the revolution; one national ideology and concept which is revolutionary, clear, 
firm, and detailed‖ (Sukarno, 1960a). Under Sukarno‘s leadership, the Indonesians 
often shouted bravely to the world ‗Ever Onward ! Never Retreat !‘ (Suryadinata, 
1997, p.116). 
 
This ideology relied upon the popular/mass support for effective, centralized 
leadership196. On many occasions, Sukarno emphasized that the inspiration for 
revolution had its source in the aspiration of the people, for whom he acted as 
‗Pemegang Amanah Penderitaan Rakyat—The carrier of the people‘s suffering 
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 According to Sukarno‘s ‗theory‘, the two groups, NEFO and OLDEFO, were mutually antagonistic. 
Their irreconcilability and the inevitable future conflict in which ultimate victory will be gained by the NEFO 
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revolutionary process, Sukarno‘s regime took militant and aggressive steps to give substance to the ideology 
(See: ‗Diverting internal conflicts towards external enemies‘—later sub-section). 
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 This explains why Sukarno chose PKI as one amongst main pillars to support his power—because 
PKI is a mass-base political party with wide popular support. 
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(AMPERA)197. By saying this, Sukarno tried to convince the Indonesian people of his 
commitment to address the physical, material, political, economic, social, cultural, 
and mental suffering which had been forced on them by centuries of imperial 
oppression and later from sectarian interests in the period of independence. The task 
of the revolution, according to Sukarno, was to alleviate the suffering by destroying 
the old order and create a new order of political, economic, and social justice for a 
people with a new confidence and identity198. However, from Sukarno‘s perspective, 
the people‘s suffering was inarticulate; the people were incapable of translating their 
suffering into concrete demands, their aspirations into revolutionary program, or their 
discontent into action. This made leadership necessary (See: Legge, 1972, chapter 
12). This was Sukarno‘s self-determined role: the spokesman of the people charged 
with articulating their suffering. Citing Anderson‘s remark, ―One well-known solution 
was Sukarno‘s claim that he was the Penyambung Lidah Rakyat—literally, ‗the 
extension of people‘s tongue‘ perhaps more concisely, vox populi‖ (Anderson, 1990, 
p.62) 
 
In this ideology, the revolution was therefore conceived to be the locus of 
sovereignty to which everyone, including Sukarno, was subject. As Sukarno said: 
 
―Thus the political-economic-social ordering (the revolution) is actually the 
main power—the highest holder of power—of our national life. Every person, 
every citizen, every group, yes everything that lives on the soil of Indonesia, 
should be subordinated to the authority of this highest power......It is clear that 
the highest authority is a person, not the President, not the Government, not a 
council, but a concept of life which animates our revolution. In brief, and to put 
it simply, everything that is the ideal of the 1945 revolution, that is the highest 
authority, that is the highest power, that is the Tjakrawati (cakravartin—the 
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highest ruler). That is what we must put into practice, that is what we must be 
loyal to, and that is what we must serve. We must direct and subordinate all 
the layers of our national life to the realization of the ideals of the revolution. 
And whoever refuses to be directed there, or whoever does not want to be 
subordinated, is an obstructor of the revolution‖ (Sukarno, 1959)199. 
 
The Indonesian revolution, then, was not without purpose. The next question is ‗how 
can that purpose are achieved?‘ Or, borrowing Sukarno‘s term, how can the 
message of the people‘s suffering be answered?  
 
Since Sukarno‘s ideology encompassed the aspirations of all living within the 
Indonesian territory and was ‗congruent‘ with the conscience of the Indonesian 
people, these objectives could only be achieved in a utopian and idealistic way. 
However, Sukarno came up with an impressive formulation answering all queries. 
This was labelled the ‗Framework of the Revolution‘ and consisted of:   
 
1. The establishment of a State of the Republic of Indonesia with the structural 
form of a Unitary State, which is democratic, with a territory under its authority 
stretching from Sabang to Merauke (from the western tip of Sumatra to the 
eastern border of West Irian); 
 
2. The establishment of a society which is just and prosperous, materially as well 
as spiritually, within the bounds of that Unitary State of the Republic of 
Indonesia; 
 
3. The establishment of good friendship between the Republic of Indonesia and 
all the states of the world, in the very first place of all with the states of Asia-
Africa, upon the basis of mutual respect , and upon the basis of cooperation to 
create a New World free from imperialism and colonialism marching towards 
perfect World Peace. (The Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1961)200 
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The ultimate result was therefore easy to predict. This framework became the main 
reference (guidelines) for the regime‘s approach and policies, and since the defense 
of the state and revolution was given the highest priority, the ideology would 
simultaneously justify Sukarno‘s offensive efforts to maintain order in the face of 
threats from rebels and dissidents, including orthodox Islamists (See: the next 
section). Externally, the guidelines contributed to the formulation of an aggressive 
foreign policy towards Western-capitalist countries, which were regarded as 
imperialist powers. Sukarno‘s ideology of revolution obliged his regime to struggle 
against imperialism and neo-colonialism but, in fact, was Sukarno‘s strategy to 
maintain order through the creation of common enemies201. This position partly 
explains the regime‘s confrontational policies in West Irian and with Malaysia, which 
will be elaborated upon below.  
 
Direct strikes against rebels 
 
The efforts to maintain order by the parliamentary government was also undertaken 
through military operations against rebels. Since 1945, Indonesia has been the site 
of a number attempts to change the government or the ideology of the state by 
forcible means, most being motivated by the same thing: ideology. While there have 
been a small number of rebellious movements driven by concrete disagreements 
with government conduct or policy (such as the rebellion of Captain Andi Aziz, 
KNIL/Westerling troops rebellions, and PRRI/Permesta—The United Republic of 
Indonesia), the vast majority were purely ideological. These ideological rebellions 
involved the Communist Party (the Madiun Affair of 1948 and the coup d‘état of 
1965) and the Islamists (Darul Islam, the Islamic state of Indonesia, Amir Fatah, the 
Troops of the Islamic Community, the 426 Batallion, The Troops of Islamic 
Community, Kahar Muzakkar, the Islamic Kingdom, the Islamic State of Aceh, and 
so on). Facing these internal threats to stability, Sukarno often stressed the 
importance of national unity in the multicultural setting of the Indonesian society202 
while promising democratic settlements to disputes (See: chapter 2 and 3). However, 
not all of these measures produced a peaceful resolution between the government 
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and the rebels and created even further hatred amongst the Islamists. This explains 
the continuous military operations203 during the later regime under Sukarno‘s 
presidential monarchy.  
 
6.2. Version II: Sukarno‟s Martial Approach 
 
When Sukarno declared martial law through presidential decree of 1959, maintaining 
order through violent military operations had been standard response to dissidents 
hence does not need to be elaborated further in this section despite its significance.  
Meanwhile, the domestic political circumstances was too complicated (see: chapter 
3, section 3.3) hence Sukarno arrived to a conclusion that common enemies are 
required to overcome the prolonging domestic disorders.  
 
Diverting internal conflicts toward external enemies: West Irian and Malaysia 
 
The West Irian (Papua) was an unfinished project, left over since the 1949 
settlement of the Dutch-Indonesian conflict. The future of West Irian, therefore, had 
been a bone of contention between the Dutch and Indonesia since the agreement, 
the status of which was yet to be determined by negotiations between the two 
countries (See: Van Der Kroef, 1958). Since each party had a different interpretation 
of the terms of agreement – following each party‘s own interests – disputes over the 
territory become a stumbling block to harmonious relations between the countries 
throughout the 1950s, a time during which Indonesia experienced strong nationalist 
sentiment and intense competition between elites and masses. All the elements of 
the realm were united in demanding the last remnant of the Dutch‘s East Indische‘s 
colony be ceded to the new republic (Feith, 1962, p.155-164). Sukarno and his 
radical nationalist allies saw this problem as central in ‗uniting‘ the nation, using the 
pretext of the ‗completion of the revolution‘. For Sukarno, the resolution of the 
problem through a revolution would also bring about pride among the Indonesian 
people; this would increase his charismatic legitimacy (See: chapter 3). In the 
second half of the 1950s, therefore, this issue become a major source of political 
conflict and agitation, leading in the foreign policy sphere to deteriorating relations 
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with the Netherlands and a more anti-Western orientation by the Indonesian 
government (Feith, 1962, 450-456).   
 
This campaign started to become hostile in 1960 and reached its height in 1961. In 
August 1960, Indonesian diplomatic relations with the Dutch were cut off, and by the 
end of the year the Indonesian army entered west Irian, marking a new stage in the 
conflict. In January 1961, an arms purchasing mission to Moscow led by Defense 
Minister General Nasution concluded with 400 million dollars worth of modern 
military equipment for the West Irian campaign and the promise of further aid of a 
similar kind (Pauker, 1961, p.13-22). 
 
This result was decisive for Sukarno and his project of national unity but in fact 
proved a disappointment for the army. As analysed in chapter 3 and 4, the political 
system during Sukarno‘s reign was built on a competitive coalition of the army, the 
communists and Sukarno himself as the balancer. For the army, the commitment of 
assistance from the Soviet Union would push Indonesia closer to the communist 
orbit, a situation likely to strengthen the position of its internal rival. In fact, Army 
leaders wanted Indonesia to be within the Western orbit (in order to minimize the 
communist influence) and had struggled to persuade the American government to 
meet Indonesia‘s needs for modern weapons and training. In 1960, Nasution and 
other generals had repeatedly attempted to obtain aid from Washington but without 
much success. America‘s suspicions of Sukarno‘s motives and ties to Holland under 
the NATO treaty not to aid Indonesia‘s bid to oust the Dutch from West Irian  
(Pauker, 1961, Ibid).  
 
The change of American leadership altered the conflict between the Dutch and 
Indonesia over West Irian. In January 1961, John F. Kennedy became the new 
American president and immediately showed himself to be more concerned than his 
predecessor about the importance of Indonesia to America‘s strategic foreign policy 
position. As marked by Schlesinger ―The President regarded Indonesia, this country 
of a hundred million people, so rich in oil, tin, and rubber, as one of the potentially 
significant nations of Asia.  He was anxious to slow up its drift towards the 
Communist bloc; he knew that Sukarno was already turning to Moscow to get the 
military equipment necessary for invasion. And he was also anxious to strengthen 
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the anti-communist forces, especially the army, in order to make sure that if anything 
happened to Sukarno, the powerful Indonesian Communist Party would not inherit 
the country‖ (Schlesinger Jr., 1965, p.464). Such a concern was visible in Kennedy‘s 
decision in February 1961 to send United States representatives to the opening of 
the New Guinea Council, a new legislative body regarded by the Dutch as a 
landmark in their policy of granting ‗self-determination‘ to the people of West Irian 
(Van Der Kroef, 1963, p.129-130). For Indonesia as well as for the Dutch, this 
decision was clearly signalled a shift in American policies from impartiality on the 
issue toward an active intervention favourable to Indonesia‘s interests. However, in 
April 1961, Sukarno ordered the Indonesian Armed Forces to prepare a military plan 
for the ‗forced‘ liberation of the West Irian, putting pressure on Nasution and other 
army leaders who were opposed to a major military effort204. In this situation, it was 
clear that the power and ultimate choice was completely in Sukarno‘s hands, for 
Indonesia finally took offensive action through the deployment of troops to the 
territory. Meanwhile, the Dutch forced another UN debate on the issue205. This bold 
move by Sukarno is the major piece of evidence for our argument that Sukarno had 
ulterior motives for his military operation in the West Irian: the national unity and 
prestige project so significant to his charisma. If we analyse Sukarno‘s approach 
more deeply, we can see that he should have been well aware that his aggressive 
actions had the potential to change Washington‘s opinion. Even though it can be 
speculated that a serious armed clash between the Dutch and Indonesia may 
precipitate American moves for a settlement of the problem, an offensive attack 
amidst an on-going peaceful settlement would normally be seen rather negatively by 
the international community. In addition, Indonesian aggression would quite possibly 
create nationalist sentiment amongst the West Irian people, being further 
encouraged by Dutch promotion of self government for West Irian. Finally, the 
spreading rebellious movements across the archipelago and the domestic economic 
situation in 1961 should have been a clear sign that Indonesia was in no situation for 
a military operation against the Dutch in the West Irian. However, Sukarno‘s regime‘s 
efforts to maintain order and the continuous project of national unity at all cost. It was 
fortunate for Indonesia that after a difficult negotiation in the United Nations (partly by 
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virtue of Kennedy‘s diplomacy), any further military action could be avoided. The 
problem of West Irian was solved peacefully through a referendum, the result of 
which favoured Indonesian interests. 
 
In the aftermath of the successful campaign in West Irian, it appeared that the 
Sukarno regime might return their attention to the task of economic stabilization and 
development, as this had been the major concern outside and within the country 
(See: chapter 3). The United States, especially, had been intent on encouraging 
Indonesia to take such measures which, it believed, would promote stability in 
Indonesia, combat Russian influence, and undercut the appeal of the communism 
(Bunnel, 1969, p.60-148)206. 
 
The PKI Leaders were well aware of what was developing. From the time that 
serious negotiations on the issue of the West Irian had been initiated, they began to 
worry that the United States mediation would mean a significant threat to the 
existence of Communist ideology in the Indonesian political system. The PKI, 
therefore, warned Sukarno that the United States‘ aid was linked to neo-colonialist 
plans to dominate the Indonesian economy and promote the interests of 
reactionaries among the political elites (The US Government, 1963, p.58-61). In the 
strategic calculation of the communist leaders, once the right wing policy course had 
been set in, there would be no certainly of when it would end. From the ideological 
perspective, meanwhile, the PKI and its socialist approach would tend to be 
neglected, since such neglect would be considered ‗necessary‘ to reassure Western 
powers and foreign investors207. With powerful enemies anxious to block its future 
growth and with martial law still in force, the PKI‘s position was under serious threat 
if President Sukarno decided to sacrifice the party for the sake of national economic 
rehabilitation208. As the result, the competition between the Army and the 
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Communists became more intense, which left Sukarno in a difficult position. On one 
side, he would need the aid of the capitalist bloc, as the people had endured too 
much suffering due to Indonesia‘s dire economic situation. In addition, Sukarno 
would need total commitment from the army, especially to suppress rebellious 
guerrillas in the country. Receiving Western aid, however, raised a significant 
possibility of a splitting of his coalition, with Sukarno‘s main pillar – the PKI – being 
likely to break away.  
 
Amidst this delicate situation, a revolt broke out in Brunei in 1962 followed by the 
formation of Malaysia Federation by the British authority. Presumably, President 
Sukarno was in two minds about how far Indonesia should react to this development 
at her front door, and for sure, he was conflicted over the relative importance of 
economic stabilization and maintaining his coalition. Obviously, Sukarno chose the 
latter for a new confrontation would always be a golden opportunity for him to divert 
conflicts at the domestic level. At the very least, the army and the PKI would forget 
for a while their conflicts and maintain loyalty to Sukarno. This choice was signalled 
by Subandrio, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, on the 20th of January, when he said 
that the Indonesian position on the Malaya Federation was one of confrontation, and 
that learning from Indonesian confrontation in West Irian, there would be a calculated 
shift from diplomatic to economic or even military pressures against the proposed 
Federation (Indonesian Herald, 1963). On February 13, Sukarno expressed an anti-
Malaysian attitude in a speech. He said that the proposed federation was a  neo-
colonialist enterprise intended to encircle Indonesia and expressed his support of the 
struggle of the people of North Kalimantan (Bunnel, 1969, p. 287). At the same time, 
Sukarno demonstrated that stabilization had no strong hold over his affections 
(Bunnel, 1969, Ibid). In response to the action of the International Olympic 
Committee in suspending Indonesia for its exclusion of Israel and Taiwan from the 
Asian Games, Sukarno announced an ambitious and inevitably expensive plan to 
organize a Games of the New Emerging Forces later in the year as a rival sports 
festival to the Olympics (Bunnel, 1969, p.287-297). As expected, the support for 
confrontation appeared widely across the country. People were inspired by the spirit 
of revolution, which was had imperialism and neo-colonialism as its targets. By 1963, 
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the masses created paramilitary units ready for physical confrontation with Malaysia, 
with the slogan ‗Ganyang Malaysia‘—Swallow Malaysia—becoming popular209. 
 
This evidence may be used to investigate Sukarno‘s motives. According to Bunnell, 
Sukarno‘s motives were multiple. In his words, ―While Sukarno ultimately envisioned 
Indonesia supplanting the British—and the Americans—as the dominant influence in 
the region, his short term goal seems to have been to harass and humiliate the 
British in the hopes of not only expediting their withdrawal but magnifying Indonesia‘s 
(Sukarno‘s) importance in the eyes of his own people. For apart from the political 
benefits from twisting the lion‘s tail, Sukarno saw himself engaged in the most 
fundamental task of national-building—sowing self-respect  and national feeling‖ 
(Bunnel, 1969, p.499). Whatever the external motivation behind the confrontation210, 
what was certain is that by launching an aggressive campaign against Malaysia, 
Sukarno was able to divert conflict at the domestic level towards a common external 
enemy, just as he did with his similar campaign in West Irian. The final result was 
that order was preserved along with his other ‗agenda‘ at the domestic level. 
 
6.3. Version III: Maintaining order through power consolidation 
 
In chapter three, it was argued that Suharto had learned from Sukarno‘s quest for 
legitimacy, so that this former army general sought a different form of legitimacy 
through a different strategy from that of Sukarno. Similarly, it seems that had also 
learned from Sukarno‘s experience in his quest to maintain order and stability, again 
applying a different strategy. At this time, Suharto was of the belief that the capacity 
of the state was the key answer to the intensive disorders within the archipelago. 
Increasing the state‘s capacity was therefore among the top priorities of his regime 
which was pursued through a series of measures, starting from economic 
development. 
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At the beginning of Suharto‘s rule (1966), a strong public aspiration towards 
economic modernization emerged. The public‘s expectations of the new regime were 
expressed in the popular slogan ‗Ekonomi Sebagai Panglima‘---the economy first. 
The main argument was that economic development was the only possible means to 
realize the hope of the people who had been suffering and who had long been 
dreaming of an economic re-establishment211. That the economic sector must be the 
first and the main task of the new regime, hence, was presumably the consensus 
amongst the elites as well as the majority of the people within the realm. It was partly 
due to this aspiration that the New Order then adopted capitalism and created 
economic development programmes to realize to people‘s dream. 
 
This wide consensus, however, was not firm enough. The partially-implemented 
economic modernization programmes revealed negative impacts to certain 
segments of society, especially the Pribumi—local/indigenous economic actors212. 
From Suharto‘s strategic perspective, this development was politically risky, 
especially as he anticipated the general election that had been envisaged by the 
(provisional) National Assembly on July 5, 1968213. Facing the risk, Suharto had two 
available alternatives: (1) to establish a coalition with one or more political parties 
able to help him mobilize supports from the people or; (2) to reform the constitution 
and create a new consensus which was supported by the Pribumi. 
 
The first option required Suharto to make more concessions to political parties by 
giving them wider freedom to mobilize the support from the people and to let them 
compete in the election. If this arrangement worked out, Suharto‘s regime would 
benefit from a kind of popular legitimacy. In addition, if this alternative was supported 
by the army, a co-operation between the civilian elites and soldiers based on 
democratic participation was also possible. For Suharto to realize his target, two 
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major political parties would be potential allies: the NU (which gained massive 
support from the Islamists), and the PNI (which was defended mainly by the 
bureaucrats and nationalist groups). 
 
However, a different argument may have led Suharto to reject this alternative. The 
fact that the two main political parties, due to their political platforms, would tend to 
defend the Pribumi‘s interests at all cost214 would make impossible the 
implementation of capitalist-style economic policies (the economic policy ‗towards 
external‘—will be analysed in the later section). Indeed, the success of national 
economic development and the high level of growth were already perceptible with 
the assistance of the capitalist countries, especially the United States and Japan. A 
justified speculation was that the regime could not rely too much on the Pribumi, so 
that Suharto would not really need, at least in the short term, to seek support from 
them as well as from the existing political parties. In other words, to choose Pribumi 
and political parties as allies in Suharto‘s coalition would involve the risks to the 
capitalist-style development programmes that had already been planned. In addition, 
there were fundamental problems which would need to be solved by Suharto before 
such an alliance could be realized, since there were still loyal defenders of Sukarno 
within the NU and PNI leaderships215.  
 
These considerations were enough to push Suharto towards the second alternative: 
restoring a new consensus through the manipulation of the constitution. For Suharto, 
this option was simpler and less risky, especially because the articles of the 1945 
Constitution are in general less detailed and more flexible, which provided ample 
enough space for re-interpretations. In other words, Suharto tried to manipulate the 
constitution, using it as legal backup for the policies being designed to give 
maximum support to his economic development programmes, and at same time to 
counter any opposition that could interfere with the implementation of the 
programmes. 
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This strategy first manifested itself with the establishment of a controllable political 
system in order to create political stability, the condition considered most essential to 
the implementation of an effective economic program. These measures can be 
separated into steps: (1) to create an ideology which legitimated the capitalist-style 
development programmes and the role of the army in politics, and; (2) to set up new 
political structures which were easier to control.  
 
The New regime understood that an ideology was pivotal for any political system, as 
it would give not only the basis to the State but would also legitimate the state‘s 
objectives as well as the means to achieve them.  As Liddle said: 
 
―....Ideology has a number of uses: it provides a map of social reality, 
distinguishing important from unimportant determinant of human behaviour, 
explaining how the past shaped the present and how the present might shape 
the future; to the extent that its explanation of the past and present and its 
vision of the future conform to the aspirations of a significant segment of the 
politically active (or activable public), it confers legitimacy upon its formulators 
and proponents; it contains or can prescribe a course of action designed to 
attain the desired future; and, of course, it may in varying degrees, and more or 
less consciously, provide a cover for a politicsof personal or group interest and 
ambition‖ (Liddle, 1973a, p.177). 
 
Suharto had decided that prosperity through economic development was one of his 
regime‘s main objectives. This objective, meanwhile, required a wide consensus 
amongst the people, and in this case, ideology would be an effective way of unifying 
people behind the state. Based on this belief, Suharto then introduced an ideology 
called Ideologi pembagunan—the ideology of development—which was based on 
pragmatism, rationalism and internationalism. The root of this ideology was in the 
thought of Indonesian intellectuals trained in Western countries during 1940s and 
1950s whose concepts and principles regarding modernity were neglected by 
Sukarno during the previous regime. Among these intellectuals were Muhammad 
Hatta, Sultan Hamengkubuwono IX, and Sutan Sjahrir. Amongst the most explored 
by Suharto was the thought of Sjahrir, who argued that the ultimate objective of the 
Indonesian government should be the creation an economy based on industry and a 
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welfare state based on democratic principles (Liddle, 1973a, p.179). Starting from 
this postulate, Sjahrir believed that ―...the ultimate objective that he sought for 
Indonesia---an industrialized economy, an egalitarian society, and an activist welfare 
state founded on democratic principle‖ (Liddle, 1973a, Ibid) ; This pragmatism gave 
him the conviction that the achievement of this goal would require the support of 
―...the already industrialized West...with which he was therefore prepared to 
cooperate‖ (Liddle, 1973a, Ibid).  
 
Finally, in order to assure the support from the army on the implementation of these 
intellectual thoughts, the ideology of ‗dual-function‘ which justifed the military role in 
politics and had been adopted by previous regime was re-affirmed (see; chapter 4).  
 
The next stage was to create a political structure which was able to control all 
elements of the society. This effort was undertaken through certain measures such 
as the following: 
 
1. Control on bureaucracy 
 
One of the main issues confronted by the New Order was how the programs of the 
government could be applied in an effective way across the Indonesian territory. The 
answer at which the regime arrived was the creation of an effective bureaucracy 
capable of delivering public services as well as imposing the power of the central 
government. Meanwhile, the bureaucracy inherited from the previous regime was too 
bloated, ineffective, poorly paid and corrupt (Legge, 1957, p.61-62). In addition, 
during the reign of Sukarno, the bureaucracy had often become the arena of 
competition amongst politicians (See: chapter 3). For the New Order, therefore, it 
was natural that the reform of the bureaucracy was given priority. 
 
This reform was aimed at transferring the government‘s authority to the highest level 
of the bureaucracy, which meant the centralization of the decision-making process. It 
was also aimed at creating an effective bureaucracy specially designed to transfer 
orders from the center (top-down). Finally, the bureaucracy would be used as an 
effective machine to impose the authority of the center and to control the peripheries 
(Maryanof, 1959, chapter VI).  
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The first measure was taken by centralizing all of the important policies of the 
government through the creation of the Garis-Garis Besar Haluan Negara—State‘s 
Guidelines (GBHN), Rencana Pembagunan Lima Tahun—Five-yearly plan of the 
national development (Repelita) and Anggaran Pendapatan dan Belanja Negara—
State Annual Budget (APBN). All these administrative but political-tools would serve 
to centralize the mobilisation and allocation of the state‘s resources (Jakti, 1981, 
p.133).  
 
The second measure consisted of positioning technocrats and army personnel in 
strategic positions. Since the creation of the Cabinet Pembangunan I in 1968, the 
majority of the departments and government institutions had been occupied by 
officers of the army and civilian technocrats (general inspector, general secretary 
and managing director). Less important posts were allocated to members of political 
parties216. 
 
The third measure undertaken by the New Order was placing pro-Jakarta figures as 
governors and mayors in provinces and districts. In 1968, for example, 68% of the 
Indonesian provincial governors and 59% of district mayors were retired or active 
army officers (Tinker and Walker, 1973, p.104). 
 
2. Consolidation of the Army 
 
Another problem that had to be resolved by the regime was the conflict between the 
factions within the Army as well as the competition between the three forces (the 
Army, the Navy, and the Air Force). As was analysed in chapters 3 and 4, the 
dissensions were politically used by Sukarno to prevent the over-growing influence 
of the Army which may threat his regime and it was therefore in his interest that 
conflict remained. Soon after assuming power with the title of ‗president-in-charge‘ in 
1967, Suharto realized that these conflicts must cease, and he gradually applied 
resolutions by establishing the unification within the Army through: (1)  the dismissal 
of army officers who were considered as leftist and disobedient; (2) the transfer of 
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factions‘ leaders away from Jakarta or by assigning them new posts within the 
Indonesian embassies in foreign countries, or even by assigning less important posts 
in the civil administration; (3) the usage of the institutions and military traditions to 
channel criticisms and divergent opinions; (4) giving favourable treatment to the 
military factions who defend Suharto; (5) the alteration of the military hierarchy.217 
 
The reforms were applied to all three forces (the Army, the Navy, and the Air Forces) 
which were then unified through the creation of a single military academy and the 
suppression of the Ministry of Army (See: chapter 4). At the same time, Suharto 
announced a guideline which was to unify the three forces and the national police 
force under a single command (Sundhaussen, 1972, p.57).  
 
All these changes conferred the entire power of the military forces on Suharto as he 
was now in control of the minister of defence while Suharto (the now-president-in-
charge) himself was also the Panglima Tertinggi TNI---the commander-in-chief of the 
Indonesian military.  
 
3. Control on Legislative 
 
Since the time Sukarno dissolved the Parliament resulting from the general elections 
of 1955, there was no independent and critical legislative power in Indonesia until the 
fall of Suharto in 1998. Thus, when Sukarno established the Parliament Gotong 
Royong (DPR-GR) and the Provisional National Assembly (MPRS), the political 
system was dominated by the president, with the executive controlling the legislature 
in many ways. In a typical situation, the Parliament would be considerably in favour 
of the executive institutions and would tend to obey the latter. This practice was 
reinforced when Suharto dismissed certain members of the parliament (the partisans 
of Sukarno and those who had affiliations with communist) and replaced them with 
his ‗puppets‘. The situation, however, considerably changed when certain members 
of Parliament saw the fall of Orde Lama as a golden opportunity to restore the power 
of the Parliament and free it from the domination of executive. Suharto certainly saw 
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this inclination as a threat to his centralized power, prompting him to take a series of 
measures218 by:  
 
- introducing the ‗List System‘ as the mechanism of the legislative election; 
- increasing the number of Parliamentary membership from 347 to 460; 
- creating a new law that gave privilege to the government--that the government has 
the right to nominate 100 members of Parliament (of which 75 seats were allocated 
to the Army, and 25 seats for the civil servants); 
 - giving to the members of the Indonesian military the ‗right to vote‘ in the general 
election planned to be held on March 27, 1968.  
 
On the 27th of March 1968, the provisional National Assembly officially endorsed 
Suharto as the second president of the Republic of Indonesia. This latest 
development meant Suharto had considerably more power to implement his 
programmes and in particular to make Parliament his ‗wished‘ institution. Suharto 
then introduced the ‗recall‘ mechanism, through which the leaders of political parties 
were given authority to ‗discipline‘ their members whenever they were considered 
disloyal to the party‘s direction. At the practical level, the executive used this 
mechanism to control the behaviour of the members of the Parliament. As the result, 
the Parliament was under the government‘s control. 
 
4. Moderation of the Party System 
 
For the New Order, it was quite clear that the majority of the political parties in 
Indonesia since 1945 were ideology-oriented and tended to neglect the 
platform/program. The government, therefore, could not rely on them in 
implementing its development program. Moreover, Suharto had decided to use the 
constitutional framework by launching political reforms within which the political 
system was based on ‗controllable‘ electoral participation. In brief, the political 
parties were useful, but they should not threaten the economic program of the 
government. Later, Suharto announced another strategy of creating political 
groupings within the Parliament whose members were made up of non-party 
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politicians. The result of this strategy was the creation of corporatist representatives 
in the parliament followed by a reduction in the number of political parties through a 
forced consolidation (Ward, 1974, p.10). 
 
This reform started with the reorganization of Sekretariat Bersama Golkar--General 
Secretariat of Golkar (Sekber Golkar). In chapter 3, it was explained how Sukarno 
had established the Guided-Democracy with the Army, Sukarno, and the 
communists as the competing pillars. Since October 20, 1967, this coalition was 
managed by Sekber Golkar but excluded Sukarno and the communists (Pratignyo, 
1974, p.155). The new organization was now supported by 7 social and professional 
organizations: Kosgoro, MKGR, SOKSI, Ormas Hankam (veterans and members of 
family of the Army), Gakari (bureaucrats grouping and civil servant), Karya Profesi 
(professional body) and Karya Pembangunan (Nishihara, 1972, p.19). Even though 
this organization did not form itself as a political party, during the period of the New 
Order this organization and its satellites had become a very effective machine for 
Suharto to impose his influence across the Indonesian territory. This success was 
mainly due to the fact that the organization had maximum support and facilities of the 
government, and especially due to the law which prohibits civil servants from 
becoming members of political parties (the mono loyalty principle of the Indonesian 
civil servants and their families)219. Finally, the nomination of army officers as 
officials within the Sekber Golkar and within every strategic post in the executive 
branch was also a major factor in the success of the Sekber Golkar. 
 
The creation of this ‗political party‘220 was then followed by the establishment of 
corporatist groupings who then become ‗satellites‘ within the Golkar‘s network. The 
objective was to control the representation of interest groups and at the same to 
prevent those groups‘ engagement in social conflicts. In fact, these corporatist 
organizations were also used by the government to support its policies and 
                                                 
219
 This Law obliged all civil servants to quit from any political parties to which they previously 
affiliated and then join into the Sekber Golkar. See: KEMENTRIAN DALAM NEGERI RI (1970) Peraturan 
Menteri Dalam Negeri (The Regulation of the Minister of Internal Affairs) No. 12/1969., and INDONESIAN 
GOVERNMENT (1970) Peraturan pemerintah (Government's Law) No. 6/1970. Jakarta. 
220
 The role of the Sekber Golkar was similar to that of political party but the New Order government 
insisted that Golkar was not a political party. Instead, in the government‘s argument, Golkar was a functional 
organization that overrides the interests of all elements of the society which is different from political parties, 
which represent sectarian interests.  
186 
 
programmes. As a bonus, this strategy had taken the political parties away from their 
potential sympathizers.  
 
The first target was the civil servants. In 1966, the ministry for internal affairs created 
a single organization in his department and developed the monopoly of 
representation of the ministry into the body. After the 1971 general elections, this 
organization led to the appearance of another organization which was now much 
larger in term of size and included the civil servants of all departments, government 
institutions, and state enterprises in its membership: The Korps Pegawai Republik 
Indonesia—Indonsian Civil Servants Association (KORPRI). 
 
The next target was trade unions and labour associations. Since 1950, political 
parties were generally mass-organizations, like labour associations and trade 
unions, the number of which more or less matched that of political parties (Sukarno, 
1980, p.5). In 1973, when nine political parties were reorganized and forced by the 
government to fuse into two new parties, these labour associations and trade unions 
lost their patron organizations. This situation was politically beneficial to the 
government, but the new parties could not be co-opted by the Golkar. For the 
interest of Suharto, a meeting was held on February 20, 1973 to establish a new 
trade union named Federasi Buruh Seluruh Indonesia—the Federation of Indonesian 
labour (FBSI). In March 1974 the government recognized this new organization as 
the only trade union in Indonesia and forced all companies operating in Indonesia to 
create branches of the FBSI in their offices and required membership of all their 
employees. Under the direction of the government, the FBSI was able to control the 
movements and political behaviour of labour. This meant that the creation of FBSI 
had suppressed any potential conflicts between social classes without the need to 
adopt the theory of Karl Marx. 
 
The next targets were the social groupings within the business and professional 
sectors. In 1971, the government established Kamar Dagang dan Industri—The 
Chamber of Commerce and Industry (KADIN) aimed at organizing the employers' 
syndicates which were now playing the role of mediators between their members 
and the government. The state‘s corporatism was also manifested in Persatuan 
Wartawan Indonesia—Indonesian Journalists Union (PWI), Majelis Ulama 
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Indonesia—Indonesian Ulema Council (MUI), Komite Nasional Pemuda Indonesia—
Indonesian National Youth  Commitee (KNPI), Himpunan Kerukunan Tani Indonesia-
--Indonesian Farmers Union (HKTI), Himpunan Nelayan Seluruh Indonesia---
Indonesian Fishermen Union (HNSI), Konggres Wanita Indonesia---Indonesian 
Women Congress (KOWANI) and so on.  
 
The strategy of controlling political parties in Indonesia had actually been used by 
the previous regime. In 1960, Sukarno reduced the number of political parties from 
25 to 10, each representing an element of Indonesian society: the nationalists (PNI, 
Partindo, IKPI), the Islamists (NU, PSII, Perti), the Christians (Parkindo, Catholic 
Party) and the Marxists (PKI, Murba). Following the change of regime in 1966, the 
PKI was removed from the Indonesian political landscape. These nine parties took 
part in the general elections of 1971. In February 1971, Suharto organized a meeting 
with the leaders of the nine parties to discuss the government‘s upcoming plan to 
reduce the number of the political parties and to unify them within two groups. This 
meeting led to the creation of two groups within the Parliament: (1) The group of 
Demokrasi Pembangunan (Democracy of Development) being composed by the 
PNI, IPKI, Murba, Parkindo, and of the Catholic Party and; (2) The group of 
Persatuan Pembangunan (Union of Development) being composed by NU, Parmusi, 
PSII, and Perti (Murtopo, 1974, p.74-76). More pressure was placed on political 
parties after the general election of 1971. After suffering significant losses in the 
election while being under intensive pressure from the government, the nine parties 
now had no choice but to amalgamate into two ‗pre-designed‘ parties. In January 
1973, the groups which represented Islamists aspirations amalgamated into the 
Partai Persatuan Pembagunan—the Development Union Party (PPP) while the 
groups which represented the aspirations nationalists and Christians amalgamated 
into the Partai Demokrasi Indonesia---the Indonesian Democratic party (PDI) 
(Murtopo, 1974, p.77). From this moment on, Indonesia had only two political parties, 
the PDI and the PPP, plus a functional organization, Golkar, which took part 
elections.  
 
In this type of party system, control of political parties operates through a number of 
mechanisms. The first mechanism is the ‗Recall‘, by which the leaders of the political 
parties can at any time impose a disciplinary action on their members of parliament. 
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The other control mechanism is applied through the manipulation of direction/party 
guidelines, which obliged the parliamentary candidates of political parties to first 
obtain the ‗green light‘ from the government. There was also obvious intervention by 
the government at political parties‘ congresses aimed at preventing dissensions from 
parties‘ leadership. This meant certain figures who tended not to cooperate with the 
government were usually disqualified. Finally, the government prevented the political 
parties from organizing their activities outside the set political campaign periods, 
which were several days in every five years. 
 
5. To reinforce the prerogative of the president 
 
The new order felt that it was necessary to establish an effective government. 
Motivated mainly by the existence of major constraints at the beginning of the 
regime‘s establishment as well as the absence of an effective bureaucracy essential 
for an economic transformation, Suharto arrived at the conclusion that he would 
need a small, unified and reliable group to help him make and apply policies and 
decisions. In 1966, Suharto transferred the Panitia Sosial Politik---the Committee of 
Social and Politics---from the Army headquarters to the office of the President 
(Mas'oed, 1989, p.177). This commission, established in 1965, was initially designed 
to support the war against the Communists. Functioning just like a political ‗think-
thank‘, its operation seemed to be democratic, with policies and strategies decided 
through discussion and debates amongst the army generals. Suharto interacted with 
other generals in this committee when he was an Army commander, and he 
therefore saw the potential of this group to perform more or less the same function of 
creating policies and strategies in his presidential palace, but now on a wider scale. 
Placing this Committee in his office also placed it under his direct command. 
However, there was no mention of this committee in the Indonesian constitution and 
thus nothing giving it legal legitimacy to perform on behalf of the state. Because this 
kind of commission was extra-state, Suharto classified the members of this 
commission as Asisten Pribadi—personal assistants (Aspri). However, in 1974 
Suharto started to regard Aspri as counter-productive, especially after a number of 
demonstrations broke out during 1973 and 1974. The protests were mainly 
concerned with the corruption in Suharto‘s regime, the rise of foreign domination on 
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the economy, the economic growth without significant development, and so on221. It 
was at this point that Suharto showed his skill as a tactician. He reorganized the 
Aspri, transforming it into a ministry which was part of the cabinet. However, this 
ministry was different from others in the cabinet as it was not in charge of any 
particular departmental area, but instead acted as the center of coordination which 
was powerful but politically independent.  In fact, this ministry was a ‗machine‘ by 
which the president controlled the various elements of political system that he 
established222. 
 
Winning international support 
 
From Suharto‘s point of view, Indonesia could endure the crisis and recover only with 
political stability at the domestic level (possible through internal power consolidation) 
with significant external supports. This would be achieved through the adoption of an 
open foreign policy.  
 
To explore the most effective development strategy in accordance with open foreign 
policy, a seminar was organized in Jakarta on May 1966 with the theme of 
Kebangkitan Angkatan 66: Menjelajahi Traces Baru (Resurrection of the generation 
of 1966: to explore new ways). This produced a number of recommendations for 
change in the orientation of the Indonesian foreign policy. These recommendations 
included centering Indonesian foreign policy around:  
- resolving economic problems at the domestic level;  
-ending irrational economically nationalist practices and prestige-oriented policies 
such as the nationalization policies, the politics of confrontation with neighbouring 
countries, and the radical revolutionary foreign politics of New Emerging Forces 
(NEFO);  
-launching the peaceful resolution of the conflict with Malaysia;  
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- re-establishing Indonesia‘s membership of the United Nations and their institutions, 
and; 
- restoring Indonesian adhesion in the other international organizations for the sake 
of the national economic modernization (Universitas Indonesia, 1966). 
 
The government of the New Order positively responded to these recommendations 
by announcing its new policies which gave significant incentives to creditors, in 
particular Japan and Western countries. The government also stated that it would 
adopt an open foreign policy with those countries which were, for the most part, non-
socialist223. Presumably, Suharto strongly believed that these non-socialist countries 
would offer their unqualified support to Indonesia, since Indonesia had previously 
combated communism at the domestic level without significant assistance from 
capitalist countries. This optimism was particularly strong because at the global level 
during the second half of 1960s, the ideological competition between the socialist 
and the capitalist blocks was reaching its culminating point. This can be seen, for 
example, in a statement by an Indonesian army officer after his visit to the American 
Congress in September 1966:  
 
―Bagi para pengamat, pendekatan mereka sulit dimengerti karena anggapan yang 
tidak dinyatakan tetapi mendasar bahwa Indonesia terlalu vital bagi kepentingan 
Amerika dan Barat untuk dibiarkan larut dalam kekacauan, menyiratkan bahwa 
Negara-negara lain pasti akan datang untuk menyelamatkannya. Orang-orang militer 
tersebut mungkin juga telah menyampaikan perasaan, baik langsung atau tidak 
langsung, bahwa sementara Amerika telah menghabiskan berjuta-juta dollar untuk 
membunuh orang-orang komunis di Vietnam, orang-orang Indonesia telah 
membunuh ratusan ribu komunist di negaranya sendiri tanpa sepeserpun bantuan 
dari Amerika. Dalam arti tersebut, Amerika berhutang pada Indonesia satu atau dua 
milyar dollar dalam bantuan luar negeri‖ (Mas'oed, 1989, p.72)—For many 
observers, their approach might seem difficult to understand because there was a 
significant but implicit opinion that leaving Indonesia in a prolonged chaos was too 
risky for the American and Western countries‘ interests. It signifies that these 
countries will certainly come to save her. These military people might have also 
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mentioned to the (American) Congress, directly or indirectly, that America had spent 
millions of dollars to kill a communist in Vietnam, while Indonesians had killed 
hundreds thousands of communist in her country. In this logic, America should have 
been indebted one or two billion dollars to Indonesia in the form of foreign aid 
(Researcher‘s translation on the text). 
 
This sounds like an example of cynical frankness. Apart from this presumption, there 
was also an opposing view that the chance of Indonesia obtaining support from the 
international community was not as high as had been estimated by the first group224. 
Despite the second group‘s agreement on the significance of the United States, the 
Western countries, Japan and international institutions (such as the IMF and the 
World Bank) to the Indonesian economy, they saw danger in over-estimating the 
likelihood of external support. The group was particularly concerned by Sukarno 
radical policies during the previous years225 which, they thought, were too serious to 
be forgotten so quickly (Thomas and Panglaykim, 1973, Ibid). In addition, the 
American Congress began to debate the Indonesian regime‘s capacity to allocate 
the aid. Certain Congressmen were of the opinion that Indonesia would quickly 
waste the aid (Posthumus, 1971, p.13). Finally, the situation in 1966 was generally 
unconducive to massive foreign assistance for the third world countries, especially 
for Indonesia which had previously scared off ‗rare‘ foreign investors (Mas'oed, 1989, 
p.73).    
 
These doubts, however, were countered by the announcement by Adam Malik (the 
Minister for Foreign Affairs) on April 4, 1966 that Indonesia would review its foreign 
policy and apply certain measures such as:  
- Extending international cooperation with all nations and seeking to participate in the 
international activities in the various fields such as economic, social, and cultural.  
- Restoring its membership within the international organizations, especially the 
United Nations and its institutions.  
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- Undertaking peaceful conflict resolution with Malaysia (Kementrian Penerangan RI, 
1966). 
 
As the manifestation of this ‗new approach‘ to foreign policy, the government sent 
missions to foreign countries with the main objective of reassuring the creditors of  
the New Order regime‘s commitment to its new orientation (Far Eastern Economic 
Review, 1966, p.519). Among these missions were: a delegation to the European 
countries directed by Umaryadi Nyotowiyono with the additional mission of debt 
rescheduling and obtaining new loans; a delegation to Japan directed by Sultan 
Hamengku Buwono IX with an identical objective; a mission to Malaysia in August 
1966 to negotiate a peaceful agreement226; a mission to build a comprehensive 
relations with Singapore, and so on227. 
 
International creditors responded positively to these missions. The mission of Sultan 
Hamengku Buwono IX obtained the Dutch‘s commitment to support Indonesia‘s 
membership within international institutions; the mission to Malaysia obtained peace 
with this country; the mission in Singapore obtained the resumption of the diplomatic 
relations between the two countries plus Singapore‘s commitment to back up 
Indonesia‘s economic development program by promising foreign investment; in 
April 1966, the United States granted assistance in the form of 50,000 tonnes of rice 
with the value of US$ 9 million dollars plus another loan to purchase cotton valued of 
US$ 10.5 million (Far Eastern Economic Review, 1967a, p.459); the Umaryadi 
mission also secured a new loan from Germany of 7.5 million dollars in the form of 
credit. Finally, Japan promised assistance of up to 30 million dollars (Far Eastern 
Economic Review, 1967b, p.222). 
 
These commitments were significant but not yet optimal. The disadvantages were 
mainly in the economic commitments in the form of commercial loans which would in 
fact become a new burden for Indonesia in the future. In addition, the missions to 
Europe, America, and Japan did not achieve the debt-rescheduling goal or the new 
non-commercial loans. The United States, for example, fixed the interest rate at 
4.9%, and Japan at 5.5% for their loans. In addition, the two countries required 
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Indonesia to fulfil certain strict conditions, among which was the obligation to end 
economic assistance from the Soviet Union, the largest creditor for Indonesia during 
Sukarno‘s period (Far Eastern Economic Review, 1967a, p.460). Finally, these new 
creditors required certain improvements in domestic economic performance before 
realizing the promised assistance (Weinstein, 1976, p.232). No doubt, these were 
serious challenges for the New Order, as at the domestic level these had reinforced 
the public‘s commitment to economic nationalism (which was adopted by Sukarno 
during the previous regime). In a speech on the 1st of September 1966, Sukarno 
reminded his audience of the essential meaning of independence. He mentioned that 
being an independent state, Indonesia should berdiri di atas kaki sendiri---be 
independent—and that the economic rehabilitation should not applied through 
‘mengemis‘—begging—and ‗mempermalukan diri sendiri‘---self-humiliating 
(Sekretariat Negara RI, 1966). This challenge became even stronger when the 
Soviet Union and other communist countries refused to reschedule the debt as 
proposed by Indonesia. However, all these disappointments were quickly forgotten 
when the Minister for foreign affairs prevailed in his efforts to restore Indonesia‘s 
membership of the United Nations and its institutions. In addition, a long time later, 
two international financial institutions, the IMF and the World Bank, agreed to renew 
their aid programmes to Indonesia. The New Order‘s diplomatic efforts to seek 
external supports for its program of economic development intensified from that time 
on. 
 
The peace agreement with Malaysia on August 11, 1966 was an important starting 
point for Indonesian diplomatic efforts. In a memorandum addressed to President 
Johnson, the American Secretary of State proposed US assistance in great quantity 
for Indonesia. This memorandum mentioned that there were positive signs in the 
Indonesian transition such as the peaceful resolution of her problems with Malaysia 
and especially the change in the orientation of Indonesian foreign policy after the end 
of Sukarno‘s reign. The memorandum recommended the restoration of bilateral 
economic relations with Indonesia, which had been ‗low-profile‘ since the beginning 
of 1965228. This memorandum was then followed by the US government through the 
disbursement of a new assistance-package in the form of donation valued at US$ 40 
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million starting from 1966 (Far Eastern Economic Review, 1967a, p.136). On the 19th 
and 20th of September, 1966, a consortium of seven creditor-countries (the United 
States, England, France, West Germany, Italy, and Holland) plus non-creditor 
countries (Australia, Canada, the New Zealand, and Austria) together with the IMF 
organized a conference in Tokyo to comprehensively discuss the Indonesian 
problem (Sullivan, 1969, p.342). With an expectation that this conference would lead 
to a new commitment for Indonesia, Suharto sent a special mission who delivered a 
‗letter of intention‘ signed by Suharto, explaining that the new government would 
make the stabilization programme and economic rehabilitation as its first priority. 
This declaration detailed step by step measures to achieve these goals, such as the 
following: 
 
1. To stimulate the market by granting opportunities to state enterprises and foreign 
companies;  
2. To restore the balance between the incomes and the expenditure of the 
government;  
3. To pursue a policy of strict management of credit and foreign exchange rates, 
and;  
4. To establish harmonious relations with other nations and to promote international 
trade (Far Eastern Economic Review, 1966, p.11). 
 
However, this conference did not live up to Indonesia‘s expectations. The creditors 
agreed to a rescheduling of the debt due between 1st of July, 1966 and December 
31st, 1967 but they refused to give new loans. The reason behind this refusal was the 
Soviet Union‘s refusal to reschedule Indonesia‘s debt. Presumably, the new creditor 
countries were worried that the loans would be used by Indonesia to pay her debt to 
Russia (See: Heinz, 1967, p.136).  
 
Nevertheless, in the later period, Indonesian efforts finally prevailed in gaining the 
confidence of the international financial institutions, of significant importance to the 
on-going economic program. This new commitment became manifest at the end of 
December 1966 when an IMF team came to Jakarta with information about 
Indonesia‘s real economic situation while offering an evaluation about the 
requirements for foreign assistance. The IMF also assisted Indonesian technocrats 
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in the formulation of the economic stabilization policies. Since the adhesion of 
Indonesia to the IMF in February 1967, this institution even placed a permanent 
representative in the Indonesian central bank to provide technical advice, especially 
within the framework of economic stabilization and rehabilitation programs 
(Tomasson, 1976, p.311-312). Since then, Indonesian economic policy was always 
dependent on the recommendations and warranty of the IMF through its stand-by 
agreement229.   
 
Finally, the ‗open door‘ strategy had obviously strengthened Indonesian position at 
the international forum. Being combined with the political stability at the domestic 
level and significant support from the international community (especially from 
Capitalist-countries), for three decades the Indonesian economy grew by an average 
of 7% per annum and the real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) were significant230. 
Export growth was healthy and the balance of payments was secured and, if to be 
compared with other countries in the region, Indonesia had one of the lowest current 
account deficits and the highest ratios of international reserves, so that by the early 
1990s the World Bank was calling it one of the East Asian ―miracle‖ economies (Hill, 
1998, p.94) 
 
6.4. Version IV: Democratic consolidation 
 
The fall of Suharto on May 1998 opened the way for democratization across the 
country. In chapter 3 (subchapter 3.5.) it has been analysed how the Habibie‘s 
administration, the first government since the fall of the New Order, tried to secure its 
legitimacy through the implementation of ‗daring‘ policies such as granting 
independence to the press, releasing political prisoners, and reviewing the problem 
of East Timor. At the same time, the administration also started to implant 
democratic culture into the Indonesian political system by institutionalising just and 
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fair democratic election, enforcing Laws, and reforming the army while make it as a 
professional military which (according to democratic culture) is fully under civilian 
control (see: chapter 4). These efforts towards democratization keep rolling over, 
and being fortified from time to time during the later period under several 
governments led by three different presidents: Abdurrahman Wahid, Megawati 
Sukarnoputri, and Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. Order during presidential democracy 
period was, hence, parallel with the measures applied by the post-1998 regimes to 
establish democratic cultures within the republic. In addition to these, the regimes 
also implemented a policy which was designed to respond massive disorders caused 
by dissatisfaction amongst regions: decentralization policy. 
 
Re-establishing order through larger regional autonomy 
 
Efforts to develop the cause of decentralization in Indonesia have actually been put 
on trial long before 1999. In the earlier dates of the republic, some attempts to de-
concentrate government functions were made to satisfy diverse needs of regions for 
example by the issuance of Laws 1 of 1945, Law 22 of 1948 and Law 1 of 1965 
(See: Asanuma, 1999). In 1970‘s state showed more serious effort for 
decentralization by issuing Law 5 of 1974 that provided significant roles to local 
governments. This Law was part of the implementation of State Guidelines and 
Government Development Plan 1973-1978 but had never been followed by any 
governmental regulations for implementing it (Asanuma, 1999, Ibid). In 1980s a 
limited commitment was made by decentralizing the provision of urban infrastructure 
to local governments. The level of the commitment was quite significant but this 
choice was made presumably because the central government alone would not be 
able to provide for the growing needs of rapidly growing urban areas at the time (?). 
In 1992, again, Suharto‘s government issued Government Regulation number 45 of 
1992 to implement Law 5 of 1974, the regulation which devolved certain functions 
previously held by central government to the second level of local governments of 
Kabupatens/Kotas (Regencies/Municipals). This policy was later confirmed by the 
People Assembly as State Policy Guidelines, which is significant in term of principle 
as it was the first time that the government appeared to accept the ―Fiscal 
Federalism‖ argument that public services could be more efficiently provided by local 
governments. Even a further regulation to this commitment was passed with the 
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issuance of Law 18 of 1997 which widened the tax power of local governments to 
enable them to discharge the certain functions to be transferred.  
 
All those efforts did obviously not eliminate regional hatred to Jakarta that 
accumulated especially during the previous period of state machinery (version II and 
III) that the spreading disorder in the regions since 1998 were partly motivated by the 
regions‘ dissatisfaction against Jakarta such as in Riau, Central Kalimantan, Papua, 
Aceh, and East Timor (see: chapter 5). It is based on the belief that a bigger 
autonomy may ease the tension between the center and peripheries that in 1999, a 
serious effort to decentralize power is made, while commitments on its 
implementation are noteworthy. The Habibie government enacted two Laws that 
significantly committed to decentralize governmental functions and authorities in 
Indonesia: Law 22 of 1999 and Law 25 of 1999. The first devolves certain powers to 
local government and set up regional political processes in regions while the second 
supports such devolution of power by providing fiscal resources at the disposal of 
local governments.  
 
6.5. Conclusion 
 
During the early period of Independent Indonesia, nationalism and the unity of the 
archipelago were regarded as the first priority of the government, due to Indonesia‘s 
extreme diversity and the polarized aspirations amongst the country‘s elements. The 
intensive conflicts among those elements and the state‘s limited capacity to resolve 
comprehensively the disorders across the archipelago had left the parliamentary 
government and Sukarno in a difficult position. While the parliamentary government 
sequentially rise and fall, Sukarno played role as a ‗balancer‘ within the sharp 
competition within the elites (Army, Communists, and Nationalists) and within the 
masses (Islamist, and Secularist), but in the later period Sukarno had to apply an 
‗Iron Fist‘  at the domestic level and pursue an aggressive foreign policy at the 
international level to divert the domestic conflicts to ‗common enemies‘. The 
reluctance of the Dutch to release its control over Papua had left Sukarno with 
opportunities to realize his strategy. A similar opportunity for Sukarno was available 
when the British planned to create the Malaya Federation, by virtue of which 
Sukarno was, again, successfully able to divert internal conflicts to an external 
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confrontation. Sukarno had even been successful in realizing one of his grand-
strategies at the global level when he mobilized the third-world countries to join into 
the Non-Alignment movement. Even though Sukarno‘s regime ended with the state‘s 
bankruptcy and a violent coup d‘état by one of the regime‘s main pillars (PKI), for a 
period of around 20 years Sukarno had been successful in maintaining ‗limited‘ 
order, and especially in overcoming problems related to the state‘s existence.  
 
Order and stability during the New Order period was maintained through power 
consolidation along two dimensions: internal and external. Suharto tightly controlled 
state power by eliminating the communist group, mobilizing the army behind him, 
and crushing the nationalist groups and political parties under his boots. To support 
the regime, Suharto manipulated the constitution and the political system at the 
domestic level, proposed a gradual ‗capitalist‘ formula of economic development 
and, as a consequence, implemented the politics of cooperation at the systemic 
level. The regime sought relations with capitalist countries in particular, which 
guaranteed the financial assistance required to support Suharto‘s economic 
development programmes. As the result, the state had not only been able to 
maintain order and stability but had also gained further results: 1) conflict between 
political elites as well between social/communal groups were rare; 2) the state was 
adept in implementing ‗authoritarian‘ control over its subjects and territory; 3) the 
exploitation and mobilization of resources were effective; 4) economic growth was 
significant; 5) national development was sustainable; 6) foreign relations were 
harmonious; 7) national unity was preserved; 8) support from the military was 
assured by virtue of the state‘s political and economic ‗concessions‘ to the military; 9) 
relations between the center and peripheries were relatively stable but dominated by 
the center, and; 10) external pressures related to Indonesia such as the issue of 
East Timor were relatively ―manageable‖ despite the absence of international 
recognition. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN: 
 
PRE-DEMOCRATIC ORIGINS OF THE PRESENT VERSION OF THE STATE 
 
 
 
1989 was a remarkable year in the world politics. The Berlin Wall came 
tumbling down and marked the end of the Cold War. There was an intense 
struggle for democracy in many parts of the Third World; sometimes resulting 
in real processes of democratization but sometimes, as in China, violently 
repressed. Most of this events I followed from the Asian horizon, travelling in 
China and especially in Indonesia (Uhlin, 1997, p.vii) 
 
 
The testimony above comes from a book partly dedicated to the trend of 
democratization in Asia around the time when the book was published in 1997. In 
1999, two years after Uhlin made this remark and ten years after the fall of the Berlin 
Wall, an obvious confirmation of the trend can be seen in Indonesia. A 
democratically significant popular vote ended 40 years of authoritarian rule. 
Indicators seen prior, during, and after the election were all favorable to democracy: 
while authoritarian constraints were absent, political parties were allowed to conduct 
nation-wide campaigns, regulations were made impartial, management was 
transparent, and contestants accepted the rules and procedures231. Together, these 
factors indicate the fulfillment of democratic requirements with the exception that 
members of representative body (parliament) were only partly elected232. This flaw, 
however, was compensated by further implementation of democratic principles 
during the two subsequent public participations: the elections of 2004 and 2009, 
which combined the indicators mentioned above with a parliament in which all 
members were elected through direct ballots233.  Yet, the president and the vice-
president, who used to be appointed by the National Assembly (MPR234), were now, 
due to the third amendment of state constitution of 11 November 1999, elected 
through a direct but separate popular suffrage. All of these changes took place within 
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 A comprehensive report on Indonesian 1999 Election, See: INTERNATIONAL FOUNDATION 
FOR ELECTION SYSTEM (2000) Republic of Indonesia: Report on the 7 June 1999 Parliamentary General 
Election and Recommendations for Electoral Reform. February 2000 ed. Washington DC, IFES. 
232
See: INDONESIA (1999b) Law Number 3/1999 on Election. 
233
See: INDONESIA (2003) Law No.12/2003 on Election.; INDONESIA (2008) Law No.10/2008 on 
'Pemilihan Umum Anggota DPR, DPD, dan DPRD'   
234
 A body comprising 695 members: 462 elected and 38 appointed members of parliament from the 
Indonesian Armed Forces plus 130 indirectly elected regional delegates and 65 appointed representatives of 
social groups. Up to 1999, this body had two key responsibilities: to enact state guidelines and to elect the 
President and vice president.  
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the framework of the constitution, virtually supported by the majority of the state‘s 
subjects; the transition was relatively peaceful and ultimately producing a legitimate 
democratic government. Indonesian statehood since 1999, hence, is believed to be 
approaching a mature democracy, in which the collective ruler‘s ―right to issue 
commands‖ is acknowledged by the subjects of the polity.  
 
Indonesian democracy did not stand in a vacuum or appears instantly like magic. It 
was started in 1998, the year which was then regarded as the third milestone in the 
history of the Indonesian state. The first milestone was 1945 when the long period of 
colonization and revolution ended with the appearance of the new state marked by a 
declaration of independence in that year (See: chapters 2 and 3). The second 
milestone was 1966, when a long period of economic crisis and intense political 
competition led the army to replace Sukarno and his political system. This was 
followed by the establishment of the New Order operating under a single regime led 
by Suharto (See: chapter 3). This last milestone emphasized by ‗people power‘, and 
was followed by the emergence of several democratic ‗regimes‘ living under the 
curious title of ‗Reformers‘.  
 
In the shadow of these three milestones certain analytically interesting patterns can 
be identified. The first milestone saw Sukarno criticizing colonial political and 
economic policies, blaming the Dutch state for suffering and injustice amongst the 
inhabitants of the archipelago, using the blame as the seeds of nationalist sentiment 
and then manipulating and using them as materials to create a base for his 
charismatic legitimacy (see: chapter 3, section 3.2). Obviously, these materials were 
also used by Sukarno as the main reference determinant to the orientation of his 
regime (see: chapter 3, Ibid.). During the second milestone, Suharto was also 
criticizing the political and economic orientation of Sukarno‘s regime, blaming the 
latter for conflicts among elites, economic bankruptcy within the state, suffering 
amongst the people, political instability, and conflictual relations with other states 
(see: chapter 3, section 3.3). Suharto was then using them as a justification for his 
performance legitimacy and at the same time as his main reference when creating 
strategies of ‗economic development‘ determinant to the state‘s capability under his 
leadership (see: chapter 3, Ibid.). Notwithstanding the importance of the ‗third wave 
of democratization‘ which was a ‗global trend‘ during the end of the twentieth 
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century, the orientation of the post-Suharto Indonesian regimes is assumed to be no 
different from  the situation of the first and the second milestones; that the 
democratic regimes Indonesia were using deficiencies during the New Order period 
as their base of legitimacy and later as their reference to create strategies 
determinant to state‘s capability since that year. It is based on this assumption that 
the situation that led to the collapse of the New Order is worthy of analysis, as this 
would provide a base to analyze the state‘s orientation and capability of the post-
1998 Indonesian democratic regimes. 
 
7.1. Economic crisis 
 
In 1971, Indonesia had adopted ‗open-market‘ capitalism (Chalmers and Hadiz, 
1997, p.16). This system was designed to attract foreign investment and gave 
investors a high level of flexibility, meaning they could withdraw their money from the 
country whenever they considered their business unprofitable. During the initial 
stage of the New Order, the adoption of this economic policy was important as it was 
considered to be a significant indicator of the anti-communist or anti-socialist 
orientation of Suharto‘s regime (see: chapter 3, section 3.4). The key point here was 
to re-assure the capitalist countries who were expected to provide the support 
required by Suharto‘s economic development programs. However, from 1980s there 
were practical problems resulting from the policy as the foreign investments were 
relatively rare, a trend which was anomalous compared to the healthy operations of 
national companies which had grown fast since the end of 1970s (Wie, 2006, section 
3). The problem here was securing financial capital at the domestic level was 
expensive. The Indonesian central bank (BI) applied policies to limit the level of 
inflation as well as speculative loans by setting a high rate of interest. It was, 
therefore, cheaper for Indonesian companies to borrow capital ‗offshore,‘ since the 
‗open market‘ system did not restrict these practices235. However, borrowing foreign 
capital involved big risks, especially when the value of rupiah fell against the US 
                                                 
235
 From 1980 to 1990, not less than 800 major Indonesian companies had borrowed direct ‗offshore‘ 
capital or loans from the local banks denominated in US dollars; these non-government debts added up to 80 
billion dollars, or approximately four times higher than the reserve of the central bank and even much higher 
than the liquid reserve available at the BI. See: O‘ROURKE, K. (2002) Reformasi: The Struggle for Power in 
Post-Suharto Indonesia, New South Wales, Allen&Unwin., p.41 
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dollar. Nevertheless, the borrowers and the creditors had the same faith in the 
‗implicit guarantee‘ of currency rates provided by the Indonesian government236.  
 
In Southeast Asia, meanwhile, different currency systems were adopted by countries 
in the region237. As Indonesia adopted the free-floating system, several countries put 
their faith in the Currency Board System, through which the governments of these 
countries simply ‗peg‘ the currency to American dollar while their national monetary 
policies were kept independent from the United States‘ monetary policy. In practical 
terms, these countries get the immediate benefit of certitude in their currency level 
amidst the potential instability of the floating system of their neighbors. Despite this 
benefit, however, the system is embedded with several disadvantages. Among the 
obvious is the tendency for ‗pegged‘ currencies to become ‗overvalued‘ hence 
potential to invite massive ‗foreign‘ capitals. Unfortunately, this capital has an ‗abrupt‘ 
characteristic as the capitalist system operating in these countries provided an 
instrument known as ‗easy-liquidity‘, a mechanism making it easy for investors to 
withdraw their capital and convert them to US dollar before leaving the countries with 
their capital. When investment conditions deteriorated, due for example to an 
unstable political situation, a massive local currency selling in these countries would 
be evident. Such turbulence would, unfortunately, also affect countries with free-
floating currencies in the region as the fleeing investors would find US dollar 
wherever they could, putting pressure on the currency rates of these countries.  
 
                                                 
236
 The non-fixed currency rate adopted by Indonesia until 1997 was the base on which Suharto‘s 
regime established its monetary system. This system was operating in accordance to the ‗free-floating‘ 
mechanism hence the pressures resulted from selling and purchase of US$ would have a direct effect on the rate 
of the currency. This system has made the currency level unpredictable while national business, especially those 
who were involved in exports and imports, would need a kind of stability on the currency rate. In this 
mechanism, the central bank may interfere into the currency market to determine the expected level of the 
currency by using monetary policies such as changing the interest rates or flooding the currency market with US 
$ taken from the reserve of the BI. Another available system (but one not adopted by Indonesia even to this 
day), meanwhile, was the Currency Board System (CBS), where the government and its central bank should stay 
away from the currency market and instead attach the currency level to a chosen foreign currency (for example 
US$) while issuing monetary policies like devaluation and revaluation to stimulate their national economy or to 
handle economic turbulence---so that the main principle is, when the market believed that the central bank has 
sufficient liquidity of US$ to back up its currency, businesses would not need to concern themselves with US$ 
buying by speculators. The point is: they rely on the government‘s monetary intervention.  
237
 About the various currency systems operating in Southeast Asia, see, for example: DAQUILA, T. 
(2005) The Economies of Southeast Asia: Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand, Nova 
Publishers. 
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Following the devaluation policy taken by the Thai government, the economies of 
neighboring countries were becoming the victims of an ‗irrational‘ financial market 
system which had destroyed the region like a contagion (domino-effect). The Asian 
crisis was thus regarded as an inescapable epidemic, for this crisis was the result of 
factors driven not by the real economy but merely by speculation and sudden panic. 
In fact, the massive capital withdrawals occurring in Thailand in 1997 were triggered 
by foreign investors‘ distrust due to Thailand‘s domestic economic deficiencies, such 
as raging inflation, poorly allocated finance, and the inadequate servicing of its 
foreign debts238. Being combined with frequent domestic political instability, these 
factors contributed to the devastating crisis of 1997, which was marked by the 
massive withdrawals of foreign capital from the country (Kamesaka and Wang, 
2004). It was unfortunate for Indonesia that the same distrust was extended to the 
other ‗similar‘ economies of the region. When evaluating Indonesia soon after the 
wake of Thailand economic crisis, they arrived at the conclusion that the economic 
miracle created by Suharto‘s regime was actually as fragile as Thailand, for it shared 
the common patterns with the latter. The predicted future of Indonesia‘s economy at 
the time was even worse as Indonesia has been mingling with serious problem of 
corruption, complicity, and nepotism---Korupsi, Kolusi, dan Nepotisme (KKN)--the 
famous jargon been used by the reformists to criticize the regime (Sharma, 2003, 
p.124). The investors saw the Indonesian economy as less stable and deemed the 
high and sustainable economic growth in Indonesia since 1980 as only ‗at the 
surface‘ and  only possible due to the abundant contributions of foreign donors239. In 
other words, Indonesia had lived on a borrowed wealth and investors concluded that 
their investments would be threatened when Suharto was not in power anymore.  
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 This argument was forwarded by many scholars. See, among others: KAUFMAN, G., KRUEGER, 
T. & HUNTER, W. (1999) The Asian Financial Crisis: Origins, Implications and Solutions, Springer. 
239
 The Suharto regime had declared itself to have a strong commitment to capitalism but this 
commitment was considered as ‗false‘ for the economic practices in Indonesia at the time were missing some 
important ingredients required of a capitalist system, such as free competition and the rule-of-law. In fact, 
Suharto had implemented a range of instruments aimed to assure political stability for the sake of ‗planned‘ 
economic development. Very often, these instruments were used by the regime as its mechanism to allocate 
resources and ‗fortune‘. Hence, state enterprises, banks and governmental departments played the role of the 
state‘s tools for the resource allocation. As a consequence, the executive branches of the government often 
created rules and regulations specifically designed to benefit Suharto‘s families and cronies. Such a pattern is 
known as Ersatz capitalism—a term introduced by Yoshihara Kunio. See: KUNIO, Y. (1988) The Rise of Ersatz 
Capitalism in Souteast Asia, Oxford, Oxford University Press. 
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To deal with the high demand for US$ in the region by the beginning of 1997, and 
especially to anticipate speculations on the rupiah, BI applied a monetary strategy 
known as ‗downward crawling peg‘ (gradual stabilization)240. This strategy allows the 
depreciation of the currency value in a slow way by determining a monetary margin 
of 8% (see: Rajan, 2010). In this corridor, the figure can respectively increase or 
decrease, but cannot go outside the maximum and minimum limit determined by the 
BI. In order to make this policy work, BI would interfere indirectly in the currency 
market, by deploying and withdrawing US$ to buy or sell the rupiah for example, or 
by increasing the interest rate to reduce the rupiah in circulation. In July 1997, the 
great demand for the US$ and the high selling-buying speculation in the currency 
market forced the BI to increase the maximum and minimum limit to 12.5% (see: 
BIS, 2005, p177-187). The negative trend obviously continued until the decision of BI 
on August 14th that definitively release these limits because of the limited reserve of 
US$ in this central bank (BIS, 2005, Ibid). As a consequence, the rupiah immediately 
fell by up to 6% against the dollar (BIS, 2005, Ibid). As if this were not enough, in a 
few weeks the rupiah would suffer a ‗fall-free‘ disaster, from 2.449 per US$ on June 
30th, 1997, to 3.800 per US$ by the 15th of October of the same year (See: 
Handerson, 1998, p.88-90). 
 
Towards the end of August 1998, the index of the Jakarta Stock Exchange (JSE) 
had shown that Indonesia had lost up to 75 percent of her total economic values 
which led to a most critical condition during that year (Mann, 1998, p.87). In the past, 
when the economy encountered a difficult time and the confidence of the investors 
was falling, the technocrats usually revealed a list of reforms in order to stimulate 
investment and economic productivity, issuing a ‗commitment‘ to avoid interference 
in the market241. Since 1990, however, such practices of de-regulation have become 
rare. On September 3, the market was surprised by a chain of fiscal regulations 
                                                 
240
 About the strategies of Asian countries to maintain their exchange rate and especially about the 
downward crawling peg strategy, see: RAJAN, R. S. (2010) The Evolution and Impact of Asian Exchange Rate 
Regimes. ADB Economic Working Paper Series No. 208. Manila, Asian Development Bank. 
241
 In Indonesia, there exists a theory that ‗Bad Times made Good Policies‘ which is contradictive to 
another theory that  ‗Good Times made Bad Policies‘. This theory was introduced by an ancient minister of the 
New Order: Muhammad Sadli. In the 1960s, Indonesia used to experience similar economic crises, during 
which the technocrats were successful in addressing problems caused by a crisis resulting from the ‗bad‘ 
economic policies of Orde Lama. In the 1970s , the technocrats were also successful in stabilizing the economy 
after a period of fiscal turbulence and inefficiencies within the state petroleum companies. In the 1980s, again, 
the technocrats were able to co-opt the radical fall of oil price and used the opportunities to invigorate the 
manufacturing sector; the policy which brought Indonesian exportation into non-oil based international trade. 
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produced by the principal technocrat of the cabinet, the Minister of Finance Mar'ie 
Muhammad. With the main objective of tightening government spending amidst the 
deficit of the state budget, Mr. Muhammad ordered a cessation of the majority of 
large-scale projects as well as the public works (see: Muhammad, 2005, p.335-338). 
He also increased taxes on the import of luxurious goods while promising to provide 
liquidity in order to alleviate spreading worries amongst national banks (Muhammad, 
2005, Ibid). In the end, these policies only added insult to injury. 
 
Among the currency-related problems were businesses at risk of failure. Hundreds of 
companies with un-hedged (not-protected) debts in US$ suddenly incurred great 
losses due to the extreme fall of the rupiah242. This was only part of the problem, 
because the majority of the Indonesian companies earned income in rupiahs but 
incurred costs in dollars. The fall of the rupiah vis-à-vis the dollar would mean a 
decrease in their incomes relative to costs, while at the same time the devaluation 
had already tightened their profit margins. The incomes were also affected by the 
general economic deceleration and the companies suddenly found that their interest 
payments (in rupiah) were three times as great as they had been. Many companies 
fell into bankruptcy, which in turn had serious implications for the banking system. 
Many banks were concerned about the solvency of their debtors (Mann, 1998, p.52). 
Now, the rupiah floated freely and incomes had fallen. The problem was not 
restricted to companies with debts in foreign currency; there was an obvious threat to 
those borrowing in the local market due to the ‗insolvency‘ problems. Meanwhile, the 
BI‘s policy of increasing interest rates (to encourage the investors to hold the rupiah) 
had the side-effect of asphyxiating the borrowers of local currency under high 
interest rates. 
 
In the trade sector, the exportation was also less plausible. Soon after the economic 
crisis hit the country, exporters would immediately encounter difficulties. The 
degradation of the financial system would mean that the international banks had a 
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 Many of these losses were life-threatening, since they swept these companies‘ total capital. 
According to Mann, by the beginning of 1998, 80 percent of companies listed on the Jakarta Stock Exchange 
were technically bankrupt—see: MANN, R. (1998) Economic Crisis in Indonesia: The Full Story, London, 
Gateway Books., p.244-245 
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little ‗trust‘ in Indonesian local banks243. For the exporters, this situation was 
catastrophic as the banks are their partners and often their only source of financial 
aid for their imports of raw materials. In a normal situation, the devaluation of the 
currency gives extra benefits to exporters, but in the situation of credit 
disappearance, many companies faced serious problems of ‗cash-flow‘. As a 
consequence, in 1997 potentially profitable Indonesian companies which exported 
clothes, shoes and electronics component were forced to stop their operations and 
lay off their workers (Bernas, 1998b, Kompas, 1998g). Combined with the collapse of 
the national currency and the index of the JSE, this forced investors admit that the 
value in dollars of their capital had dropped by up to two thirds in a period of three 
months (Mann, 1998, p.73). In brief, the Indonesian economy was devastated by a 
vicious cycle of pessimism, capital flight and devaluation. 
 
Desperate to stop this vicious cycle and to reconstitute confidence, the ministers of 
Suharto recommended that Indonesia follow the example of Thailand and Philippines 
in calling for assistance from the International Monetary Fund (Kivimaki, 2003, 
p.220). But Suharto (who was 76 years old at the time and had just lost his wife), 
encouraged by the advice of an anti-American policy economist Steve Hanke, was 
reluctant to resort to the office of Michel Camdessus (IMF) and the department of 
finances of the United States (US Treasury) (Emmerson, 2001, p.324). 
 
Nolens volens, on October 8, 1997, the IMF and the Indonesian government agreed 
to assistance of 43 billion dollars on behalf of three multilateral institutions and five 
countries (see: International Monetary Fund, 1997). This assistance was provided on 
the condition that Indonesia would carry out a series of reforms (International 
Monetary Fund, 1997, Ibid). Facing reluctance and opposition from certain groups 
within the country regarding the conditions required by the IMF, the second 
agreement was signed by Indonesia on January 15, 1998 (International Monetary 
Fund, 1998c). This contained 50 measures of reforms (Letter of Intent - LoI) which 
had to be realized by the regime in order to receive the promised aid in a step-by-
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 The impact of the economic crisis to the banking sector in Indonesia in 1997 was much more severe 
as the crisis had led to the bankruptcy of these banks.  For example, the Indonesian government followed the 
IMF‘s recommendation to close 16 out of 42 local banks as part of IMF-Indonesia agreement to the overcome 
the crisis, the decision that had provoked a ‗rush‘ on banks (the massive withdrawals of money in banks by their 
customers) About this issue, see: Ibid. 
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step fashion. Up to this point, however, Indonesia still showed her hesitation and in 
fact delayed the implementation of the engagement with the IMF, while there was a 
strong impression that the relations between the IMF and Suharto‘s regime were 
becoming conflictual (McGlynn and Sulistyo, 2007, p.328-333). On April 10, 1998, 
another agreement was signed. This included more serious conditions from the IMF; 
it contained 117 measures which needed to be applied by the Indonesian 
government (see: International Monetary Fund, 1998b). Because of these hesitations 
and hitches, of the 43 billion dollars promised by the IMF five months earlier, only 3 
billion dollars (7%) was received244. 
 
The conflict between The Indonesian government and the IMF culminated in the 1st 
of March 1998. During a session of the National Assembly, Suharto reminded his 
audience of the successes of his regime during the earlier period, such as the 
increase of income per capita, the sustainable growth of GDP, and the low morbidity-
rate (Suharto, 1998). At different occasions, Suharto complained about the fact that 
the reforms required by the IMF did not produce the expected results and that the 
majority of the structural reforms were simply unrealizable (Hanke, 2007, p.100-
1001). Suharto‘s unease at the IMF presence can be seen, for example, in his 
remark that ―a number head-of-governments visited me or telephoned…..and they 
expressed their opinions on this solution that they think would be a good solution to 
solve our problem ……but, me, I refer to a more suitable concept, it is the IMF 
Plus….. I am, carefully and with precaution, contemplating on the possible adoption 
of the ‗currency board system‘‖(See:The Republic of Indonesia, 1998).  
 
In the middle of the conflict, Steve Hanke, an economist at John Hopkins University 
insisted that Indonesia should adopt the currency board system as the best way out 
of the economic crisis (Mann, 1998, p.15). This would mean that the value of rupiah 
would be automatically converted into US$ at a fixed rate. In addition, this currency 
board would replace policies previously issued by the BI, means that the currency 
market would operate independently and free from the government‘s direct 
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 The main participants of this engagement were (in billion $) : The IMF ($10), The World Bank 
($4,5), The Asian Development Bank ($3,5), Japan ($5), The United States ($3), Brunei Daresalam($1,2), 
Malaysia ($1), Indonesian Foreign capitals ($5)—see: INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND (1998a) 
Annual Report of the Executive Board for the Financial Year Ended April 30, 1998. Washington DC, 
International Monetary Fund.  
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intervention. BI‘s interference in the market, as the consequence, would only be 
possible indirectly through the mechanism of ‗interest‘. 
 
The IMF and the United States opposed the formula offered by Hanke (which, in fact, 
had the approval of Suharto), further degrading the relationship between the IMF and 
Suharto‘s regime245. The IMF announced the reasons for its rejection of Hanke‘s 
formula: (1) the success of a currency board system requires a high level of 
credibility while the New Order at the time was regarded as ‗not-credible‘; (2) 
Suharto was going to regard this board system as an instant formula and cosmetic 
solution to safeguard the rupiah but at the same time the formula would free 
Indonesia from her obligation to implement ‗reforms‘ signed in the letter of intent, 
and; (3) The currency board system requires sufficient reserve of US$ at the central 
bank and also a strong currency, which was not the case of Indonesia246.  
 
During first half of March, the fact that the foreign currency reserves which had fallen 
up to 16 billion dollars was the only factor prevented the adoption of the currency 
board system (TempoInteraktif, 1998b). On March 18, one day after the visit of an 
IMF special envoy, Hubert Neiss, in Jakarta, a senior official of the government, 
Ginandjar Kartasasmita, declared that the foreign currency reserves at the BI were 
insufficient to back up the immediate ‗test‘ of the currency board system (Bisnis 
Indonesia, 1998a). However, several prominent members of the government 
expressed a different attitude. The Minister for Finance, Fuad Bawazier, announced 
a potential disaster to the government‘s revenue from  the tax sector along with the 
capital flight (Shiner, 1998); the Minister of Trade and Industry, Bob Hassan, refused 
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 As was remarked by Goldsborough, ‗Professor Hanke advised Indonesia to scrap the IMF plan and 
create a currency board, tying the rupiah firmly to the U.S. dollar. This plan successfully combated inflation in 
Argentina and Chile. But the IMF didn't like Professor Hanke or his plan.  Both the IMF and U.S. Treasury 
Secretary Robert Rubin vehemently opposed the establishment of a currency board. We learned that in Jakarta, 
Professor Hanke and his wife had round-the-clock government bodyguards because a hit team had been hired to 
assassinate the professor. Even the Wall Street Journal recognized the IMF as an engine of revolution‘—see: 
GOLDSBOROUGH, R. H. (1998) Indonesia's Wealth: Who Will Control it? Personal Update NewsJournal, 
July 1998. 
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 Following Suharto‘s speech on the 1st of March, on the 6th of March the IMF declared that it would 
have to delay the 3 billion US$ amount of credit which was promised to be allocated as a ‗security‘ loan to 
Indonesia. Two days later (the 8
th
) Suharto responded to this decision by declaring that certain conditions in the 
Letter of Intent proposed by the IMF were against the state constitution hence should not be applied. Suharto 
cited especially article 33 of the constitution, saying that ―Perekonomian disusun sebagai usaha bersama 
berdasar atas asas kekeluargaan----the national economy should be organised in accordance to collective 
efforts based on the principle of familial system‖ See: O‘ROURKE, K. (2002) Reformasi: The Struggle for 
Power in Post-Suharto Indonesia, New South Wales, Allen&Unwin., p.75  
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the IMF‘s Letter of Intent, especially with regard to the obligation to release the 
monopolies which had been under government control (Ries, 2000, p.215). Hassan 
even regarded the structural reforms required by the IMF as an effort aimed at 
weakening Indonesia, declaring ―the foreigners are nice only if they want something 
from Indonesia….When they cannot any more draw benefit from our products, or 
when they feel threatened by our exports, they start to attack us‖247. These 
denunciations were even worse in the following weeks. ―We are not the Republic of 
the IMF…..This is an expression that should end up at a demonstration‖ (Harian 
Neraca, 1998). Soon, Suharto himself would express a similar sentiment. In April, 
the president stated that after the realization of independence in politics, Indonesian 
economic independence was compromised by foreigners who sought to exploit the 
national capital (Kompas, 1998b).  
 
Simultaneous with the fall of the rupiah, a natural disaster (El Nino storm) struck the 
country, causing significant damage to crop production and hence contributing even 
more to soaring prices. In November 1997, the index of the consumer prices 
observes a rise of 17.3%, while the general increase of the annual index of the 
consumer prices reached the dangerous level of 29.7% at the first quarter of 1998; 
on average, this index was of 8.8% during the period from 1990 to 1996 (Handerson, 
1998, p.204). The economic crisis also generated an unprecedented wave of 
unemployment248. As a consequence, chaos settled gradually in the Indonesian 
cities (see: chapter chapter 5, section 5.4); from the first months of 1998, continuous 
student demonstrations spread across the archipelago (chapter 5, Ibid). 
 
7.2. Political Crisis 
 
At the domestic level, political support for Suharto‘s regime was decreasing. This 
started in 1988 with the debate on his succession soon after his re-election as 
president by the National Assembly. With the tacit support of the army, protests from 
students burst across Java towards the end of 1988 and became worse at the 
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 Bob Hassan declared ―Which monopolies are we talking about? If they provide us with the needs for 
the people, no problem‖ See: HARIAN NERACA (1998) Harian Neraca. 17 March 1998 ed. Jakarta. 
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 According to the data of National Survey of Social-Economic 1998 as cited by Firdausy, it was 
estimated that the number of unemployment by end of 1998 was about 4.5 million people—see: FIRDAUSY, C. 
M. (1998) The Social Impact of Economic Crisis on Employment in Indonesia. Centre for economic and 
Development Studies, Indonesian Institute of Sciences.  
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beginning of 1989 (see: chapter 4 and 5). In intellectual circles, aspirations for 
greater political freedom and of an equitable economic growth also started to appear. 
These aspirations were based on arguments that an alteration to the tight control of 
the government on the economy would help to faster achieve the prosperity of the 
people (Saunders, 1998, p.29-36). Certain members of the government even 
demanded this liberalization, which was backed up by the statement from army 
officers that Indonesia should look towards the future249. 
 
After his re-election as president with B.J. Habibie as the vice president, Suharto 
constituted his seventh cabinet, entitled ‗Cabinet Development-7‘, on March 14. 
Without a doubt, this cabinet is the greatest manifestation of KKN (See: the previous 
part of this chapter) of the New Order regime. Amidst the spreading student 
demonstrations demanding that the regime end nepotism, Suharto named his 
daughter, Tutut Suharto, as the minister of social services. An army general who was 
closely associated with Tutut was appointed as the Minister of Internal Affairs. The 
minister of state enterprises was Tanri Abeng, the director of Bakrie & Brothers, a 
figure closely associated with Tutut in her business projects. The substitute to Mar'ie 
Muhammad as Minister for Finance was Fuad Bawazier, formerly managing director 
of the Department of Tax who was very close with Suharto‘s sons250.  
 
Other examples of the state allocating resources to Suharto‘s family could also be 
cited: Subiakto Tjakrawerdaya was maintained as the Minister for Co-operatives, 
where he continued to defend the monopoly of the clove trade by Tommy Suharto 
(Schwartz, 1994, chapter 6); Sanyoto Sastrowardoyo was kept as the Minister of 
Investments despite persistent complaints in business circles about his ‗hidden-cost‘ 
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 Critics of Suharto were actually reflected in every level of society. However, as Suharto‘s regime 
was so powerful at any rate, the appeals for political liberation and democratic popular participation were only 
the initial sign of political change in Indonesia. The issues were therefore more related to the succession of 
leadership when Suharto (who would be 70 years old in 1991) could no longer handle state leadership. The 
debate was concentrated around the figure of the next leader as well as the successoral mechanism best fit to the 
Indonesian political circumstances. 
250
 Bawazier‘s proximity with Suharto‘s sons can be seen, for example, in the tax exemptions given to 
the company of Tommy Suharto for the ‗fake‘ national automobile project of Timor whose products were 
actually imported from the Korean automobile manufacturer KIA Motors co. in the form of completely built-up 
units (CBU). Bawazier had also been assisting Bambang Tri Hadmojo (another son of the president) as a 
treasurer in an operation which diverted 2% of taxpayer‘s money. He also sits as a commissaris at PT Satelindo, 
the communication satellite company owned by Bambang Trihadmojo. See, for example:HOFMAN, B. (2004) 
Indonesia: Rapid Growth, Weak Institution. Jakarta, World Bank. 
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policy which involved investment licensing251; Abdul Latief, who admitted to having 
abused public money (i.e. diverted more than 3 billion rupiah of pension funds into 
his personal account) was also kept as the Minister of Labour (Robison and Hadiz, 
2004, p.82); Haryanto Danutirto, the former Minister of Transport who had helped 
manage the incomes of the Suharto family by restructuring the state air lines 
(McGlynn and Sulistyo, 2007, p.328), was maintained as a minister responsible for 
stocks and drugs. But the most contestable and controversial choice of Suharto was 
related to the principal economic post of the government, the Minister of Industry and 
Trade, which was given to Bob Hassan. The irony was remarkable: the man who 
was considered as amongst the most responsible for the national economic crisis 
was now had a central role to play in the state‘s economy. Though Bob Hassan had 
been the main target of the structural reforms imposed the IMF, he was now the 
principal figure in the negotiations between the Indonesian government and the IMF. 
 
The selection of the cabinet members coincided with the issuing of ‗emergency 
powers‘ by the National Assembly. The body granted special rights to Suharto, 
allowing him to take measures such as dissolving parliament or proscribing political 
parties if he considers them ‗necessary‘. This caused fears of the reactivation of the 
Kopkamtib, the secret organization established by Suharto in 1965 which was initially 
aimed at combating Communism in the country but eventually became one of the 
regime‘s tools to suppress notorious criminals or even political opponents without 
trial252. 
 
Before March, student demonstrators had hope that progress towards the reform 
would be made by the parliament, the members of which they saw as the people‘s 
representatives expected to express the people‘s aspiration. However, the re-
election of Suharto (with Habibie as vice-president), the launching of the ‗emergency 
powers‘ by the National Assembly, and the composition of the new cabinet put an 
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 See, for example WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION (2001) Dispute Settlement Report 1998. 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press., p.2408 
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 By February of 1998, the possible re-appearance of Kopkamtib become a ‗hot‘  issue, especially 
because the National Assembly had granted ‗special right to maintain social order‘ to the president. The later 
developments, such as the assignment of big number of strategic posts to civilian and military figures from the 
president‘s circle were seen as a clear indicator towards the realisation of Kopkamtib. See: ANDERSON, B. R. 
O. G. (Ed.) (2002) Violence and the State in Suharto's Indonesia, Ithaca, Cornell Southeast Asia Program 
Publications, SIEGEL, J. T. (1998) A New Criminal Type in Jakarta: Counter-Revolution Today, Durham, Duke 
University Press. 
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end to all these hopes. As the consequence, protestors seized campuses through 
the country. Even the most conservative group of students was now joining the 
demonstrations against the government (Widjodjo, 1999, p.168). Towards the end of 
March, massive demonstrations took place regularly in Yogyakarta, Jakarta and in 
the provincial cities throughout the archipelago. It was not surprising then that the 
aspirations from the students were not only related to the end of corruption and 
control of (soaring) prices, but also the departure of Suharto and his family from the 
government. The protesters seemed convinced that, because political authority was 
centralized in the hands one person (Suharto), the departure of this person would 
end corruption, abuse and unjust practices. This antagonism towards Suharto 
galvanized the students of all religions and social classes. 
 
A demonstration on April 2nd, 1998 at the campus of the University of Gadjah Mada 
of Yogyakarta brought about 38 casualties amongst protesters (see: Media 
Indonesia, 1998). This tragic incident triggered remarkable violence between the 
protesters and the military elsewhere in the country. Suharto responded by ordering 
his Minister of Education to prohibit students from taking part in the political 
gatherings, but this effort was obviously not effective in preventing disobedience 
from students or those in intellectual circles (Bisnis Indonesia, 1998b). On April 15, 
25 campuses throughout the country conducted simultaneous demonstrations while 
Suharto‘s regime did not show any indication of bending (see: Kompas, 1998e, 
Kompas, 1998c). On the contrary, these demonstrations prompted the president to 
dismiss his Minister of Information and blame the media for their propagation of 
‗false reports‘ (Kompas, 1998c, Ibid, Suara Pembaharuan, 1998b). He repeated his 
call for students to return to their classes and study (Suara Pembaharuan, 1998b). 
Later, this call became more stern; in an annual celebration honouring the special 
forces, Suharto threatened by saying: ―I hope that the general situation of order will 
be controlled by the people themselves, otherwise it will be controlled by the local 
governments and the police force‖ (Kompas, 1998f). However, he indicated that the 
participation of the special forces to suppress the student‘s demonstration would not 
be necessary253.  
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 In fact, an element of the Special Forces (Kopassus) had been profoundly involved in the incidents 
as there were many cases of torture been reported. A judicial inquiry had concluded later that there were at least 
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The president had, meanwhile, punished an eminent figure of the army, General Edi 
Sudrajat, who was considered as ‗too soft‘ on the protesters254. As the Minister of 
Defense, Suharto expected Sudrajat to be more stern with the students who had 
organized continued anti-government demonstrations. Suharto‘s expectation could 
not be fulfilled by the general, and Suharto excluded him from the government in 
March (see: Indonesian government, 1998). However, towards the end of April, a 
number of other generals seemed to follow Sudrajad‘s example, although cautiously, 
as they explicitly expressed their approval of the student protests, though none 
adopted an intransigent position towards Suharto. General Syarwan Hamid, a figure 
considered as among the hard-liners by students, showed his ‗understanding‘ to 
students‘ action, for example. Specifically, Hamid encouraged students ―to feel free 
in expressing their aspirations but‖, he continued, ―with the condition that their action 
would not to create security issues‖ (Mann, 1999, p.133). General Wiranto255 also 
took the same position by declaring that ―the soldiers will accept and support any 
aspirations...since these aspirations are required for the progress of the nation‖ 
(Jawa Pos, 1998c). Through the country, the military commanders underlined ―the 
importance of dialogue‖ and agreed to recognize that it was possible to tolerate 
―differences in opinion‖256. Other generals took even more explicit positions. General 
Agum Gumelar, the former commandant of Special Forces who was now the 
commandant of Sulawesi garrison, stated on April 24 that the students‘ demands 
were ―right and represented the aspirations of all levels of the society‖ (Suara 
Pembaruan, 1998b). 
 
The uncertainties of the army were quickly reported by the leader of Muhammadiyah 
(the second largest islamist organization), Amien Rais. After having several meetings 
                                                                                                                                                        
14 students disappeared—kidnapped by the Kopassus. See: SUARA PEMBARUAN (1998a) Kassospol ABRI: 
Tidak Ada Perintah Pangab untuk Menculik Aktivis. Suara Pembaruan. 26 April ed. Jakarta.  
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 Sudrajat used to be the Army Chief-of-Staff, the Armed Forces top commander, and the minister of 
Defense at the same time. He was also known as a figure who encouraged the military to ‗back to barrack‘ and 
becoming professional. 
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 Wiranto had been known as amongst Suharto‘s loyal generals, nevertheless, he now seemed to be 
reluctant to take a radical position against the protesting students. Instead of deploying an open force (as Suharto 
had apparently wished), Wiranto conducted a series of dialogues with student activists. One of the major 
dialogues took place on the 25
th
 of April, when a big number of student activist came to Jakarta to meet and had 
a dialogue with territorial general Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono   
256
 On the 18 of April 1998 for example, General Wiranto held a meeting with students to discuss best 
solution to the worsening political circumstances—see: TEMPOINTERAKTIF (1998a) Krisis Mengantarkan 
Indonesia ke Jurang Kehancuran. Tempo. 29 December 1998 ed. 
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with the chiefs of the army during April and March, Rais seemed to feel that the 
soldiers hesitated in their support for Suharto. Conscious of the fact that this could 
mean the end of Suharto‘s regime, Rais vigorously sought to associate with and 
encourage the students to intensify their attacks against Suharto (Kompas, 1998d). 
By doing this, Amien distinguished himself from other dissenting ―reformers‖ such as 
Megawati Sukarnoputri and Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur)
257
 
 
Towards the end of April, the students gained support from intellectuals, 
professionals, and almost all other social groups, while demonstrations continued to 
occur at almost every city at the archipelago, from Aceh to Papua (see: Saunders, 
1998, Appendix D). Violence was not rare, inasmuch as students had learned how to 
deal with the security forces, who made use of teargas (Suara Merdeka, 1998). In 
fact, the students were particularly difficult enemies for Suharto as they were too 
numerous to be crushed, too idealistic to be co-opted and too persistent to be 
neglected. 
 
Suharto acknowledged the deteriorating situation on May 1, gathering more than 30 
leaders of political parties and factions within the parliament. At this gathering, 
Suharto underlined that he was constitutionally obliged to apply the five-year-plan 
development program (Pelita) that the parliament had adopted seven weeks before 
(Bhakti, 1998a, p.241). This plan already contained elements of reforms but, again, 
Suharto threatened to take measures against the parties who were attempting to 
advance reform (Bhakti, 1998a, Ibid).  
 
The first week of May involved major violence propagated in Jakarta, Yogyakarta, 
Bogor and Medan (Saunders, 1998, Ibid). In the second week, Suharto faced 
increasing pressure, in particular from the demonstrators who were now also 
focused on the issue of the reduction of energy subsidies in a situation of high 
inflation. When Suharto went to a conference of Heads of State to Egypt in May 
1998, his regime was hopelessly staggering. The troops ended up drawing their 
arms and killed several demonstrators in Jakarta, starting riots which would produce 
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 The latter two figures had for many years been known as ‗anti-Suharto‘. Megawati is the daughter of 
the former president Sukarno and used to be the president of PDI-Indonesian Democratic Party, while Gus Dur 
was the leader of NU--the biggest Moslem organisation--which had been struggling for democracy in Indonesia. 
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more than 1000 casualties258. On his return to Jakarta, Suharto noted that even his 
own ministers had turned against him and that he could not form a new government 
(See: Maley, 1998). On May 21, he made the decision to resign. 
 
7.3. Weakening support from the Military 
 
It is too simplistic to explain the collapse of the New Order by reference only to the 
events immediately prior to Suharto‘s resignation. This argument assumes that the 
economic and political crises in Indonesia in 1997 and 1998 were only a ‗triggering-
detonator‘ of the time-bomb which had long been waiting to explode. Indeed, while 
Thailand, Philippines and Malaysia, three countries in the region which underwent 
the same crisis, were beginning to recover within a year, Indonesia had to deal with 
a multidimensional crisis which seemed to end only with the collapse of a celebrated 
regime. Indonesia‘s extraordinary development and how the New Order arrived at its 
tragic end is a puzzle for many observers. Based on this assumption, analysis on the 
army and political elites should give a more significant explanation to our task in this 
chapter. 
 
To secure the regime against any possible threats, Suharto installed instruments 
which he could systematically use to suppress criticisms from his adversaries. These 
were mainly the police force and a judicial system used to maintain public order 
(See: chapter 6). When facing more serious threats, however, Suharto relied on the 
fidelity of the army. 
 
As has been analyzed in chapter 4, in spite of its prestigious past, the Indonesian 
army gradually transformed itself into an instrument whose institutions and personnel 
were at the service of Suharto‘s authoritarianism. Starting from the beginning of the 
1970s, the army became the most powerful political institution in Indonesia and the 
principal pillar of the regime. Its political role was rationalized through the doctrines 
of the ‗double function of the military‘, under which the army played double role as 
the armed guardian of the nation and at the same time as an instrument of the 
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 The violent clash between student demonstrators and security forces during April-May 1998 and the 
number of claimed casualties were recorded in a wide range of reports and news. See, among others: JAWA 
POS (1998a) Aksi di Sejumlah Kota Turun ke Jalan dan Bentrok. Jawa Pos Online. 3 May 1998 ed.; BERNAS 
(1998a) Aksi Makin Deras, Korban Jatuh lagi. Harian Bernas. 3 May 1998 ed.; ANDERSON, B. R. O. G. (Ed.) 
(2002) Violence and the State in Suharto's Indonesia, Ithaca, Cornell Southeast Asia Program Publications. 
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development of the country (see: chapter 4). In fact, the ‗double function‘ ideology of 
the Indonesian army was an obvious anachronism for the army. Instead of playing 
role as the guardian of the nation, it was in fact the armed guardian of Suharto‘s 
policies. Up to 1993, thousands of active or retired army officers were still in charge 
in the executive branch of the state at various levels (chapter 4). They even took the 
lead in a wider range of the state‘s institutions such as the parliament, the supreme 
court, Golkar ‗party‘, and in state enterprises (Lowry, 1996, p.188). 
 
The priority given to the political role of the army (to the detriment of other units of 
the armed forces), can be seen especially from the structure of command of the 
armed forces. Hierarchically, the commander-in-chief of the armed forces was a 
general of four stars assisted by a chief-of-staff superior to the four composing ‗units‘ 
of the armed forces (the army, the marine, the air force and the police force). But 
beside the commander-in-chief of the armed forces, two generals of three stars were 
in charge in the army but not of the other forces (see: chapter 4). One is the 
commander of the strategic reserve of the army (Kostrad) and the other one is the 
commander-of-territorial-staff of the army (Kaster). While the commander of Kostrad 
had purely military functions, the Kaster had an exclusive function because he is 
responsibility for political affairs (which is not the function of professional military). 
The Kaster often implemented strategies for the army‘s intervention in the socio-
political sphere favourable to Suharto. The political instruments at the disposal of 
Kaster were Badan Intelijen Strategis--The Armed Forces Strategic Intelligence 
Agency (Bais) and the Special Forces (Komando Pasukan Khusus--Kopassus)259. 
Suharto thus had formidable and well grounded instruments within the army which 
not only gave him control of the entire armed forces, but also enabled him to face 
any challenges towards his authority. However, despite this significant support from 
the army, certain ‗disatisfaction‘ grew amongst the generals, especially those who 
had been ‗isolated‘ by Suharto. In fact, looking more closely at the matter, the loyalty 
of the army to Suharto had never been really proven. 
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 The Bais set up a monitoring system by installing a web of intelligence at every level of the 
territorial system. Its main task was concentrated on internal threats to the regime such as political dissidents or 
secessionist movements at peripheries. In order to make effective these secret operations, the Bais worked 
closely with one unit of the special force known as the ‗Commando-elite‘ which was attributed with an authority 
of ‗counter-terrorism‘.   
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The major wave of anti-Suharto inclination within the army was effectively 
suppressed when Suharto ‗disciplined‘ certain groups of the army at the beginning of 
1980. A document called as ‗Petisi 50‘ had been forwarded to the parliament 
containing a complaint from 50 prominent national figures, including some army 
generals260. The document stated that Suharto‘s regime had abusively used 
Pancasila as a ‗weapon‘ to crush his political opponents by interpreting critics of the 
regime as critics of Pancasila (See: chapter 7). Being aware that the soldiers were 
not solid in their backing-up of his manouvers, Suharto had fears that this would be 
‗dangerous‘ to his political operations, to stability, and (presumably) to his chances of 
re-election as president in 1982. The indicator which alerted Suharto was the fact 
that the army seemed to distance itself from the government‘s Golkar ‗party‘ and 
started a tacit gathering with the moslem party, the PPP. In March 1980, at a 
meeting at Pekanbaru of Riau province, Suharto threatening to apply a ‗coup de 
foudre‘ to anyone in the army renouncing their loyalty to the state, the Pancasila and 
the 1945 constitution (see: Jenkins, 1984, chapter seven).  In addition, as the 
parliament was dominated by the Golkar ‗party‘, Suharto‘s later authoritative 
action261 against the petition‘s signatories was backed up without any constraints 
from the parliament. Specific to the army, Suharto was saying even more explicitly 
during a preparatory meeting of the Kopassus‘ birthday that he would divide the 
army if it showed disloyalty to the regime. He  envisaged using the intelligence units 
of the special forces to ‗discipline‘ all the ‗infidels‘ (Crouch, 1978, Ibid). To preserve 
the unity of the army and especially to maintain its political position, up to 1997 the 
army had no other choice but to stand for and give loyalty to Suharto, but in fact, a 
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261
 Soon after Suharto delivered his speech, the regime removed the signatories‘ right to travel, forced 
the media to not quote their words or publish their pictures, and also banned the signatories from any banking 
contracts. See: CROUCH, H. (1978) The Army and Politics in Indonesia, Ithaca, Cornell University Press., 
p.356. This decision had made the signatories to lose their political and economic opportunities. Even socially 
they were isolated as none would take risks to be seen of their sympathizers. The group had been quasi-
imprisoned until 1998 when the political reformation began.   
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significant resistance within the army to Suharto‘s regime did exist despite their 
‗clandestineness‘.  
 
7.4. Rallying opponents amongst elites 
 
Apart from this ‗failed‘ opposition, the 1980s also saw another agitation against 
Suharto‘s regime. Following the collapse of oil prices in 1983, the elites‘ support for 
Suharto‘s regime was drastically declining. The opposition, however, did not make 
much effort to gain political benefit from the situation. Perhaps this was because the 
crisis was due to world economic conditions and therefore difficult for the opposition 
to blame on the regime. In addition, the political pressure on Suharto was only 
provisional. When the debates on the succession of leadership started to appear by 
the end of the 1980s, the negative impacts of the crisis were little used by Suharto‘s 
opponents. In fact, it was not easy from any perspective to conclude that the 
economic crisis would lead to a loss of support for the regime from people who had 
enjoyed almost everything they wanted under Suharto‘s leadership.  
 
All these factors were duly used by those who estimated that Suharto should be able 
to be persuaded to resign in 1993 after the legislative election. The general election 
of 1992 saw the vote for Golkar decreasing slightly from 73% in 1987 to 68% in 
1992, while the minor parties, the PPP (Moslems) and the PDI (nationalist) had 
modest additional votes (see: table 1). Even though the additional votes were not 
particularly significant, the gains brought about more self confidence amongst elites 
within the PPP and the PDIP, and hence a series of dissensions against the political 
system designed by Suharto started to appear. 
 
Table 1 : Result of Indonesian General Election 1971-1997  
(in percentage) 
Party 1971 1977 1982 1987 1992 1997 
Golkar 62.80 62.11 64.34 73.16 68.1 74.51 
PDI 10.09 8.60 7.88 10.87 14.9 3.06 
PPP 27.11 29.29 27.78 15.97 17.0 22.43 
Source : (Suryadinata, 1998, p.199) 
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Within the PDI, the resistance to the New Order started when the regime used the 
army to interfere in the internal affairs of the party. During the party‘s congress held 
by mid-1993, Feisal Tanjung (the commander of the armed forces) intervened the 
process of the congress by giving order to Kaster and the intelligence officers of 
BAIS to approach the members of PDIP and intimidate them in order to blockage a 
figure who later become Suharto‘s major political adversary, Megawati Sukarnoputri, 
the daughter of Sukarno (Schwartz, 1994, p.266). Despite the intimidation lasting for 
months, members of PDI still inclined towards Megawati despite the army‘s 
manipulation. 
 
The election of Megawati had made Sukarno-ism popular for the second time, 
despite public doubts over whether she had enough capability in politics262. Indeed, 
while Suharto regarded Megawati Sukarnoputri as his ‗aggressive‘ niece (implied not 
to be dangerous), the latter was in fact a real threat due to Sukarno‘s lasting 
charisma and public support; Megawati was the only alternative available within 
Sukarno‘s dynasty. With the crucial support of the reformers in the PDI, Megawati 
used her popularity to criticize the government and even to call for political and 
economic reforms (McIntyre, 1997, Ibid). Despite minimal publication of these 
criticisms, they were actually very intense throughout the years of 1994-1995, 
particularly on Java island, where 60% of the population reside. In 1996, it was 
already clear that the PDI intended to make the legislative election of the following 
year (1997) a major turning point in Indonesian political dynamics. In fact, the PDI 
was not trying to have an illusion by expecting ‗transparency‘ during the election, but 
Megawati promised to her constituents that she was willing to make an active 
campaign and would openly express anti-government sentiment, which was 
obviously effective in mobilizing massive support from the people. 
 
Of course, Suharto was ‗annoyed‘ by this latest development. Letting Megawati hold 
a massive campaign across the country would mean humiliation for his regime, but 
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 Megawati is Sukarno‘s daughter, a status that gave her an extraordinary benefit regarding the 
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presiden, tak cukup bermodal kharismatis dan popularitas Republika. 12 June 1999 ed. Jakarta. 
220 
 
stopping the figure who was now becoming a national icon would be imprudent as 
well. Facing this complicated situation, Suharto chose an intermediate solution: he 
would dethrone Megawati from the PDI leadership, while he had enough power to do 
so. Even though Megawati‘s mandate as party leader was not yet completed, but it 
would not be the first time that Suharto would illegally eliminate an opponent from 
the Indonesian political arena (see: chapter 6). This time, Suharto relied on Feisal 
Tanjung, the commander of the armed forces.  
 
Tanjung then entrusted this project to lieutenant general Syarwan Hamid who was 
notorious mainly as his role in the imprisonment of several pressure groups‘ leaders 
since 1992 and as the man who made a severe public warning about the latent 
threat of the ‗new left‘ to be associated with communism (See: Asiaweek, 1996). 
Hamid perceived that a significant number of PDI delegations could be persuaded to 
oppose Megawati. A key part of the plan was finding the most appropriate figure to 
replace Megawati; he realized that to interfere for a second time would make the 
‗secret‘ operation of the army transparent to the public. He thus chose an ancient 
figure with considerable popularity within the PDIP: Suryadi. Hamid indicated to 
Suryadi that if he accepted the condition proposed by the army, he would be granted 
the leadership of the party by usurping Megawati (Schwartz, 1994, p.322). Suryadi 
accepted this offer as later Suryadi called for the ‗dissenting‘ faction within the PDI to 
hold an extraordinary party congress to be held in Medan by June 1996. Being 
manipulated once again, the congress withdrew the party leadership from Megawati 
and gave it to Suryadi. 
 
Being the victim, however, it was very clear that Megawati was not willing to 
surrender despite intense pressure from the army. Approximately 200 students held 
a demonstration in her favour, while her supporters refused to leave the 
headquarters of the PDI in Jakarta (see: Edy, 1996). The students maintained a sit-in 
action in front of the building, denouncing the ‗dirty‘ operations around Medan 
congress while blaming the treachery of Suryadi (Edy, 1996, Ibid). The protest 
movement developed and attracted widespread sympathy for her courageous 
criticisms of the government. The gatherings quickly became more numerous and 
violent (Edy, 1996, Ibid). 
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Facing theses deteriorating circumstances, Hamid needed an urgent solution. But 
the problem was accumulating as the amount of violence was increasing. In this 
situation, Hamid understood that using the police force would not be beneficial, for 
an obvious attack would only reinforce public sympathy towards Megawati at the 
expense of the army and of Suharto. Hamid was thus turned to a conventional 
solution for such a situation: using of preman (gangsters) instead of the regular 
troops263. The latter were disguised by Hamid like the partisans of Suryadi who were 
in anger against the occupation of their rightful headquarters, with an aim of giving 
the impression that the attack was strictly the internal business of the party led by the 
defenders of the Suryadi faction. The result was effective: the students were 
dislodged, killed or wounded (see: Edy, 1996). 
 
Vis-à-vis the Islamist group, Suharto had to deal with two figures with the potential to 
be a real threat to the regime: a religious leader and the chief of NU Abdurrahman 
Wahid (known as Gus Dur) and Amien Rais, the chief of Muhammadiyah. The 
significance of NU in the Indonesian political landscape has its explanation in history. 
In 1920, Hasyim Ashari (the grandfather of Gus Dur) founded a religious doctrine 
which synthesized the indigenous mysticism of Java with Middle Eastern Islamism264 
(Federspiel, 1998, p.124). The doctrine itself was not new, but the contribution of 
Ashari was in his establishment of the organization of pesantren (traditional religious 
boarding schools), which quickly developed a socio-religious organization at various 
levels of the society under the name of Nahdlatul Ulama (literally means the rebirth 
of the religion—the NU ideology). In the mid-1990s, the NU claimed more than 40 
million members (The Jakarta  Post, 1998). Although this number sounds 
‗exagerated‘, it is undeniable that the NU is the largest Islamic organization in 
Indonesia. Furthermore, as Indonesia is the largest Moslem country of the world, the 
NU also could pride itself on being the greatest Islamic group in the world. Although 
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Gus Dur generally abstained from taking an active role in politics, the size of the 
organization under his control undeniably made him a prominent political figure. Gus 
Dur was not, however, without rivals. In spite of the size of NU, the major part of its 
membership was living in rural Java. Anywhere else, especially in the cities and on 
other islands, the dominant organization was Muhammadiyah. 
 
Founded in 1912, Muhammadiyah reflected the Middle Eastern movements that 
sought to reconcile Islam with an increasingly modern and secular world. In religious 
terms, this implied the promotion of Middle Eastern orthodoxy rather than indigenous 
belief. In the educational terms, Muhammadiyah underlined the teaching of science 
and technology rather than the ‗Western‘ liberal philosophy (Federspiel, 1998, Ibid). 
Even though Muhammadiyah repudiated any political participation, its organization 
was, in fact, intensely political. Like the NU, Muhammadiyah also had a significant 
number of adherents (by the mid-1990s, it claimed to have about 30 million active 
members). However, the size of organization was not the only factor of 
Muhammadiyah‘s prominence within the Indonesian political landscape as there is 
another factor which is the ‗modernist‘ brand of Islamic ideology. In fact, this 
organization appeared partly as a result of the modern Islamist movement in 
Indonesia, which had grown since the beginning of the twentieth century as an 
alternative to the existing ‗traditional‘ Islamist groups (See:Jainuri, 1997). Indonesian 
history has shown Muhammadiyah to be an organization which always worked 
towards political ends even though these goals changed considerably over time. In 
term formal, the main target of this organization was to improve the practice of the 
government by moral values derived from Islam (See: Maarif, 2007). Many 
modernists, including the chiefs of Muhammadiyah, believed that this creditable goal 
could be carried out without offending the other Moslem ideologies or other religious 
minorities265. 
 
The ardent partisans of ‗modernist Islam‘ generally rejected the separation of state 
and religion, regarding this as illogical. In fact, this group has always been expecting 
to join more closely these two concepts (the state and the Shari‘a). Some have even 
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preached the ‗Islamization‘ as their main project of the government, while others 
wanted the state to be entirely based on Islamic law. The approach of the first was 
progressive while the second was militant (known as Political Islam ideology—See: 
(Federspiel, 1998). Political Islam in Indonesia thus contained divergent ideologies 
which sometimes coexisted within a single organization. Despite the minority status 
of this group within Muhammadiyah, it had affected national policy since the 
foundation of the republic in 1945. In the final years of Suharto‘s regime, this group 
again had an important role to play as the principal lever to bridge Muhammadiyah 
with the NU, the two largest Islamic organizations in Indonesia.  
 
Since the Indonesian archipelago is incontestably among the most heterogenic 
countries in the world, Gus Dur believed that tolerance of religious differences was 
essential for national unity, and he thus applied this ‗secular‘ principle to the NU. 
Therefore, rather than being an ‗exclusive‘ organization with a rigid dogma, Gus Dur 
wanted the NU to be a tolerant organization despite its traditional character. Across 
the archipelago, therefore, Gus Dur promoted religious tolerance (See: Suaidi, 
2009). This made him even more popular, not only amongst the Islamist groups but 
also amongst non-Islam religions existing in Indonesia. In doing so, Gus Dur also 
denounced the ‗Political Islam‘ ideology as intolerant and having the potential to 
alienate religious minorities in Indonesia (with reference of insurgencies orchestrated 
by radical Islamist in West Java during 1950s and in Aceh of the contemporary 
period)266. 
 
Perhaps, in primordial terms, there was a demagogic threat. Like any other 
ideological movement, political Islam had the cynical propensity to deliberately 
exploit religious sentiments to support their own search for power. In a country like 
Indonesia with a long history of authoritarianism, there were sufficient reasons for the 
people to fear that any ideology starting as a sincere moral movement could later be 
diverted and misused once the defender of the ideology had stayed in power for 
some time. The vehement opposition of Gus Dur to ‗political Islam‘ was focused on 
the radical approach of this group, while he seemed unaware of the possibility that 
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the group could have institutional interests. In fact, Gus Dur was opposed not only to 
Political Islam, but actually to the Islamic modernists as a whole. This position 
distinguished NU from other existing Islamist groups in Indonesia, especially 
Muhammadiyah. 
 
Actually, as a puritan-reformist movement, Muhammadiyah also sought to resolve 
the apparent conflict between indigenous belief and Middle Eastern orthodoxy. 
Among these beliefs was a symbolic mystical belief in relations with the ‗Javanese 
Islam‘, a typical religion which syncretized the middle eastern orthodoxy and the 
native Javanese culture (See: Geertz, 1976). Even though in doctrinal terms 
Muhammadiyah defied the principles defended by the NU, in more practical terms, it 
obviously encroached on the traditional syncretism of the NU. These factors made 
the two organizations aggressively compete to recruit new members in Java. 
Undoubtedly, this situation had also contributed to Gus Dur‘s unfailing opposition to 
modernist Islam and Muhammadiyah. In the 1980s, however, the two organizations 
had the same ‗enemy‘: Suharto.  
 
By the beginning of the 1980s, the New Order had practically been successful in co-
opting political activities in practically all layers of the society, the strategy that was 
canalized through schools, media, associations and professional groups (see; 
chapter 6, section 6.2). Meanwhile, the increasingly educated Moslem youths faced 
a shortage of establishments sufficiently independent to express their ideas on the 
political future of the country. Many thus turned to a place of ‗refuge‘, using the 
mosque for political purposes with the pretext of religious activities. Thus, Suharto in 
spite of his strict control towards every layer of the society still allowed a political 
space in which ‗Political Islam‘ could thrive. 
 
In the later period, however, such freedom of religious activities transformed 
themselves into the more political ones as the networks of modern Islam mosques 
developed very quickly throughout the country267. In addition to the attractive 
religious speeches that they developed, these networks now set up other 
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possibilities: ‗religious‘ organizations within communities which were at the same 
time sophisticated channels for their messages, ideas, as well as communication 
media. Being aware of the Islamic revolution which had shaken Iran, Suharto wished 
to thwart such a development amongst Modernist Islam. This mission would be 
entrusted to General Benny Moerdani. 
 
As well as being an expert in secret operations, and especially ‗underhand tactics‘ 
(see: chapter 4), Moerdani was also a devout catholic with a major aversion to Islam. 
The intelligence units of Moerdani had effectively carried out a bloody campaign 
against the Islamists throughout 1980s, and this policy brought about widespread 
hostility towards radical Moslems, including within the armed forces themselves 
(Aspinall, 2005, p.33-40). In the later period, the campaign of Moerdani produced a 
result opposite to that expected: while the objective of the operation was aimed to 
destroy the organizational capacity of modernist Islam, the result was of the contrary 
for it also led the moderate Moslems within this group to radicalize themselves268. 
Despite Moerdani‘s intensive ‗attack‘, Political Islam was developing unrelentingly. 
 
By 1990, Suharto started to become aware that the awkward approach of Moerdani 
was a dead end and had the tendency to create martyrs, radicalized critics of his 
regime, and perhaps growing dissent within the army. Giving up with the use naked 
force, Suharto chose a better strategy, namely co-optation269. After almost a decade 
of antagonism with respect to the leaders of Political Islam, the president started to 
support them by offering facilities, advantages and power. The showpiece of this 
tactic was the creation of Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia-the Association of 
the Islamic Intellectuals (ICMI) in December 1990. 
 
The idea of creating ICMI came from a varied group of influential Islamic thinkers. 
Discussions were intensive and frequent, with the dominant issue being whether the 
new organization would help modernist Islam to influence the government or vice 
versa (Vatikiotis, 1994, p.133-134). Suharto, for his part, clearly envisaged being 
able manipulate the ICMI to suit his own political interests and chose a figure 
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amongst his most loyal circle to direct this ‗high profile‘ organization: the Minister for 
research and technology, B.J. Habibie. Habibie‘s appointment was greeted with 
suspicion among Modernist Islamists, but in fact this decision was politically brilliant. 
It was obvious that Habibie‘s accession to the ICMI‘s leadership was due to the fact 
that he was one of the most dedicated ‗servants‘ of Suharto, while he would not be 
considered as a threat by the Islamists. He was known as a figure with no political 
ambitions so that the Modernist Islamists were of the belief that he would not play 
the same game as Moerdani270. In fact, Moslem intellectuals of ICMI understood that 
in order to survive, they needed the support of Suharto and sought to maintain 
harmonious relations with the regime. The ICMI and Habibie, thus, were well 
matched. Although the ICMI is a relatively moderate organization, Habibie (who was 
the Minister for technologies in Suharto‘s sixth cabinet) in practice had to make 
frequent incursions into Political Islam and intensive interactions with this group, the 
activities which sooner or later affirmed him as a prominent figure amongst the 
Islamist groups at the national scene. 
 
The creation of ICMI had also helped certain figures gain national prominence; 
among them a professor of Political Science from a prestigious university in the 
central part of Java: Amien Rais. During his career as a lecturer, Rais had vigorously 
defended Islamic modernism while at his initial career in politics, occasionally Rais 
launched statements of anti-Christians and anti-Chinese (Forrester, 1999, p.68). 
These occasional remarks were of course polemical in nature, but they also helped 
Rais to understand the mobility of Political Islam in the archipelago. When the ICMI 
was formed, Rais was among the Modern Islamist politicians who clearly intended to 
make use of the organization as a lever for his political ambitions (Forrester, 1999, 
Ibid.). This reinforces the truism that one serves an institution only insofar as it 
serves oneself. 
 
While entering into Suharto‘s game, Rais used his attachment to the ICMI to create a 
national platform in support of Islamic modernism. In 1995, he was rewarded by what 
was unquestionably the most influential position in the community of Modernist 
Islam: the president of Muhammadiyah. In exchange of his engagement with the 
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political force which was to abstain from criticizing Suharto, he obtained at the same 
time considerable support from Modernist Islam through Muhammadiyah. This 
development had also reinforced his status, which now rivaled that of Gus Dur from 
the NU. 
 
Until the beginning of 1990s, Gus Dur and the NU had remained ‗remote‘ from 
national policy making, the same position as during the pogrom of Moerdani in the 
1980s. In such a situation Gus Dur had shown himself and his organization to be 
neither the defender not the opponent of Suharto. However, this political posture 
changed immediately with the appearance of the ICMI in 1990. Gus Dur warned 
Suharto of the existence within the ICMI of certain groups who used to support the 
Modernist Islam —who were threatening national unity by promoting intolerance---
but since 1990 (the year of ICMI‘s establishment), this groups would end up at 
haunting them (Hefner, 2000, p.50). Irritated by this warning, Suharto started to 
threaten those who did not support the establishment of the ICMI, an approach 
which made Gus Dur become more ‗talkative‘ and take a less moderate stance 
(Purdey, 2006, p.17). At the beginning of 1991, he founded his own organization, the 
Democratic Forum (Barton, 2002, p.184). As a reaction to the adhesion of modern 
Islamist intellectuals to ICMI, despite the threatening statements from Suharto, the 
Democratic Forum of Gus Dur started to weave close relations with the reformer-
leaders of the PDI (Barton, 2002, p.184-186). 
 
Suharto took action without delay to respond to this development in the political 
landscape. In 1994, when the NU prepared to re-elect Gus Dur for his third tenure as 
NU leader, the political advisers of the president pulled the strings to prevent his re-
election and to support a more obedient figure. This operation almost succeeded: 
Gus Dur was re-elected by only a very narrow margin (See: Barton, 2002, p.204). At 
this moment, Suharto suffered another failure, that of the ‗Megawati operation‘. 
Together, Gus Dur and Megawati continued to agitate against Suharto. 
 
Suharto‘s decision to directly intervene in PDI had obviously brought a significant 
‗evil‘ to the political balance in Indonesia during his later period. For more than two 
decades, the president had intelligently used the PDI and the Islamic party, PPP for 
his political ends. During the general election to be held once every five years, these 
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political parties usually obtained a vote which never reflected a real threat to the 
regime. During this time, meanwhile, the PDI and the PPP gave the impression to 
the public of their independence (relatively like the opposition parties). In the mean 
time Suharto could use this ‗illusion‘ to maintain his authoritative regime within a 
democratic ‗standard‘ which Brooker called ‗disguised democracy‘ (See: Brooker, 
2009) . But when he usurped Megawati‘s position by force in 1996, Suharto 
destroyed the last vestiges of the PDI‘s independence. It was very clear that the 
voters would be diverted into Non-Golkar parties or to abstain at the next legislative 
election. To abstain from the vote, however, was illegal and thus the sympathizers of 
the PDI (which was now under Suryadi‘s leadership) tended to vote an alternative 
‗party‘ in order to express their opposition to government‘s ‗Golkar‘ party. The only 
available alternative was the PPP, the Islamist party which did not have relations 
with either Gus Dur or the ICMI. 
 
The PPP was born at the end of 1970s as the result of the forced regrouping of 
various Islamic parties (including the NU271) as part of Suharto‘s efforts at political 
stabilization (See: chapter 3). But in the mid-1980s, Gus Dur had to withdraw his 
support for this party. Since that time, the party had fallen under the influence of 
Modernist Islam as well as other figures of the ICMI (who were the traditional 
adversaries of Gus Dur). In the 1997 election, however, Gur Dur‘s support for this 
party had the possibility of returning. Even though the PPP seemed to be far from 
capable of becoming a coherent opposition party, it had a unique opportunity due to 
the political dynamics of the country: it had the potential to be a significant political 
force as it gathered figures and factions dissatisfied with the regime.  
 
Later political developments, however, showed this prediction to be wrong and 
revealed that the golden opportunity of the PPP was only temporary. Being obliged 
to take a political stance, Gus Dur oscillated between support of the PPP against 
Suharto‘s regime; support of Golkar against modernist Islam; and neutrality. In a 
decision which distilled doubts about his commitment to democratic principles, Gus 
Dur gave up his pro-democratic rhetoric and lined up with Golkar-- supporting 
Suharto. In Java East, the home of NU‘s major constituency, enigmatic 
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ecclesiasticism (Gus Dur) was seen on a platform accompanied by the oldest 
daughter of Suharto (Tutut Suharto) and general Hartono, the chief of the army. 
Later, Gus Dur also took part in the election of the members of the National 
Assembly, the ‗chosen‘ body to re-elect Suharto as president every five years 
(Barton, 2002, p.290-293).  
 
The co-optation of Gus Dur by Golkar constituted another windfall for Suharto. The 
results of the next legislative election, announced in June 1997, came without much 
surprise---Golkar gained its sixth victory (see: table 1). Previously, Suharto had 
wedged Gus Dur and forced him to capitulate in spite of the dissatisfaction of political 
elites, but now Suharto was co-opting political elites and the state with outstanding 
success. 
 
When the National Assembly held a session in 1998, there was not even the 
slightest doubt that the 77 year-old Suharto was going to be re-elected for his 
seventh reign. The only question was whom Suharto would choose as his vice-
president. Suharto‘s decision on this matter was very important, as the chosen vice 
president would have a big opportunity to be his successor. Meanwhile, entering the 
last half of 1997, the Indonesian economy continued to fall and Suharto‘s power 
started to dwindle (see: chapter 5, section: 5.4). However, the president always 
refused to choose a successor, while, in his absence, the physical health of Suharto 
became the main object of speculation amongst the public (chapter 5, Ibid.). The 
major concern was that Suharto‘s sudden disappearance might provoke a political 
crisis which would damage the economy. 
 
By the end of 1997, the American government started to take a sterner stance 
towards Jakarta. This was partly because a number of conservative members of the 
congress did not see any hope of Suharto regime implementing serious reforms 
despite the fact that American taxpayer money had been channeled into the 
Indonesian economy (Kivimaki, 2003, p.219-227). At the other pole, liberal activists 
within the congress emphasized the importance of applying more pressure to 
Suharto over human rights and specific issues such as the problem of East Timor 
(Kivimaki, 2003, p.228-230) 
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The American official pressures on Suharto came too late and had little impact on 
the events in Jakarta. When the Secretary of State of the United States, Madeleine 
Albright, encouraged Suharto to resign within several days of the statement 
(Tuesday May 20), the reformers in Indonesia considered the announcement an 
additional ‗insult‘ from the American government, seeing as for more than thirty years 
Washington had been giving full back-up to Suharto‘s regime (during which time the 
Indonesian reformers were ignored) (Kivimaki, 2003, p.2). The impression became 
stronger, especially in the last minutes of Suharto‘s reign, that America‘s actions 
were nothing more than official pressure on Suharto to stabilize the economy. In fact, 
the majority of foreign powers were worried by the prospect of greater political and 
economic chaos if Suharto left power (Kivimaki, 2003, Ibid). Despite all pressures, 
from inside and from outside, the end of the reign of Suharto seemed still irreversible 
on the 20th of May. It was only at 9am in the morning of May 21st, when Suharto 
announced his resignation, that the ‗Wind of change‘ was obvious for the 
stakeholders of Indonesian politics272. 
 
From the analysis of the factors leading to the fall of Suharto‘s regime, there is a 
strong impression that an alliance between political elites, students and the army 
against the regime did exist, but there is so far no clear evidence of this ‗conspiracy 
theory‘. Even though there were no signs of interaction between these three actors, 
the soldiers seemed to support the change of regime273. As mentioned in chapter 4, 
the doctrine of the ‗double function‘ gave political rights to the army to interfere 
whenever the ‗safety of the State‘ was ‗in danger‘, while the instability from the 
beginning of May should have provided more than enough reason for a ‗praetorian‘ 
intervention. Therefore, it might be worth speculating that the support of the soldiers 
for the people‘s mobilization (by abstaining) was amongst the main factors which led 
to the fall of the regime; or, that this kind of position was taken merely because the 
army did not want to further provoke the people‘s anger following certain incidents in 
the previous period; or, that the soldiers might simply want to preserve their prestige 
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and power in the case of regime change. The elites, especially those from the 
progressive-wing, seemed to face a situation similar to that of the army. There was 
no doubt that the reformers wanted the soldiers to remain distant from the political 
‗soubresouts‘—as there was political certainty despite instability. So, the reformers 
expected the soldiers to stay where they were, but wished them to make efforts to 
ensure the stability after the departure of Suharto. Nevertheless, up to the day of 
Suharto‘s resignation, nobody was sure which role the soldiers would, or even could, 
play. 
 
As a transitory successor, vice-president Habibie was going to take an oath a few 
moments after Suharto read his statement of resignation. However, as the transition 
was ‗confusing‘ and abrupt, the end of Suharto‘s regime left Indonesia in political 
chaos. The only hope was that, after the departure of Suharto, political reform and 
the economic re-establishment would follow. The immediate problem was that 
Habibie‘s reign lacked legitimacy (See: chapter 3). 
 
To end this chapter, it is worth to have a look into Dan Slater‘s unpublished thesis on 
Southeast Asian state and to give a brief comment on it.  
 
―Like the postcolonial world more generally, Southeast Asia exhibits tremendous 
variation in state capacity and authoritarian durability. Ordering Power draws on 
theoretical insights dating back to Thomas Hobbes to develop a unified framework 
for explaining both of these political outcomes. States are especially strong and 
dictatorships especially durable when they have their origins in 'protection pacts': 
broad elite coalitions unified by shared support for heightened state power and 
tightened authoritarian controls as bulwarks against especially threatening and 
challenging types of contentious politics" (Slater, 2005, no page). 
 
If such a ‗protection pact‘ existed in Indonesia during Suharto‘s presidential 
monarchy, then it would have been disrupted by the factors and crises that have 
been presented as explanations for the late 1990s collapse of Suharto‘s dictatorship 
and so for the opportunity to democratise Indonesia‘s state. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
 
This conclusion collates and sums up the findings of the research in the previous 
chapters, and then briefly evaluates the usefulness of the paradigm developed for 
this project and applied in the research. The collating of the research findings on 
capabilities will confirm the thesis‘s argument that Indonesia was a prime example of 
a ‗new‘ state experiencing the mechanical type of development and will therefore 
have confirmed the thesis‘s explanation of what occurred to the Indonesian state 
after the 1950s. The summation will deal with: 1) the controversies involved in the 
pre-independence era and 2) the factors involved in the pre-democratisation period 
will confirm that these controversies and factors help to explain why Indonesia 
imitated a Western model of the ‗modern‘ state during the 1940s and 1950s and 
returned to democracy in the 1990s after some forty years of dictatorship. 
 
 
Collating the Four Versions‟ Capabilities 
 
As was described in chapter one, the first version of the Indonesian state, the 
parliamentary democracy of the 1950s, had highly complex policymaking institutions. 
However, Version 1 showed a low capability in the three areas of: 1) achieving legal 
legitimacy; 2) controlling the military and; 3) dealing with political disorder (see 
Appendix 3, Fig. 1). So this overall markedly low capability was very disproportionate 
to the highly complex nature of its policymaking institutions – and very typical of 
mechanical rather than organic state development. 
 
The low capability of Version I for achieving legal legitimacy was described in 
chapter three and was indicated mainly by the state‘s inability to implement 
programmes and display governmental stability, particularly due to the short life of 
Indonesian cabinets. The government was not stable because it lacked support from 
a ruling party claiming the majority of support or support from a solid coalition in the 
parliament. The result was permanent deadlocks among political parties often 
escalating into extra-parliamentary conflicts and frictions causing ruling cabinets to 
fall.  
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Version 1‘s low capability for controlling the military was described in chapter four. 
Despite a high degree of efficiency and loyalty to the state, the Indonesian military 
during this period was extremely disorganized and not under the control of the 
civilian government. The soldiers were ‗in the hands‘ of military commanders in 
regions or units rather than being commanded by the formal government: a) because 
these military units were ‗self-created‘ amidst the reluctance of the civilian political 
leadership to raise a formal army following the end of the Japanese occupation and; 
b) because of the high level of political uncertainty from the period of revolution until 
mid-1950s. As a result, the Indonesian military under Version 1 was relatively 
independent from the civilian government, and, in fact, were more loyal to the military 
commanders than to civilian leaders. 
 
The low capability of Version 1 for dealing with political disorder was described in 
chapters five and six. The state was incapable of handling the on-going disorders, 
especially in the regions, because of the complexities resulting from the uncertain 
political situation at both the domestic and international levels, and also because of 
the intensive disagreement amongst elites and social groups over the fragmentation 
of state ideology. Combined with the inability of civilian leaders to control the military, 
those weaknesses produced political tensions and rebellious movements across the 
country during this period, culminating in the separatist revolts that led to martial law 
and the replacement of parliamentary democracy by the personal rule of President 
Sukarno as a civilian presidential monarch.     
 
As was described in chapter one, the shift in the late 1950s to Version 2 of the 
Indonesian state, a civilian presidential monarchy produced a marked reduction in 
the complexity of the policymaking institutions – That is, there was a marked 
reduction in the complexity of the formal policymaking institutions, but the informal 
‗rules of the game‘ of Sukarno‘s presidential monarchy were not markedly less 
complex than those of the parliamentary democracy that it replaced, so the overall 
reduction in complexity was only noticible rather than very marked. However, 
Version 2 showed an increased capability in three areas:  achieving legal legitimacy; 
controlling the military; and dealing with political disorder (see Appendix 3, Fig. 2). 
So this overall increased capability was very disproportionate to the marked 
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reduction in the complexity of the state‘s policymaking institutions and, as with the 
case of Version 1, was very typical of mechanical rather than organic state 
development. 
 
Version 2‘s capability for achieving legal legitimacy was described in chapter three 
as higher than that of Version 1, but not as great as what might have been achieved 
by a presidential democracy rather than presidential monarchy. Sukarno‘s 
charismatic leadership as the ‗founding father‘ and presidential monarch of Indonesia 
increased the legitimacy of the state as well as the legitimacy of his personal rule. 
Nonetheless, because he made himself a presidential monarch – a President ‗for life‘ 
– he did not strengthen the legal legitimacy of the state in the way that, for example, 
the similarly charismatic George Washington strengthened the legal legitimacy of the 
newly created USA by serving only two four-year terms as President, and then 
refusing to seek another term. 
 
Similarly, Version 2‘s capability for controlling the military was described in chapter 
four as being higher than that of Version 1 but not as great as might have been 
attained by transforming the military into a  professional army. The civilian President 
Sukarno attempted to transform the Indonesian military into an unusual form of the 
revolutionary type of army which would be loyal to his Pancasila ideology, and to him 
personally as the leader of the revolution and the country‘s presidential monarch. 
The limits of this personal loyalty were revealed in 1965-1966, when the military 
replaced Sukarno with one of its commander, General Suharto.     
 
The capability of Version 2 for dealing with political disorder was described in 
chapters five and six as being higher than that of Version 1, but again not as high as 
that which might have been attained by different methods. Despite Version 2‘s higher 
capability in controlling the military, its capability for dealing with political disorder 
was undermined by political factors, especially Sukarno‘s failure to reduce the 
disappointment among Islamists and leftists with his attempt to create national unity 
by re-adopting  the 1945 Constitution and its commitment to Pancasila.  The country 
therefore continued to experience social tumults and rebellious acts which 
culminated in 1965 with the communist-backed attempted coup d‘etat by a small 
faction within the military. Although the army dealt with this threat by defeating the 
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coup and destroying the communist movement, it was a tragic event that led to 
Sukarno being removed from the throne of his presidential monarchy and being 
replaced by a military man – General Suharto.  
  
As has already been described above, this shift in the late 1960s to Version 3 of the 
Indonesian state produced a minor reduction in the complexity of the state‘s 
policymaking institutions. However, General Suharto‘s presidential monarchy 
showed a significant overall increase in capability across the three areas, a pattern 
that was more complicated than those of the previous two versions (see Fig. 3 in 
Appendix 3). The capability of  Version 3 for achieving legal legitimacy was about the 
same as Version 2‘s, the capability for controlling the military was markedly higher 
than Version 2‘s and the capability for dealing with political disorder was higher, not 
markedly higher, than Version 2‘s. Therefore it was typical of mechanical rather than 
organic state development but was not as obviously mechanical as in the case of 
Versions 1 and 2. 
 
The capability of Version 3 for achieving legal legitimacy was described in Chapter 
Three as being about the same as Sukarno‘s civilian rather than military form of 
presidential monarchy. Although General Suharto lacked the charismatic legitimacy 
of Sukarno, he achieved some performance legitimacy – through political stability 
and economic growth – that increased the legitimacy of the state. However, like 
Sukarno, by establishing a presidential monarchy he was personalising rather than 
legalising the government‘s ‗right to rule‘.   
 
Version 3‘s military rather than civilian form of presidential monarchy was predictably 
more capable of controlling the military and Chapter Four described how it attained a 
markedly higher capability than Version 2.  General Suharto became the leader of 
the military, reduced its policymaking influence and emphasised military 
professionalism more than President Sukarno had during his short reign as a 
presidential monarch. During the General‘s long reign as a presidential monarch he 
seems to have been unknowingly preparing the military for the professional role it is 
supposed to have in Version 4 of the Indonesian state.  
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The higher capability of Version 3 than Version 2 for dealing with political disorder 
was not as marked an increase as the increase in capability for controlling the 
military. Chapters Five and Six described how General Suharto‘s presidential 
monarchy had continuing problems with political disorder, even if the dilemma of 
East Timor is viewed as a special case and one that would have been more 
problematic for Versions 1 and 2 if they had been faced with it. Perhaps the best 
evidence of Version 3‘s higher but not markedly higher, capability for dealing with 
political disorder is that the fall of General Suharto‘s presidential monarchy in 1998 
was not associated with the sort of violence seen in 1965 during the failed factional 
coup and its anti-communist aftermath, but was associated with some political 
disorder. Indonesian politics were still not very ‗orderly‘ even after nearly half a 
century of independence and three different versions of the state.   
 
As was described in chapter one, the shift in the late 1990s towards democratisation 
led to the presidential democracy of Version 4 and a marked increase in the 
complexity of the state‘s formal and informal policymaking institutions. However, 
Version 4 of the Indonesian state has shown about the same capability overall as the 
military presidential monarchy of Version 3, even if the pattern of capability across 
the three areas is more complicated than in the case of that earlier version. The new 
democracy‘s capability for achieving legal legitimacy was higher than Version 3‘s but 
the capability for controlling the military was lower than Version 3‘s, and the 
capability for dealing with political disorder was about the same as Version 3‘s (see: 
Appendix 3, Fig. 4). So the overall capability was about the same and therefore not 
proportional to the marked increase in the complexity of the policymaking institutions 
but was not very disproportional. Again, this was typical of mechanical rather than 
organic state development, but was not as obviously mechanical as in the case of 
Versions 1 and 2. 
 
The capability of Version 4 for achieving legal legitimacy was higher than that of 
General Suharto‘s presidential monarchy because, as was described in chapter 
three, it was replacing his personal rule with the legally legitimate rule of 
democratically elected Presidents – who have also avoided the political problems 
that prevented Version 1‘s parliamentary democracy from achieving much legal 
legitimacy. In contrast, chapter four described how Version 4‘s capability for 
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controlling the military has been lower than that of General Suharto‘s military 
presidential monarchy, because the new democracy‘s elected civilian leaders have 
not been leaders of the military and because the Indonesian military is still not as 
professional as those in Western democracies or in India, Malaysia and Singapore. 
Finally, chapters five and six described how the capability of Version 4 for dealing 
with political disorder has been about the same as that of General Suharto‘s 
presidential monarchy, for the new democracy has not had to face the special case 
of East Timor but has still had to deal with separatist and Islamist insurgencies.       
 
To conclude this collation of the research findings on capability, it will be argued that 
they have provided strong evidence that Indonesia‘s state development from the 
1950s to the 1990s was indeed a prime example of the mechanical type of state 
development. It is strong evidence because all four versions of the Indonesian state 
show a lack of proportionality between: 1) complexity of policymaking institutions 
and; 2) capability in the three important areas for a new state of achieving legal 
legitimacy, controlling the military and dealing with political disorder. This might not 
appear to be very strong evidence because there is some variation in the degree of 
disproportion, both within and among versions, but such variation is only to be 
expected and is also typical of mechanical development – which differs from the 
organic in its lack of predictability, not in having a predictable degree of 
disproportionate relationship between complexity and capability. 
 
 
Summing up the pre-independence controversies and pre-democratisation 
factors  
 
A summing of chapters two and seven is concerned with explanations of why 
particular things occurred in the development of the Indonesian state rather than with 
explaining what occurred to this new state during its half-century of development 
from the 1950s to the 1990s. Chapter two described the pre-independence debates 
and controversies that help to explain why Indonesia adopted a Western, not Islamic, 
model of the state. These debates and controversies were related to two major 
issues or problems: the basis for a unitary rather then federal state and the secular 
versus Islamic nature of the new state‘s Constitution.  
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The controversy over the basis for a unitary Indonesian state involved an extreme 
polarisation in the perspectives of elites and other elements of Indonesian society 
because: 1) Indonesia had no real nationalist roots in the pre-colonial period and; 2) 
Indonesia is one of the most heterogeneous countries in the world in terms of 
ethnicity, religion, culture, and territorial divisions – and this extreme heterogeneity 
and diversity is also obvious in politics, society and the economy.  
 
The debate over the secular versus Islamic nature of the state Constitution involved 
arduous competition between two dominant groups within the new state: Islamists 
and nationalists. The debate between exponents of the Shari‘a and exponents of 
secular ideologies led to the creation of a ‗compromise‘ ideology, Pancasila, which 
was enforced – despite the opposition of the Islamist majority – under the pretext of 
protecting national unity. The Islamist majority accepted Pancasila but only half-
heartedly and only: 1) because the state of emergency meant that a new state had to 
be established in the shortest possible time; 2) because of the critical circumstances 
related to the possible return of Dutch colonial power through intervention by the 
United Nations and 3) because the secular 1945 Constitution, with its declaration of 
support for Pancasila, was stated by Sukarno to be ‗temporary, swift, and 
revolutiegrondwet‘ and he promised to create a more comprehensive constitution at 
a later date. 
 
The 1945 Constitution was indeed replaced in 1950 by a new constitution, which was 
the constitutional basis of Indonesia‘s new, independent state and of its first version 
of a Western model of the state. This seems surprising because the 1950 
Constitution was secular, did not refer to Pancasila, and was a parliamentary-
democracy version of the Western model of the state. The question then becomes, 
why did Indonesia opt for the 1950 Constitution instead of adopting the presidential-
democracy version that it had developed, with ‗local‘ modifications, in the Pancasila-
supporting 1945 Constitution? However, this is a topic for further research in another 
thesis or book. The key question here is why pre-independence Indonesia opted for 
a Western, not Islamic, model of the state and therefore created the opportunity for 
adopting in 1950 the parliamentary-democracy version of the Western model – and 
for later adopting three other versions of the Western model of the state. It is this 
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question that chapter two answers in its description of the pre-independence 
controversies and debates concerning the nature of the new state that would be 
created when Indonesia became independent.     
 
Similarly, chapter seven describes some factors that help to explain why Indonesia 
democratised in the late 1990s and therefore created the opportunity for adopting the 
presidential-democracy version of the Western model of state. The chapter has not 
attempted to explain why democratising Indonesia chose a presidential rather than 
parliamentary version of democracy or, in other words, why Indonesia developed a 
new, presidential-democracy version of the state instead of returning to the 
parliamentary democracy of version 1. Instead chapter seven identifies factors that 
were crucial in bringing about the democratisation that brought down Suharto‘s 
presidential monarchy and ensured that it would be replaced by a democratic version 
– whether presidential, semi-presidential or parliamentary – of the Western model of 
the state. 
 
These democratising factors can be summed up as four different but interacting 
crises afflicting Suharto‘s presidential monarchy: 1) an economic crisis; 2) a political 
crisis; 3) a crisis in the presidential monarchy‘s military support and; 4) a crisis in the 
presidential monarchy‘s use of semi-competitive elections to provide it with a 
democratic disguise.  The economic crisis arose from the 1997 Asian Economic 
Crisis, which led to low investment, capital flight, a failed banking system, a KKN 
(corruption, complicity, and nepotism) pandemic, decreasing international monetary 
backup, a wave of unemployment, and a drop in economic productivity. The political 
crisis arose from a rapid decrease of political support for Suharto‘s regime, with 
increasing pressure from students and intellectual circles and even from elites within 
the Parliament and National Assembly. The crisis in military support arose from an 
anti-Suharto inclination amongst the generals, the military‘s re-orientation towards 
professionalism, and tacit military support for the political opposition to Suharto. (This 
crisis was particularly threatening to stability because the military had been the key 
supporters of Suharto, who had become the leader of the military and had relied on 
their support as his loyal followers not merely as self-interested allies who supported 
him for the same sort of self-interested reasons that they had supported Sukarno 
until they removed him in 1966). The crisis in the use of semi-competitive elections 
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arose from the disintegration of three-party semi-competitive system because two of 
the three parties, the PPP/Islamists and PDI/Nationalists, were losing their 
supporters after : a) the two biggest Muslim organizations in the country (NU and 
Muhammadiyah) had withdraw their support from the PPP and; b) the growth of a 
new nationalist party (led by the daughter of the long-dead Sukarno) that had 
become the main rival of President Suharto‘s political status quo.  
 
The factors associated with these four interacting crises were more than sufficient to 
bring down Suharto‘s presidential monarchy and it is perhaps surprising that his 
dictatorship had a lenghtly survival from the 1970s to the 1990s global wave of 
democratisation. With Indonesia finally following the global democratizing trend, it 
was a question of what form of democracy would be introduced to replace Suharto‘s 
presidential monarchy. The choice of a presidential rather than parliamentary form of 
democracy may have been predictable but chapter seven was not concerned with 
explaining why Indonesia developed a new, fourth version of the Western model of 
the state instead of returning to the parliamentary democracy of the first version: 
That too is a topic for ‗further research‘.  
  
Evaluating the paradigm 
 
The usefulness of the organic-versus-mechanical typology of state development is 
limited to explaining what form of state development occurred in Indonesia from  the 
1950s to the 1990s. It may not be as useful in explaining why state development 
took this form, and indeed why it produced these four particular versions of the state 
and in this particular sequence – parliamentary democracy, civilian presidential 
monarchy, military presidential monarchy and presidential democracy. In fact the 
paradigm has been a disappointment as a means of explaining the sequences of 
these developments, and clearly it needs more articulation so that it will provide 
some theories about why state development took this form, produced these 
particular versions and produced them at these particular times in the modern history 
of Indonesia.   
   
This development of the paradigm seems to be in line with what Thomas S. Kuhn 
suggested in the classic definition of a scientific paradigm that he provided in his 
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book The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.  ‗A paradigm is an accepted model or 
pattern‘ and in a science ‗is an object for further articulation and specification under 
new or more stringent conditions‘ (Kuhn, 1970, p.23). So the organic-mechanical 
paradigm of state development should be subjected to the ‗further articulation and 
specification‘ of developing some theories that explain why this form, in these 
versions and at these times. Clearly such theories are also testing the paradigm 
‗under new or more stringent conditions‘ but another way of adding new or more 
stringent conditions would be to apply the paradigm to a broader range of examples 
and issues than just the Indonesian case and the issues that arise from it. For 
example, the paradigm might be applied to the many other post-colonial ‗new‘ states 
that, like Indonesia, became independent in the 1940s-60s era. Or it might be 
applied to another historical era, such as the creation and development of post-
colonial ‗new‘ states in the American hemisphere in the 1700s-1800s or even the 
creation and development of the European states – the ‗old‘ states – by explaining 
why France experienced that predominantly mechanical type of state development in 
the 1789 to 1958 era of the First to Fifth Republics that is described in the thesis‘s 
Appendix 2. 
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APPENDIX 
 
 
Appendix 1 
ANDERSON‟S VIEW OF THE INDONESIAN STATE 
  
Though this thesis has touched upon recent secondary literature, it is important to 
mention one of the earlier analysis as well. In particular it should be remembered 
that Benedict Anderson‘s classic 1983 paper on Indonesia‘s state development, ‗Old 
State, New Society: Indonesia‘s New Order in Comparative Historical Perspective‘, 
focused on the state‘s policy-implementing rather than policymaking institutions – on 
the civil service and military organisations rather than on institutions such as the 
Presidency and parliament. Anderson viewed the state as a single institution 
consisting of administrative and military organisations, that he could readily use to 
make local historical comparisons with the colonial state apparatus used for 
centuries by the Dutch imperialists to rule the territories that later became the 
independent country of Indonesia (Anderson, 1983b, p.477, 478-80).  The Dutch 
colonial state that ruled pre-independence Indonesia had administrative and military 
organisations that are comparable to the independent state of Indonesia‘s civil 
service and military organisations, but the Dutch colonial state lacked anything 
comparable to an elected (directly or indirectly) President or an elected 
parliamentary representative assembly. 
  
From Anderson‘s perspective, policymaking and representational institutions such as 
an elected President and an elected parliament express the nation‘s or society‘s 
general interests – as distinct from or even opposed to the general interests of the 
state (Anderson, 1983b, Ibid). For example, he described Indonesia‘s 1950s 
experience with parliamentary democracy as a case of the ‗preponderance of nation 
and society over state‘, with the ‗weakness of the state‘ arising from the lack of a 
‗coherent civil bureaucracy‘ and of ‗centralized, professionalized armed forces‘ 
(Anderson, 1983b, p.482). In terms of the Western model of the state, the 1950s saw 
its parliamentary and Cabinet policymaking institutions operating more effectively 
than its policy-implementing institutions of civil service and military organisations. But 
in terms of Anderson‘s perspective on the state this period was one of state 
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weakness that ended only after President Sukarno and his military supporters 
cancelle parliamentary democracy in the late 1950s and replaced it with a form of 
non-democratic rule. Anderson described this late 1950s shift from democracy to 
dictatorship as ‗two powerful forces‘, the army and Sukarno, coming  ‗to the rescue 
of the state‘ and being responsible for  a relatively smooth  ‗transition from 
―parliamentary‖ to ―Guided Democracy‖‘ (Anderson, 1983b, p.483, 484).  
  
In the late 1960s General Suharto and the army replaced Guided Democracy and 
President Sukarno with the New Order and President Suharto – with even better 
results for the state‘s policy-implementing institutions. Anderson argued that the New 
Order policy outcomes ‗are best understood as maximal expressions of state 
interests‘, and the ‗consistent leitmotiv of New Order governance has been the 
strengthening of the state-qua-state‘ (Anderson, 1983b, p.478, 488).  However, he 
also pointed out that the state‘s military policy-implementing organisations did not 
benefit as much as the civil service from the New Order: 
  
One of the most curious aspects of New Order policy – given the regime‘s 
domination by the military – has been its neglect of the armed forces as armed 
forces, both in terms of basic amenities for the lower ranks and in terms of 
equipment and training. … The fact is that for a nation of Indonesia‘s size, 
population and strategic location, her 250 thousand or so strong military remains 
remarkably small, under-armed, and under-trained (Anderson, 1983b, p.492). 
  
In contrast, the civil service‘s administrative officials were certainly not neglected by 
the new regime. The New Order‘s anti-inflationary and other economic successes 
provided the basis for ‗reconstituting the discipline, cohesion, efficacy, and power of 
officialdom‘ and indeed Anderson compares the New Order spending on the civil 
service with ‗the outlays on officialdom in the calm, autocratic days of the colonial 
beamtenstaat [civil servants‘ state]‘ developed by the Dutch imperialists (Anderson, 
1983b, p.488). This implies that when Anderson pointed out that during the 1970s 
President Suharto had built ‗the most powerful state in Indonesia since Dutch 
colonial times‘, he was referring primarily to the state‘s civil service rather than 
military policy-implementing organisations (Anderson, 1983b, p.489). 
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A perspective on state development that includes the state‘s policymaking 
institutions can provide a simple and very realistic (based on the ruler‘s political self-
interest) explanation for why Indonesia‘s military regime favoured the civil service 
rather than the military. As is described in the first chapter of this thesis, during the 
1970s President Suharto personalised the state‘s policymaking, particularly by 
easing the military out of policymaking and confining it to policy-implementation. 
General Suharto had therefore established a personalist military regime, which was 
dominated by him personally rather than by the military as an organisation. Anderson 
described the New Order as an example of Nordlinger‘s ‗ruler-type praetorianism‘ 
category of ‗military-dominated regimes‘ (Anderson, 1983b, p.490). However, 
Nordlinger‘s ruler-type category  of military regime included cases of personal rule by 
a military leader as well as cases of organisational rule by the military – and 
Suharto‘s Indonesia was an example of personal rather than organisational rule 
(Brooker, 2009, p.154). Such personal rule by a military leader may well result in 
surprisingly little outlay by the state on the military as armed forces, as in the classic 
example of the Spanish military under General Franco‘s 1940s-1970s absolutist 
personal rule of Spain (Brooker, 1995, p.146). General Suharto never established a 
Franco-like absolutist leadership position over the Indonesian military, but in fact he 
was a leader and, at the same time, the agent or ally of the military and therefore he 
was politically able to favour the civil service rather than the military in his New Order 
spending policies.            
  
President Suharto‘s politically self-interested reason for favouring the civil service 
was his search for some performance legitimacy to strengthen his newly established 
presidential monarchy, as is described in chapter three of the thesis. Providing the 
Indonesian people with a less corrupt and more effective civil service was an obvious 
way of achieving some performance legitimacy. Another way in which performance 
legitimacy was achieved was through the end of the Sukarno-era hyperinflation and 
by making some progress towards economic development. The economic successes 
of the New Order not only were the basis for its strengthening of the civil service, but 
also directly contributed to Suharto‘s claim to some performance legitimacy. 
  
Suharto‘s politically self-interested search for legitimacy also explains the effort that 
he made to establish a democratic disguise for his presidential monarchy. Anderson 
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described at some length the way in which the ‗state leadership has attempted to 
persuade its audiences that this ―no change‖ [no reintroduction of democracy] future 
is legitimate by insisting that a peculiarly Indonesian form of democracy is already in 
place‘ and by having introduced a system of semi-competitive elections and creating 
an official party, Golkar, to win these elections with a suitably large majority of the 
vote (Anderson, 1983b, p.490, 491-492). The question here is why did  the ‗state 
leadership‘ (Suharto) make such a major institutional effort to bolster the regime‘s 
claim to democratic legitimacy? In contrast, the previous regime (President Sukarno) 
had merely claimed to be a ‗Guided Democracy‘ and had not made any institutional 
effort to bolster that claim to democratic legitimacy – for example, instead of 
instituting a semi-competitive form of parliamentary elections it had introduced a non-
elected form of parliament. 
  
A simple and realistic explanation for this contrast is that Suharto‘s newly established 
presidential monarchy had to make an effort to achieve legitimacy, including some 
democratic legitimacy, because it lacked the charismatic legitimacy of Sukarno‘s 
Guided-Democracy presidential monarchy. Sukarno was a nationalist ‗founding 
father‘ of Indonesia and, as Anderson pointed out, a ‗charismatic figure‘ (Anderson, 
1983b, p.484). The charismatic legitimacy of his presidential monarchy was 
strengthened in the 1960s by his nationalist foreign policies, and in fact these 
policies may well have been motivated by his search for more charismatic legitimacy. 
  
As Anderson noted, there was clearly a personal aspect to the creation as well as 
policymaking of Sukarno‘s Guided Democracy non-democratic regime: 
  
This is not deny that Sukarno had long chafed under the limits imposed on him by 
the parliamentary constitution of 1950 or that he enjoyed the vastly increased 
powers assigned the presidency under that of 1945. Moreover, in protecting the 
parties and popular organizations … he was certainly motivated by a need for 
organized political support as a counterweight to the army. Indeed so concerned 
was he about the army‘s intentions that he went out of his way to show favour to 
the navy, air force and police (Anderson, 1983b, footnote 5). 
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Anderson‘s point about Sukarno‘s favouring of the navy, air force and police 
suggests that the Guided Democracy era was similar to the New Order era in terms 
of personalised policymaking having a major effect on the development of the state‘s 
policy-implementing organisations. In Sukarno‘s case a civilian organisation, the 
police force, was favoured over a military organisation, the army, and within the 
military itself the navy and air force organisations were favoured over the army. 
  
So Anderson‘s classic paper on the Indonesian state highlights the importance of the 
changes in the policymaking institutions that occurred in the shift from parliamentary 
democracy to Sukarno‘s civilian presidential monarchy and then to Suharto‘s military 
presidential monarchy. These changes were important not only because they were 
dramatic changes in key institutions but also because they had marked indirect 
effects on the development of the state‘s policy-implementing organisations – the 
civilian administrative and policing organisations and the military‘s army, navy and air 
force organisations. 
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Appendix 2 
 
FRANCE‟S MECHANICAL DEVELOPMENT 1789-2010 
 
France has been undergoing a predominantly mechanical type of development since 
1789, with a long organic interlude during the Third Republic (1871-1940) and a 
period of organic development during the present Fifth Republic (1958-2010). With 
the outbreak of the French Revolution in 1789, the state went through rapid change 
that transformed a monarchy without cabinet government or even a representative 
assembly (since the seventeenth century) into the parliamentary-ruled republic of 
1793. Although there was a conservative shift in the revolution to government by the 
Directory, France in 1799 was still at least an ‗infant‘ parliamentary democracy, with 
a much larger proportion of the male population than in England being entitled to 
vote in elections to the representative assembly. 
 
The mechanical development continued in the 1800s with the establishment of 
General Napoleon Bonaparte‘s military dictatorship in the 1800s. There was an 
increasing personalisation of his rule as he became First Consul ‗for life‘ and then 
‗Emperor Napoleon‘. This means reintroduction of a hereditary monarchy, with 
Emperor Napoleon intending that his young son would eventually succeed him as 
‗Napoleon II‘, but both steps in the personalisation were ‗democratically‘ legitimised 
by a plebiscite/referendum. ‗Napoleon Bonaparte‘s use of plebiscites (referendums) 
to legitimise his military dictatorship and eventual assumption of the title of Emperor‘ 
has been described as the beginning of a global modernisation of dictatorship: 
‗Bonaparte had put forward a new answer to problem of how to legitimize a military 
seizure of power; he had hypocritically  adopted the ―will of the people‖ principle 
espoused by the democratic ideology of the American and French revolutions‘ 
(Brooker, 2009, p.4). Therefore, the use of plebiscitary or semi-competitive elections 
to legitimise dictatorship would become a standard feature of dictatorial versions of 
the modern state, whether they were military or civilian dictatorships and whether or 
not they involved a personalisation of rule like that instituted by Napoleon.  
 
The 1815 restoration of monarchical rule by a King from the pre-1789 dynasty 
brought a change only in the family that personally possessed power and not until 
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the democratising revolution in 1830 was there some development towards 
parliamentary democracy. However then the 1848 democratising revolution 
produced a shift towards presidential democracy, as the new Constitution replaced 
the monarchy with an elected President as head of government as well as head of 
state. France, therefore, might have imitated the American version of the Western 
model of the state if the first President of France had not instead established a 
dictatorship. The President was the nephew of Napoleon Bonaparte and was named 
Louis-Napoleon Bonaparte so it is perhaps not surprising that he would try to follow 
in his uncle‘s footsteps and transform an infant democracy into a dictatorship. 
However, it was certainly an unpredictable development that Louis-Napoleon would 
create a new design for dictatorship by establishing history‘s first example of the 
populist presidential monarchy. But it will be noted here that the populist form 
created by Louis-Napoleon: 1) does not involve rule by the leader of a military or 
party organization but instead is one-person rule by an elected public official who 
has converted a democracy or democratization into a presidential monarchy. It 
arises from an autogolpe or ‗self-coup‘ by an elected President; 2) relies more on 
popular than military or party support, and it has a distinctively populist tinge to its 
policies, such as conferring benefits on the labour movement and/or the poor. It was 
pioneered by Louis Napoleon, the nephew of Napoleon Bonaparte, after he was 
elected President of France in the aftermath of the 1848 democratizing revolution 
(Brooker, 2009, p.77-78). 
 
In 1851 President Louis-Napoleon staged the autogolpe (self-coup) that transformed 
him into a dictator and created this new design for dictatorship but in 1852, he 
converted himself into a real monarch by exchanging his republican title/office of 
President for that of ‗Emperor Napoleon III‘. This was a very obvious personalisation 
of rule but keeping such ‗modern‘ institutions as a representative assembly and a 
written Constitution. The new, 1852 Constitution increased the power of the 
executive and reduced the legislative power of the representative assembly but 
guaranteed that its lower house would be elected and that all adult males would 
continue to have the right to vote (though the elections were biased in favour of the 
government‘s ‗official‘ candidates and therefore no more than semi-competitive). 
Napoleon III intended to be succeeded by his son the Prince Imperial but a 
disastrous war with Prussia in 1870 produced the Emperor‘s military defeat and 
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capture by the Prussians, the siege of Paris, France‘s surrender and the deposing of 
the monarchy. In 1871, France did not return to the presidential democracy of 1848 
(Second Republic) but instead to the republican parliamentary democracy of the 
1790s (First Republic), though with the addition of the title/office of President to act 
as the largely ceremonial head of state of what would be termed the Third Republic, 
so from 1789 to 1871 France‘s policymaking institutions had undergone a ‗redesign‘ 
on several occasions and at least two of these new designs had (been pioneering 
efforts) created dictatorial versions of the modern state that would spread to other 
parts of the world, namely Napoleon‘s plebiscitary (military-based  monarchy) military 
dictatorship and Louis-Napoleon‘s populist presidential monarchy. In addition, there 
had been three different moves towards republican democracy (the first and third 
towards parliamentary democracy and the second towards presidential democracy)  
that had been separated by two long periods of monarchical rule and two short 
periods of military or populist dictatorship. A more important feature from a state-
development perspective is that this rapid and apparently haphazard, unpredictable 
sequence of changes was unpredictable because it was not progressing towards 
increased complexity and capability. On at least two occasions there was a decrease 
in the complexity of policymaking institutions i) when General Napoleon Bonaparte 
reintroduced personal rule through his personalisation of power as First Consul and 
then Emperor and ii) when President Louis-Napoleon Bonaparte reintroduced 
personal rule through his personalisation of power as a presidential monarch and 
then as Emperor. It is true that in the first case there was a counterbalancing 
increase in the complexity of administrative organisations during the early 1800s but 
that still leaves the case of Louis-Napoleon as a clear-cut and marked reduction in 
the complexity of the state through the personalisation of its policymaking 
institutions. The Louis-Napoleon case also provides an example of another 
characteristic feature of mechanical development as there may be a lack of 
proportionality between complexity and capability. 
 
This characteristic feature of mechanical development is evident during Louis-
Napoleon‘s personal rule of 1851-1870 because the marked reduction in complexity 
of the state‘s policymaking institutions was not accompanied by a marked reduction 
in the capability of its policymaking or of its performance of such state functions as 
territorial control. In fact, historians tend to view the economic and social policy of 
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Napoleon III quite favourably and, certainly, France‘s policymaking and 
administrative-military organisations were not markedly less capable than those of 
England or USA during the same period, until the Emperor‘s foreign-policy blunder of 
being drawn into a war with Prussia in 1870. Furthermore, the parliamentary republic 
established in 1871 does not appear to have markedly increased the capability of the 
French state even though it had markedly increased the complexity of the 
policymaking institutions. France experienced another period of mechanical 
development from 1940 to 1958. During this period: a) the Third Republic was 
militarily defeated and destroyed by Germany and replaced by the dictatorial Vichy 
regime in the parts of France not occupied by Germany in 1940-42; b) there was a 
post-war, 1945 restoration of parliamentary democracy as the Fourth Republic; and 
c) in 1958 there was a redesign of policymaking institutions into a semi-presidential 
form of democracy as the Fifth Republic. However, it needs to be underlined that this 
semi-presidential system was a new form of democracy for France and had 
appeared only twice before in Europe or the rest of the world.  
 
During the 1940s-60s period many French colonies became independent, especially 
in Africa, and imitated the Western model of the modern state. However, if they were 
imitating France‘s latest version of the modern state in pre-1958 it would have been 
a republican parliamentary democracy and in post-1958 a semi-presidential 
democracy. In fact, France‘s ‗model‘ of the development of a modern state was so 
‗mechanical‘ that it is perhaps not surprising these former French colonies would 
often experience a mechanical rather than organic type of state development in the 
decades after their new states were established.  
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Appendix 3 
 
ASSESSMENT ON STATE CAPABILITY 
Chapter 3: Legitimacy 
Type of Regime 
Complexity (of policy making 
institutions) 
Capability 
Version I High complexity Low capability 
Version II Markedly lower complexity Higher capability 
Version III Somewhat lower complexity Very high capability 
Version IV Markedly higher complexity Very high capability 
 
 
 
Chapter 4: Military 
Type of Regime 
Complexity (of policy making 
institutions) 
Capability 
Version I Low complexity Low capability 
Version II Markedly higher complexity Higher capability 
Version III Somewhat lower complexity Very high capability 
Version IV Very High complexity High capability 
 
 
0
2
4
6
Version 1 Version 2 Version 3 Version 4
Capability Complexity
0
2
4
6
Version 1 Version 2 Version 3 Version 4
Capability Complexity
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Chapter 5&6: Political order 
Type of Regime 
Complexity (of policy making 
institutions) 
Capability 
Version I High complexity Very low capability 
Version II Markedly lower complexity Very low capability 
Version III Somewhat lower complexity Very high capability 
Version IV Markedly high complexity Very high capability 
 
 
 
Total capability of 3 combined areas 
Type of Regime Legitimacy Military Order Total  
Version I Low Low Very Low Low 
Version II High High Very low Low 
Version III Very high Very high Very high Very high 
Version IV Very high High Very high Very high 
 
 
  
0
2
4
6
Version 1 Version 2 Version 3 Version 4
Capability Complexity
Low Low
Very 
high
Very 
high
Version 1 Version 2 Version 3 Version 4
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Appendix 4 
 
ECONOMIC INDICATORS (1955-1971) 
 
Revenue and spending of the government (in million rupiah) 
 
Year 
 
Revenue 
 
Spending 
 
Deficit/ 
surplus 
 
Percentage of deficit 
to revenue 
1955 14 16 -2 14% 
1956 18 21 -3 17% 
1957 21 26 -5 24% 
1958 23 35 -12 52% 
1959 30 44 -14 47% 
1960 50 58 -8 16% 
1961 62 88 -26 42% 
1962 75 122 -47 60% 
1963 162 330 -168 104% 
1964 283 681 -398 141% 
1965 923 2.526 -1.603 174% 
1966 13.142 29.433 -16.291 124% 
1967 84.900 87.555 -2.655 3% 
1968 185.283 185.283 - - 
1969 334.762 334.671 +91 - 
1970 465.137 457.929 +7.208 - 
1971 563.548 544.995 +18.553 - 
 
Foreign debt until 31 December 1965 (In Million US$) 
 
Donors 
 
 
Long term 
 
Short term 
 
Sum 
 
Total percentage  
Communist countries (1.361) (43) (1.404) (59,5%) 
Soviet Union 980 10 990 41,9% 
Yugoslavia 108 7 115 4,8% 
Poland, Tchzekoslovakia, East 
Germany, Hongaria, China 
 
228 
 
26 
 
299 
 
12,6% 
     
Western Countries (539) (48) (587) (24,8%) 
United states 172 7 179 7,5% 
West Germany 112 10 122 5,1% 
France 113 2 115 4,8% 
Italia, England, Dutch, Swizerland  
142 
 
29 
 
171 
 
7,2% 
     
Asian countries (176) (85) (261) (11,0%) 
Japan 168 63 231 9,7% 
India, Pakistan 8 22 30 1,2% 
     
African countries     
Egypt 3 1 4 0,1% 
     
International Institution     
IMF 102 - 102 4,3% 
 
Total 
 
 
2.181 
 
177 
 
2.358 
 
100,0% 
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Money in circulation 
(in billion rupiah) 
 
End of year 
 
 
Sum 
 
Percentage of 
increase 
1954 11 - 
1955 12 10% 
1956 13 9% 
1957 19 46% 
1958 29 52% 
1959 35 20% 
1960 48 37% 
1961 29 42% 
1962 131 93% 
1963 263 101% 
1964 675 157% 
1965 2.580 282% 
1966 20.550 696% 
 
Exports 1956-1965 
 (in million US$) 
 
 
Years 
 
Coton 
 
Petrol and 
petroleum 
products 
 
Difference 
 
Exportation 
Plantation Non-
plantation 
1956 154,4 206,2 255,2 308,6 924,4 
1958 108,7 153,2 315,1 213,7 790,7 
1960 133,9 243,2 220,7 242,2 840,7 
1962 101,6 196,9 215,8 167,3 681,6 
1964 98,6 137,2 267,3 221,1 724,2 
1965 87,6 135,3 270,6 212,4 705,9 
 
Source : Indonesian National Bureau of Statistic (BPS), accessible at <www.bps.go.id> 
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Appendix 5 
GARNADI DOCUMENT 
 
The report of the Politics and Security Team in Dili 
 
Memo 
Number: M.53/Tim P4-OKTT/7/1999 
To: Coordinating Minister of Politics and Security 
From: Assistant Coordinating Minister I/Home Affairs 
Subject: General Assessment if Option I loses 
Attachments: None 
Date: July 3, 1999 
The report of the Politics and Security Team in Dili, hereby respectfully submitted, is as 
follows:  
For the past more or less 23 years that East Timor has been integrated with Indonesia, East 
Timor has noticeably and quickly progressed especially in the physical/material aspects. The 
infrastructure truly developed in a surprisingly short time but this was not accompanied by 
the mental/spiritual development of the society.  
The armed resistance of the Security Disturbing Movement continued throughout and there 
was a tendency for it to expand further. Its regeneration has taken place in a good way, so that 
there has been a growth of resistance groups that are better educated and more militant, that 
are able to carry out clandestine activities so that their terrorizing is fairly effective and can 
attract, create, and politicize public opinion, to establish an anti-integration society. Openly, 
the anti-integration society could create a tense life, to the point that there was a large exodus 
especially of those not native to East Timor.  
The pro-integration group, spread fairly widely in all the districts, was meanwhile asleep and 
became the target of the anti-integration group. The TNI was cornered, even terrorized by the 
anti-integration group. The situation became chaotic, to the point that the government thought 
that there was no use in keeping East Timor, since it was constantly creating problems, and 
out of this emerged Option 2.  
The birth of Option 2 startled and woke up the pro-integration group that felt as if it would be 
wiped up if East Timor was released from Indonesia. Since the awakening of the pro-
integration group was able to reverse the situation to become dominant very quickly. 
Although the security situation is already under control, the outsiders have not, perhaps can 
not, yet come back, except later if Special Autonomy wins in the Consultation.  
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World opinion was already so influenced that the UN took the initiative to come to East 
Timor after the Tripartite agreement in New York agreed to hold a Consultation with the East 
Timorese people whether they accept or reject the Special Autonomy that was conceptualized 
by the UN. If they accept, the people of East Timor will remain integrated with the 
Indonesian nation, and if they don‘t accept they will be released from Indonesia.  
The United Nations Assessment [sic] Mission on East Timor (UNAMET) came to East 
Timor before the Central and the Provincial administrations were ready to receive them. 
UNAMET was welcomed with great fanfare by the anti-integration group because they 
consider UNAMET like a god coming to save them, while the provincial government was 
spellbound and didn‘t make any sound, though the Central Government, with Presidential 
Decree no. 43, had already taken many steps to coordinate between Departments.  
With the coming of UNAMET, the situation again became worrisome because the anti-
integration group got a second wind, while the Indonesian government which was given 
responsibility to guarantee security for the Consultation instructed all sides (in this case, the 
instruction can only reach the TNI and the pro-integration groups) to do nothing that could be 
seen as intimidation. The fresh wind pushed the anti-integration group that committed acts of 
intimidation and then took shelter behind UNAMET.  
[4] At the start when the Political and Security Team (as part of the Satgas P3TT) arrived, 
many sides  
were optimistic that the Special Autonomy would become the people‘s choice. But after the 
arrival of UNAMET, there were many contributing factors which encouraged the anti-
integration to be inspired. It‘s too skeptical if we say that UNAMET takes sides, but the fact 
that we are always left behind in responding to the maneuvers from the unfriendly sides, our 
initial optimism which seemed to be convincing has became less firm. This is because first 
our space for movement is so restricted and then our helplessness in counterbalancing the 
maneuvers of UNAMET, inside of which is supported by local personnel from the anti-
integration group. The UNAMET is dominated by anti-integration groups and there is a 
tendency that its task is not merely to hold the popular consultation, but is more than that.  
The task to win Special Autonomy for the people of East Timor is actually not too difficult 
because what is being fought for is a floating mass whose demand is very simple, that is, for 
the availability of food and medicine. Whoever can provide food and medical treatment, the 
people will follow them. Even the anti-integration group is waiting for this type of help but 
unfortunately we are always late while the anti-integration side can make use of the chance of 
UNAMET‘s presence with its additional task, as if it is a savior.  
In Dili at this point, there are 32 NGOs waiting ready to help "refugees". The limit between 
refugees and hungry people is not clear, even those hungry people can quickly be led to 
become refugees under the pressure of the anti-integration group. Many more funds will 
immediately flow from outside the country, all of this can change the constellation of forces. 
In such a constellation, the initial optimism which was so great will become doubtful 
especially if the promises from the central government are not yet fulfilled. The local 
government and the TNI can only watch other people give food to our people while the pro-
integration people are not touched. 
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To respond to this kind of situation, it is true that there is still time, but time continues 
moving without any sign beneficial for winning the first option. Therefore, it will not be 
wrong if we predict the worst possibility, that Option 1 will not be accepted.  
What is the assessment if Option 1 fails? 
a. The anti-integration group will have a big party, like what happened when non-organic 
troops were withdrawn from Aceh last August 1998. While the Acehnese already felt 
victorious, people threw stones and cursed the TNI which was still undergoing a ceremony to 
return to its home base. This kind of thing can happen in East Timor on a more sadistic scale. 
Even though several agreement meetings have been held between the armed groups with the 
militant pro-integration groups, both at the Center and at the province, there is no guarantee 
that both sides will accept each other if Option 1 fails. Maybe the Indonesian government will 
be relieved of the heavy burden of bearing the set of problems of East Timor which has never 
been finished except losing face in the world. The pro-integration group is prepared to take a 
position similar to the anti-integration now. The Indonesian government in this case cannot 
wash its hands if the pro-integration followers are massacred in the future. From the 
monitoring that has been going until now, it can be predicted that if Option 2 becomes the 
people‘s choice, the pro-integration group will continue its resistance, but first they will 
secure their families in NTT. From this aspect itself, it can be assured that the Indonesian 
government will not be able to wash its hands of this matter.  
b. How will the attitude of the anti-integration group be toward outsiders, especially TNI, 
POLRI, and all Indonesian civil servants and other outsiders. If Option 1 wins, TNI/POLRI 
non-organic, and non-native civil servants will have to leave East Timor in an honorable 
manner. If Option 2 becomes implemented, a horrifying thing will happen to the Indonesian 
civil servants. The most intense moment will be at the announcement of the result of the 
popular consultation. The pro-integration groups who are the most tense, without ignoring the 
Indonesian civil servants. Is it possible for the Indonesian civil servants to continue carrying 
out their tasks until the announcement of the results of the consultation? They will ask for a 
guarantee from the Indonesian government and the TNI for their safety, not merely promises 
but can also forsee an evacuation plan for those who are spread all over East Timor territory.  
c. The attitude of the East Timor soldiers who were recruited from the supporters of 
integration can not be ignored. They are the heroes of integration. Will they join the main 
body of troops or maybe they don‘t want to leave East Timor which will mean that they will 
choose to raise arms. They are sons of the soil who have children, wives, and relatives in East 
Timor. At least, they can send their children, wives and relatives to NTT [Nusa Tenggara 
province, meaning West Timor in particular]. 
d. It is certain that the society‘s life will be disturbed. The economy will be paralyzed because 
the businessmen are generally outsiders even though at this time they are still active. But until 
when this will go on? Possibly they will flee to NTT several days before D-Day. There are 
some signs that the anti-integration groups have already drawn up a list of new ownership for 
the assets which will be left by the government and the outsiders. They of course unable or 
not yet able to operate the management of the society, they will not be able to run the 
hospital. Even though the anti-integration civil servants are many, they are generally 
incompetent. At the most, they will be controlled by the church meanwhile the others will be 
controlled by UNAMET or Australia and its volunteers.  
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Responding to the above matters we only have six weeks more to win Special Autonomy, but 
if it fails the period of six weeks is very short to draft a contingency plan for the pro-
integration personnel and other assets. Therefore, the drafting of the contingency plan in 
response to Option Two has to be developed as early as possible. The government has to 
spare some funds to support this alternative plan. If at this point the government already faces 
difficulties in supporting the victory it can be said that if the government faces the 
unexpected possibility without this alternative plan, the integrity of the government in the 
eyes of the world will be degraded further, especially in the eyes of the Indonesian people in 
general.  
Alternative possibilities which can be carried out are:  
a. Maintain a commitment to win Special Autonomy. We have been left behind in the attempt 
to win the hearts of the people. Aid from foreign NGOs is waiting and it can be assured that 
political elements will be attached and it will be used by the anti-integration groups. 
Therefore, the commitment of the government has to be manifested by empowering the pro-
integration group further. They really hope that there will be a new capacity to carry out the 
Operation Sympathy.  
To create an alternative plan (contingency plan) in order to face the situation if Option 1 is 
not accepted.  
Plan to expedite evacuation for Indonesian civil servants and outsiders (before the 
announcement of the result of the ballot) to NTT.  
To prepare elements of the TNI (Army, Navy, Air Force) both the personnel and the 
equipment near the areas for evacuation.  
Prepare the NTT territory to receive massive refugees including their security 
Planning and securing the withdrawal route, if possible destroying vital facilities or objects.  
According to the information, the anti-integration armed forces received a significant 
dropping of weapons and it is certain that they will not be surrendered even though there is a 
peace agreement. This indicates that if Option 1 is successfully fought for, the anti-
integration groups will remain with another plan to fight for their interests.  
Hereby, this report is presented to become a material for consideration to decide the follow 
up.  
Assistant Coordinating Minister I/Home Affairs (H.R. Garnadi) 
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Appendix 6 
SUHARTO’S RESIGNATION SPEECH 
(Unofficial Translation) 
 
In the name of God the All-Mighty, 
Fellow members of the nation and the motherland, 
Assalamualaikum Warrahmatullahi Wabarakatu, 
During these recent times, I have been following carefully the development of our national 
situation, especially the aspirations of the people for reforms in all sectors in the life of our 
nation and state. 
Based on my deep understanding of these aspirations and prompted by the conviction that 
these reforms need to be implemented in an orderly, peaceful and constitutional manner for 
the sake of maintaining the unity and cohesion of the nation, and the continuity of the 
national development, I declared a plan to form the committee for reform and to change the 
composition of the Seventh Development cabinet. 
But, the reality to date has shown that the said committee for reform cannot be materialized 
because there was no adequate response to the plan to form that committee. 
In the wish of implementing these reforms in the best manner possible, I deem that faced with 
the impossibility of forming the committee, changes in the composition of the Seventh 
Development Cabinet are no longer necessary. 
Considering the above development, I am of the opinion that it would be very difficult for me 
to implement in a good manner, duties in governing the state and in development. 
Therefore, in line with article 8 of the 1945 Constitution and after earnestly taking into 
consideration the views of the leadership of People's Representatives Council and the 
leadership of the factions in it, I have decided to declare that I have ceased to be the president 
of the Republic of Indonesia as of the time I read this on this day, Thursday, May 21, 1998. 
I have conveyed this statement, about me stepping down from the post of president of the 
Republic of Indonesia, to you, leaders of the People's Representatives Council who are also 
the leaders of the People's Consultative Assembly, during the opportunity for a meeting. 
In line with article 8 of the 1945 constitution, the vice president of the Republic of Indonesia, 
professor, doctor, engineer B.J. Habibie is the one who will conclude the remainder of the 
presidential term, holder of the mandate of the MPR, for 1998–2003. 
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For the assistance and support of the people while I led the nation and state of Indonesia, I 
express my thanks and I seek forgiveness if there was any mistakes and shortcomings. 
May the Indonesian nation remain victorious with Pancasila and the 1945 constitution. 
As of this day too, the Seventh Development Cabinet is outgoing and to the ministers I 
express my thanks. 
Because conditions do not allow the taking of oath in front of the People's Representative 
Council, to prevent a vacuum of leadership in implementing the governing of the state, the 
vice president should now take his oath before the Supreme Court of the Republic of 
Indonesia. 
 
Jakarta, 21 Mei 1998 
 
PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA 
 
SOEHARTO 
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Appendix 7 
 
MAIN OPERATIONAL COMMANDOS OF THE INDONESIAN ARMED FORCES 
Operational Commandos Character and Responsibility 
Komando Antar Daerah Pertahanan-Inter-territorial 
defense Commands--KOANDAHAN 
1. a unit responsible for wide and continuous defensive-
strategic efforts 
2. a joint commando force composed of two or more 
forces 
3. Established based on regional strategic concept 
Komando Pertahanan Udara Nasional-Air Defense 
Command--KOHANUDNAS 
1. a joint commando force composed of two or more 
forces responsible for continuous defensive-strategic 
efforts (in the air) 
Komando Pertahanan Pantai (Maritim) Nasional-National 
Maritime Defense Command—KOPPAN(MAR)NAS 
a joint commando force composed of two or more forces 
responsible for continuous defensive-strategic efforts (at 
sea) 
Komando Pasukan Komando-Special Forces 1. responsible for influencing the strategic environment 
2. composed of members from across the entire forces to 
perform special missions 
 
Komando Cadangan Strategis-Strategic Reserve 
Command--KOCADSTRAT 
1. a reserve commando force which is ready to be used in 
battle whenever required 
2. composed of Army, navy and Air Forces 
Satuan Tugas Gabungan-Joint Task Force--
SATGASGAB 
1. a joint force composed of the Army, the Navy and Air 
Force to perform limited and non-permanent tasks 
2. created only when required by the Panglima TNI or 
Chief-of-Staff of each force 
Mandala Luar Nasional—National External Command 1. responsible for defensive as well as offensive 
operations 
2. composed of the Army, the Navy and Air Forces 
3. Created based on regions 
 
Cited and translated from Widjajanto (Widjajanto, No year). 
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